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JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY MUST SAFEGUARD, NOT
THREATEN, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION
SANDRA DAY O'CONNORt
This issue of the Denver University Law Review is devoted to an
important subject: judicial accountability. Properly understood, judicial
accountability is a fundamental democratic requirement of our federal
and State governments. Put simply, judges must be accountable to the
public for their constitutional role of applying the law fairly and impartially. Judicial accountability, however, is a concept that is frequently
misunderstood at best and abused at worst. It has become a rallying cry
for those who want in reality to dictate substantive judicial outcomes.
The notion of accountability is superficially attractive: judges who reach
outcomes that part ways with the will of the majority--often mislabeled
"activist" judges-should be held "accountable."
This simplistic understanding of accountability-judicial accountability for the majority's desired substantive outcomes-ignores the role
of the judiciary and indeed the very structure of our democratic governments, State and federal. Worse, this perversion of the concept of judicial accountability threatens to undermine the safeguards of democracy
and liberty that were so brilliantly conceived by those who first designed
our governmental institutions and drafted our Constitution. In short,
"[p]opulist, substance-based accountability for judges is precisely what
the Founders feared[.]" ' The Framers placed at the core of the judiciary's design the concept of judicial independence as a means to guarantee the Rule of Law. Judicial independence is the vital mechanism that
empowers judges to make decisions that may be unpopular but nonetheless correct. In so doing, the judiciary vindicates the principle that no
person or group, however powerful, is above the law. And it gives life to
the promise that the Rule of Law safeguards the minority from the tyranny of the majority. 2
Alexander Hamilton, one of the Framers of the United States Constitution, wrote in The FederalistNo. 78 to defend the role of the judiciary in the constitutional structure. He emphasized that "'there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
t
1.

United States Supreme Court Justice, Retired.
Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation Programfor the

FederalJudiciary,86 DENV. U. L. REv. 7,8 (2008).
1 ALEXIS DE TocQuEvLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Ch. VI (Henry Reeve trans.,
2.

1835).
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. [L]iberty can have nothing to fear from the judi-

ciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its union with either
of the other departments. 3 Only with judicial independence can the
reality and the appearance of zealous adherence to the Rule of Law be
guaranteed to the people. As former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson
wrote, government "keeps its promises, or does not keep them, in its
courts. For the individual, therefore, .

.

. the struggle for constitutional

government is a struggle for good laws, indeed, but also for intelligent,
independent, and impartial courts." 4
This principle undergirds the place of the judiciary in the United
States. The Founders of the United States recognized that it is essential
to the effective functioning of the judiciary that it not be subject to domination by other parts of the government. To accomplish this goal, the
United States Constitution established an independent federal judiciary
by separating the law-making function of the legislative branch from the
law-applying role of the judicial branch. This separation of the legislative and judicial powers has proven essential in maintaining the Rule of
Law. When the roles of lawmaker and judge are played by different state
actors, the danger of government arbitrariness is greatly diminished.
When the power to make laws is separated from the power to interpret
and apply them, the very foundation of the Rule of Law-that controversies are adjudicated on the basis of previously established rules-is
strengthened.
An independent judiciary requires both that individual judges are
independent in the exercise of their powers, and that the judiciary as a
whole is independent, its sphere of authority protected from wrongful
interference by the other two branches of government. Judicial independence has both individual and institutional aspects. As for the independence of individual judges, there are at least two avenues for securing
that independence: First, judges must be protected from the threat of
reprisals, so that fear does not direct their decision-making. Second, the
method by which judges are selected, and the ethical principles imposed
upon them, must be constructed so as to minimize the risk of corruption
and outside influence. The first endeavor is to protect judicial independence from outside threats. The second is to ensure that judicial authority
is not abused, and it is the core concern of the enterprise of judicial accountability.
I regret that threats to judicial independence seem to be occurring
with record frequency. Members of Congress have faulted the courts for
their decisions on various issues. There have been demands for "mass
3.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., William S. Hein &

Co. 2002).
4.
WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (Columbia Univ. Press 1911).
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impeachment," stripping the courts of jurisdiction to hear certain types of
cases, and using Congress's budget authority to punish offending judges.
The pages that follow contain some of the most egregious examples.
Judge Edwin Felter discusses South Dakota's 2006 "Jail for Judges" Initiative, which would have made the State's judges liable in criminal and
civil actions for judicial acts deemed improper by dissatisfied litigants. 5
Former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis and Jordan Singer cite House Majority Leader Tom DeLay's remarks that "the
time will come" for federal judges who refused to restore Terri Schiavo's
feeding tube "to answer for their behavior" and that the federal judiciary
was "arrogant, out-of-control, [and] unaccountable. 6 This was after the
federal courts affirmed the state courts in the Terri Schiavo case,7 under
the review required by Congress's one-time only statute.8 Unfortunately
there are many more examples.
In all the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, death threats
have become increasingly common. Judge Greer, who handled the
Schiavo case for over a decade, received many menacing e-mails and
death threats. We've seen this before-Justice Hugo Black often wore a
chest protector provided by the Secret Service when he visited Birmingham; my former colleague Harry Blackmun got death threats because of
Roe v. Wade, and his living room window was once shattered by a gun
shot. Recently, we saw a U.S. lawmaker go as far as to suggest that
completed acts of violence against judges and their families were motivated by ideological disagreement with their judicial decisions. 9
The exercise of independent judging in the face of such pressure requires great courage. Judges are called upon to stand firm against both
the tide of public opinion and the power of the legislative and executive
branches. A compelling example can be found in the 1954 decision of
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education,'0 which declared
that separate educational facilities for children of different races are inherently unequal. The case provoked a firestorm of criticism in much of
the country. The unpopular decision was, however, the necessary first
step in desegregating public institutions in the United States. It was an
exercise of accountability to the Rule of Law over the popular will.
As you review the articles that follow, it is important to locate the
notion of judicial accountability in this larger context. Keep in mind the
5.
Edwin L. Felter, Accountability in the Administrative Law Judiciary: The Right and the
Wrong Kind, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. 157, 159 (2008).

6.
Kourlis & Singer, supra note 1, at 8 n.s.
7.
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005), affd, 403
F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005).
8.

Act of Mar. 21,2005, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005) ("An Act For the relief of

the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.").
9.

Editorial, The Judges Made Them Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A22, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/06/opinion/06wed I .html.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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cornerstone of judicial independence in our democratic governments,
state and federal, and recognize that there are real, mounting threats to
that independence. There are sound ways to achieve judicial accountability while safeguarding the role of our courts, accountability consistent with the larger role of the judiciary in our democratic society. True
judicial accountability advances judicial independence and the paramount Rule of Law. "Accountability and independence are two sides of
the same coin: accountability ensures that judges perform their constitutional role, and judicial independence protects judges from pressures that
would pull them out of that role."' 1 Indeed, as Kourlis and Singer suggest, the enterprise of accountability may greatly safeguard judicial independence; "[e]mbracing accountability for fair and efficient processes
may help stave off irresponsible demands for accountability for decisional outcomes."' 2
True judicial accountability furthers another necessary characteristic
of a functioning judiciary: judicial integrity. An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to the Rule of Law. Alexander Hamilton captured this necessity well when he wrote that a "steady, upright,
and impartial administration of the laws" is essential because "no man
can be sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which he may be the gainer today."' 13 If judges are to be the independent guardians of Rule of Law values, they must be incorruptible.
Judges are entrusted with ultimate decisions over the life, freedoms, duties, rights, and property of citizens. But judges will never win the respect and trust of the citizens if they are subject to corrupt influences.
Whenever a judge makes a decision for personal gain, or to curry favor,
or to avoid censure, that act denigrates the Rule of Law. A third value
may be advanced through judicial accountability properly construed:
judicial competence. A fundamental value of the Rule of Law is that
judicial decisions are not made arbitrarily, but through a process of reasoned decision making. The Rule of Law therefore requires that "official
decisions be justified in law, and therefore
be reasoned and nonarbitrary
14
with respect to general legal standards."
Independence, integrity, and competence, then, are the hallmarks of
a judiciary committed to upholding the Rule of Law and they are the
principles for which a judiciary should be held accountable. In the pages
that follow, the contributors to this issue present and debate proposals to
advance judicial accountability as experienced in our federal, State, and
administrative courts.
11.
Sandra Day O'Connor & RonNell Anderson Jones, Reflections on Arizona's Judicial
Selection Process, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 23 (2008).
12.
Kourlis & Singer, supra note 1, at 9.
13.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supranote 3, at 430.
14.
Steven J. Burton, Particularism,Discretion, and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW:
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 178, 187 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
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Leading off, Kourlis and Singer propose a framework for a federal
judicial performance evaluation program.' 5 Because state judicial performance evaluation programs have been so successful, they argue, federal judges could equally benefit from them. Implementing a federal
judicial performance evaluation program, they conclude, could preserve
judicial independence, provide information for judges to improve their
performance, and increase the public's confidence in the courts.
Next, using principles derived from international Rule of Law initiatives and international economic development, Norman L. Greene
considers the relationship between fair and impartial courts and economic development in the United States.' 6 Greene argues that state court
judicial elections in the United States violate the Rule of Law and lead to
adverse economic effects at home in much the same way they lead to
adverse economic effects abroad. For the welfare of the economy,
Greene concludes, Americans should eliminate judicial elections.
Washington State University Professor David C. Brody then analyzes the methods by which states assess the effectiveness of their judicial performance evaluation programs.17 Brody surveys the conventions
of judicial performance evaluations, and examines the impact that
evaluations have on judicial accountability. He presents the results of a
case study on the importance of methodology in judicial performance
evaluations, and concludes that maintaining effective and trustworthy
judicial performance evaluation programs will result in a desirable balance of judicial independence and judicial accountability.
Colorado administrative law judge Edwin L. Felter, Jr., then discusses and evaluates several forms of accountability in the administrative
law judiciary, and compares them with prevalent forms of accountability
in the judicial branch.' 8 Felter argues that codes of judicial conduct, as
well as formal enforcement mechanisms, work together to maintain a
balance of independence and accountability in the administrative law
judiciary.
Next up is James Bopp, Jr., who argued Republican Partyof Minnesota v. White,' 9 and Josiah Neeley. They probe commonly-cited criticisms of privately funded judicial election systems, and identify potential
weaknesses of publicly funded judicial election systems. 20 Bopp and
15.
Kourlis & Singer, supra note 1.
16. Norman L. Greene, Perspectivesfrom the Rule of Law and InternationalEconomic Development: Are there Lessons for the Reform of Judicial Selection in the United States?, 86 DENV.
U. L. REV. 53 (2008).
17. David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial Accountability,JudicialIndependence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 115 (2008).
18. Felter, supra note 5.
19. 536 U.S. 735 (2002).
20. James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections: Davis, White,
and the Future ofJudicial Campaign Financing,86 DENV. U. L. REV. 175 (2008).
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Neeley argue that common criticisms of private funding are hyperbolic,
and question the constitutionality of bans on personal solicitation of
funds by judicial candidates, as well as the constitutionality of certain
provisions of publicly-funded judicial elections. They conclude that restrictions on judicial candidates' speech will not effectively reform judicial elections.
Taking on Bopp and Neeley, Georgetown University Professor Roy
A. Schotland argues that the personal solicitation of campaign funding
by judges is problematic. 2' Schotland identifies "six fatal flaws" with
Bopp and Neeley's argument, examining judges' personal solicitation of
campaign funds in historical, constitutional, and pragmatic contexts.
Finally, former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice and current University of Tennessee Professor Penny J. White examines John Grisham's
fictionalized account of a corporate defendant's scheme to oust a state
supreme court justice and replace her with an appointee more friendly to
the defendant's case.22 White argues that situations similar to Grisham's
fiction are not only plausible, but have repeatedly occurred. An "appeal
to the masses" through the medium of fiction, she concludes, could spark
greater public concern with the current state of the courts.
I am hopeful that some of these interesting proposals and ideas
will help us stem the tide of threats to the independence of our judiciaries. The fair and effective functioning of our democracy demands as
much.

21.
Roy A. Schotland, Six Fatal Flaws: A Comment on Bopp and Neeley, 86 DENY. U. L.
REV. 233 (2008).
22.
Penny J. White, "The Appeal" to the Masses, 86 DENY. L. REV. 251 (2008).

A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAM FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY
REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS t & JORDAN M. SINGERtt
INTRODUCTION

Federal judges enjoy a degree of freedom from structural political
constraints unrivaled by nearly all of their counterparts on the state
bench. Lifetime appointments shelter district and circuit judges from the
fury of periodic elections or reappointment decisions, allowing them to
focus on judging and other official duties rather than fundraising, electioneering, or testing the winds of prevailing electoral sentiment. Even
federal magistrate and bankruptcy judges not subject to the guarantees of
Article I are generally more insulated from politics than their state colleagues, as their appointments and reappointments remain largely internal matters.
Many commentators have praised Article III's guarantees of life
tenure and freedom from salary cuts as essential tools to preserve judicial
independence. 1 Far less frequently have the commentators explored the
impact of these guarantees on judicial accountability. Rather, until relatively recently, the prevalent assumption (dating back to the original
Federalist debates) has been that "the perceived need for judicial accountability to counterbalance life tenure, nonreducible salaries, and judicial review, began and ended with the impeachment mechanism."2 A
f Executive Director, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, University of Denver. The Institute is a national, non-partisan organization dedicated to improving the
process and culture of the civil justice system. The Institute provides principled leadership, conducts
comprehensive and objective research, and develops innovative and practical solutions--all focused
on serving the individuals and organizations who rely on the system to clarify rights and resolve
disputes.
ft Director of Research, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System,
University of Denver. The authors wish to thank the many judges, lawyers, and scholars whose
comments helped us develop the proposal contained in this article, with special thanks to Steve
Ehrlich and Russell Wheeler for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.
1. E.g., Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 864 (2002)
("Life tenure may be the most important ingredient in assuring federal judicial independence."); see
also, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Casefor Adopting Appointive JudicialSelection
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 305 (2002); Daniel Klerman,
Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S.CAL. L. REV. 455, 455 (1999). But see Jonathan
Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2181 & n.35 (noting that life tenure and
the guarantee of no reduction in salary is "only one such template" for establishing judicial independence).
2.
Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial
Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 51 (1998); see also James E. Pfander, Removing FederalJudges, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (2007) (noting that Hamilton himself "appears to have embraced impeachment-and-removal exclusivity as a feature of both the New York
state constitution and the proposed federal Constitution ... [and] did not identify any alternative
judicial mode by which judges were to be removed from their offices."). But see Saikrishna Prakash
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reexamination of that assumption, however, has been sparked in the early
twenty-first century both by academic commentators and some in Congress. The last ten years alone have produced a host of creativesometimes outrageous-alternatives to promote federal judicial accountability through (in most cases) a combination of executive and legislative
power and populist sentiment. Some such proposals are effectively substance-neutral, most notably replacing life tenure with fixed, lengthy
judicial terms.3 Other proposals, however, are aimed at the substance of
judicial decision-making, among them several schemes to strip federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear certain types of cases. 4 Prominent politicians have even occasionally threatened impeachment-or worse-for
federal judges as a punishment for decisions they did not find appropriate. 5 Contributing to the tenor of politically "accountable" judges is a
federal judicial appointment process that has become increasingly partisan in the last two decades. 6
Populist-based accountability for judges is precisely what the Founders feared, and should be avoided.7 But this does not mean that judges
should be exempt from any form of accountability to the citizens they
serve. Rather, judges should remain accountable to the public for the
& Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a FederalJudge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 72 (2006) (arguing that the
Constitution permits Congress to "enact necessary and proper legislation permitting the removal of
federal judges upon a finding of misbehavior in the ordinary courts of law.").
3.
See generally REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
(Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006); see also Steven G. Calabresi & James
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 769 (2006); James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Saving this Honorable Court: A Proposal
to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-Year Terms,
90 VA. L. REV. 1093 (2004).
4.
See, e.g., Helen L. Norton, Reshaping FederalJurisdiction:Congress's Latest Challenge
to Judicial Review, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1003 (2006); Caprice L. Roberts, JurisdictionStripping in Three Acts-Three String Serenade, 51 VILL. L. REV. 593 (2006).
5. See, e.g., Mike Allen, DeLay Apologizes for Comments on Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
2005 (page unavailable) (quoting House Majority Leader Tom DeLay's remarks that "the time will
come" for federal judges who refused to restore Terri Schiavo's feeding tube "to answer for their
behavior" and that the federal judiciary was "arrogant, out-of-control, [and] unaccountable."); Dana
Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3 (noting
that several Congressional leaders had called for the impeachment of Justice Anthony Kennedy after
he authored an opinion forbidding capital punishment for juveniles); see also Editorial, Unimpeachable Sources-Impeaching FederalJudge Thornton Henderson, NAT. REV., Feb. 10, 1997 (suggesting that Judge Henderson should be impeached specifically for his decision enjoining California
Proposition 209, which sought to prohibit racial preferences in certain programs).
6. See Steven B. Burbank, Judicial Independence, JudicialAccountability, and Interbranch
Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 924-25 (2007) (arguing that "there is ample and persuasive evidence
from both Supreme Court and lower federal court appointment experience that presidential pursuit of
a policy agenda in making judicial nominations (and the reaction to it by Senators of the opposition
party) is the chief cause of the politicization of judicial selection at the federal level."). See also
NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS:
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 1-8 (2005).

POLITICIANS,

ACTIVISTS,

AND

THE FEDERAL COURT

7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("The standard for good behavior for the continuance of office in the judicial magistracy is certainly
one of the most valuable of the modem improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy
it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to
the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body.").
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process of adjudication. Judicial decisions, whatever their substantive
impact, should be timely rendered, understandable, and supported by
clear legal reasoning. Parties and their attorneys should be treated fairly
and politely in the courtroom. And the judge should at all times earn the
public trust and reputation that naturally comes with his or her position.
These considerations locate accountability in actions that should be expected of any judge in any court, regardless of how the judge ascended to
the bench or the length of his or her tenure. Embracing accountability
for fair and efficient processes may help stave off irresponsible demands
for accountability for decisional outcomes.
Accountability based on process measures is not new. Processoriented criteria are employed regularly at the state court level to measure judicial performance, promote professional development among
judges, and educate the public on the importance of accountability for the
judicial process as opposed to the substance of specific decisions. At the
federal level, however, judicial performance evaluation (JPE) programs
remain an untried and (at least in a comprehensive form) unwelcome
resource. This need not be the case. The time is ripe to separate the notions of judicial accountability for process and accountability for outcome, and for the federal judiciary carefully to consider process-oriented
accountability through a regular performance evaluation program.
This Article begins with a discussion of the purpose and design of
JPE programs, gleaned from more than thirty years of experience at the
state level. Part II explores the sporadic history of federal JPE, and explains the historical objections to evaluation of federal judges. Part I
proposes a series of pilot studies to test different methods of implementing JPE programs. Finally, Part IV discusses some of the more challenging issues presented by the establishment of a federal JPE program, and
offers topics for further reflection and research.

I. THE PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF JPE PROGRAMS
Judicial performance evaluation programs are currently in use in
various forms in nineteen states, as well as the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico.8 The details of these programs vary by jurisdiction, but all
are designed to meet three fundamental objectives: (1) to provide constructive feedback to sitting judges to inform their professional development; (2) to educate the public on the work of its judges and foster appropriate expectations about the role of the judge; and (3) where applica-

8. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, SHARED
EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT app. A (2006) [hereinafter SHARED
EXPECTATIONS].
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ble, to provide relevant information to decision-makers concerning the
retention or reappointment of judges. 9
While there is no standard JPE program, most state programs share
similar characteristics. Judges are evaluated periodically, either at the
end of their terms or at another preset interval.10 Evaluations are typically conducted by an independent, volunteer commission composed of
attorneys, judges, and lay citizens.' 1 In many states, each branch of government appoints a certain number of members to the commission,
thereby reducing the risk of one appointing authority packing the commission with his or her selections. 12 Commission members usually serve
staggered terms to further limit any potential mischief by any given appointing authority. 13
The commission must evaluate judges on predetermined criteria related to the process of adjudication rather than to substantive outcomes.
Most state JPE programs use the five criteria adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1985: legal knowledge, integrity and impartiality,4
communication skills, judicial temperament, and administrative skills.'
Guided by these criteria, a present-day commission typically collects a
wide range of information on each judge, including surveys of those who
interact with the judge in the courtroom (always lawyers, and frequently
jurors, witnesses, litigants, or court staff as well), case management data,
interview data, information gleaned from direct courtroom observation,
and review of the clarity of the judge's written work product.' 5 The
commission reviews the collected information and composes a detailed
9. Judicial performance evaluation originated in the 1970s and 1980s as a method of providing process-oriented information on a judge's performance to voters in judicial retention elections.
It was subsequently adopted by a number of jurisdictions in which judges are subject to periodic
reappointment by the governor or state legislature, and even in Massachusetts and New Hampshire,
where state judges are appointed for life. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 211, § 26-26B (2005); MASS.
SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:16 (2008); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 56 (2008).
10.
In New Hampshire, for example, trial judges are appointed until retirement or age seventy,
and are nevertheless evaluated at least once every three years. See N.H. SUP. CT. R. 56(B)(A)
(2008).
11.
The size of the evaluation commission varies considerably across jurisdictions, from the
seven-member Alaska Judicial Council to the thirty-member Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review. See Alaska Judicial Council, Membership, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us (last visited
Oct. 17, 2008); Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review, http://www.azjudges.info
/home/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
12.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-102(l)(a)(l)(A) (2008) (dividing appointment authority over the ten-member Colorado state performance commission between the Governor, Chief
Justice, President of the Senate and Speaker of the House).
13.
See, e.g., S.B. 105, 2008 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2008) (establishing for Utah's new evaluation
commission that "At the time of appointment, the terms of commission members shall be staggered
so that approximately half the commission members' terms expire every two years.").
14.
See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (1985)

[hereinafter 1985 ABA GUIDELINES]. The ABA reaffirmed these criteria in 2005. AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, BLACK LETrER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

(2005), availableat http://www.abanet.org/jd/lawyersconf/pdf/jpec-final.pdf.
15.
See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 8, at 20-37 (describing data collected in several
states).
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report that discusses the judge's perceived strengths and weaknesses on
the bench. That report is given to the judge and, if appropriate, also provided to the judge's supervisor and those with the power to determine
whether the judge remains on the bench.' 6 Reports are also
typically
7
made available to the public, either in full or summary form.'
JPE programs have an established track record at the state level.
They are sustainable over many years, even at high volume. In Colorado
alone, more than one hundred evaluations of trial and appellate judges
are typically conducted every two years, 8 and additional interim evaluations have recently been introduced and formally codified as part of the
state's JPE statute.1 9 JPE also has positive ripple effects: judges have
found that JPE provides useful feedback for their professional growth-

information that they could not have otherwise received. 20 Furthermore,
at least one study has shown that the public has greater confidence in the
quality of its judges as a result of JPE programs. 2' JPE also provides
critical information for judicial retention or reappointment decisions,
diluting the temptation of voters or reappointment authorities to make
such decisions on the basis of specific case outcomes.22
16.
The retention/reappointment authority varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In many
states, retention of the judge is left directly to the voters, either in a special retention election in
which the judge runs uncontested and must pass a straight up-or-down vote, or in a contested election. In other states, the legislature or governor bear the responsibility for reappointing judges. In
Hawaii and the District of Columbia, reappointment and retention decisions are conducted by a
commission. See D.C. Code § 1-204.33(c) (2008); HAWAI'I CONST. art. V1, § 3; Hawai'i State
Judiciary, Judicial Selection Commission, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/page-server/Courts/
2E049BDF320E2D7 1F0456B57B6.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
17.
In New Hampshire and Hawaii, collective reports have been made available to the public
that review the judiciary as a whole. See JUDICIARY, STATE OF HAWAI'I, JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
PROGRAM
2007
REPORT
(2007)
(on
file
with
authors),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/218D 292A4F6A54DE9973AA6FC/JPP2007.PDF; Letter
from John T. Broderick, Jr., Chief Justice, to John Lynch, Governor, New Hampshire (Jul. 6, 2007)
(on
file
with
authors),
available at
http://www.nh.gov/judiciary/PerEvalU2007-0703%20final%20report.pdf. But see Pamela A. Maclean, More States EvaluatingJudicial Performance, NAT'L L.J. Jun. 2, 2008 (explaining that the New Hampshire Supreme Court will move to
individualized reports in 2008). In states with retention elections, full reports are frequently made
available on the commission's website, and summary reports are provided in voter guides. See
Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial PerformanceEvaluations to Promote
JudicialAccountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 204-05 (2007) (describing methods of public dissemination in each state).
18.
Any Colorado judge who is eligible for retention is subject to a full evaluation during his
or her retention year. Historically, some judges have chosen not to stand for retention after the
evaluation has been completed, for reasons both related and unrelated to the evaluation results. Only
the evaluation results of those judges who choose to stand for retention are released to the public.
Accordingly, the number of judges who are evaluated is always somewhat higher than the number
whose evaluations are made publicly available.
19.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-106.3 (2008).
20.
See infra nn. 142-144 and accompanying text.
21.
A seminal 1998 study of JPE programs in four states found that significant majorities of
voters who received evaluation information agreed that "the official ... report adds to my confidence in the quality of judicial candidates [seeking retention]." KEVIN M. ESTERLING & KATHLEEN
M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH

RECOMMENDATIONS 41 (1998) (omission in original).
22. See id. at 39-40.
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The demonstrated benefits of JPE at the state level warrant serious
consideration of a similar program for the federal courts. It is true that
even the most successful state programs cannot be applied directly to the
federal judiciary, and that any federal JPE program would need to be
designed to address the unique circumstances of the federal courts. But
JPE does hold considerable promise for the federal system. Indeed, each
of the three major goals of state JPE translates meaningfully to the federal level. First, federal judges, no less than state judges, reasonably
could benefit from periodic feedback on their performance based on information gleaned from those who interact with them in the courtroom.
Although the Constitution intentionally shelters federal judges from public sentiment to a greater extent than do most state systems, legitimate
expectations about a judge's ability to communicate clearly, treat parties
fairly, and manage cases effectively apply with equal force to federal and
state judges. Information derived from JPE programs might assist not
only individual judges, but also Chief Judges, court administrators, and
those who design and implement judicial education programs, to capitalize on individual and collective strengths, and address individual and
collective weaknesses.
Moreover, if widely disseminated to the public, thoughtful evaluations at the federal level might help to educate the citizenry about its
judges. The evaluation process holds the power to be a valuable tool for
civic education; regardless of the outcome of any specific judicial
evaluation, the routine of evaluating all judges for the same processoriented skills reinforces to the lay citizen the proper expectations of a
good judge. Finally, JPE may prove to be an important asset for those
determining the reappointment of magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges,
and others not subject to Article 1's life tenure guarantees. Simply put,
JPE provides decision-makers with information that they would otherwise not have at their disposal; given the choice between having or foregoing relevant, high-quality information, responsible decision-makers
should choose to have the information every time.
I. FEDERAL JPE IN CONTEXT
A. The HistoricalFrameworkfor Process-OrientedAccountability
Some of the principles underlying JPE have been present at the federal level for several decades, even though a sustained JPE program has
not. As described in this Part, however, efforts to expand these principles to develop a more comprehensive review of judges' processoriented performance have fallen short.
1. Nibbling at Accountability: Case Management and Misconduct
Both the federal courts and Congress have emphasized processoriented judicial accountability measures from time to time, usually in
the area of case management. The courts themselves took the lead. As
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Chief Justice, Earl Warren noted the negative impact of "[i]nterminable
and unjustifiable delays in our courts" on substantive rights,2 3 and pushed
the Judicial Conference of the United States to study, and eventually
recommend to Congress, the establishment of the Federal Judicial Center
24
Warren Burger, too,
(FJC) as the research arm of the federal courts.
bluntly acknowledged as Chief Justice that the federal judicial system
needed to explore and adopt better management techniques, and that
25
"[m]ore money and more judges alone is not the primary solution."
Certain judges at the district court level subsequently became active proponents of case management among their peers. 26 And in 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to give district judges
27
greater management control over civil cases. With those amendments
came the increased expectation of judicial involvement
28 in scheduling
events, controlling discovery, and promoting settlement.
Congress, however, was dissatisfied with the way it perceived some
judges to be using (or not using) their case management authority. In
1990 it passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), which mandated
among other things that the Director of the Administrative Office of the
Courts prepare a semiannual report, available to the public, disclosing for
each judicial officer the number of motions pending more than six
months, the number of submitted bench trials pending more than six
months, and the number of cases pending more than three years. 29 The
CJRA thus created a degree of transparency and accountability regarding
the performance of federal judges. But the accountability it created was
at once too much and too little. Merely publicizing case processing data
about judges artificially elevates the importance of that data over other
process criteria. Moreover, information on a judge under the CJRA is
not available unless the judge fails to meet the statute's proscribed outer
time limits, and what information is available reflects a mere sliver of the
23.

Maurice Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes, and ProposedRemedies, in THE

COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29, 31 (Harry W. Jones ed., 1965).

24. See Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration:
Creatingthe FederalJudicialCenter, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 38-39 (1988).
25. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Remarks on the State of the Federal Judiciary (Aug. 10,
1970), in HOWARD JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS iv (1971). Burger continued this plea throughout
his tenure as Chief Justice. See Warren E. Burger, Introduction to Symposium, Reducing the Costs
of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 (1985) (rejecting that additional judicial resources
would alone resolve the challenges faced by the federal courts, and arguing that "[j]udicial administration needs tireless, articulate workers.").
26. See, e.g., Robert F. Peckham, The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition,69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981).
27. The most prominent of the 1983 amendments were those to Rule II (mandating the imposition of sanctions for abuses related to the signing of pleadings and motions), Rule 16 (requiring
case management conferences), and Rule 26 (giving the judge authority to keep discovery proportional to the magnitude of the case). See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26 advisory committee's notes
(1983 amend.).
28.
Id.
29.
28 U.S.C. § 476 (2008). Given the notion of transparency and accountability inherent in
the CJRA, it is ironic that the Director's semiannual reports are not available to the public on the
official U.S. Courts website.
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overall30 picture of a judge's performance with respect to case management.
Congress's other foray into process accountability for judges occurred in 1980, with the passage of the Judicial Conduct and Disability
Act. 31 That Act established a formal procedure for reviewing complaints
"alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or alleging
that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of
mental or physical disability., 32 The Act charged each chief circuit
judge with determining if complaints fell within the Act's coverage, and
dismissing those that did not. 33 The Act also charged the Judicial Councils with investigating complaints that the chief judge did not dismiss,
and authorized the Councils to take a variety of actions, including imposing a range of statutorily specific sanctions. 34 The Act cautioned, however, that "[u]nder no circumstances may the judicial council order the
removal from office" of an Article III judge.3 5
Like the CJRA, the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act addresses
only very narrow issues of process-oriented accountability: those concerning formal allegations of misconduct by a federal judge or a judge's
inability to discharge the duties of the office for health reasons. Most
federal judges never seriously come within its purview.3 6 The judge
whose written order is simply not clear, or whose courtroom manner is
abrasive, or whose dockets move at a snail's pace, will fly under the radar of the Act as long as no action rising to the level of formal misconduct is alleged. And the judge whose written orders are careful and
thoughtful, and whose manner is unfailingly deserving of respect, will
similarly avoid acknowledgment.

30. Some statistical information on the performance of an entire court is available to the
public outside the auspices of the CJRA. The Federal Court Management Statistics on the U.S.
Courts website provide data on, among other things, each district court and circuit court's overall
caseload for the previous five years, actions per judgeships, and median times from filing to disposition and filing to trial for district courts. See generally http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/ (then
follow the District Court hyperlink for the year for which data is sought). The Federal Court Management Statistics, however, do not publicly disclose figures for individual judges.
33. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, P.L. 96-458,
94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2006)).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a).
33. Id. § 352.
34. Id. § 354(a)(l)-(2).
35. Id. § 354(3)(a).
36. A recent study found that roughly 650 to 800 complaints were filed annually between
2001 and 2005, with nearly half coming from prisoners. See JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABtLrrY
ACT STUDY COMMITTEE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF
1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 22 (2006). Almost all of the complaints were dismissed,
88% of the time because the allegations related directly to the merits of the case or were otherwise
frivolous. Id. at 6, 28.
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2. Limited Efforts at JPE Programs
Although process-oriented accountability has been addressed to
some degree in the areas of case management and judicial misconduct,
attempts to implement more comprehensive JPE at the federal level have
been sporadic and largely unsuccessful. For thirty years, most of the
discussion has centered on evaluating those federal administrative law
judges (ALJs) who serve pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.
In many ways, ALJs were a natural starting point for a federal judiciary
hesitant to embrace any form of external evaluation. Although they perform certain judicial functions, ALJs are employees of the executive
branch, and indeed are one of the few groups of career federal employees
that remain statutorily exempt from performance appraisals. 37 Accordingly, proposals to develop a JPE program for administrative law judges
have circumvented the thornier issue of Article III independence by
couching evaluations as promoting consistency among all executive
branch employees.38
Beginning in the late 1970s, several studies suggested that performance evaluations were necessary to assure consistency and efficiency in
administrative adjudication. In 1978, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) recommended that Congress amend the Administrative Procedure
Act to assign responsibility for periodic evaluations of ALJ performance,
to be conducted by the Civil Service Commission alone or in conjunction
with an ad hoc committee of lawyers, Chief ALJs, agency officials, federal judges, and the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS). 39 In 1978 and again in 1986, ACUS issued its own recommendations for peer review.40 These recommendations emphasized the importance of judicial independence, but also noted that "[m]aintaining the
administrative law judges' decisional independence does not preclude the
articulation of appropriate productivity norms or efforts to secure adherence to previously enunciated standards and policies underlying the
[agency's] fulfillment of statutory duties.'
In 1992, ACUS issued Recommendation No. 92-7, which proposed
among other things that the Chief AU be permitted to coordinate development of case processing guidelines for ALJs and conduct annual per37. See 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2006) (exempting ALJs from the definition of "employee" for
the purpose of performance appraisals). See also Jeffrey S.Lubbers, The Federal Administrative
Judiciary: Establishingan Appropriate System of PerformanceEvaluationsfor ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J.
AM. U. 589, 590 (1993); 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (2008).
38. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 37, at 590-93.
39.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS: BETTER MANAGEMENT
Is NEEDED v-vi (1978).
RECOMMENDATION 78-2,
40.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CLAIMS 36 (1978);
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES RECOMMENDATION 86-7, CASE
MANAGEMENT AS A TOOL FOR IMPROVING AGENCY ADJUDICATION 53 (1986).
41.
ACUS RECOMMENDATION 78-2, supra note 40.
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formance reviews. 42 The recommendation also proposed a non-exclusive
list of criteria for ALU evaluation, including case processing guidelines
(i.e., ALl productivity and step-by-step goals), judicial comportment and
demeanor, and "the existence of a clear disregard of, or pattern of nonadherence to, properly articulated and disseminated rules, procedures,
precedents and other agency policy. '43 The recommendation spurred
considerable consternation and intense debate."a
The performance
evaluation program was never implemented, and ACUS itself lost Congressional funding in 1995; one study suggests that ALJs angry with the
ACUS proposal were a contributing factor to its demise.45
A similar effort to create a performance evaluation program for federal immigration judges-who are Department of Justice employeeswas announced in August 2006.46 The directive from then-Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales described the need for a JPE program to detect
unusual reversal rates or backlogs, and emphasized that, in the words of a
Justice Department spokesman, "performance appraisals will not be used
to tell judges whether to grant or deny relief. '' 4 7 The announcement nevertheless was met with considerable skepticism by some immigration
judges, who voiced concern that the proposal would interfere with their
duty to administer their duties neutrally and without political pressure.4 8
Commentators, too, split on whether a performance evaluation program
for immigration judges could be constructed in a meaningful way. 49 To
date, the program has not been implemented.
There have also been periodic efforts to introduce JPE into the judicial branch. The Seventh Circuit Judicial Council, for example, has used
evaluations to screen sitting bankruptcy judges who are applying for re-

42.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDICIARY RECOMMENDATION NO. 92-7, 89 (1992).

43.
Id.
44.
See, e.g., Lubbers, supranote 37, at 595-96; James P. Timony, PerformanceEvaluationof
FederalAdministrative Law Judges, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 629 (1993); see also Ann Marshall
Young, Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Premises, Means, and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 54-70 (1997) (proposing a different approach to ALJ evaluation).

45.
Toni M. Fine, A Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 19, 59-61, 96-97 (1998).
46.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines
Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals, Aug. 9, 2006, available at 2006
WL 2282541.
47.
Nina Bernstein, ImmigrationJudges Facing PerformanceReviews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10.
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/10/washington/10immig.html.
48.
See id.

49.
Compare Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 468, 469 (2007) (describing as an "especially bad
idea[]" "[p]erformance reviews that take into account and serve as a criterion for retention and
promotion") with Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Ddjb
Vu of DecisionalDisparitiesin Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 499 (2007) (noting that
the 1992 ACUS study "identified several criteria for a system of performance evaluation that appropriately protects decisional independence," including peer review and external oversight).
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appointment. 50 Such evaluations have consisted of surveys sent to a random sample of one hundred attorneys who had at least two cases before a
given judge during the two years prior to evaluation. 51 The Eighth Circuit has used a similar program to evaluate magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges in advance of reappointment decisions.52 And in 2003, the
Federal Judicial Center assisted the Judicial Conference's Bankruptcy
Committee in developing guidelines and surveys for evaluation of bankruptcy judges, for the limited purpose of professional selfimprovement.53
To date, however, there have been only two notable efforts to extend JPE to federal district judges. The first was a voluntary program
developed in the Ninth Circuit in the early 1980s. The program emerged
in response to informal polls conducted by newspapers and bar associations within the Circuit to evaluate federal judicial performance; in the
words of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
Ninth Circuit, a more comprehensive approach under the leadership of
the Judicial Conference would "contribute usefully to an effort to make
the evaluation of judges as constructive as possible and to avoid the dangers of ill-conceived and sensational 'polls' which merely serve to influence passions. ' 54
As this language suggests, the Ninth Circuit project appears to have
been initiated and conducted from a strongly defensive posture. In authorizing an Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Evaluation of Federal
Judges (the Ad Hoc Committee), the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council simultaneously authorized a parallel Committee to Study the Evaluation of
Lawyers.55 Furthermore, the Ad Hoc Committee was not authorized to
actually evaluate judges, but merely "to evaluate the evaluation of
judges. 56
The Ad Hoc Committee modeled its program on two previous programs in California. The first program used a bar committee to collect
attorney complaints about judges. The committee had no power to act on
the complaints, but rather passed the complaints along to a committee of
judges, who would forward them to the judge in question. 57 This pro-

See DARLENE R. DAVIS, JUDICIAL EVALUATION PILOT PROJECT OF THE JUDICIAL
50.
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 2 (1991).

51.
Id.
52. See id.
53.
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 11; see also Surveys on Behalf of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois (on file with authors), available
at http://www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/Announcements/FJCSurvey.pdf.
54.
Hon. James R. Browning, EvaluatingJudicialPerformanceand Other Matters, 90 F.R.D.
197, 198 (1981) (quoting mandate of Ninth Circuit's Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Evaluation of
Federal Judges).
See id.
55.
56.
Id.
57.
See id. at 199.
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gram was severely limited: it had no transparency, no serious mechanism
for accountability other than the notion that "[p]eer pressure ...

would

be a far more effective means of correcting judicial deficiencies, 58 and
no comprehensive scope. The second program considered by the Ad
Hoc Committee featured a questionnaire sent to attorneys who had appeared before a district judge in the Northern District of California.5 9
Here again the lack of transparency was trumpeted as a virtue: "The advantages are clear ....

The judge alone receives the responses. There is

no automatic public exposure
to put the judge on the defensive and in60
hibit self-improvement.,
The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council ultimately adopted a voluntary,
confidential self-evaluation program for district judges in 1981.61 Few
judges participated. In fact, a 1985 Judicial Council survey found that
only nineteen of the 234 judges eligible for the program-less than 8%had actually undertaken self-evaluation.6 2
The second effort to evaluate federal district judges came in the
form of a pilot program completed in the Central District of Illinois in
1991, under the auspices of the Judicial Conference Committee of the
Judicial Branch.63 That district was selected in part because its district
judges unanimously expressed interest in the pilot. Indeed, interest was
so widespread throughout the district that the pilot program was expanded to include magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges as well. 64
The pilot was limited in two key respects. First, the only source of
evaluation information came from surveys sent to attorneys. 65 The clerk
of the court reviewed a pool of attorneys who had appeared in civil and
criminal cases during the eighteen months prior to the study, and sent
surveys to a sample of 150 selected attorneys who had appeared before
each subject judge.66 Jurors, witnesses, and parties were specifically
excluded from the study.67 Second, the results were entirely confidential
and each completed survey was returned directly to the subject judge. 68
The judges later estimated that the return rate on surveys was about fifty
percent.69
Despite (or perhaps because of) these limitations, the judges who
participated in the pilot project deemed it beneficial. One judge re58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
See id. at 199-200.
Id. at 200.
See DAVIS, supra note 50, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.at 1.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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marked, "The responses from the bar are an excellent barometer of how
we are perceived to be performing our duties., 70 Another judge stated
that the results of the survey are "helpful because they are about as objective an evaluation as we can hope to get.'
In the final analysis, however, the 1991 pilot study was at best a
mixed success. It demonstrated that JPE programs may benefit judges'
professional development by providing valuable information about each
judge's performance-information that the judge is unable or unlikely to
receive in any other format. At the same time, the pilot program clearly
failed on two fronts. Most obviously, despite positive reviews from the
participating judges,7 2 the program was neither repeated in the Central
District of Illinois nor attempted in other jurisdictions. Any momentum
toward the design of a more widespread evaluation program was therefore lost. In addition, even if the program had been repeated or expanded
in its original form, its extremely constricted scope rendered it of virtually no benefit to judicial training programs, court administrators, or the
public. Short of a formal report issued by the Federal Judicial Center the
following year,73 no information was disseminated about the results of
the program. Accordingly, the public neither learned about the performance of its individual judges nor was afforded the opportunity to see its
judges collectively as dedicated public servants striving for continuous
professional improvement. Even within the court, where collated survey
results might have helped develop new judicial education initiatives or
helped the Clerk's Office to anticipate case management issues, no such
74
information was forthcoming.
B. Conceptual Objections to FederalJPE
There are likely many reasons why JPE has not yet succeeded at the
federal level, but one key explanation may be anti-evaluation sentiment
within the courts themselves. Both conceptual and practical objections
have been offered by the courts. We discuss these objections below.
1. Decisional Independence
The most vocal objections to JPE focus on perceived abuses and
threats to the judiciary as an institutional actor. The most commonly
voiced objection is that JPE, by its very nature, constitutes an assault on
a judge's decisional independence.75 James Timony, an administrative
law judge writing to critique the 1992 ACUS proposal, argued that the

70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
See generally id.
74.
See generally id. at 4 ("[T]he subcommittee resolved that the results would remain strictly
confidential.").
75.
See, e.g., Jacqueline R. Griffin, Judging the Judges, 21 LIGATION 5 (1995).
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JPE portion of the report "should be rejected, because it would diminish
the decisional independence of federal ALJs and would decrease public
acceptance of their decisions."7 6 Similarly, Denise Noonan Slavin, thenPresident of the National Association of Immigration Judges, stated that
performance review of federal immigration judges was "unwelcome"
because it could lead to the public perception that rulings are based on
quotas rather than dispassionate application of the law.77 And Tennessee
Administrative Law Judge Ann Marshall Young has argued that "unless
sufficient attention is paid ...to the need to protect judicial independence on a practical and human basis, the costs of such oversight and
evaluation may outweigh any potential benefits. 78
Two studies have attempted to measure the perceived impact of JPE
on a judge's independence. A 2008 survey of Colorado judges conducted by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System and Professor David Brody of Washington State University (the
"Colorado judges survey") revealed an almost perfect bell curve of judicial opinion, with 28% of trial judges stating that the state's JPE program
decreases their judicial independence, 44% indicating no effect, and 29%
stating that JPE in fact increases their independence. 79 Another study of
judges in several states with JPE programs posed the question somewhat
differently, asking judges whether they agreed that "[tihe evaluation
process undermines my independence as a judge., 80 In that study, only
14.5% of judges in Colorado, 22% of judges in Alaska, and 33% of
judges in Arizona indicated their belief that their decisional independence was undermined by their state's JPE program.8 1
The survey findings provide reason for both optimism and concern.
On the one hand, they demonstrate that a substantial majority of judges
surveyed feel that JPE programs do not detract from (and indeed, may
increase) their decisional independence. On the other hand, the minority
of judges expressing concern about the impact of JPE on their independence cannot be disregarded.82 These figures suggest, at least to us, that
JPE programs should not be rejected for fear of conflict with decisional
independence, but instead should be developed thoughtfully and with
judicial input in order to minimize the risk of encroachment on the exercise of independent judgment.
76.
77.
Sept. 25,
78.
79.

Timony, supra note 44, at 657.
Alfonso Chardy, Immigration Law: Respect Sought for Busy Judges, MIAMI HERALD,
2006, at B1.
Young, supra note 44, at 7-8.

appellate
80.
81.
82.

levels, responded to the anonymous survey. Id. at 2.
ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supranote 21, at 44.
Id.
See id.

INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, THE BENCH
SPEAKS ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION: A SURVEY OF COLORADO JUDGES 31 (2008)
[hereinafter THE BENCH SPEAKS]. Nearly two thirds of all judges in the state, at both the trial and
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Judicial independence is a matter not only of the judge's internal
thought processes, but also of public perception. In this respect, JPE
programs can put instances of independent, albeit unpopular, judicial
decisions into context, thus strengthening judges' willingness to make
such decisions. The 2008 state evaluations in Colorado provide a concrete example. In October 2007, Judge James Klein, a district court
judge in the state's Twentieth Judicial District, issued a controversial
ruling granting a claim for adverse possession.83 Those who disagreed
with the ruling immediately branded it as a "land grab"; a term picked up
in the media. 84 Soon Judge Klein was known to most of the public as the
"land grab" judge, to the extent he was known to the public at ally. His
regularly scheduled performance evaluation, however, properly deemphasized the single case outcome. The district commission reviewing
Judge Klein conducted a thorough evaluation of his overall performance,
issuing a report that emphasized his strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for continued development on the bench.86 The commission also
thoughtfully put the adverse possession case in the context of his overall
caseload and performance:
Judge Klein presided over a highly publicized adverse possession case. The Commission notes that this is only one of over
one thousand cases handled by Judge Klein over the past three
years. The Commission reviewed Judge Klein's rulings in the
case. Judge Klein listened to the testimony presented, visited
the site twice, and wrote clear and articulate rulings. Without
offering any opinion on the merits of the decision, or whether
the decision will be upheld by the appellate court, it is the opinion of the Commission that Judge Klein followed appropriate
procedures. Disagreement with the result should not be expressed as unhappiness with Judge Klein's performance.8 7
Judge Klein was ultimately retained by the voters in the November
2008 election.88 No matter what the final result at the polls might have
been, however, the JPE program served its purpose of locating a single
case outcome in the broader context of the judge's overall role.

83.
See McLean v. DK Trust, Case No. 06-CV-982, at I (Colo. 20th Jud. Dist. Oct. 17, 2007).
84. See, e.g., Heath Urie, Judge to Revisit 'Land-Grab' Case, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Apr.
2, 2008, at At; Editorial, Legal Land Grab Should be Overturned on Appeal, DENVER POST, Nov.
20, 2007.
85.
See, e.g., Ryan Morgan, Judge in Land Case up for Retention, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA,
Apr. 3, 2008, at Al.
86. Judge Klein was appointed to the bench in 2005. See Commissions on Judicial Performance, Honorable James C. Klein (2008), http://www.cojudicialperformance.comretention.cfm?
ret=210 (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
87. Id.
88. Colorado
District
Judge
Election
Results,
Denver
Post,
http://data.denverpost.comlelectionlresults/district-judge/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

Decisional independence is of course central to the role of the
judge. As one commentator has put it, independent decision-making
should "be viewed less as a power than as an indispensable responsibility
of all judges, at all levels .... ,89 Judicial performance evaluation may
help judges discharge that responsibility fairly and accurately, and can
educate the public on the full and proper role of the judiciary.
2. Life Tenure
Even leaving accountability issues aside, others object that JPE is a
needless exercise at the federal level because district and circuit judges
cannot be removed simply for underperforming. Judge Timony, for example, has dismissed the notion that state JPE programs are useful models for a federal program, arguing that "[t]he evaluations of state judges
usually [are used] in retention elections, a process not relevant to federal
ALJs who serve for an unlimited term." 90 But this is all the more reason
to implement performance evaluations. Promises of continued employment are certainly no excuse for failing to perform to one's very best
ability. Baseball players with guaranteed contracts still work on their
swings. Best-selling authors have editors. Self-employed businesspeopie send out customer satisfaction surveys. The position of federal
judges should be no different. They are appointed to the bench based on
a proven combination of skill, experience, and future promise; part of
fulfilling that promise is a commitment to the public to grow in the job.
Moreover, for federal judges who do not have life tenure, such as
magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges, JPE may assist not only with
professional development, but also with reappointment decisions. Fulltime federal magistrate judges serve eight-year terms; part-time magistrate judges four-year terms. 91 Terms are renewable with the concurrence of the majority of district judges in a district court, or by the chief
judge if there is no such concurrence.92 Bankruptcy judges similarly
serve fixed terms of fourteen years, renewable by the Court of Appeals
for the circuit in which they serve.93 JPE is especially suited for these
judges, because it could provide critical information about the judge's
performance to the relevant decision makers in advance of a reappointment decision. We discuss one possible application of JPE to reappointment decisions in Part ElI.
3. Public Perception
A final conceptual objection to JPE relates to the potential release of
evaluations into the public domain. The concern is that rather than fo89.
90.
91.

Young, supra note 44, at 27.
Timony, supra note 44, at 641.
28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (2008).

92.
93.

See id. § 631 (a).
Id. § 152.
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cusing on the judges who receive excellent reviews, or even the judges
who demonstrate marked improvement in one or more areas, some in the
public sphere will emphasize the judge who does badly or who receives
particularly harsh comments.94 Where informal polls of attitudes toward
judges constitute the sole basis for judicial evaluation, there is indeed an
increased risk that judges will be inappropriately ranked, or that specific
evaluation results will be taken out of context. 95 However, when evaluations are based on a broad set of process-oriented criteria and are
grounded in credible information from a wide variety of sources, and the
process itself is transparent, the risk of media sensationalism or public
overreach has the potential to be greatly reduced.
There is in fact some evidence that when the judiciary publicly supports a JPE program and makes the results broadly available, it gains the
respect and confidence of the mass media-and perhaps by extension,
the public. After a bar-sponsored program released evaluations of trial
court judges in Pierce County, Washington, in June 2008, the county's
largest newspaper ran five different stories on the evaluations. None of
those articles focused exclusively on judges who did poorly (although
they did mention those judges whose overall evaluations were particularly strong or weak),96 and several explicitly praised the judiciary for its
increased commitment to transparency and public service. As one editorial put it, "Naturally, sitting judges don't much like getting report cards,
but Pierce County's judges cooperated admirably with the bar's rating
process. The bench wins more respect when it acknowledges
that its
97
members should be held accountable for performance.,
Moreover, the Colorado judges' survey suggests that judges who
have been through a comprehensive JPE process at least once strongly
support providing evaluation results to the public. Nearly 69% of trial
judges indicated that they have no difficulty with Colorado's current
method of disseminating information to the public, which consists of
94.
See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 75, at 61-62 ("[A]ny [state] judge who is given a 'do not
retain' [recommendation] has no access to information on why or how the decision was made, and
he is unlikely to have the resources to mount a response ....). This statement is incorrect. In most
comprehensive JPE states, each judge receives an extensive report compiling all the data on his or
her performance before the evaluation is even released to the public. Colorado allows judges who
disagree with a recommendation to seek a second interview with the evaluation commission, and, if
necessary, to write a short rebuttal statement to go to the voters prior to the evaluation's release. See
S.B. 08-54, 66th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2008) (codified as amended at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-5.5-106(1)(a)(V) & -(2)(a)(V) (2008)). Arizona also enhances transparency by requiring
that the ultimate vote on whether the judge had met performance standards be taken publicly. See
ARIZ. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW IN THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
6(e)(3) (2006), available at

http://azjudges.info/about/procedure.cfm.
95.
See Browning, supra note 54, at 199 (discussing a San Francisco Bar Association poll in
the late 1970s that led to rankings of individual judges in the press).
96. See, e.g., Editorial, Bar's JudicialRatings Will Aid the Voters, NEWS-TRBUNE (Tacoma,
Wash.), June 3, 2008, availableat http://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/story/379136.html.
97.
Id.
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posting full evaluations on the state commission website, and providing
short summaries of each evaluation in a voter guide.98 The judges who
provided comments in the survey uniformly indicated that public dissemination, and efforts to educate the public about the JPE process,
could in fact be even more extensive. 99 If judges who face retention
elections mere months after their evaluation favor such efforts to publicize the results, federal judges with life tenure should be comfortable
with the release of their evaluations as well.
C. PracticalObjections to FederalJPE
1. Cost
One frequently raised objection to JPE programs, even among those
who support evaluations in principle, is the cost associated with a regular
and ongoing JPE program. 1°° Surveys must be sent out and responses
tabulated. Where commissions are used, members may have to travel
and results must be disseminated. Particularly when taxpayer money is
at stake, the cost of a new program is never a matter to be taken lightly.
However, the cost of a JPE program for a federal district need not be
prohibitively expensive. The 1991 pilot program in the Central District
of Illinois reported very few costs, and concluded that "the cost of a similar evaluation program in a large district would most likely be minimal."' ' While a full-scale, nationwide federal JPE program would certainly incur something more than "minimal" costs, evidence from existing programs suggests that it could be done in a cost-effective manner.
Detailed cost considerations usually begin with surveys. Some state
programs use private polling companies to design and circulate surveys
and tabulate responses, which ensures a high level of professional competence in survey methodology. High quality polling can also be
achieved, however, through lower cost means. Some state programs
complete their polling through local universities, 1°2 which promises high
quality methodology with potentially less expense. Others have developed electronic surveys, 10 3 which eliminates mailing and copying costs,
and allows for results to be tabulated on a rolling basis. Existing commercial survey software might well be suitable for use at least in federal
98. THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 26.
99. Id.
100. See generally Griffin, supra note 75, at 5-7.
101.
DAVIS, supranote 50, at 7.
102. For example, Alaska conducts its JPE surveys through the University of Alaska Anchorage, Virginia uses Virginia Commonwealth University, and a recent pilot program in Pierce County,
Washington relied on surveys conducted through Washington State University.
103. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for example, developed in-house an electronic
system to survey attorneys. Respondents complete surveys for individual judges on a secure, encrypted website, and results are automatically aggregated by judge. Mona Hochberg, Judicial Performance Evaluation Coordinator, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, Remarks at IAALS Symposium:
Judicial Performance Evaluation: Strategies for Success (Aug. 6, 2008) (copy of presentation on file
with authors).
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pilot programs. Costs associated with more robust JPE programs, such
as travel and public dissemination of results, can also be reduced or even
eliminated with modem communications technology-teleconferencing
and videoconferencing can reduce the number of required face-to-face
meetings for the commission, evaluation results can be posted on the
court's website at minimal cost, 1°4 and so on. Reasonable options for
financing JPE programs can also be explored, perhaps through a modest
raise on application fees for admission to practice in a federal district
court.
Actually predicting costs is difficult, at least before thorough pilot
studies are undertaken. Data on the cost of JPE programs at the state
level are instructive but not dispositive. Massachusetts runs a relatively
limited program based on electronic surveys, with no evaluation commission or publication of results, for the cost of one full-time employee
and some minor overhead costs. 10 5 Alaska evaluates anywhere from ten
to thirty judges each election cycle, spending $2000-4000 per judge for
surveys, travel, materials, and dissemination inclusive;' °6 if staff time
were to be factored in, the per judge cost would roughly double. 10 7 Virginia's JPE program currently spends about $5000 per judge for surveys,
but costs are expected to drop in the future to the range of $3500-4000
per judge. 10 8 These programs also benefit from economies of scale; the
more judges evaluated during a particular cycle, generally the lower the
per-j udge cost.t19
2. Risk of Politicization
Another common objection to JPE goes like this: "I support the idea
of evaluating judges, certainly for purposes of self-improvement, but if
we leave the evaluation to those outside the judiciary even the most carefully designed process is bound to inject politics into a system where
none should exist." 0 Judges alone, the argument goes, can be trusted to
understand the roles and responsibilities of the judiciary, and to reach
104. For excellent examples of state court websites describing their JPE programs and recent
results, see Alaska Judicial Council, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); Arizona
Commission on Judicial Performance Review, http://www.azjudges.info (last visited Oct. 17, 2008);
Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance, http://www.cojudicialperformance.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); Kansas Commission on Judicial Performance, http://www.kansasjudicialperformance.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); Supreme Court of New Mexico Judicial Performance
Evaluation Commission, http://www.nmjpec.org (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
105.
See Hochberg, supra note 103.
106.
Larry Cohn, Executive Dir., Alaska Judicial Council, Remarks at IAALS Symposium:
Judicial Performance Evaluation: Strategies for Success (Aug. 6, 2008) (notes from presentation on
file with authors).
107.
Id.
108.
Edward Macon, Assistant Executive Sec'y and Counsel, Supreme Court of Virginia,
Remarks at IAALS Symposium: Judicial Performance Evaluation: Strategies for Success (Aug. 6,
2008) (notes from presentation on file with authors).
109.
Cohn, supra note 106.
110.
See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 75, at 7.
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conclusions about strengths and weaknesses in an objective and apolitical manner. Underlying this objection is the fear that various governmental appointing authorities will choose commission members who will
evaluate judges on the basis of case outcome rather than adjudicative
process.' 1
Proponents of this view, however, are unable to cite to actual examples of politicized JPE programs. Instead, they argue by analogy. A
recent article by Justice Charles Wells of the Florida Supreme Court, for
example, argued that Florida was right to reject a comprehensive JPE
program because the state legislature had changed the statutory composition of its judicial nominating commission in a way that "increased the
potential for political influence in the selection of judges."' 1 2 From this
starting point, Justice Wells extrapolated the conclusion that "there can
body will remain
be no bulletproof guarantee that the judicial
' 1 3 evaluation
free of legislative or executive influence."
It is certainly true that distrust between the courts and the legislative
branch is broad and deep.' 4 Recent concerns that proposed legislation
for an Inspector General for the federal judicial branch might result in
additional scrutiny of judges whose decisions are unpopular with Congress, notwithstanding statutory admonitions to the contrary, has not
helped assuage this distrust. 1 5 However, independent JPE commissions
should be seen as a possible solution to concerns over legislative or executive encroachment-not something to be discarded because of those
concerns. In over thirty years of operation, there are no clear-cut examples in the popular or scholarly literature of state JPE commissions
evaluating a judge on the basis of anything other than established, process-oriented criteria. We are certainly not aware of any examples in
which a commission systematically targeted judges based on a particular
ideology or approach. Rather, the outward politicization of judges and
judicial decision-making occurs more frequently in jurisdictions that do
not have judicial performance evaluation programs. 16
The list of judges or entire judiciaries that have been targeted for
political reasons in jurisdictions lacking JPE programs is lengthy and
stretches out over more than two decades. At the state level, California
Chief Justice Rose Bird and two of her peers did not retain their seats on
See id.
111.
Charles T. Wells, Editorial, Viewpoint: The Inherent Danger of Judicial Evaluation
112.
Commissions, JACKSONVILLE DAILY RECoRD, Jan. 7, 2008, available at http://www.jaxdailyrecord.corn /showstory.php?Story id--49192.
113.
Id.

114.
For a discussion of a recent project to promote effective communication between Congress and the courts, see Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for Statutory
Housekeeping: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 131 (2007).
115.
Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, A Primeron Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO.
U. 1155, 1171 (2007).
See Kourlis & Singer, supra note 17, at 202.
116.
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the state supreme court in 1986 after an extensive and politicized public
non-retention campaign. The three justices, who had no evaluations to
document their broader judicial performance (the California judiciary
7
had discussed but declined to adopt a JPE program in the early 1980s),"1
were left to defend themselves armed only with the esoteric notion of
"judicial independence"-which public polling showed "was the one
message that would not work."'" 8 In 1996, Justice David Lanphier of the
Nebraska Supreme Court and Justice Penny White of the Tennessee Supreme Court were separately removed from the bench in highly politicized retention elections. 1 9 Once again, neither justice was able to point
to objective evaluations from an independent commission to defuse the
political rhetoric. Justice Lanphier limited his active campaigning to a
bare minimum in order "to maintain the dignity of the office," a strategy
that failed. 12 Justice White adopted Rose Bird's strategy of emphasizing
the importance of judicial independence, which unfortunately produced
the same result.'12 Justice White has since become an articulate supporter of JPE programs as a bulwark against politicization and for judicial independence, noting that "[u]ndoubtedly, much of the success of
those who seek to destroy judicial independence results from the lack of
available
information upon which to base one's decision in judicial elec122
tions."'
To be clear, we are not asserting that JPE alone can inoculate the
judiciary against politicization efforts. Local and national political culture would seem to have the most powerful impact on the existence and
intensity of political attacks on the judiciary, and JPE by itself cannot
change a poisoned cultural dynamic. But if JPE is not a vaccine, it is
perhaps at least preventive medicine. Efforts to hold judges "accountable" for particular case outcomes appear more likely to find purchase in
jurisdictions where process-oriented accountability measures are not
publicly available. The "JAWL 4 Judges" initiative 123 emerged in South
117.

See REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS & JORDAN M. SINGER, A FRESH LOOK AT JUDICIAL
EVALUATION
IN
CALIFORNIA
4-5
(2007),
available
at
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/news/CA%20JPE.html.
118. John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the CaliforniaJustices: The Campaign,
The Electorate, and the Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 350 (1987); see also
Bill Zimmerman, The Campaign that Couldn't Win: When Rose Bird Ran Her Own Defeat, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1986, at VI (noting that "[to base a political campaign on the independence of the
judiciary was to commit electoral suicide").
119. See Traceil V. Reid, The Politicizationof Retention Elections: Lessons from the Defeat of
Justices Lanphierand White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 76-77 (1999).
120. Id. at 72.
121.
See id.
122.
Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial
PerformanceEvaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1076 (2002).
123.
The proposed initiative, styled as Constitutional Amendment E, would have allowed a
thirteen-member "Special Grand Jury" to expose judges and prosecutors, as well as citizens serving
on juries, school boards, county commissions, or in similar decision-making capacities to fines and
jail-and strip them of public insurance coverage and up to half their retirement benefits-for making decisions that break rules defined by the special grand jurors. See CHRIS NELSON & KEA
PERFORMANCE
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Dakota, a state without a JPE program, in 2006. When that effort proved
unsuccessful, 124 proponents proceeded with efforts to get the same measure on the ballot in Florida (a state that recently rejected any public dissemination of its JPE results) 125 in 2008.126 Increased attacks on the state
judiciary have also occurred recently in Missouri, 127 which similarly has
lacked a formal JPE program.12 8 Once again, we do not wish to suggest
that the mere absence of a formal JPE program caused these attacks;
rather, it is sufficient to observe that more existential threats to the independence of the judiciary tend to arise in states where public accountability through a JPE process is wanting.
By contrast, judges in JPE jurisdictions tend to be less subject to
specialized attacks. When these attacks do occur, evaluation results-or
simply the existence of a JPE program-have been used to emphasize
the judges' adjudicative skills and depoliticize special interest messages.
In 2006, for example, a ballot initiative was introduced in Colorado
which sought to term-limit all of the state's appellate judges. 129 The initiative was retroactive and would have immediately removed nineteen of
the state's twenty-six appellate judges from the bench, regardless of their
experience and abilities. A spirited public education campaign, emphasizing among other things the fact that Colorado already had a system for
evaluating (and, if necessary, removing) judges in a much more precise
fashion, helped to defeat the initiative at the polls. 130 A follow-up study
of Colorado voters found that only 18% of those who voted for judicial
WARNE, SOUTH DAKOTA 2006 BALLOT QUESTIONS (on file with authors), available at
http://www.sdsos.gov/electionsvoteregistration/electvoterpdfs/2006SouthDakotaBallotQuestionPamphlet.pdf. The proposed amendment was designed to apply retroactively. Id.
124. Due in large part to an extensive public campaign, the proposal was ultimately defeated
by a 9-1 margin.

See SOUTH DAKOTA SECRETARY OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL

RETURNS FOR BALLOT QUESTIONS (on file with authors), http://www.sdsos.gov/elections
voteregistration/pastelections electioninfo06_- GEballotquestions.shtm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
125.
See Letter from Peter D. Webster, Chair, Comm. on Judicial Evaluations, to R. Fred
Lewis, Chief Justice, Fla. Sup. Ct. (July 10, 2007) (on file with authors).
126.
See Florida Department of State, Division of Elections, Initiative No. 02-06 (2002), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetaI.asp?account=35025&seqnum=1.
127.
As one example, Missouri Governor Matt Blunt used part of his 2008 State of the State
Address to encourage the state legislature to "close the door" on courts who have "hijack[ed] the
powers to tax and spend," even though no Missouri state court had raised such an issue in an opinion. Governor Matt Blunt, 2008 State of the State Address (Jan. 15, 2008) (on file with authors),
available at http://governor.mo.gov/State of the State_2008.pdf. Missouri is now the center of a
firestorm concerning the best form of state judicial selection, and legislative threats to discontinue
the Missouri Plan-the first state merit selection system implemented in the country-continue.
128.
On February 29, 2008, the Supreme Court of Missouri created JPE committees at the trial
and appellate levels by court rule, pursuant to its constitutional authority. The basis for the rule was
a Report of the Missouri Judicial Evaluation Survey Committee. The program went into effect
almost immediately, with the first set of reports and recommendations scheduled to be released in
September 2008. See Letter from Dale C. Doerhoff, State Chair, Missouri Judicial Performance
Evaluation Comms., to Participants at ]AALS Symposium: Judicial Performance Evaluation: Strategies for Success (Aug. 5, 2008) (on file with authors).
See STATE OF COLORADO, ANALYSIS OF THE 2006 BALLOT PROPOSALS 7-8 (2006).
129.
130.
The proposed initiative gained only 43% support in the November 2006 election. See
STATE OF COLORADO, OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST FOR THE 2005
COORDINATED, 2006 PRIMARY, 2006 GENERAL 140 (2006).
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term limits were aware that judges were evaluated by an independent
commission; by contrast, 41% of those who voted against term limits
knew specifically about the state's JPE commissions. 13 1 Far from injecting politics into the evaluation process, independent JPE programswhen they are publicly known and understood-have a tendency to serve
as a bulwark against political attacks on the judiciary, making such proposals less likely to pass public muster.
III. DEVELOPING A MODEL FOR FEDERAL JPE THROUGH PILOT
PROGRAMS

In this Part, we propose a series of different pilot studies to test the
benefits of JPE at the federal level. We suggest several alternatives: (1) a
pilot program designed to elicit confidential feedback for federal district,
magistrate, and bankruptcy judges strictly to promote professional selfimprovement; 132 (2) a pilot designed to collect information on magistrate
judges to provide feedback during their terms and provide information to
the relevant decision-makers when the magistrate judge seeks reappointment; and (3) a program that employs an independent commission
to review a wide range of data on the performance of district, magistrate,
and bankruptcy judges, and to distill that information into a written report describing each judge's strengths and weaknesses on the bench.
These proposed pilots are described in more detail below, although the
opportunity for variation extends far beyond those three. Upon completion, we envision that each of the pilot studies would themselves be
evaluated to determine their value in providing useful feedback to
judges, increasing transparency and process accountability in an appropriate manner, and promoting greater public understanding of the courts.
Pilot programs should be designed to test the application of different elements of state JPE programs to the federal arena. These elements
include the types of information collected, how the information is collected, whether the information is provided directly to the judge or reviewed first by a supervisor or commission, whether specific recommendations concerning the judge's professional strengths and weaknesses are
made, to whom evaluation results will be provided, and the specific goals
of the program. We recognize that the ideal pilot studies would be controlled experiments; however, given the reality of the federal courts'
131.
See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LEAGUE OF
WOMEN VOTERS OF COLORADO, 2007 COLORADO VOTER OPINIONS ON THE JUDICIARY 4 (2007),

available at http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/form-voter-input.html.
132.
In restricting these pilot proposals to the district court level, we do not mean to suggest
that other federal judges, such as appellate judges and ALIs, should themselves have no formal
evaluation. Indeed, at the state level appellate judges have been evaluated for decades, and thoughtful programs have been developed to tailor appellate evaluations to the specific tasks and responsibilities of those on the appellate bench. New programs for appellate judges are being considered as
well. Among them, the State of New Hampshire recently established an internal committee responsible for developing individualized performance evaluations of its Supreme Court. See Maclean,
supra note 19.
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dockets and the concern about installing an untried JPE program at the
federal level, much less rigorous approaches will have to suffice. 133
The three pilot studies described below build one on the other. The
first proposed pilot is designed primarily to test the development of surveys, collection of meaningful case management data, and judicial response to receiving anonymous feedback. The second pilot includes
each of these features, and additionally examines the value of interviews,
independent review of judicial orders for clarity of communication, and
distribution of evaluation results to those specifically charged with reappointing federal magistrate judges. The third proposed pilot would test
the perceived advantages and disadvantages of an independent evaluation
commission, and further would examine the efficacy of direct courtroom
observation and judicial self-evaluations. While there is a logical progression to these proposals, they are not the only possibilities, and we
welcome further discussion of the precise development of such pilots.
A. Pilot ProposalNumber One: ConfidentialEvaluations
As the 1991 study in the Central District of Illinois suggested, a basic JPE pilot could be organized and conducted solely within the judicial
branch at relatively low cost. Like the Central District of Illinois pilot,
our first proposed program would preferably be piloted in a district in
which all judges support the endeavor. Also like the Illinois pilot, the
program would be based primarily on survey responses from those who
have directly interacted with the judge in the courtroom. We would go
beyond just attorneys who have appeared before the judge, however, and
also issue surveys to litigants, court staff, and jurors where appropriate.
For purposes of the pilot program, it may make sense to have these surveys developed by the Federal Judicial Center.
Survey data traditionally have formed the backbone of judicial performance evaluations, and some background on their use is warranted.
Attorney surveys in particular already comprise the core of JPE programs
at the state level. In addition, the Chicago Council of Lawyers has conducted survey-based evaluations of federal judges who sit in Chicago for
over thirty-five years, including evaluations of magistrate judges, district
judges, senior district judges-and judges on the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. 134 The most recent survey-seeking input on Chicago-area
federal magistrate judges-was sent to approximately 3,400 members of
the Federal Trial Bar for the Northern District of Illinois, as well as all
members of the United States Attorney's Office and Federal Defender's

133.
For a discussion of the benefits of controlled experimentation in the context of procedural
rules, see Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of
Justice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 14-16 (1988).
134.
See CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS, AN EVALUATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGES 1 (2008).
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Office in Chicago. 135 Survey recipients were asked about the magistrate
judge's integrity (for example, by indicating their level of agreement
with the statement "His/her rulings in civil cases are free from any predisposition to decide for either plaintiff or defendant"), judicial temperament (e.g., "He/she is courteous toward lawyers and litigants"), legal
ability (e.g., "He/she understands the issues in complex cases"), decisiveness (e.g., "He/she rules promptly on pretrial civil motions"), 36 and
diligence (e.g., "His/her hearings37and pretrial conferences reflect adequate research and preparation").
As the Chicago surveys suggest, attorney surveys must be carefully
tailored both in their design and in their dissemination. 138 The survey
should contain questions designed to elicit attorneys' perceptions of the
judge's level of preparedness, clarity of expression, impartiality, and
temperament on the bench, but should never allow them to comment on
the substantive merits of a decision or order. With respect to dissemination, care must be taken to target only those attorneys who have actually
appeared before the judge during the evaluation period, and to require
those attorneys to respond to the survey based only on their personal
experience with the judge. 139 In addition, an emerging practice at the
state level is to survey attorneys shortly after the close of each case rather
than to survey all attorneys at the same time. 140 Continuous dissemination of surveys has the virtue of targeting respondents while their experience with the judge is fresh in their minds.
Surveys should also invite attorneys to provide more extensive
comments on the judge. In the pilot program in the Central District of
Illinois, several of the judges who participated in the program reflected
that the surveys and comments were beneficial to their professional development going forward. One district judge explained:
I have benefited from knowing the feelings, ratings, and views of
the attorneys. We all develop habits or ways of doing, or not doing, things in connection with our offices that we often are

135.
Id. at 2.
136. Id.
137.
Id. at Exhibit 2.
138. See Steven Flanders, Evaluating Judges: How Should the Bar Do It?, 61 JUDICATURE
304, 304-05 (1978) (praising the efforts of the Chicago Council of Lawyers but cautioning that bar
polls alone may not produce a fully accurate picture of the judiciary).
139. The State of Alaska actually permits attorneys to complete surveys based on professional
reputation or social contacts with the judge, but they must clearly indicate that this is the basis for
their answers, and the basis for such responses is noted in the judge's final evaluation. See
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH RESEARCH AND SERVICES, ALASKA

JUDICIAL COUNCIL RETENTION SURVEY 1 (2004). No other jurisdiction permits evaluations based
on anything other than direct experience.
140. See, e.g., COLO. RULES GOVERNING COMM'NS ON JUD. PERF. 10(a) (2007) (requiring that
"surveys shall be conducted on a continuing basis").
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oblivious to that need continuing14 1or changing. The responses I
got will aid me in doing my job.
Similarly, the Colorado judges survey indicated that most judges
appreciated the greater feedback and were able to translate that feedback
into immediate positive change.142 As one judge put it:
The most useful part of the process is the survey results. Although I think we're never as good as the most glowing compliments and never as bad as the worst, it is sometimes possible to
find a common thread that alerts you to deficiencies.143 Even the
most hateful comments may contain a kernel of truth.
Attorney surveys are a necessary component of judicial evaluations,
but other groups may also offer valuable information. Whereas attorney
surveys in most jurisdictions ask for the attorney to rate a judge on a sliding scale for each question, juror surveys tend to ask a limited number of
straightforward yes or no questions. This approach has the dual advantage of being easy to understand (yes or no questions make difficulties in
the interpretation of questions less likely) and easy to complete (making
it more likely that jurors will give it due attention after a long trial). As
with attorney surveys, juror questionnaires tend to focus on the judge's
behavior and control in the courtroom, rather than any substantive matter
in the case. To this end, juror surveys might include questions such as:
Did the judge treat people with courtesy? Did the judge act with patience and self-control? Did the judge act with humility and avoid arrogance? Did the judge pay attention to the proceedings throughout? Did
the judge clearly explain the responsibility of the jury? Did the judge
start court on time? And did the judge maintain control over the courtroom? 1"

In practice, juror surveys tend to be overwhelmingly positive for
judges. 145 This is clearly a good thing from the perspective of juror service and public perception of the courts. Jurors who leave a courtroom
believing that the judge acted thoughtfully, fairly, compassionately
(where appropriate), and with a firm hand are more likely to think about
the courts as a steady and valued institution, and are also more likely to
share their positive experience with others. As one commentator has put
it, "The [jury] system has served many purposes, but its enduring purpose has been to secure a greater measure of trust in judicial institu-

141.
142.
143.
144.

DAVIS, supra note 50, at 9.
THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 13.
Id. at 14.
For related model juror questions, see SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 8, at Appendix

F.
145.
See, e.g., STATE OF UTAH, UTAH VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET-GENERAL ELECTION
NOVEMBER 2, 2004 at 46-69 (2004) (showing that jurors gave favorable responses of 95% or higher
to virtually all survey questions for virtually all district judges evaluated in 2004).
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tions." 146 Because these virtues are so important, one should resist any
temptation to discount high across-the-board ratings in juror surveys.
Indeed, cause for concern should stem not from high ratings, but from
abnormally low ones. The judge who does not connect with the jury, and
who does not win jurors' confidence or respect, fails in at least that aspect of his or her role as a public servant.
Litigants might also be surveyed, preferably shortly after the close
of the case. The existing literature suggests that litigants' satisfaction
with the litigation process is far more relevant to their ultimate perception of the courts than the final outcome. Based on a review of court user
studies in the 1980s, New York University Professor Tom Tyler concluded that "[t]he important role of procedural justice in mediating the
political effects of experience means that fair procedures can act as a
cushion of support when authorities are delivering unfavorable outcomes." 147 The existence of litigant surveys also serves as a gentle reminder to judges that the perception of procedural fairness is as essential
to the courtroom experience as the reality. As one judge put it, courts
must be known for "fairness and respect, attention to human equality, a
focus on careful listening,148and a demand that people leave our courts
understanding our orders."
Nevertheless, because individual litigants tend to have the highest
emotional investment in a case, surveys should be crafted with particular
care to focus only on general aspects of the litigation process. Appropriate questions for litigant surveys may include: was the judge wellprepared for your case? Was the judge respectful to you? Were the
judge's rulings clear? Did the judge explain his or her ruling in a way
that you
could understand? And did the judge listen to your side of the
149
case?

Self-represented litigants present an additional challenge, because
they lack the mediating force of an attorney to help explain procedures
and decipher rulings. And while family law matters-almost exclusively
the province of the state court system-tend to see unrepresented litigants in particularly high numbers, 150 the growing costs of legal services
means that federal courts are not immune from increasing numbers of
pro se litigants. Indeed, over twenty thousand cases were filed by non-

146. Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 79,93 (2003).
147.

148.
(2003).
149.

TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 107 (1990).

Kevin S. Burke, A Court and a Judiciarythat Is as Good as Its Promise,40 CT. REV. 4, 6
See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 8, app. G.

150.
In Colorado, nearly 56% of litigants in domestic relations cases were self-represented in
1999, and the percentage was growing. GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM,
FINAL REPORT 35 (2000) (on file with authors), available at http:llwww.state.co.us/cjrtf
/report/report.htm (last viewed Aug. 3, 2008).
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prisoner pro se litigants in the federal courts in 2007.151 This does not
mean, however, that pro se litigants require a different set of questions
from those who do have legal representation. The survey instrument
should include a question as to whether the respondent was selfrepresented, so that any trends concerning the judge's treatment of pro se
litigants can be acknowledged.
Finally, surveys might be developed for court staff: law clerks, administrative staff, division clerks, court reporters, and others who interact
with the judge on a regular basis in the courtroom. Such surveys should
focus on the judge's interactions with support staff and clerks, level of
preparedness in the courtroom, and responsiveness to administrative
concerns, including case management issues.
For each of the respondent categories described above, care should
be taken to ensure the anonymity of the respondents. Nothing on the
survey should require or otherwise encourage the respondent to identify
him or herself by name or specifics of the case. Where comments are
provided, anonymity can be more thoroughly protected by asking someone unaffiliated with the judge being evaluated to review the comments
and remove any identifying information before such comments are forwarded to the judge.
The number of responses to each survey is also important. 152 Juror
response rates can be kept high by requesting (or even requiring) that
each juror complete the short survey at the end of trial as the final component of jury service. Attorney response rates, which are traditionally
low, can be raised to adequate levels in two ways. First, the surveys
might be sent out on a rolling basis, shortly after the termination of each
case, 153 so that the specifics of the case and the judge's performance are
fresh in the attorney's mind. Second, wherever possible, surveys should
be sent out electronically. Recent developments in electronic survey
software provide respondents with the same guarantees of anonymity,
allow for surveys that can be completed quickly with a few mouse clicks,
and make it easy for the survey provider to track the number of surveys
sent out and returned. 154 Furthermore, the federal district courts' move to
electronic filing in recent years means that virtually every attorney of

151.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, tbl. S-23 (2007).
152.
See LAWRENCE F. LOCKE ET AL., READING AND UNDERSTANDING RESEARCH 48 (1998)

(explaining the importance of an adequate sample size).
153.
Here we define "termination" to mean the formal closing of the case, notwithstanding the
possibility of appeal or reopening under other circumstances. Cases that close before an answer or
other responsive pleading is filed would not be included.
154.
See Gabriel M. Gelb & Betsy D. Gelb, Internet Surveys for Trademark Litigation: Ready
or Not, Here They Come, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1073, 1076-79 (2007) (describing the growth and
development of online surveys); Dwight B. King, Jr., User Surveys: LibrariesAsk, "Hey, How Am I
Doing?", 97 LAW LIBR. J. 103, 109-112 (2005) (same).
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record has a valid e-mail account on file with the
court, making accurate
1 55
matter.
simple
relatively
a
attorneys
to
outreach
Response rate and anonymity are more significant challenges for
litigant surveys, although those challenges are not insurmountable. Most
litigants (other than those proceeding pro se) do not automatically provide a physical or e-mail address to the court. Litigants may also feel
less of an obligation to complete the survey than attorneys or jurors.
Response rates can be increased, however, by making the opportunity to
provide feedback easily available. The use of comment cards in restaurants provides an analogy. As one recent study concluded:
If a customer has to seek out a comment card from a host or
hostess, the cashier, or the front desk, suggestions for improvement of operations and general customer feedback on service are
likely not to be received. Instead, relatively infrequent comments relating to extreme situations will likely be the only feedback provided. Although useful to know about these situations,
it is of much greater importance to continually have the
typical
56
customer's assessment of normal operating conditions. 1
One method of creating a larger and more representative response
rate is to make it easy for each litigant to provide information by providing the litigant with information at the end of the case that identifies a
court website and gives a specific (and time-limited) password to log into
the system. The respondent could use any computer to complete the
survey. Another possibility is to develop kiosks in the courthouse that
would allow litigants to complete evaluation surveys electronically after
leaving the courtroom. Of course, survey questions would have to be
carefully formulated to protect against responses based on the emotion of
an immediate courtroom appearance. But the technology for such1 57kiosks
already exists, and is being put to use in several state courthouses.
Beyond survey data, we propose that the first pilot include collection of individual judges' case management data. Such data could be
compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and sent to the
judge to introduce an additional perspective on the judge's overall per155.
E-mail has become so essential to electronic case filing that one recent decision suggests
that an attorney's failure to check the status of a case via e-mail or the PACER system may constitute professional malpractice. See Jessica Belskis, Electronic Case Filing: Is Failure to Check
Related to an Electronically Filed Case Malpractice?,2 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 13, 13 (2005)

(discussing Blackburn v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. & Forest Serv., No. C04-1404RSM (W.D. Wash.
2005)).
156.
Joel D. Wisner & William J. Comey, An Empirical Study of Customer Comment Card
Quality and Design Characteristics,101 BRITISH FOOD J. 621, 629 (1999).

157.
See Randall T. Shepard, The New Role of State Supreme Courts as Engines of Court
Reform, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (2006) (discussing the emergence of "pro se kiosks" in
Maricopa County, Arizona); Henri E. Cauvin, New Internet Kiosks Make Courts More UserFriendly, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2007, at DZ03 (noting installation of kiosks in the D.C. Superior
Court to provide information and allow payment of fines).
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formance. In addition to data concerning closed cases, average time to
disposition, average caseload, and the like, at the pilot court's election,
the data might also indicate to each judge where his or her statistics rank
within the district, the circuit, and the nation. We float this idea not because we believe that judges should be ranked crudely against each other,
but rather because relative performance, particularly within a district
where judges have comparable dockets, is another important piece of
information.
Judges in the 2008 Colorado survey expressed overwhelming support for the inclusion of case management data in performance evaluations. Overall, 73% of trial judges surveyed agreed or strongly agreed
with the statement that case management data should be part of the
evaluation process. 158 The judges in the survey expressed caution that
such data be considered carefully and thoughtfully, and that judges be
given the opportunity to explain to the committee any unusual issues
with their dockets.159 A federal JPE pilot might strike the same balance
in the use of case management data; such data could be reviewed carefully for each judge and afforded appropriate, but not undue, weight in
light of all the other factors comprising the judge's performance.
As envisioned in this pilot program, formal "evaluations" would not
exist in a concrete sense. Rather, the survey and case management data,
and relevant survey comments, would be sent to each judge for review
and consideration toward his or her professional self-improvement. A
slightly more robust version of this pilot would use the survey and case
management results for individual mentoring or collective judicial training sessions.
At the completion of the pilot program, a separate study should be
conducted to determine whether (and to what extent) the program met its
stated goals, and which aspects of the program are worth maintaining,
developing further, or discarding. This study could be conducted by the
FJC or an organization unaffiliated with the federal judiciary that has
similar capacity to conduct high-quality analysis. 16 0 Any such study
should seek to measure all data reasonably related to the pilot program's
goals. Here, the goals would include developing useful and appropriate
survey instruments, soliciting an adequate number of survey responses,
and providing meaningful information to judges in the form of survey
and case management data. Much of the data that can be collected is
158.
THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 14.
159. See id. at 15-19.
160.
Assuming adequate resources are available, the benefits to using the FJC are rather obvious. The FJC's knowledge of the federal courts and the circumstances under which they operate
makes it a natural first choice. At the same time, however, using a competent organization outside
the judiciary to review the effectiveness of the pilot projects would remove any charge that the
federal courts were simply reviewing themselves and might add to public confidence in the conclusions ultimately reached.
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objective: how many judges were evaluated? Did all judges participate
voluntarily? How frequently did evaluations take place? What criteria
were set for evaluation? Other effectiveness data are subjective but
highly important: did the judges find the feedback they received to be
useful? Did judges express any concerns about the impact of the program on their decisional independence? Did the process generate any
evidence of increased confidence among the bar or the public or both?
We recognize that the most important goal, improved judicial performance, would be difficult to measure meaningfully in the context of a
pilot program. Careful selection of measurement variables, however,
may help approximate at least the perceptions of improved performance.
This approximation can be further strengthened by the inclusion of additional structural and data elements in the pilot program. We turn next to
an example of this type of more robust pilot-one that adds interviews,
review of written orders, and supervisory feedback.
B. Pilot ProposalNumber Two: MagistrateEvaluations
A second proposed pilot program would be limited to the evaluation
of magistrate judges, but would be expanded with respect to the amount
of information collected and the purposes for which such information
was used. Specifically, the program would be designed to provide constructive feedback to magistrate judges well before the time they would
need to announce intent to seek reappointment, and also to provide the
historical evaluations of each magistrate judge to those vested with the
responsibility of making reappointment decisions.
The value of comprehensive evaluations to the reappointment process is a primary goal of this proposed pilot. Currently, the information
available for reappointment recommendations is relatively limited. Assuming the district court decides to consider an incumbent for reappointment, an independent panel is created to collect information and
recommend whether the magistrate judge should be awarded an additional term. 161 The panel typically seeks input on the magistrate's performance through public comments, although an interview with the incumbent is also encouraged. 62 But as Professor Resnik has documented
in the context of bankruptcy judge reappointments, giving heavy weight
to public comments poses considerable risk. Comments come from self-

161.
At least one year before the expiration of the magistrate judge's term, the district court
must inform the magistrate judge whether it has determined not to reappoint the magistrate judge, or
whether it has determined to consider reappointing the magistrate judge. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES 29 (2002). If the district court chooses the latter route, it must issue a
public notice soliciting volunteers to serve on a "merit selection panel" for reappointment. Id. at 30.
The panel must include at least two lawyers and at least two non-lawyers. Id. at 12.
162.
Id. at 30.
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selected respondents who may have particular agendas. 163 Furthermore,
lawyers whose critical comments would otherwise be valuable may be
reluctant to comment for fear that, should the judge be reappointed notwithstanding their feedback, they may have to appear before the judge
with their identities-and criticisms-known. 64 The proposed pilot
would test whether these concerns could be alleviated by broadly expanding the pool of information available to the reappointment panel, as
well as employing anonymous surveys administered under the same rigorous methodology as proposed in the first pilot program.
As with the first pilot program described above, the magistrate pilot
would begin with the collection of survey data and relevant case management data. In addition, the developers of the pilot program might
consider including two additional sources of information: an interview
with the magistrate
judge, and a sample of the magistrate judge's recent
165
written orders.
Reappointment panels already have the option to interview an incumbent magistrate judge.' 66 In the pilot program, we would suggest
using an interview to flesh out any concerns about the collected information and allow the magistrate judge to provide any additional information
that might not be evident from the data, such as an irregular docket or an
unusually demanding or notorious case. The interview might also preview the panel's perceptions of the magistrate judge's strengths and
weaknesses, and foster discussion (at least at a basic level) about future
efforts for continuous professional improvement. Accordingly, the optimal time for an interview is some time after the panel has collected survey and case management data. All collected information should be
forwarded to the magistrate judge in advance of the interview so he or
she has an opportunity to review it ahead of time.
This pilot program might also consider collecting samples of the
magistrate judge's orders for review. The purpose of this review is twofold. First, it allows those charged with reappointment to determine
whether the magistrate judge's orders and opinions are sufficiently clear
and understandable. It goes without saying that when any judge expresses him or herself in writing, the attorneys and litigants who review
the opinion should understand without any hesitation the precise scope of
the judge's ruling, and how the judge reached that result. Put another
way, the parties should be clear about what happens next in their case.
163. Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the Federal District
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the Districtof Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 676
(2002).
164.
Id.
165.
While discussed here solely in the context of magistrate judges, self-evaluations and
review of written orders could obviously be piloted, and, if successful, employed in any JPE program for federal district judges, bankruptcy, judge, and the like.
166.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 161, at 30.
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But this concern goes beyond the parties; even those with no interest in a
particular case outcome should be able to read an opinion and understand
the judge's reasoning.
The second purpose behind reviewing written orders is to ensure
that the magistrate judge is relying on sound legal reasoning. By this we
do not mean a "correct" decision in the substantive sense-that determination is the province of the district or appellate courts or both. Rather,
the review for JPE purposes is somewhat more high-level: has the magistrate judge provided adequate citation to legal authority? Did the magistrate judge set out the relevant facts and evidence on which he or she
relies for the decision? And is there a logical flow to the reasoning in the
opinion?
While we have described this pilot with specific reference to magistrate judges, it could apply with limited modifications to the evaluation
of bankruptcy judges as well. Reappointment decisions concerning
bankruptcy judges, for example, do not require the use of advisory panels, but the practice of providing evaluation information to the ultimate
reappointment authority would remain the same.
As with the first pilot, a pilot program using this model should be
evaluated for its effectiveness. Because this proposed model builds on
the first pilot, each of the effectiveness measurements used for the first
pilot are equally appropriate here. In addition, one might examine the
effectiveness of this pilot study by attempting to measure the value of a
face-to-face interview to both the magistrate judge and the reappointment
panel, the value to the reappointment panel of reviewing the magistrate
judge's sample of written orders, and the overall value of the collected
information on the magistrate judge to the reappointment panel.
C. Pilot ProposalNumber Three: Commission-BasedEvaluations
A final proposed pilot program-again, one of dozens of possible
variations--combines the emphasis on broader data collection in the
proposed magistrate judge pilot with an additional element frequently
used in state JPE programs: an independent commission to conduct the
evaluation. The inclusion of an independent commission may serve
three purposes. First, commission members may provide a perspective
on the judge's professional strengths and weaknesses that might not be
directly apparent to the judge, even if both the judge and the commission
are reviewing the same performance-related information. Second, the
commission can process the collected information and summarize it in a
form that is more easily digestible than survey and case management
data, and a potentially unwieldy number of comments. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an independent commission may provide an imprimatur of balance and public oversight that simply cannot be achieved
by even the most conscientious internal evaluation.
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By "independent commission" we mean a volunteer commission at
the district court level composed of a roughly equal number of attorneys
and non-attorneys. This balance has proven to be successful at the state
level, 167 and a similar format is used for magistrate judge reappointment
panels. 68 Attorneys have the most consistent direct experience with the
court and should have reasonable expectations about the nature of the
judicial process. Attorneys may also provide legal expertise during the
evaluation process and are in a position to explain the intricacies of a
court's docket to laypersons. Non-attorneys provide a community perspective in the evaluation process, and help assure that the final evaluations are presented in a straightforward and non-technical manner. Both
groups also add to the ultimate legitimacy of the evaluations. If only
attorneys were involved, the process might be criticized as an "inside
job" in which members of the legal community simply protect their
own. 169 Citizen involvement strengthens both the perception of the program and the final product. As one early commentator on JPE put it:
The key to any successful program of judicial evaluation is active lay participation-people working in concert or as a part of
a co-ordinated effort with the legal profession in a broadly based
citizens' effort to assist the voters in170making those important decisions on critical judicial positions.
If no attorneys were involved, however, evaluations might equally
be criticized as the product of those who have little or no familiarity with
the legal system or the role of judges. Finally, the inclusion of nonattorneys carries the additional benefit of fostering greater community
understanding of the role of the judge. At least one study has shown that
non-attorneys who are involved in the evaluation
process walked away
17 1
do.
judges
what
of
sense
better
a
with
it
from
For purposes of testing a JPE program in a pilot setting, it is sufficient to assemble a dedicated and balanced group of ten to twelve volunteers who are willing to review the relevant information provided by the
167.
As of 2008, all seven states with comprehensive JPE programs (Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Tennessee and Utah) utilize a commission with roughly equal representation of attorneys and laypersons.
168.

See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supranote 161, at 12.

169.
See A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, PracticalEffects
and Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 648-49 (1998); John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona
Experience, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837, 878-79 (1990). The same criticisms have emerged where evaluations are conducted by Judicial Councils or otherwise controlled by the judiciary itself. The State of
Utah, for example, instituted a JPE program in 1984 under the auspices of its Judicial Council,
which consists of twelve judges and one attorney. That approach came under fire in the mid-2000's
and was a major consideration undertaken by the state's Judicial Retention Task Force in 2007. In
March 2008, Utah passed new JPE legislation that, among other things, entmsted evaluations to a
commission composed of attorneys and non-attorneys. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A- 12-201 (2008).
170. Henry T. Reath, Judicial Evaluation-The Counterpart to Merit Selection, 60 A.B.A. J.
1246, 1247(1974).
171.
See, e.g., Anne Rankin Mahoney, Citizen Evaluationof Judicial Performance: The Colorado Experience, 72 JUDICATURE 210, 216 (1989).
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Clerk of the Court (i.e., the survey data, self-evaluation, and sample of
written orders) and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (case
management data), collectively discuss the judge's strengths and weaknesses that come out in the collected information, and draft a short report
describing their conclusions as to the judge's performance. The independent commission may also wish to collect information itself from two
additional sources: courtroom observation and a judicial self-evaluation.
Courtroom observation may be performed by members of the independent commission or by additional courtroom observers specially
trained for that purpose. 172 There are advantages to either approach.
Where commission members themselves conduct the observations, they
can witness directly the judge's courtroom behavior and the behavior the
judge expects (and tolerates) from attorneys, witnesses, and jurors.
Commission members who do their own observations are also more
likely to internalize the challenges a judge may face in the courtroomcrowded dockets, emotionally distraught litigants, unprepared counsel,
and so on-that may not be apparent from paper reports on the judge.
Independent observers, by contrast, are less likely to be recognized by
the judge (assuring that the judge's behavior is not altered by the knowledge that a commission member is in the courtroom), and may have
fewer preconceived notions about the judge before entering the courtroom.
In the Colorado judges survey, trial judges overwhelmingly supported regular courtroom observation. Forty-eight percent of the judges
stated that courtroom observation was "very useful" in the JPE process,
' 73
and another 40% stated that such observation was "somewhat useful."'
Only 12% were neutral on the issue, and no judge indicated that observation was not useful. 174 Indeed, the judges practically pleaded for more
observation as part of the process,175 noting among other things that ob172.
The State of Alaska, for example, has used a special corps of courtroom observers who
are trained in advance and are required to couch their observations in specific categories of predetermined, process-oriented criteria. As many as fifteen observers are assigned to each judge. Each
observer is given approximately forty hours of advance training, and the observers are directed to sit
in courtroom proceedings at unscheduled intervals. They observe both criminal and civil cases and
proceedings ranging from arraignments and motion hearings to full jury trials. The observers' notes
are collected into a report for each judge, which specifies the number of observations, types of
events and cases observed, the total number of hours the judge was observed, and the average rating
the judge received in each category. The final reports are then forwarded to the Alaska Judicial
Council for consideration as part of the judge's overall evaluation. See ALASKA JUDICIAL
OBSERVERS 2006 BIENNIAL REPORT 1-8 (on file with authors), available at http://www.ajc.state.
ak.us IRetention2006/JudicialObservers2006.pdf.
173.
THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 20.
174.

Id.

175.
Colorado's JPE program requires that each commission member directly observe at least
three judges up for evaluation in unannounced courtroom visits. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5103(l)(k) & -105(l)(c) (2008); Jane B. Howell, Executive Director, Colorado Office of Judicial
Performance Evaluation, Presentation on Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance (Aug.
2008), http://www.courts.state.co.us/Media/Law_School.cfm (select link for "Judicial Performance
and Retention Presentation") (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
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servation would be enhanced further if the observer were to meet with
the judge immediately afterward to ask any questions about what occurred. One judge summarized the feelings of a majority of respondents
as follows:
Observation is particularly useful if the judge does not know
the individual or does not know that the observer is present in
the courtroom. In our district, a courtroom can be observed by
security officers over closed circuit TV. Another way is to appear during a busy docket day when the courtroom is full. I
think the observer should arrange to sit down with the judge
after observing him or her and ask questions about things observed to be sure there is no 76misunderstanding-particularly if
the observer is a lay person.1
The developers of the pilot program may also consider introducing
a judicial self-evaluation. It should be designed with two purposes in
mind: to allow each judge to consider his or her strengths and weaknesses on the bench in private reflection, and to help the independent
commission determine whether the judge's perception of those strengths
and weaknesses comport with the strengths and weaknesses identified by
others. The first purpose recognizes that even the most conscientious
judge committed to continuous professional improvement is more likely
to succeed when he or she takes time to assess his or her skill set on a
regular basis. The second purpose ensures that there is no disparity between the judge's perception of his or her skills (positive or negative)
and the perception of those who interact with the judge in the courtroom.
A common complaint among judges is that self-evaluation lacks
real meaning, because all judges feel pressure to rate themselves as
highly as possible. 177 Indeed, an average or below average selfevaluation in any category may invite questions from the commission,
even if all other data indicate that the judge is above average in that category. There is, of course, little that can be done to assure that all judges
approach the self-evaluation openly and honestly. But those who do
should derive a benefit much greater than those who are inclined to inflate their self-assessments.
The pilot program can help promote sincere self-evaluations by
considering making available mentorship programs that foster selfimprovement. Here, the State of Arizona provides a model. Each judge
who is evaluated is assigned to a "conference team" composed of another
judge, a member of the state bar, and a member of the public. 78 The
judge meets with the conference team to discuss his or her strengths,
176.
177.
178.

THE BENCH SPEAKS, supra note 79, at 21.
Id. at 21-22.
See Pelander, supra note 169, at 690.
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weaknesses, and areas for improvement based on the self-evaluation,
survey results, and public comments. Together, the judge and his or her
conference team prepare and sign a written self-improvement plan. 79 By
conference team may participate in formal
rule, no member of the
1 80
judge.
the
of
evaluation
Similar to Arizona, a federal JPE pilot program might choose to use
judicial self-evaluations as a teaching and self-improvement tool rather
than as a formal component of the magistrate judge's evaluation. The
conference team model, which uses the information gleaned from the
evaluation process but is more hands-on and more private than a formal
evaluation, should encourage magistrate judges to be thoughtful and
honest in their self-assessments.
Regardless of whether the judge being evaluated is a district judge,
magistrate judge, or bankruptcy judge, the independent commission
should endeavor to collect as much of the specified information as possible during the data collection phase. If all information is not available
for a certain judge, however, the commission may still proceed with the
evaluation and note in its report what information was missing.
Once again, an effectiveness study should follow a pilot program of
this type. In addition to the measurements described for the first and
second proposed pilots, an effectiveness study here should consider
measuring the time and money expended by the independent commission, the commission members' perception of the process, the value each
judge placed on completing the self-evaluation, the number of times each
judge was observed in the courtroom, the value to both the judge and the
commission of the courtroom observation, and the overall value to the
judge of receiving an independent analysis of his or her performance
data.
TV. BEYOND PILOT PROGRAMS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

It is our hope that suitable testing of JPE through a variety of pilot
programs in one or more districts will more rigorously define the contours of successful judicial performance evaluation at the federal level.
A successful pilot program in one district, however, may not translate
cleanly to another district, or to a national program encompassing all
ninety-four districts. A pilot program may also be able to sidestep certain structural and administrative issues that become more pressing-and
more complex-when extrapolated to a national program. The development of a more permanent and expansive federal JPE program, then,
ultimately will require consideration of several additional factors. Here
we discuss five such factors: the administration of a national JPE pro179.
180.

Id. at 692; see also ARIZ. JUD. PERF. REV. R. 4(o.
See Pelander, supra note 169, at 693.
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gram; the development of national rules governing such a program; the
structure and use of independent commissions; the frequency of evaluations; and the degree to which evaluation results should be publicly disseminated.
A. Authorization and Administration
A nationwide program of JPE in the federal courts would plainly
benefit from some degree of centralized administration. A single authority can exercise greater control over both inputs (e.g., uniform survey
questions, case management data, and operating procedures) and outputs
(e.g., format of evaluation reports, methods of disseminating evaluation
results if applicable). A centralized authority also may find it easier to
run comparative analyses across districts, to confirm (for example) that
the level of survey responses is reasonably consistent.
Judges would presumably be more comfortable if any national administration of a federal JPE program rested within the judiciary itself.
Excellent resources within the judicial branch for developing and operating a national program are already in place. In one formulation, the Judicial Conference of the United States might be tasked with overseeing
the program and developing national rules and procedures; the FJC with
developing appropriate surveys and conducting research into the effectiveness of JPE across districts; the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts with providing case management data; and the Circuit Clerks with
collecting all the relevant data for each evaluated judge in the circuit and
providing that information to the judge, appointing authority, and independent commission as appropriate.
A coordinated effort within the federal courts to develop and implement a robust JPE program would require both commitment and leadership from the judiciary. But it would also assure greater judicial control over the process and would demonstrate to the American public that
federal judges are sincere about improving their performance on the
bench and committed to their role as public servants. By contrast, the
potential consequence of a tepid judicial response is a strong-and perhaps unwelcome-legislative response. Titles 18 and 28 of the U.S.
Code are littered with statutory responses to perceived failures of the
federal judiciary to address issues invoking accountability. The Speedy
Trial Act' 8 1 reflects legislative impatience with the judicial use of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 50(b).182 The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act arose in part as a response to the failure of Judicial Councils to
use their (admittedly vague) authority to deal with issues of judicial mis-

181.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2008).
182.
See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV.
375, 430 (1992).
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conduct under the pre-1980 version of 28 U.S.C. § 332.183 The Civil
Justice Reform Act was in part a Congressional response to the perception that district courts were not sufficiently achieving cost and delay
reduction through case management.184 And the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998 suggests legislative frustration with the pace of
alternative dispute resolution implementation in the federal courts.' 85
When the judicial branch demonstrates strong leadership in areas of
transparency and accountability, however, Congress is less likely to pass
reactionary legislation. The Judicial Conference's mandated use of conflict disclosure software, for example, probably prevented a legislative
push for a statutory mandate.186 A similar mandate concerning seminar
disclosure requirements may be sufficient to defeat a proposed legislative
amendment to the pending federal judicial salary legislation to ban attendance at non-judicial seminars altogether. 87 And broad legislative demand for cameras in the courtroom in at least the lower federal courts
may be dampened by the experimental posting of audio files of trial court
proceedings on the federal court's PACER website.188
Judicial leadership and judicial administration of a federal JPE program, then, may well make sense. A statutory structure, however, does
not entirely lack merit. We note that in most states in which JPE is successful, it rests upon a legislative foundation. Moreover, thoughtful legislation may carry certain advantages. First, a JPE program may engender greater public confidence when it is not administered by the judiciary
itself. No matter how well-meaning or thoughtfully constructed a judicially operated JPE program might be, from the citizen perspective the
evaluations are to some degree less credible when judges are the only
parties involved in their own evaluations.' 89 Second, a statute provides
backbone to a program; it may be somewhat more difficult to change
than a set of rules or guidelines, and accordingly may provide a more
183.

See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils Reform and

Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 291-94 (1982) (describing the
legislative history of the Act and the concerns of some that the Judicial Councils were unwilling to
exercise existing power).
184.
See, e.g., Mary Brigid McManamon, Is the Recent Frenzy of Civil Justice Reform a CureAll or a Placebo? An Examination of the Plans of Two Pilot Districts, 11 REV. LrIG. 329, 332

(1992).
28 U.S.C. § 651 (2008).
185.
The Third Branch, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C. Transpar186.
ency Takes Shape (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/12-06/transparency/index.
html; see also Linda Greenhouse, Federal Judges Take Steps to Improve Accountability, N.Y.
TtMES, Sep. 20, 2006, at A20.
187.
See Greenhouse, supra note 186; see also Charles Lane, Judges Alter Rules for Sponsored
Trips, WASH. POST, Sep. 20, 2006, at A23.
See News Release, U.S. Courts, Pilot Project Begins: Two Courts Offer Digital Audio
188.
Recordings Online (Aug. 6, 2007) (on file with authors).
See Jean E. Dubofsky, Judicial Performance Review: A Balance Between Judicial Inde189.
pendence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 334 (2007) ("[J]udges' own
evaluations often are too self-serving; no one can possibly be as good as some judges think they
are.").
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consistent model for judicial performance than might otherwise be available. Individual rules and guidelines can of course be authorized by the
legislative framework, and such guidelines can be adjusted with greater
frequency while leaving the framework in place. 90 Third, a statute
represents, at its best, a triumph of communication between two branches
of government, and between the citizens and their courts. It should be a
product of discussion between elected representatives, the courts, and the
public, based on careful thought and discussion about what it means to
evaluate judges as public servants.'91 Finally, legislation would promote
a certain degree of transparency about the purpose of the JPE program;
debates concerning the legislation become part of the public record, and
the statute itself is widely available. If the goals of the program and the
criteria for evaluation are clearly delineated, the statute itself can be a
self-contained civics lesson on what the public can expect from its federal judiciary.
We are cognizant of the concerns-voiced most recently by Justice
Wells-that legislative authorization opens the door to legislative mischief. 192 And in discussing the perceived advantages and disadvantages
to legislative versus judicial authorization of a federal JPE program, we
do not take a position that one approach is preferable. A robust program
created and designed under the auspices of the judiciary, with active
leadership and buy-in from the entire federal bench, would be expected
to gain considerable public support and plaudits for the courts' commitment to transparency and accountability.
B. Rules and Procedures
Depending on the frequency and complexity of pilot JPE programs,
rules and guidelines governing those programs may reasonably be set at
the district or circuit level. Indeed, this sort of experimentation may be
encouraged as a means of developing JPE rules and practices that best
meet with the performance improvement needs of the judges and the
190.
We discuss the ability to change or amend rules and guidelines in greater detail in Part
IV(B) infra.
191.
We fully recognize that the process of crafting legislation is inherently political and that
even the most careful strategies and thoughtful suggestions are not immune from criticism and
compromise. But that sober conclusion warrants greater involvement in the process, not less. Two
recent legislative amendments to state JPE programs illustrate the point. In Utah, the Task Force on
Judicial Retention considered changes to the state's program through the fall of 2007 before a bill
was introduced in the state senate in early 2008. The Task Force was composed of members of both
houses of the state legislature and three state court representatives, including the Chief Justice. See
Minutes of the Judicial Retention Election Task Force (Aug. 14, 2007) (on file with authors). While
it is not fair to say that every member of the Task Force walked away from the experience with
everything he or she wanted, the discussion only benefitted the final legislative outcome. Similarly,
the respective chairs of Colorado's Senate and House Judiciary Committees held open meetings
throughout the summer and fall of 2007 to receive input on the reenactment of that state's JPE statute. The interests of the courts, attorneys' groups, legal organizations, think tanks and private individuals were considered during these initial meetings and throughout the legislative process. The
bill that ultimately became law, while perfect to no one, was nevertheless largely acceptable to all.
192.
See generally Wells, supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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information-seeking needs of appointment authorities, chief judges, or
the public. In a national program, however, a uniform set of national
rules and guidelines should be considered, perhaps to be developed by
the Judicial Conference. Such rules might set out the purposes of the
JPE program, criteria for evaluation, process of collecting data, person(s)
eligible to view the collected data on each judge, and procedures for preparing a report if an independent commission is used.
A provision for future amendment might also be included in the
rules. Amendments should not go into effect immediately, for the obvious reasons that independent commissions would require time to prepare
for changes to the data collection or the evaluation procedure, and judges
subject to evaluation would require adequate notice of a procedural
change. Judicial performance evaluations only have professional development impact if each judge is presented with clear and comprehensible
criteria for the evaluation ahead of time. Put another way, judges cannot
be expected to hit a constantly moving target.
C. Use and Composition of Independent Commissions
If pilot studies suggest that a national program should use independent commissions, the rules should set out the composition and reach
of those commissions. As discussed above, for pilot purposes it may be
sufficient to seek out volunteers in rough balance of attorneys and nonattorneys. In a more fixed program, however, consideration should be
given also to balancing a commission by appointing authority, and perhaps to achieving partisan balance as well. The judiciary may wish to
appoint all commissioners itself. Or the rules could institute a model in
use in some states, in which appointments are shared among all three
branches of government. Some appointment authority may also be invested in groups outside the federal government that have an investment
in the success of the courts, such as the Faculty of Federal Advocates or
a local bar association. No matter how appointments are broken down,
additional balance can be achieved by staggering the terms of each commission member so that no appointing authority has the power to pack
the commission with new appointees at any given time. 193
D. Frequency of Evaluations
A judge is likely only to be evaluated once or twice during the
course of a pilot program. In a more permanent program, however, regular intervals should be set for the evaluation of each judge. Evaluations
should be conducted with sufficient frequency that improvements and
continuing strengths are well-documented, and weaknesses or difficulties
are identified and diagnosed quickly. Depending on the stated goals of a
193. For a more extensive discussion of best practices for the composition of independent
commissions at the state level, see SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 8, at 81-82.
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final JPE program, evaluations for magistrate and bankruptcy judges
might be timed to provide reasonably current data to assist with reappointment decisions. For example, districts that employ part-time magistrate judges with four-year terms might evaluate those magistrate judges
three years after their initial appointments and three years after each reappointment. 194
Full-time magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges might be evaluated more often. More frequent evaluation would serve two purposes.
First, it would identify the judge's strengths and weaknesses on an early
and continuing basis, providing more time and opportunity for professional development than might be the case if the judge was only evaluated once each term. Second, multiple evaluations are more likely to
show improvement or lack of improvement in certain areas over time,
making aberrations in data or dockets less likely than might be the case if
only one evaluation is conducted.
The timing of evaluations for district judges with life tenure is less
obvious, because there are no reappointment decisions or other temporal
cues. However, there are strong arguments for maintaining a pattern of
regular evaluations similar to those proposed for magistrate judges. One
format might be to evaluate district judges two years after initially taking
the bench, and every three years thereafter. District judges with senior
status could also be evaluated every three years. This scheme has been
used at the state level where judges are similarly appointed with no fixed
terms. In New Hampshire, for example, Superior Court and District
Court judges face evaluation at least once every three years. 95 Similarly,
in Massachusetts, trial judges are evaluated at least once every three
years. 196
Evaluation every three years makes sense from a professional development perspective. As is the case with magistrate judges, regular
evaluation of district judges helps to identify and address weaknesses
more quickly. Regular evaluation also can be used to demonstrate a pattern of individual improvement. It can pinpoint areas for more widespread judicial education if a number of evaluations suggest collective
strengths and weaknesses across the court. Finally, when evaluations are
conducted on a frequent and consistent basis, the natural level of stress
associated with such evaluations (for the judge being evaluated, but also
194.
This timing scheme would allow sufficient time for a thorough evaluation (and, if requested, a recommendation on reappointment) based on three years of the magistrate judge's performance. It would also afford the magistrate judge a full year before reappointment to address any
weaknesses identified in the evaluation.
195.
See News Advisory, New Hampshire Judiciary, 2002 Judicial Performance Evaluations
Released (Jul. 11, 2003) (on file with authors) available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/
press/pr030611 .htm.
196.
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 211, § 26A (2008) (setting evaluation intervals of twelve to eighteen months for judges with four years of experience or less, and evaluation intervals of eighteen to
thirty-six months for judges with more than four years of experience).
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for members of the bar and court staff who must interact with the judge
on a regular basis) may be diluted.
E. Disseminationof Evaluation Results
Public dissemination of evaluation results historically has been a
difficult aspect of JPE for judges to stomach. And there are certainly
circumstances in which the release of a judge's evaluation may be unwise.197 But the importance of circulating evaluation results to the general public should not be underestimated, and should be considered carefully for inclusion in any final program of judicial performance evaluation. Indeed, there are at least five advantages to broad sharing of results. First, regular dissemination of judicial evaluations reinforces appropriate criteria by which the public should measure its judges. Rather
than considering a judge to be "good" or "bad" based on his or her handling of a particularly difficult or controversial case (the types of cases
most likely to be covered by the media)-or worse, the outcome of a
particularly politicized case-the lay public may begin to base its assessment of judicial quality on the judge's clarity of expression, ability to
manage his or her docket efficiently, and demonstrated command of procedural rules and substantive law.
Second, to the extent the public is aware that evaluations are being
conducted, knowledge of the program may increase transparency and
foster public confidence in the court system. Transparency would in fact
be increased along two dimensions: the courts demonstrate that they are
willing to be subject to evaluation as a means of fostering continuous
improvement in their role as public servants, and the evaluation commission demonstrates that its evaluation process was 198
open, thorough, and in
line with its role as a representative of the people.

197.
If, for example, the judge retires or resigns after the evaluation is conducted but before the
date scheduled for its release, there is little value in making the evaluation public. This approach has
precedent at the state level. Colorado has a longstanding requirement that judges be shown their
final evaluation and "narrative profile" (a short form of the evaluation for inclusion in voter guides)
at least 45 days before they must declare their intent to seek retention. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-5.5106(1)(a)(V) & (2)(A)(3) (2008). Judges who resign from the bench or do not declare their intent to
seek retention do not have their evaluations circulated or placed in the voter guide. In 2008, the
state's JPE legislation was amended to require the state's Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
to issue a statewide statistical report thirty days before the election, setting forth the total number of
justices and judges who were eligible to stand for retention, the total number of evaluations performed by the state and district commissions, the total number of justices or judges who were evaluated but did not stand for retention, and the total number of justices and judges recommended for
retention. See id. §§ 13-5.5-l03(l)(q)(I)-(1V).
198.
One commentator recently observed in a discussion ofjudicial nominating commissions:
A lack of transparency is highly damaging to the public's perception of the commission
system. In the absence of information regarding proceedings, the public tends to think
that the system is 'closed,' and that judges are selected through 'the old-boy system' or
some other process that has little to do with the qualifications of the candidate. Such perceptions undermine the confidence in the quality of judges and ultimately in the quality
of the legal system.
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Third, public confidence is also promoted by the simple fact that
most judges historically do well on evaluations, and the federal benchgiven the increased salaries, prestige, and difficulty of appointmentshould shine in this area. Certainly at the state level, judges selected
through a competitive appointive process tend to do well on evaluations.199 Federal district judges in particular, whose initial qualifications
were sufficient to elicit a Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, are presumed to be well-qualified to take the bench. Dissemination
of evaluation results serves both to confirm this presumption, and to
demonstrate that each judge is motivated to grow and improve on the
bench.
Fourth, for those judges who do not receive a strong evaluation,
public dissemination may serve as motivation to improve performance.
Indeed, it may be the single strongest source of motivation. Federal district judges do not face the danger of being removed in an election; only
personal standards of excellence and the risk of public embarrassment
align a judge toward continued improvement on the bench. For most
judges (state and federal), personal drive is enough. For those few
judges who have lost their enthusiasm for the job, however, publication
of poor evaluation results might provide the appropriate kick-start to
either dedicate oneself to rapid professional improvement, or resign from
the bench if that dedication is lacking.
Finally, widespread dissemination assures that the information the
public actually receives on its judges is comprehensive and accurate.
Public awareness of the federal judiciary has been influenced by the proliferation of media coverage for judicial nominations, confirmation hearings, and infamous cases.200 Furthermore, in recent years an increasing
number of websites have emerged that either target specific judges 201 or
ask for anonymous and unedited comments on a wide range of judges.0 2
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: FirstPrinciplesin JudicialSelection and Their Application to a
Commission-BasedSystem, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125, 157 (2007). The identical point applies to
judicial evaluation commissions-full disclosure of the evaluation process and the identities of the
commission members promotes public understanding of the system and confidence therein.
199.
Alaska, for example, has utilized merit selection since statehood and has used a JPE
program since 1975. During that time, only three judges have not been recommended for retention,
in part because of the careful efforts of the nomination commission to recommend highly qualified
candidates. Bill Gordon, Member, Alaska Judicial Council, Remarks at IAALS Symposium: Judicial Performance Evaluation: Strategies for Success (Aug. 5, 2008) (notes of remarks on file with
authors).
200.
This list of federal cases generating high media interest in the last several years alone is
extensive and springs easily to mind, particularly in the areas of accused corporate malfeasance,
criminal activity by celebrities, or terrorism. The judges presiding over these cases have found
themselves under an unexpected (and uninvited) microscope, with greatly increased public scrutiny.
201.
E.g., Impeach Judge Turk!, http://www.anusha.com/turk.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008);
Ten Federal Judges Who Must Be Impeached for Abuse of Power, http://home.earthlink.net/
-dlaw70/top 1O.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
202.
See, e.g., The Robing Room, http://www.therobingroom.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
The website describes itself as "a site by lawyers for lawyers." Id. Their mission is "to provide a
forum for evaluating federal district court judges and magistrate-judges." Id. Lawyers are encour-
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The evaluations on these sites are at best unscientific and anecdotal, reflecting only the comments of a self-selected group; at worst, they are
factually incorrect and motivated by personal bias rather than any dispassionate evaluation. JPE, by contrast, holds both the judges and the
evaluation process itself to rigorous standards, creating a system in which
both the public and the judiciary can be confident.
CONCLUSION

If thoughtfully implemented, a JPE program holds great promise
both for the federal judiciary and for those who use and rely on the federal courts to preserve their rights and resolve their disputes. Pilot programs, drawn from elements of successful programs at the state level,
may be useful in developing a program tailored to the unique needs of
the federal system. A well-constructed JPE program would help locate
judicial accountability where it belongs-in the process of adjudication-rather than in public or Congressional reaction to case outcomes.
Ultimately, for any JPE program to be accepted and functional, it
must be embraced both by federal judges and the public they serve. Individual judges will need to step forward as leaders in this enterprise.
The benefits of doing so-reframing judicial accountability, preserving
judicial independence, and building public confidence in the courtssuggest that such an effort would be well worthwhile.

aged to provide numerical ratings or comment on individual judges. See id. Commenters' e-mail
addresses are collected, but no names are displayed in connection with the comments. See id. For a
similar example, see Robe Probe, http://www.robeprobe.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).

PERSPECTIVES FROM THE RULE OF LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ARE THERE
LESSONS FOR THE REFORM OF JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES?
NoRMAN L. GREENE t

The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the
basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions,
improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences,
direct or indirect,from any quarterorfor any reason.
Most U.S. judges and court reform organizations regard elections
as a poor method for selecting judges. They believe judges can be influenced by the fear of electoral retaliationagainst decisions that conform
to the law but not popular preferences. They also fear that judges may
compromise their independence by incurring obligations to those who
providefinancial supportto their election campaigns.2
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INTRODUCTION

I have learned through multiple conversations and extensive study
that American writers on domestic judiciaries and American writers on
foreign judiciaries seem to be on separate paths. They often publish in
different places, and if they read each other's work, it is not obvious
from some or perhaps much of what I have read. Not too long ago, I was
on one of those separate paths myself (the domestic one) until I was told,
in substance, by a friend who was on the other one (the international and
rule of law one) that "the issues on both paths are really the same, don't
you know?" This simple but perceptive thought gave me an entirely new
perspective. The objectives of this article include joining the two paths,
applying to the domestic sphere perspectives from the field of rule of law
and international economic development, inspiring further scholarship,
and starting on the road toward positive change.
This article will consider whether a relationship exists between
good business and a fair and impartial judiciary; if so, whether a compelling domestic economic rationale for American judicial reform may be
identified; and if so, how it may be achieved. It will begin by focusing
on the international principles of rule of law originating in work sponsored by international financial institutions and other governmental and
non-governmental organizations, which have disbursed billions of dollars
to improve judicial systems in developing countries. These principles
include key components of the rule of law, such as judicial impartiality,
independence,3 competence, and accountability; 4 and they are applicable

INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 133, 140 (rev. ed., USAID Office of Democracy and Governance

2002), available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-governance/publications/pdfs/
pnacm007.pdf.
3.

See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND

DEVELOPMENT 61-63 (2008); Pamela S.Karlan, JudicialIndependences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1042-43
(2007); see also Suleimanu Kumo, The Rule of Law and Independence of the Judiciary Under the
Sharia, 8 J. ISLAMIC & COMP. L. 100, 103 (1978) ("The principle of the rule of law is inextricably
mixed with the principle of independence of the judiciary. The latter principle means, in effect, that
judges shall enjoy immunity from interference by the government and [be free] to decide issues
before them only in accordance with the law without fear of adverse repercussions. This is secured
in modem constitutions, by provisions laying down well defined procedures for appointments to the
higher judicial offices, charging judicial salaries on the consolidated fund thus giving them fixed
salaries and excluding these from parliamentary debates and by the procedure for their removal from
office."); Sam Rugege, Judicial Independence in Rwanda, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. &
DEV. L.J. 411, 411, 415 (2007) (noting the relationship between the rule of law and judicial independence as well as economic progress: "Judicial independence is a universally recognized principle in democratic societies. It is a prerequisite for a society to operate on the basis of the rule of
law," and citing the Asian Development Bank for the following proposition:
The cornerstone of successful reform is the effective independence of the judiciary. That
is a prerequisite for an impartial, efficient and reliable judicial system. Without judicial
independence, there can be no rule of law, and without the rule of law the conditions are
not in place for the efficient operation of an open economy, so as to ensure conditions of
legal security and foreseeability.)
See also Evelyn Lance, Commentary, Emerging Democracies Get Help from Isles, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER,
May 2, 2005 at I, available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/7337E1F0797A8F54EB5741B062/edghfi050205.pdf (noting that "many [emerging democra-
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to the United States as well as to other countries.5 This article will also
consider the basis for linking the rule of law and economic development,
various causation controversies affecting the linkage, and the likely economic consequences of rule of law violations. It will then assess state
court judicial elections in the United States in light of the rule of law,
whether the American practice of judicial elections is consistent with the
rule of law, and the potential economic implications.
The article concludes that a sufficient connection between the rule
of law and sustainable economic progress (whether called development
or growth) has been demonstrated to warrant the concern of governmental and nongovernmental policymakers, both at home and abroad; that
the principles of the rule of law and economic development apply domestically as well as internationally; that state court judicial elections
create or appear to create rule of law violations in the United States; and
that Americans most concerned about the welfare of our economy should
work for the elimination of state court elections in the United States.
I. THE RULE OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A. The Enormous InternationalCommitment to PromotingRule of Law
The notion that the rule of law promotes economic development is
built on various factors, including common sense, practical assumptions,
logic, and to some extent, empirical studies.6 Based on this level of
knowledge, policymakers have made decisions and taken action, includcies] .. recognize that a strong, independent and professional judiciary ... is an essential element
of a free, orderly and economically vital society").
4.
See TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 63-65; see also Stefan Voigt, The Economic
Effects of Judicial Accountability: Some Preliminary Insights, 27 (Int'l Ctr. for Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 19, 2005) (considering the relationship between the rule of law and judicial
accountability as well as economic progress):
In this paper, the hypothesis that judicial independence and judicial accountability are not
necessarily competing ends but can be complementary means toward achieving impartiality and, in turn, the rule of law is presented. It is argued that judicial accountability can
increase economic growth through various channels[,] one of which is the reduction of
corruption. Id.
...Independent

judges who are not accountable and do not incur any cost for such behavior, will prevent the judiciary from unfolding its potentially beneficial consequences.
A low degree of [judicial accountability] can thus increase uncertainty with regard to the
status of the promises made by the legislature [i.e., the laws passed by the legislature,
with reference to private property]. Higher levels of uncertainty are expected to induce
lower aggregate investment and thus lower levels of economic growth.
Id. at 10-11. See also id. at 27 (Voigt recommends further research to test his article's theories).
5.
The general applicability of the principles of judicial impartiality, independence, competence, and accountability to the United States judiciary is self-evident. In support of the general
applicability of the rule of law to the United States, see, for example, World Justice Project, Domestic Mainstreaming of the Rule of Law, http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/domestic-mainstreaming
(last visited Nov. 4, 2008). See also Symposium, Is the Rule of Law Waning in America?, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 223 (2007).
6. See generally John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, 3 ANN. REV. OF L. & Soc. SC. 99,
100(2007).
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ing disbursing extraordinary sums of money to promote the rule of law as
a key component of international assistance to developing countries.7
Policymakers are on a timetable: they need to make decisions now on
the basis of the knowledge that they have to try to improve or not improve foreign legal systems. If they decide to take action, they must decide what kind of action to take and where.
At the same time, an academic debate proceeds over what we know
about the subject, including: what is the rule of law; what is economic
development; do improvements to the rule of law promote economic
development; what is the measure of each; does economic development
in turn bring about a demand for the rule of law; does it do so everywhere; are there exceptions; what caused the exceptions; do they matter;
and how do we know and prove the connection between the rule of law
and economic development. Is the connection just an association, perhaps a correlation, or is there demonstrated causation? Is there empirical
evidence of this; if so, how much; and how much is necessary? If not,
what evidence should we obtain and how should we obtain it? The academic discourse is divided, sometimes tentative, other times assertive,
and often calls for further research, but it forms a vast literature.
The effort in the "field of law and economic development ... has
been lead [sic] by the international financial institutions (TFIs)-the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank, etc.-by the aid and development arms of the U.S. government and the European Union, and to a lesser extent by NGOs.... In
this context, the Rule of Law is understood as being related to economic
development and the workings of a market economy, rather than as a set
of normative political commitments." 8 These and other organizations,
such as and including the Inter-American Development Bank, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the American Bar Association (ABA) through its Rule of Law Initiative (ABA
ROLl) 9 and its diverse activities, have disbursed or overseen the disbursement of billions of dollars.1 0 The many activities of ABA ROLl
7. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 2.
Ohnesorge, supra note 6, at 100.
8.
9. See American Bar Association, About the ABA Rule of Law Initiative,
http://www.abanet.org/rol/about.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) ("The Rule of Law Initiative
(ABA ROLl) is a mission driven, non-profit organization with an annual budget of over $30 million.
The Rule of Law Initiative's primary funders are the United Agency for International Development
(USAID), the Department of State, and the Department of Justice. It also receives funding from
foundations, private individuals, law firms and corporations.").
10.
Richard E. Messick, JudicialReform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues,
14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 117 (1999); Richard E. Messick, JudicialReform: The Why,
the What, and the How I (Mar. 15-17, 2002), http://www.pogar.org/publications/judiciary
/messick/reform.pdf. The work of some of the involved organizations includes: for ABA ROLl's
judicial reform program, see American Bar Association, Judicial Reform Programs,
http://www.abanet.org/rol/programs/judicial-reform.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2008); for the World
Bank, see The World Bank, Judicial Reform, http://tinyurl.com59njp9 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008);
for the Inter-American Development Bank, see Inter-American Development Bank, A Decade of
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appear on its website and are too extensive to catalog, but cover numerous countries and projects in the area of legal reform, including gender
equality projects. 1

JudicialReform, http://www.iadb.org/news/articledetail.cfm?language-EN&artid=2127 (last visited
Oct. 17, 2008) ("The reform of Latin America's judicial systems, once considered a specialized
concern of judges and lawyers, is now at the center of the region's development agenda, 1DB President Enrique V. Iglesias said at a recent conference."); for USAID, see USAID, Strengthening the
Rule of Law & Respect for Human Rights, http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-govemance/rol.html, (last visited Oct. 17, 2008) ("[Clivil and commercial codes that
respect private property and contracts are key ingredients for the development of market-based
economies. USAID's efforts to strengthen legal systems fall under three inter-connected priority
areas: supporting legal reform, improving the administration of justice, and increasing citizens'
access to justice."); for the Asian Development Bank, see Eveline N. Fischer, Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Asian Dev. Bank, Lessons Learned from Judicial Reform: The ADB Experience (Oct. 20, 2006)
("Since 1995, international donors have invested more than US$1.0 billion in legal and judicial
reform work-for good reason. Strong rules-based institutions promote economic growth. A fair,
independent
and
efficient
judiciary
supports
equitable
development."),
http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2006/10829-speech-Eveline-Fischer/; and for the 1MF, see, e.g.,
Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Approves Three-Year US
$75.8 Million Stand-By Arrangement for Macedonia (Sept. 15, 2005) ("Comprehensive judicial
reform, to be implemented over several years, will create a fairer and more predictable framework
for business activity by increasing the independence and professionalism ofjudges, eliminating court
delays, and removing misdemeanors and administrative cases from the regular courts."),
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05l96.htm.
Although not an aid-dispensing organization, Transparency International "raises awareness and diminishes apathy and tolerance of corruption, and devises and implements practical actions to address it."
Transparency International, About Transparency International,
http://www.transparency.org/about-us (last visited Oct.17, 2008). It has likewise recognized a
connection between judicial reform-specifically, eradication of corruption, economic progress and
other societal needs.
See Transparency International,
Other Thematic Issues,
http://www.transparency.org/global-priorities /other thematic-issues/judiciary (last visited Oct. 17,
2008) ("It is difficult to overstate the negative impact of a corrupt judiciary: it erodes the ability of
the international community to tackle transnational crime and terrorism; it diminishes trade, economic growth and human development; and most importantly, it denies citizens impartial settlement
of disputes with neighbors or the authorities."); Mary Noel Pepys, Corruption within the judiciary:
causes and remedies, in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007 3
(Cambridge
Univ.
Press
2007),
available at
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download.gcr/download.gcr_2007#download; see also Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing
Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF
KNOWLEDGE 39 (Thomas Carothers ed., Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 2006) [hereinafter
PROMOTING]("Real equality before the law requires courts that are strong and independent enough
to enforce it. It also depends particularly on a lack of corruption within the judiciary, because the
rich can use bribes to escape equal justice.").
See also the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) Rule of Law program, which seeks to
advance "peace through the development of democratic legal and governmental systems." United
States Institute of Peace, http://www.usip.org/specialists/bios/current/kritz.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2008). Also, the "USIP's Rule of Law Program works to assist institutions and processes that wiU
best bring about law-based management of international conflict and a sense of justice. The program
is based on the premise that adherence to the rule of law entails far more than the mechanical application of static legal technicalities; it requires an evolutionary search for those institutions and processes that will best bring about authentic stability through justice." http://www.usip.org/
ruleoflaw/about.htmi (last visited October 28, 2008). For general information about USIP, see
http://www.usip.org/aboutus/index.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
11.
Specifically, the ABA's Rule of Law Initiative is involved in the following substantive
areas: anti-corruption, criminal law reform and human trafficking, gender issues, human rights and
conflict mitigation, judicial reform, legal education reform and legal profession reform. See American Bar Association, supra note 10. Also, it is involved in over forty countries in Africa (including
North Africa), Asia, Europe and Eurasia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. Id.
Among the many efforts of the Rule of Law Initiative has been the Arab Women's Legal Network
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For example, according to a 2002 report:
The World Bank, the Interamerican [sic] Development Bank, and the
Asian Development Bank have extended over $800 million in loans
for judicial reform .... [T]he United Nations Development Program,
the European Union and its member states, and the American, Australian, Canadian, and Japanese governments have provided signifinations improve the operation of the
cant grant aid to help developing
12
government.
of
judicial branch
The World Bank reports having lent $273.2 million in 2002, $530.9
million in 2003, $503.4 million in 2004, $303.8 million in 2005, $757.6
13
million in 2006, and $424.5 million in 2007 on rule of law initiatives.
As one commentator noted, there has been a "massive surge in development assistance for law reform projects in developing and transition
economies involving investments of many billions of dollars. The World
'rule of law' projects and
Bank alone reports that it has supported 330
14
spent $2.9 billion on this sector since 1990.,

(AWLN), for which the ABA has provided "technical assistance and capacity-building support."
See Arab Women's Legal Network Holds General Meeting in Amman, ABA RULE OF LAW
http://www.abanet
2007,
9,
July
INITIATIVE,
.org/rollnews/news jordan-awln-general-meeting.shtml. The idea of the AWLN was conceived in
February 2004 at a conference in Amman, Jordan, and the network was formally launched in 2005.
Legal Network,
Arab
Women's
The
Initiative,
Law
of
ABA
Rule
See
http://www.abanet.org/rol/mena/awln.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2008). The purpose of the AWLN
included considering and advancing issues facing women in the legal profession and women's rights
generally. Id.; see also U.S. Dep't of State, Women and the Law-A Regional Dialogue: Conference
conference),
Amman
(2004
Conclusions
and
Observations,
Summary,
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31797 .htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
Two of the persons acknowledged in this article were involved with the AWLN, one
Evelyn Lance, in the AWLN's formative phase at the 2004 Amman conference, see, for example,
Lance, supra note 3, and the other, Martha Dye, in managing the North African segment of the
program supporting the AWLN. See, e.g., A Bulletin for CEELI Staff, Volunteers and Friends
Around the World, Women Legal ProfessionalsCome Togetherfor ABA Training in Morocco, May
20, 2005, availableat http://mail.abanet.org/scripts/wa.exe?A3=ind0505&L=ROLENEWS&E=quotedprintable&P=75739&B=-%3DNextPart_001_01C55D4D.13469F2C&T=text%2Fhtml;%20charset
=iso-8859-1.
12. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 1;see also
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RULE OF LAW FUNDiNG WORLDWIDE FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1993-98 2-3 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99158.pdf:
Based on the funding data that cognizant departments and agencies made available, the
United States provided at least $970 million in rule of law assistance to countries
throughout the world during fiscal years 1993-98 .... At least 35 entities from various
U.S. departments and agencies have a role in U.S. rule of law assistance programs. The
Departments of State and Justice and USAID are the principal organizations providing
rule of law training, technical advice, and related assistance. The Department of Defense,
the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), numerous law enforcement agencies and bureaus,
and other U.S. departments and agencies also have a direct role.
Id. Research has not disclosed an updated study by the General Accounting Office.
13. THE WORLD BANK, SUMMARY OF FISCAL YEAR AcrIvrrTIEs 55 (2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2K7Resources/AR07Section3.pdf.
14. TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 2; see also Economics and the Rule of Law:
Order in the Jungle, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.economist.
com/displaystory.cfm?story-id=10849115 ("Western donors have poured billions into rule-of-law
projects over the past 20 years.").
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The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a United States
government corporation that provides aid to countries meeting certain
levels of satisfactory standards of good governance. 15 Founded in 2004,
the "MCC is based on the principle that aid is most effective when it
reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people." 16 Eligibility for grants depends, among other things, on whether
the country meets certain thresholds in particular categories. These categories include: "Ruling Justly" indicators, consisting of "Political
Rights" and "Civil Liberties" (measured by Freedom House indexes);
"Control of Corruption;" "Government Effectiveness;" "Rule of Law;"
and "Voice and Accountability" (measured by World Bank Institute indexes). 17 Using these indicators, the MCC evaluates countries on, among
other things, "public confidence in the ... judicial system; ... strength
and impartiality of the legal system; . . . independence, effectiveness,
predictability, and integrity of the judiciary; . . . [and the training of
18

judges] in order to carry out justice in a fair and unbiased manner.',
Eligibility does not require minimum scores in all indicators. 19 The purpose of the indicators is "to identify countries with policy environments
that will allow Millennium Challenge Account funding
to be effective in
20
reducing poverty and promoting economic growth.

Rule of law reform includes both judicial reform and overall legal
reform.2 ' What falls into the category of judicial reform or legal reform
15.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Fact-Sheet: The Millennium Challenge
Corporation and Political Reform in the Arab World, http://www.camegieendowment
.org/files/mccfactsheetl .pdf.
16.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, About MCC, http://www.mcc.gov/about/index.php
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
17.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, supra note 15.
18.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, Guide to the MCC Indicatorsand the Selection Process: Fiscal Year 2008 16-17 (2008) http://www.mca.gov/documents/mcc-fy08-guidetoindicators
andtheselectionprocess.pdf.
19.
Morocco received in August 2007 a $698 million five-year compact, despite passing only
two of the six "Ruling Justly" indicators, in light of its qualification in other categories of eligibility.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, supra note 15. Some countries which might not
otherwise qualify for funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation may meet the test for
threshold funding. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of State, Millennium Challenge Corporation Board
of Directors Announces 2007 Threshold Countries: Niger; Peru; and Rwanda (Nov. 8, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/76110.htm ("MCC's Threshold Program is designed to assist
countries on the 'threshold' of Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) eligibility for Compact assistance. Threshold countries must demonstrate a commitment to reforms that will address the specific
policy weaknesses identified by the MCA eligibility criteria.").
Improving conditions in developing nations, of course, requires attention to sectors in
addition to rule of law reform in an integrated approach. See Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Western Hemisphere Planning and Development Section, Active Response
Corps
Regional
Deployment,
Port-au-Prince,
Haiti,
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&shortcut=4RPF (last visited Dec. 7,
2008) (mentioning security and police, judicial improvement, good governance and community
building, and economic and infrastructure development).
20. Millennium Challenge Corporation, supra note 18, at 2.
21.
Cf. Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 47 ("Although most legal scholars define the rule of law
by its ends, most programs to build the rule of law implicitly define the rule of law by its institutional attributes. . . . Internally, most practitioner organizations rarely use the words rule-of-law
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"blurs at the margin," but the "core of a judicial reform program typically consists of measures to improve the operation of the judicial branch
of government and related [or supporting] entities such as bar associations and law schools. 22 This includes "changes in the ways in which
judges are selected, evaluated, and disciplined to ensure that decisions
are insulated from improper influences. 23 Overall legal reform may
include drafting and revising legislation as well. 24 Increasing compensation and respect for the judiciary are also concerns.25
Reforms need not involve transplanting "complicated legal systems
that work well in rich countries" to poorer countries "without significant
modification., 26 The subject of legal transplantation-what is successful
or unsuccessful and why-is one of some complexity; however, merely
transplanting an institution from one place to another does not insure that
the institution will be functional or effective when it arrives at its destination.27 The "'hasty transplant syndrome' is a critical problem in legal
reform and instead discuss legal reform, judicial reform, and police (or law enforcement) reform.");
Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 20 ("[T]he terms judicial
reform and rule-of-law reform [are] often used interchangeably," but "[tihe question of which institutions are most germane to the establishment of the rule of law in a country is actually quite complex and difficult.").
22. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 4. See
Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 48 ("As practitioners have tried to reform these primary institutions
[such as the judiciary], however, they have found that they rely on the proper functioning of a large
and ever-growing array of essential supporting institutions.... The judiciary is reliant on magistrates' schools, law schools, bar associations, clerks and administrative workers, and other supporting groups ....
As new supporting institutions are discovered and deemed to be essential, they are
added to the list of areas in need of reform.").
23. Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 5.
24. Id. at 4.
25.
Kleinfeld, supranote 10, at 59 ("When judges are underpaid and underrespected, corruption can take hold, forcing difficult choices between increasing judicial independence and achieving
predictable, equitable justice.").
26. Juan Carlos Botero et al., Judicial Reform, 18 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 61, 83
(2003). See also id. at 77 ("Poor countries, or countries without a developed judicial tradition,
should probably concentrate on instituting simple rules and procedures that are easy to enforce. A
legal system that will do perfect justice in infinite time and at infinite cost is probably a luxury that
the poor can ill afford."); Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Frameworkfor Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 5 (1998) (recommending simple rules "for the kind of
weak judiciary that one is apt to find in a poor country" because, among other reasons, they put
"fewer demands on the time and the competence of the judges" and therefore are less costly and
make decision-making "more likely to be accurate.").
27.
See Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 167 (2003)
(classifying countries into those that developed their formal legal order internally ("origins") and
those that received their formal legal order from other countries ("transplants")). Considering receptive and unreceptive transplants, the authors note that "[t]he most common complaint is that while
the transplanted law is now on the books, the enforcement of these new laws is quite ineffective."
Id. at 165; see id. at 179. See also Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11 ANNu. REV. POLIT. ScI. 205, 221 (2008) ("[I]nstitutions do not necessarily have the same
effects when transplanted from one context to another. To redeploy the memorable line of former
Brazilian minister Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, 'institutions can at most be imported, never exported."') (citation omitted); MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 2 (MIT Press 2001) (noting that "a borrowed institution may be neither enforceable nor
functional" under certain circumstances); KATHARINA PISTOR, THE STANDARDIZATION OF LAW
AND ITS EFFECT ON DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 15 (United Nations Publ'n 2000), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/pogdsmdpbg24d4.en.pdf (distinguishing between merely having "the
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reform assistance, which 'involves using foreign laws as a model for a
translation and adaptation of the laws
new country, without sufficient
' 28
into the local legal culture.'
B. The Linkage Between the Rule of Law and Economic Development at
Home and Abroad
1. Definition of the Rule of Law
The concept of the rule of law has been traced to "political theorists
like Aristotle, Montesquieu and Locke, who were concerned with devising limits to the power of the government., 29 In the case of Aristotle, the
concept appears in the sense of "judging the case rather than the parties"
and showing impartiality. 30 The phrase "rule of law" itself has been attributed to British jurist Albert Venn Dicey in 1885.31 The phrase is susceptible to varying definitions from the limited to the substantial.
For example, definitions of the rule of law have been described as
32
broad and variable; it has been called a "notoriously plastic phrase.,
The phrase "rule of law" is not a "legal term of art.",33 Commentators
have varying views of its utility. One extreme view is that the phrase has
best laws on the books" and "establishment of effective legal institutions," which are not necessarily
the same thing). Pistor "warns against viewing legal standards as a panacea for building effective
legal systems around the world." Id. at 17.
28. Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned About Legal Reform, in PROMOTING, supra note 10,
at 139. "In some egregious cases, reformers simply translate a law from one language to another,
change references to the country through search-and-replace commands, and then have the law
passed by a compliant local legislature. The result is generally an ill-fitting law that does not 'take'
in its new environment as evidenced by inadequate implementation." Id. at 139-40. The mistaken
assumption is that if one would
simply help countries adopt the laws that have been proven to support economic development, such development would follow ....
In some sense, this approach could be
compared to a hypothetical orchard development program in which analysts recognize
that healthy orchards all have a certain quality of apples. The analysts then fly in apples,
tie them to the local trees, and momentarily assume success because the result looks like
an orchard.
Id. at 145. See also Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 52 ("reformers tend to waste time and scarce legal
resources within developing countries in efforts to make laws and institutions look like those in their
own system.").
29. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the 'Rule of Law' Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRrrICAL APPRAISAL 257 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (citation omitted). A history of the rule of law commencing
with the ancient Greeks appears in BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
POLITICS, THEORY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004); however, Tamanaha's book does not cover the

subject of the rule of law and economic development.
30. Richard Posner, The Role of the Judge in the 21st Century, 86 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1049,
1057 (2006) (internal citation omitted). See id. at 1057:
[A] defining ... element of the judicial protocol is what Aristotle called corrective justice. That means judging the case rather than the parties, an aspiration given symbolic expression in statues of justice as a blindfolded goddess and in the judicial oath requiring
judges to make decisions without respect to persons. It is also the essential meaning of
the "rule of law."
TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supranote 3, at 15.
31.
32. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse in China?, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 196.
33.
Ohnesorge, supra note 6, at 101.
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no meaning: "The 'rule of law' means whatever one wants it to mean.
It's an empty vessel that everyone can fill up with their own vision., 34 If
rule of law just means the "rule of good law," the term is useless, since
"'we have no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to dis' 35
cover that to believe in it is to believe that good should triumph."'
"Everyone uses the phrase because everyone can get behind it and it
might make it easier to get funding., 36 "The rule of law... stands in the
peculiar state of being the preeminent legitimating political ideal in the
world today, without agreement upon precisely what it means. 3 7
One commentator observed that "[w]hen an American writes or
speaks on [the rule of law] he usually begins with a confident assumption
that everybody knows what the rule of law is and then devotes the rest of
his time to a bold and eloquent statement in favor of it."'38 Another
commentator noted the following:
Our tradition has produced no agreed definition of the Rule of Law,
and there is no important tradition of academic analysis and explication of the term .... Few American law students study jurisprudence
(legal philosophy), and it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of American law students never address the Rule of Law concept
in any systematic way.39
The rule of law should not be the rule of any law, regardless of its
content, however. Although that may enhance predictability, such a rule
of law would be "compatible with a regime of laws with inequitable or
evil content"; and it "may actually strengthen the grip of an authoritarian
regime40by enhancing its efficiency and by according it a patina of legitimacy.

34. Stephenson, supranote 32, at 196.
35. Id. (citing Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L. Q. REv. at 195-96 (1977)).
See also TAmANAHA, supra note 29, at 113 ("The rule of law cannot be about everything good that
people desire from government. The persistent temptation to read it this way is a testament to the
symbolic power of the rule of law, but it should not be indulged.").
36.
Stephenson, supra note 32, at 196.
37.
TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 4. See also id. at 1 ("[T]here appears to be widespread
agreement, traversing all fault lines, on one point, and one point alone: that the 'rule of law' is good
for everyone.").
38.
Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COL. L. REv. 143, 145 (1958).
39. Ohnesorge, supra note 6, at 102. Minimalist or thin theories of the Rule of Law emphasize "form and procedure" rather than a set of "substantive rights or norms," and "maximalist, or
thick theories" include "references to democracy and core human rights." Id.
40. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 120; id. at 95-96 ('qhe rule of law in the service of an
immoral legal regime would be immoral. Clarity and consistency of application with respect to
pernicious laws-like legalized slavery-makes the system more evil, enhancing its draconian
efficiency and malicious effect ....
To see formal legality as moral in itself can have hazardous
consequences for a populace."). See also Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on Nazis in the Courtroom, Lessons from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges Under the Laws of the Third Reich and
Vichy, France,61 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1124-25 (1995); Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in
the Jungle, supra note 14, at 84 ("America's southern states in the Jim Crow era were governed by
the rule of law on thin definitions, but not on thick.").
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The World Justice Project has identified four "universal" principles
comprising its "working definition" of the rule of law, embodying,
among other things, fairness, accountability, independence, and competence:
1. The government and its officials and agents are accountable under
the law;
2. The laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property;
3. The process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient;
4. The laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or
representatives, and judges, who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they
41
serve.
Another view likewise ascribes to the rule of law three elements,
which generally require that the courts should be accessible, independent, impartial and accountable:
The rule of law is a tradition of decision, a tradition embodying at
least three indispensable elements: first, that every person whose interests will be affected by a judicial or administrative decision has the
right to a meaningful "day in court"; second, that deciding officers
shall be independent in the full sense, free from external direction by
political and administrative superiors in the disposition of individual
cases and inwardly free from the influence of personal gain and partisan or popular bias; and third, that day-to-day decisions shall be reasoned, rationally justified, in terms that take due account both of the
demands of general principle and the demands of the particular situa42
tion.
In turn, judicial impartiality and independence are captured by the
notions that decisions "are reached on the factual and legal merits of the
41.
World Justice Project, http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/about (last visited Nov. 4,
2008).
42. Jones, supra note 38, at 145, cited with approval in Ohnesorge, supra note 6, at 101-02.
See also Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING supra note 10, at 4, noting that
[t]he rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are
clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political
and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the last halfcentury. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing
and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system,
including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient.
Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation.
Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding.
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issues before the court, uninfluenced by considerations that are extraneous to those merits, such as personal relations between the judge and one
of the parties, corruption, cronyism, political interference or coercion in
particular decisions, especially those affecting the government of the day
or its officials." 43 Judicial accountability, among other things, includes
such matters as the quality of the decision-making process, compliance
with judicial codes of conduct, and the efficiency of judicial administration.44
Different concepts of the rule of law are peculiarly referred to as
"thick" or "thin," depending on the number and kinds of requirements
they contain, and have been shown in a sliding scale. 45 The thickest versions contain individual rights, including some social welfare concepts.4 6
For example, the World Justice Project's concept of the rule of law is not
merely one of formalistic legality, but expressly includes concepts of
fairness, competence, and the protection of "fundamental rights." Its
definition appears to fall within the "thicker" part of the scale.
The notion of the "rule of law, not of men" has sometimes been
considered an alternative view of the rule of law.47 This is subject to the
caveat that human participation cannot be divorced from the operation of
law since laws do not apply or interpret themselves.48 It is a valuable
reminder that judges should "apply a relevant body of rules to a situation," rather than "do as they please . . . without regard to rules. 4 9
43.

TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 3, at 31.

44.
Id. at 63-65. The authors elaborated on the concept of accountability as follows:
For example, decisions of judges in lower courts are typically subject to a judicial appeal
process to higher courts. Gross dereliction of duty, abuse of office, and other flagrant
forms of judicial misconduct are typically subject to some form of judicial disciplinary
process, which may be administered by the courts themselves or by a semi-independent
body representing a diverse range of relevant stakeholders. Operational accountability in
the efficient and appropriate expenditure of public monies is often ensured through various budgetary allocation processes and public audit mechanisms ....
Id. at 32. See also Stefan Voigt, The Economic Effects of Judicial Accountability-Some Preliminary Insights 3 (Int'l Centre for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19, 2005):
Of course, we do not want judges to be able to decide no matter what with regard to cases
brought before them. We want them to treat the parties appearing in front of them with
respect, to separate relevant from irrelevant arguments, and to decide the case within a
reasonable period of time according to the letter of the law. We do not want them to let
their personal preferences or their sympathy or antipathy with the parties to taint their decision. In that sense, we want judges to be accountable to the law and, at the end of the
day, to the people who use the law as a means to structure their interactions.
45.
TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 91.
46.
Id. at 112; Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The PoliticalEconomy
of Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformers' Responses, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE:
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 336, 338 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2003) ("In Western liberal democratic discourse, rule of law connotes a commitment to democracy, an emphasis on law and order, limitations on the power of state action (particularly police and prosecutors), respect for legal authority, individual rights, and an effort to hold
state actors up to the same rules and standards as everyone else.") (footnote omitted).
47.
See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 122.
48.
Id. at 123.
49.
Id. at 126.
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Without specifying what the rules should be, the concept calls for government to "sublimate their views to the applicable laws."5 °
Finally, the World Justice Project recently developed a Rule of Law
index that has been and will be applied to a number of countries, including the United States, to measure the extent to which a country acts in
conformity with the rule of law. 5 1 A pilot study performed for the Project by the Vera Institute measured the rule of law to a limited extent in
three cities outside the United States and in New York City to "gauge the
extent to which all people, particularly those who are poor or otherwise
marginalized, experience and benefit from the rule of law. 52

50.
Id. at 140.
51.
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, http://www.worldjusticeproject.org/rule-oflaw-index (last visited Nov. 4, 2008):
The Rule of Law Index is the first index that examines the rule of law comprehensively.
. . Because the Index looks at the rule of law in practice and not solely as it exists on the
books, the Index will be able to guide governments, civil society, NGOs and business
leaders in targeting efforts to strengthen the rule of law.
The WJP has developed a robust and cost-effective methodology to measure more than
100 variables. It utilizes two main sources of new data: a general population poll, and a
qualified respondent's questionnaire. In addition, existing data and data drawn from other
indices are being incorporated into the analysis.
The WJP has completed field testing Version 1.0 of the Rule of Law Index in Argentina,
Australia, Colombia, Spain, Sweden and the USA. The next round of testing will be
conducted in Liberia and Tanzania. The WJP anticipates administering the Index in 100
countries in three years. In each country where the Index is administered, the WJP will
prepare a Rule of Law Index report that describes its findings. The Index will be
administered periodically to show changes in countries over time.
See also MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX:
MEASURING ADHERENCE TO THE RULE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD 5, 8,22, 23 (2008); id. at 5:

The Index methodology employs a combination of data collection methods and sources
of information, including a standardized general population poll, four standardized expert
surveys, and analysis and triangulation of data from existing indices and local sources.
The methodology developed by the WJP [World Justice Project] team was tested in Argentina, Australia, Colombia, Spain, Sweden and the United States.
52.
JIM PARSONS ET AL., VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DEVELOPING INDICATORS TO
MEASURE THE RULE OF LAW: A GLOBAL APPROACH, A REPORT TO THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT 1

(2008). See also AGRAST, supra note 51, at 5 ("In addition, the Vera Institute of Justice developed
for the WJP a set of new performance indicators to measure the Index, and tested indicators for the
last two bands of the Index in [particular'cities in] Chile, India, Nigeria and the United States.").
The Vera project commenced in January 2008, and its findings were presented to the World Justice
Forum in Vienna, Austria, in July 2008. PARSONS, supra at 1. In addition to New York City, the
particular cities studied were Chandigarh, India, Lagos, Nigeria, and Santiago, Chile. Id. As a pilot
project, the Vera report also noted lessons learned, next steps, and future challenges. Id. at 23-26.
As its "baseline" definition of the rule of law, the Vera Report accepted a 2004 definition
of the United Nations Secretary-General, as follows:
[The "rule of law"] refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well,
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the
law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers,
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.
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2. What is Economic Development?
Although the rule of law obviously applies to the United States as
well as other countries, the phrase is still most commonly used these
days in the field of international development work. 53 For example,
starting in the early 1990s, the World Bank and LMF "began conditioning
the provision of financial assistance on the implementation of the rule of
law in recipient countries," justified in order to "provide a secure envi54
ronment for investments, property, contracts, and market transactions.
Over the past couple of decades, this has grown to be a professional
field, whose practitioners use funding from international development
institutions, such as USAID, to promote the rule of law in developing
countries and post-conflict environments.55

Id. at 3 (citing the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and PostConflict Societies, 4, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004.616) (August 23, 2004)
cited with approval in U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., THE GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY
ANALYSIS: THE RULE OF LAW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 5 (2008)). This definition in part appears to
invoke the rule of good law by bringing in a human rights component to the rule of law and therefore
would fall within the "thicker" part of the scale for rule of law definitions. AGRAST, supra note 51,
at 6.
53. For application of the concept of the rule of law domestically, see TAMANAHA, supra note
29, at 130 (providing examples of how the United States has disregarded the rule of law in the international arena). See also Symposium, supra note 5, at 223-26; Marci Hamilton, The Rule of Law
Even As We Try to Export the Ideal of Justice By Law, Not Whim, Some in America Resist That Very
Ideal, (Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20031023.html ("Public
servants... have invested enormous amounts of time into the project of exporting the rule of law to
countries trying to establish democracy .... Even as we export this precious principle, however,
there is evidence that it has lost ground here at home."); World Justice Project, Domestic Mainstreaming of the Rule of Law, supra note 5 ("The rule of law needs to be strengthened in the United
States as it does around the world. To promote that effort, a kickoff 'mainstreaming' meeting was
held in Washington, DC in February 2007. Now, state and local bar associations around the country
are designing state-level multidisciplinary outreach meetings that can identify multidisciplinary
partnerships for strengthening the rule of law at the state and local levels.").
54. TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 2.
55. The antecedents of the current "law and development" movement may be traced back to
unsuccessful efforts in the 1960s to reform international judicial systems and substantive laws. This
effort, sponsored by USAID, the Ford Foundation, and private American donors, ended unsuccessfully but was subsequently resumed in a different form in the 1990s. See Messick, JudicialReform
and Economic Development, supranote 10, at 125 (1999); id. at 128-132 (describing rule of law aid
programs); see also Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 895, 900 (2008) (describing, among
other things, the "first wave of law and development theorists that emerged in the 1960's"); David
M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062, 1065. The "most significant
reason" for the early failure was reportedly the belief that United States legal institutions could be
"easily transplanted to developing countries." Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 126. Before the 1990s resumption, U.S. aid providers "took an interest in
law-oriented aid, starting in Central America in the mid-1980's," concentrating on criminal justice.
THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE 163 (Camegie Endowment for Int'l Peace 1999).
Many resources are available on international development efforts and practices, including http://www.bizclir.coml ("This site is a dynamic knowledge development and knowledge sharing
tool to improve the impact of USAID's efforts on Business Climate Legal and Institutional Reform.
The site will host information for development practitioners including: country assessments, best
practices, publications, and expert opinions.").
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Many articles refer to the rule of law and economic development;
however, little is said in those articles about the definition of economic
development, as if all readers knew what this term meant. Sometimes
the word "economic growth" is used instead of "economic development," as if both words were the same; and sometimes the words "development" and "growth" both appear in the same definition, as follows:
Outside the U.S., the concept of local economic development (LED)
refers to a broad set of financial and technical assistance provided to
less developed countries (LDCs) to reduce global poverty. In this
sense, policies and programs focus on a comprehensive approach to
economic growth that includes capacity building for citizen, public
and private sector participation and collaboration. These efforts may
focus on improvements to political, legal, financial, transportation,
communications, education, environmental, or healthcare systems.
Business or employment specific aspects of LED may focus on entrepreneurial development, foreign direct investment, and the development and maintenance of 56
efficient production and distribution systems for goods and services.

Although the subject is not free from doubt, development is sometimes perceived to be the broader term and more representative of permanent economic progress.
Nonetheless, nothing precludes the rule of
law from supporting less extensive forms of economic progress.
56. Int'l Econ. Dev. Council, Economic Development White Paper, 1-2 (2006).
57. My wide-ranging inquiry in July and August 2008 about the meaning of "economic development" to experienced thinkers in the field
of rule of law and economic development surprisingly led to responses to the effect that this was a "good question," with limited suggestions. This
led me to consider the subject carefully and reach my own conclusion regarding what economic
development meant, as stated in this article.
My similar inquiry about the differences between "economic development" and "economic growth" in August 2008 led to numerous comments to the effect that this too was a "good
question" and suggested distinctions and theories on the similarities and differences. For example,
there were some responses to the effect that they are not the same; that they should not be applied
interchangeably; that development was a broader and more sustainable form of economic progress;
and that, among other things, growth may indeed occur (as measured by an increase in GDP) without
overall improvement in other indicators of economic progress, such as reductions in unemployment,
poverty and wealth disparity. See, e.g., e-mail from Moira Brennan to author and American Society
of International Law Interest Group Members for International Economic Law and Transitional
Justice and Rule of Law (Aug. 28, 2008, 22:05 EST) (on file with author and Denver University Law
Review). Among other things, the Brennan e-mail noted "thank you for raising an important question . . . of whether the words 'economic growth' and 'economic development' should be used
interchangeably." Id.
Others commented to the effect that the phrases are often used interchangeably and are
essentially the same. See, e.g., e-mail from Frank Upham, Wilf Family Professor of Property Law,
New York University School of Law to author (Aug. 28, 2008, 09:13 EST) (on file with author and
Denver University Law Review) ("I generally think economic growth and economic development
denote the same phenomenon, i.e., an increase in the gross national product. The fundamental unit
of measurement is economic and does not include the political, social, or psychological measures of
well being that Sen was paramount in putting into the term 'development.' Of course we are using
these terms advisedly. Most people lump them all together."). See also e-mail from Kenneth Dam,
Max Pam Professor Emeritus of American & Foreign Law, Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago
Law School to author (Aug. 27, 2008, 17:32 EST) (on file with author and Denver University Law
Review) ("I believe that for most purposes they [i.e., economic growth and economic development]
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The definition of economic development may differ from country to
country and context to context, especially to the extent that it depends on
priorities. For example, for a country with insufficient housing, power
plants, highways, and jobs, it might mean more houses, power plants,
road construction, and new jobs. For a country with lots of housing,
power plants and roads, it might mean, among other things, more hospitals and manufacturing, if those were deficient. If the country lacked
certain goods and services, development might mean the production of
those goods and services. The definition depends on what is needed in
each case.5 8
Furthermore, whether development in particular areas
should be left to market forces in laissez-faire economies or otherwise
directed or encouraged is a fair ground for discussion in a country-bycountry context.
As an alternative or supplemental tool for assessing economic development, one might consider large measures of wealth, such as gross
domestic product or per capita income. To the extent that they do not
take into account disparities in wealth within a country, however, those
measures may be insufficiently meaningful. Therefore, to counterbalance this, one might need to reflect on the "Gini coefficient of inequality." According to the World Bank, the Gini coefficient "is the most
commonly used measure of inequality. The coefficient varies between 0
[zero], which reflects complete equality, and 1 [one], which indicates
complete inequality (one person has all the income or consumption, all
others have none)." 59 "To begin to understand what life is like in a country-to know, for example, how many of its inhabitants are poor-it is
not enough to know that country's per capita income. The number of
poor people in a country and the average quality of life also depend on
how equally-or unequally-income is distributed. 6 °
Thus one might not regard something which exacerbates wealth
disparities (e.g., by leaving virtually all the wealth in the hands of a few,
such as a dictator or an aristocracy, while the rest of the population remains impoverished) to be positive economic development, even if it
are interchangeable today. But economic development does seem slightly broader in the sense best
seen if one looks at an oil rich country which may show rapid growth in GDP but by failing to build
the physical and other infrastructure for broader based growth in the future is not enjoying as much
economic development as another country which does prepare for continued growth after oil production growth levels out or begins to fall.").
58. This definition of economic development does not define "needs." Nor does it specify if a
country needs many things how the priorities for filling those needs should be established. For
example, it does not answer the question of how many hospitals should be built if the country lacks
hospitals. This level of precision may be determined by the policymakers in each particular country.
59. The
World
Bank,
Measuring
Inequality,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITEEXTERNALJTOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/O,,contentMDK
:20238991-menuPK:492138-pagePK:148956-piPK:216618-theSitePK:430367,00.html (last visited October 29, 2008).
60. The World Bank Group, Beyond Economic Growth Student Book, Chapter 5, Income
Inequality, http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/chapter5.html (last visited
October 29, 2008).
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raises the country's overall wealth dramatically. Countries with extraordinary disparities of wealth and poverty may also be unstable and thus be
poor investment climates for business. "High inequality threatens a
country's political stability because more people are dissatisfied with
their economic status, which makes it harder to reach political consensus
among population groups with higher and lower incomes. Political instability increases the risks of investing in a country and so significantly
undermines its development potential ....,,61

Regardless of the measure of economic development, certain principles arguably support economic progress-namely, enforcement rather
than violation of legitimate bargains, 62 encouragement rather than discouragement of investment in useful enterprises, creation rather than
dissipation of legitimate and useful employment opportunities, and increase rather than shrinkage in the production of valuable goods and services. The words "legitimate" and "useful" in this sentence are intended
to reflect the notion that there is no societal interest in enforcing corrupt
contracts or contracts otherwise against public policy, 63 creating unlawful
employment opportunities or ones which are not socially useful, or in
providing poor quality or undesirable goods and services. For example,
undesirable employment opportunities might be the following: jobs
building x when the country already makes too much x, and there is no
export market for x; or jobs in industries which do not benefit society,
such as building arms for aggressive war, serving in a dictator's secret
police, and engaging in narcotics production and human trafficking. The
armaments and narcotics themselves might also be examples of undesirable production.
The use of the phrase "public policy" brings up the question of
"whose public policy," since public policy may vary from country to

61.
Id.
See
also
id.
at
Chapter
VI,
Poverty
and
Hunger,
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/chapter6.html ("A favorable investment
climate includes many factors that make investing in one country more profitable and less risky than
in another country. Political stability is one of the most important of these factors. Both domestic
and foreign investors are discouraged by the threat of political upheaval and by the prospect of a new
regime that might impose punitive taxes or expropriate capital assets.").
62.

See KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT 93 (The Brookings Institution 2006).
63.
See Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 153
(1958) ("It is not that the right of property or the right to contract were ever absolute; ... the rule
that courts will not enforce contracts against public policy are sufficient reminders that every legal
system has put outside limits on the autonomy of property owners and contracting parties."). Nor is
the rule of law voided by certain contractual limitations. See also id. at 154:
[Sitatute barring forfeiture of premiums paid on a lapsed life-insurance policy diminishes
freedom of contract only in the doctrinaire sense that insurers no longer can impose forfeiture clauses on a "take it or leave it" basis. Because of the inequality of bargaining
power, such clauses were never the subject of genuine negotiation between insurer and
insurance applicant. Similarly, it would be wildly unrealistic to see in a minimum wage
law only an interference with the individual employee's right to contract for less than
subsistence wages.
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country. 64 Western institutions attempting to bring rule of law reforms to
foreign countries would undoubtedly find it difficult to encourage enforcement which substantially offended their own public policy standards; and ignoring foreign standards of public policy would presumably
lead to resistance from the foreign nations concerned.
3. The Linkage Between the Rule of Law and Economic
Development
Many have linked the rule of law to economic development in developing countries, and statements to that effect are common and longstanding. 65 "The argument that the rule of law fosters economic development has been made many times. ' 66 Although the principal focus of
64.
See Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 129 (noting
research on contracting in Africa and finding to the effect that "rigid compliance with the terms of a
written contract was difficult if not impossible, in developing countries. Their economies are simply
subject to too many exogenous shocks for contracts to be strictly enforced ....
").
65.
See Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 121. The
article goes on to trace that argument to, among others, John Fortescue, Henry VI's chancellor, in the
15th century, Adam Smith in the 18th century, and Max Weber in the 19th century. Id. at 121-22. It
also links the notion to Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. See id.
at 3 ("Without a reliable judicial
system, he [Hobbes] argued, traders will be reluctant to enter into wealth-enhancing exchanges for
fear that their bargains will not be honored."). The full quote from Hobbes's LEVIATHAN is as
follows:
For he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after, because the
bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions,
without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature, where all
men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.
And therefore he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to
the right he can never abandon of defending his life and means of living.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991), available
at http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-c.html.
The proof of Hobbes's
theory of transactions is difficult since it would require showing how many bargains were not made
because of a poor judicial system. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra
note 10, at 120. A similar task would be to show how many dogs do not bark at night because of a
particular set of circumstances.
66. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 121; see Posner,
supra note 26, at 3 ("If it is not possible to demonstrate as a matter of theory that a reasonably wellfunctioning legal system is a necessary condition of a nation's prosperity, there is empirical evidence
showing that the rule of law does contribute to a nation's wealth and its rate of economic growth
[citation omitted].").
However, there is some controversy, among other things, concerning the strength of the
connection between rule of law and economic development in certain countries. See John K.M.
Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxiesand the Northeast
Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 256 (2008); see also Kevin E. Davis, What Can
the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141, 143 (2004)
("Optimistic claims about the role of legal institutions in achieving development have a long lineage.
In fact, most contemporary versions of this theory can be traced back to the tum-of-the-century
writings of Max Weber. But theoretical analyses that are skeptical about whether legal institutions
play an independent role in achieving development, or any other form of social change, are equally
easy to find.") (footnote omitted); David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance in the Ruins, 122 HARV. L. REV.
696, 696 (2008) (book review of CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND
CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008)) (reviewer notes that authors of reviewed book describe themselves as caricaturing, "[i]n [their] more cynical moments," what they call the "endowment perspective," to the effect that "good economic outcomes" result from "good law + good
enforcement.").
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the rule of law and economic development discussion is in the context of
international development, some American business organizations have
noted the relationship between law and American economic prosperity as
well.67 For example, one multinational company has recognized that
"the business community [has] a particular opportunity to help spread the
word that if countries want to grow economically, if they want to create
better futures for their people, if they want to build new jobs, the independence of the judiciary in fact plays a critical role in economic development." 68 In addition, the United States Chamber of Commerce has
concluded as part of its "tort" or "civil justice" reform agenda that the
American tort system costs businesses billions and harms both employment and productivity.69 Similar statements have been made by others,
including the American Tort Reform Association:
67.
Construed broadly, the civil justice reform agenda, to the extent that it seeks greater
fairness and even-handedness, is consistent with the rule of law. To the extent that the goal is not an
impartial system but one in which victory is assured or nearly assured in each case, it would not be.
See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (Doubleday 2008). Much of the reform language, however,
asserts the benefits of an unbiased and even-handed system, the proverbial "level playing field."
68.
Text of prepared remarks by Brad Smith, Senior Vice President, Legal & Corporate Affairs, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Microsoft Corporation, American Society of International Law Second Century Dinner, Washington, D.C., November 3, 2006, available at
(last visited
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/bradsmith/l1-03-061ntemationalLaw.mspx
October 28, 2008). See also id. (emphasis added):
One of the things I first discovered when I was working in Central and Eastern Europe in
1990 and 1991, when the Iron Curtain had just fallen, was how enthusiastic people were
to welcome foreign investment, especially investment that they perceived as having real
potential to generate economic growth. That remains the case today. People want corporations to be subject to their laws and regulations, and quite rightly so, and they also want
them to be present and investing in the local economy. I think that one of the important
messages we have the opportunity and indeed do convey is that we're able to make those
kinds of investments only if we have confidence that there is a legal system with principled rules applied in an objective manner by an independentjudiciary.
The remarks likewise commented on the importance of respect for a fair and independent
judiciary on a national level for respect for law at an international level:
The second challenge that I think we need to confront ... is the critical need for the
broadening and deepening recognition of the importance at the national level of a fair and
independent judiciary. You might ask "what does that have to do with international
law"? In answering, I would say this: one of the greatest threats to intemational law is
and has always been the prospect that executive power will simply ignore it. I don't
know how one can create a world in which executive power respects law at the international level if executive power doesn't respect the independence of the law and the judiciary at the national level.
Id.
69. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Institute for Law Reform, Lawsuit Abuse Impact,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/index.php?option=com ilr-issues&issue-code=LAI&view=il
r issue&expand=l (last visited Jan. 5, 2009):
America's runaway legal system imposes burdensome costs on workers, consumers,
small businesses, and healthcare. The cost of America's lawsuit-happy culture totals $261
billion a year, or $880 per person, according to seminal research by Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin (2006). According to a 2007 study commissioned by the Institute for Legal Reform, small businesses alone pay $98 billion a year to cover the cost of America's tort
system-money that could be used to hire additional workers, expand productivity, and
improve employee benefits.
See also U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Lawsuit Climate 2008: Ranking the States,
http://www.legalreforminthenews.com/2008PDFS/HarrisPollO8.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
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While most judges honor their commitment to be unbiased arbiters in
the pursuit of truth and justice, judges in Judicial Hellholes do not.
These few judges may simply favor local plaintiffs' lawyers and their
clients over defendant corporations. Some, in remarkable moments
of candor, have admitted their biases. More often, judges may, with
the best of intentions, make rulings for the sake of expediency or efficiency that have the effect of depriving a party of its right to a
proper defense. What Judicial Hellholes have in common is that they
systematically fail to adhere to core judicial tenets or principles of the
law. They have strayed from the mission of being places where legitimate victims can seek compensation from those whose wrongful
acts caused their injuries .... Rulings in these Judicial Hellholes of-

ten have national implications because they involve parties from
across the country, can result in excessive awards that bankrupt
businesses and destroy
jobs, and can leave a local judge to regulate
70
an entire industry.
The linkage between the rule of law and economic development
(including
foreign investment) has been described as the "dominant the71
ory.,,

70.
AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES-2007 1, http://www.atra.org
/reports/hellholes/report.pdf (emphasis added). Thus both the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
American Tort Reform Association have identified the relationship between legal reform and the
economy. Nonetheless, to the extent that either group is identified with reforming judicial selection
methods as a cure, they appear to be divided on how to proceed. Both do support legislative methods of civil justice reform, however.
71. See Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Finding and Facing Facts About Legal Systems and Foreign

Direct Investment in South Asia, 23:4 LEGAL STUDIES 649, 651-52 (2003):
The dominant theory therefore proposes that foreign investors are attracted to states with
"effective" legal systems-that is, those which are efficient and predictable, imposing
relatively low transaction costs on investors; and that they avoid states with "ineffective"
legal systems-that is, those which are inefficient and unpredictable, imposing relatively
high transaction costs on investors.... The central focus of this paper is how this dominant theory can be tested-that is, what methods can we use to test the extent to which
the effectiveness of legal systems affects success in attracting FDI [foreign development
investment]?
See also Dani Rodrik et al.,
Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and
Integration in Economic Development, 9 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 131-65, 157 (2004)
(noting the types of things that investors care about, including "the likelihood that investors will
retain the fruits of their investments, the chances that the state will expropriate them, or that the legal
system will protect their property rights .... Obviously, the presence of clear property rights for
investors is a key, if not the key, element in the institutional environment that shapes economic
performance. Our findings indicate that when investors believe their property rights are protected,
the economy ends up richer."). Foreign direct investment is not synonymous with economic development; nonetheless, "[riecognizing that FDI can contribute to economic development, all govemments want to attract it." Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant, Foreign Direct Investment in
Developing
Countries,
FINANCE
&
DEVELOPMENT,
March
1999,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/mallampa.htm.
See also id. at 3 ("Given the
potential role FDI can play in accelerating growth and economic transformation, developing countries are strongly interested in attracting it."). Some foreign direct investment can meet resistance
from the country which might otherwise receive it. See Daniel Bases, Global FDI to hit record
$1.47
trln
in
2007-survey,
Sept.
5,
2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSNO518321220070905?pageNumber=-I
(citing
"protectionist behavior including U.S. lawmakers resistance, cited for security reasons, to Dubai
Ports World owning six U.S. ports...").
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A set of common sense assumptions appears to underlie the connection between rule of law and economic development, with some limited
or questioned empirical study covering various possibilities,72 including a
country's historical origins. 73 These assumptions relate to the key components of the rule of law. For example, "[m]ore independent judges are
often more efficient judges .... [T]he combination of judicial independence and efficiency seems to be essential for judicial reforms to have a
positive effect on economic development., 74 "Judicial independence is a
key determinant of growth as it promotes a stable investment environment., 75 Reforms which strengthen judicial accountability-and thus
efficiency-improve judicial performance.76 A sound judicial system
promotes economic development "[b]y enforcing property rights, check72.
See Messick, JudicialReform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 122 ("Rigorous econometric methods for verifying the rule-of-law hypothesis and the role played by the judicial
system are still in their infancy."); id. ("These studies also do not rule out competing explanations
such as increases in trade and investment or even the effects of other institutional reforms such as the
introduction of an independent central bank."); id. at 123 ("In sum, while history and comparative
analysis support the view that a better judicial system fosters economic growth, there is ...no clear,
empirical evidence showing the economic impact of a weak judicial system. The most that can be
said at the moment is that the weight of opinion and evidence suggests the existence of some type of
relationship."). In addition to judicial reforms, other contributors may exist, including a free press or
other free media, civic education, and an independent business community. See, e.g., Davis &
Trebilcock, supra note 55, at 910 (referencing body of literature connecting a free press "independent of government influence" as well as a "competitive press" with rule of law and development).
73.
Some have proposed "the legal origins approach, as applied to economic development...
[which attempts] to show that the origin-say, English common law or French civil law--of a particular country's law is associated with that country's rate of economic growth." DAM, supra note
62, at 31. Using this legal origins approach, "[t]he central inquiry is to determine which legal families have the best substantive law for financial development, using substantive legal criteria determined by the authors." DAM, supra note 62, at 38 (for a detailed discussion of the "legal origins"
approach, see id. at 26-55). Dam finds the approach "interesting from a scholarly point of view," but
of "dubious relevance" for "public policy formation for the poorer developing countries." Id. at 54.
See Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law Reforms?, 26
MICH. J. INT'L L. 141, 160 (2004) ("Even if one accepts the notion that these studies succeed in
demonstrating a connection between legal heritage and development, the studies are of little direct
use to prospective legal reformers, simply because a society's legal heritage cannot be changed.")
(footnotes omitted). Cf Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of ComparativeDevelopment: An
Empirical Investigation, 91 THE AM. ECON. REV. 1369, 1395 (2001) (the nature of a country's
"colonial experience" is "one of the many factors affecting [its] institutions."; the colonial experience varied, among other things, depending on whether the colonizers "settled in the colonies and set
up institutions that enforced the rule of law and encouraged investment[]" or "set up extractive states
with the intention of transferring resources rapidly to the metropole[]"; however, according to the
authors, these "findings do not imply that institutions today are predetermined by colonial policies
and cannot be changed.").
74.
Botero et al.,
supra note 26, at 80; see also Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic
Growth and JudicialIndependence: Cross-CountryEvidence Using A New Set of Indicators,EUR. J.
POL. ECON. 497 (2003) (correlating de facto judicial independence with economic growth); USAID,
The Guide to Rule of Law Country Analysis: The Rule of Law Strategic Framework 6 (Aug. 2008),
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/PNADM700.pdf:
Rule of law provides a stable basis for democracy to develop. It ensures the protection of
those rights critical to maintaining an orderly and productive society, creating the conditions that enable a democratic society to develop and thrive .... Such rights are also essential to ensuring economic development and addressing poverty.
75.
Millennium Challenge Corporation: Guide to the MCC Indicatorsand the Selection Process: Fiscal Year 2008, http://www.mca.gov/documents/mcc-fy08-guidetoindicatorsandtheselection
process.pdf.
76.
Botero et al., supra note 26, at 81.
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ing abuses of government power, and otherwise upholding the rule of
law and in enabling exchanges between private parties., 77 "[T]he claim
that judicial independence is a necessary condition for the protection of
property rights or economic growth should give any American political
scientist pause. ,,78
"No one, whether local or foreign, wants to invest in a country that
is politically unstable or where there is no confidence in the justice system, as investors would not be assured of a fair return on their investment., 79 "An independent judiciary could thus also be interpreted as a
device to turn promises-e.g., to respect property rights and abstain from
expropriation-into credible commitments. If it functions like this, citizens will develop a longer time horizon, which will lead to more investment in physical capital. . . .All these arguments imply that [judicial
independence] is expected to be conducive to economic growth. 8 °
"The link between property rights, the integrity of contract, and
economic growth comes through several channels, but incentives play a
central role: The more well-developed and secure
are property rights, the
81
greater incentives individuals have to invest.,
Thus "the [World Bank] sees law as facilitating market transactions
by defining property rights, guaranteeing the enforcement of contracts,
and maintaining law and order., 82 As a former president of the World
Bank noted:
Without the protection of human and property rights, and a comprehensive framework of laws, no equitable development is possible. A
77.
Messick, Judicial Reform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 2 (citing
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN); see also Perry-Kessaris, supra note 71, at 650 (footnote omitted)
noting:
[Clommentators and development agencies argue ever more regularly that FDI [foreign
direct investment] flows are to some extent determined by the effectiveness of host state
legal systems-that is, the institutions and officials involved in the creation and implementation of law, including courts and judges; bureaucrats; and politicians, in their capacity as makers and implementers of law.
Her article proposes the type of data which she contends is necessary to prove this argument and the
extent of its availability.
78.
Haggard et al., supra note 27, at 217. The article also notes that "[mlost legal scholars
believe that appointment of judges is more likely to guarantee independence than election, which
requires a campaign for votes, organized interest group support, and campaign contributions." Id. at
216 (footnote omitted). This subject is discussed in more detail below.
79.
Rugege, supra note 3, at 4; see also Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 61 ("An investor does not
read the constitution of an emerging market economy but asks other businesspeople whether contracts are enforced fairly and predictably.").
80.
Lars &Voigt, supra note 74, at 499. Judicial independence may act as a counterweight to
avoid "takings of property by the state" where the "government itself is a litigant" and "in purely
private disputes when one of the litigants is politically connected and the executive wants the court
to favor its ally." La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECONOMY 445, 446-7
(2004); see also DAM, supra note 62, at 93 ("One conclusion widely agreed upon, not just in the
economic literature but also among lawyers and legal scholars, is therefore that the judiciary is a
vital factor in the rule of law and more broadly in economic development.").
81.
Haggard et al., supra note 27, at 207.
82.
Messick, JudicialReform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 127.
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government must ensure that it has an effective system of property,
contract, labor, bankruptcy, commercial codes, personal rights laws
and other elements of a comprehensive legal system that is effecby a well-functioning,
tively, impartially and cleanly administered 83
impartial and honest judicial and legal system.

Another World Bank commentator stated that "the payoffs from a
successful [judicial] reform, in terms of economic growth and development, more than justify the work involved.,, 84 "One conclusion widely
agreed upon, not just in the economic literature but also among lawyers
the
and legal scholars, is therefore that the judiciary is a vital
85 factor in
rule of law and more broadly in economic development.,
C. The Challenges to Promoting Economic Development through Rule of

Law
1. What to Do and Where to Start
Addressing rule of law reform and economic development in any
specific country presents particular challenges. "Specifying the optimal
set of judicial and legal institutions for any given country is a ... difficult and context-specific task.",86' 87"The question ... becomes one of sequencing: Where does one start?

As in the case of economic development, the answers may depend
on what the country needs. Obviously, if the country has undertrained

83.
Ohnesorge, supra note 66, at 256 (quoting James D. Wolfensohn, A Proposalfor a Comprehensive Development Framework (January 21, 1999)); see also Botero et al., supra note 26, at 79
(citing Wolfensohn to the same effect). Ohnesorge's article argues for a modified approach to law
and development theory which takes account of the Northeast Asian economic successes in Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan despite their "failure to conform to law and development theories." Ohnesorge, supra note 66, at 230-31. The article notes that "studying only a country that has a weak legal
system and a weak economy, such as Russia in the early to mid- 1990's, encourages the confusion of
correlation with causation." Id. at 226. Others have questioned in specific contexts how much
formal legal institutions have contributed to economic success, particularly in China. See Donald C.
Development,
Law
in
China's Economic
al.,
The
Role
of
Clarke
et
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=878672 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
84. Messick, JudicialReform: The Why, the What, and the How, supra note 10, at 9; see also
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference
of the Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Market Economies and Rule of Law (April 4, 2003),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2003/20030404/default.htm ("Uncertainties that
stem from the arbitrary enforcement of the body of prevailing rules are reflected in higher risk and
cost of capital which, in turn, inhibit economic growth.").
85. DAM, supra note 62, at 93; see also Christopher Clague et al., Contract-Intensive Money:
Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance,4 J. OF ECON. GROWTH 185,
207 (1999) (contending that "economic growth and investment significantly accelerate when governments impartially protect and precisely define the rights of all participants in the economy.").
86. Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Reform in Developing Countries: Constraints and
Opportunities, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT EcONOMIcs 2007,
REGIONAL: BEYOND TRANSITION 311, 314 (Franqois Bourguignon & Boris Pleskovic eds., 2007).
87. Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 50.
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judges, insufficient computer systems,88 and lack of courthouses, one
would have to look at those items. Other considerations in deciding on
reform include resource constraints, which make it important to prioritize
among reform projects: "[E]very dollar spent on judicial reform is a dollar that cannot be spent on other public goods or put toward economically productive private investment,, 8 9 including public health. 90 Researchers and policymakers may assess the effectiveness of past reforms,
and if inadequate, they may wish to revise their future approach. 9' Other
activities beyond legal and judicial reform might be needed to improve
the rule of law. "Rule of law is an end-state, not a set of activities. ,,92
For instance, one may need to inquire whether "developing the judiciary
is sufficient to advance the rule of law or whether it is also important to
invest in improving political processes. 9 3 Establishing and reviewing
the effectiveness of rule of law programs is an ongoing process.
2. Assessing the Level of Causation
a. Recognizing Causation Controversies
Determining, as a social scientific or empirical matter, whether economic development is caused or at least facilitated by rule of law reform
88. But see id. at 52 ("Reform programs that focus on providing computers to improve court
efficiency in the midst of a political autocracy, for example, seem rather like treating heartburn in a
patient suffering from cancer.").
89.
Stephenson, supra note 86, at 314. See also id. at 315:
A similar resource constraint problem, and a similar set of hard choices, appears when we
think about how to allocate resources among different types of judicial reform projects..
. . [H]ow should priorities be set? Is it more important to train judges or to computerize
the case filing and tracking system? Is it more important to invest in fighting corruption
or in educating the poor about their legal rights? Does it make more sense to concentrate
resources on creating a few highly capable specialized tribunals-say, to deal with disputes involving foreign investors or major business transactions--or to spread resources
more widely to improve the average local court?
See also Stephen Golub, A House Without a Foundation,in PROMOTING, supra note 10 at 105, 119
(questioning the value of the argument that judicial reform is a valuable "development priority" in
itself (even if not "a direct path to poverty reduction") in light of the need to set priorities, noting that
resources are limited and there are other options "for serving the poor" besides improving judiciaries).
90.
See Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the
Doing Business Project,32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095, 1116 (2007):
Given the limited empirical support for the claim that reforms recommended by the DB
project [i.e., the World Bank's Doing Business Project] will have positive effects on development outcomes, it is far from clear to us that widespread implementation of those
reforms is an accomplishment worth boasting about. We believe that it is an open question whether the energy and resources invested in legal reforms would have been better
put to other uses, including medical research, vaccines, distribution of mosquito nets, and
sanitation projects.
91.
See Channell, supra note 28, at 145.
92.
USAID, supra note 74, at 19; see also Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 34 ("Current definitions of the rule of law used by organizations working to create it abroad tend toward ad hoc laundry
lists of institutions to reform ....

); id. at 57 (objecting to "defining the rule of law by institutional

reform rather than by end goals."); id. at 56-57 ("Rule of law reformers believe, by definition, that
they are trying to create the rule of law.... Any work to reform laws, any change to police policy,
is considered rule of law reform.").
93.
USAID, supra note 74, at 19.
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or any of its aspects, including sound judicial institutions, is beyond the
scope of this article. Such an approach requires an adequately designed
research study, perhaps on a country by country basis, controlling for the
effect of perhaps many other circumstances that might affect development.94 One commentator, for instance, has identified the questions she
would like answered in order to determine the extent to which foreign
investment is influenced by legal reform, but noted that the data was so
far unavailable.95 The questions are as follows:
* Did or will you investigate Country X's legal system before you
deciding [sic] to invest there? (Are legal systems a factor?)
e If yes, did or do you consider it to be an attractive legal system?
(What is an attractive legal system?)
o Would you refuse to invest in, or remove investment from, Country X if you did not consider its legal system to be effective? (How
much of a factor are legal systems?)
e How much importance do you place on the legal system as a factor in determining where you should invest? (How much of a factor
are legal systems?)
* Have you had or do you expect to have much interaction with the
in Country X? (How much of a factor are legal syslegal system
96
tems?)
The results may be inconsistent from country to country; and researchers or commentators may not achieve consensus because of disputes over the variables selected, the presence or absence of data, 97 the
94. The World Bank's Governance project gathers subjective measures of institutional quality
and groups them into six clusters--of which the rule of law is only one-in order to measure the
quality of governance in many countries. In addition to "rule of law," the clusters are "voice and
accountability," "political stability," "government effectiveness," "regulatory quality," and "control
of corruption." The Governance project concludes that there is a relationship between institutional
quality and its measure of development, "hence their conclusion that 'Governance Matters."' Davis
& Trebilcock, supra note 55, at 938. The Governance project is also described on the World Bank's
website. See World Bank, Governance Matters 2008: World Wide Governance Indicators, 19962007, http:/linfo.worldbank.orglgovemancelwgi/index.asp; see also DAM, supra note 62, at 52-55;
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and
Individual Governance Indicators,1996-2007 7-8, 11 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper
No. 4654, 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 148386. The governance data is updated
annually, and a website is dedicated to the cross-country data on institutional quality. See
www.govindicators.org.
95. Perry-Kessaris, supra note 71, at 688.
96. Id. (describing the questions that she would like to have answered).
97. Davis & Kruse, supra note 90, at 1114 ("Given the often sweeping conclusions drawn by
the ... authors, it is clear that they want to draw inferences about the relationship of regulation to
development that go well beyond the limited set of regulations and social and economic outcomes
they have studied."). Compare Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank, Growth and Governance:
Models, Measures, and Mechanisms, 69 J. POL. 538, 547, 552 (2007) (pointing out that "[riecent
scholarship has emphasized the importance of good governance for economic performance," yet
contending that "the oft-asserted connection between growth and governance lies on exceedingly
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definition of terms (including what is "rule of law" and what is "economic development"),98 other methodological controversies, such as
countries that arguably do not fit within the overall theory, and the contention that correlation between rule of law reform and economic development is being confused with cause. 99 Some even suggest that causation flows in reverse, with economic development leading to rule of law
reform, rather than rule of law reform leading to economic development. 1°° Causation may also flow in both directions.' 0 '
Moreover, certain northeast Asian countries have weak rule of law
and had substantial economic progress 10 2 Some may question, if this is
established, what this means for the general rule: for example, are they
outliers or anomalies which leave the rule intact; is it too early to tell
whether the progress is sustainable; 10 3 might past progress have been
shaky empirical pilings"), id. at 541 ("Clean, effective government is desirable, but what is not so
clear is whether it is an essential or even important antecedent of rapid economic growth..."), and
Marcus J. Kurtz and Andrew Schrank, Growth and Governance: A Defense, 69 J. POL. 563 (2007),
with Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Growth and Governance: A Reply, J.
POL. 555, 555 (2007) (responding to Kurtz and Shrank articles, among other things, by noting that
there is a "rich body of recent work in the economics literature that has documented a sizeable longrun effect of governance on growth."), and Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi,
Growth and Governance:A Rejoinder, 69 J. POL. 570 (2007) (further rebuttal to Kurtz and Shrank
articles).
98.
Davis & Kruse, supra note 90, at 1097 (referring to the "complexity and uncertainty of
law, the contested nature of the concept of development, the opacity of the causal connection between these phenomena .
.
99.
Id. at 1112-13.
100.
See Daniel M. Klerman, Legal Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic
Development, 19 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L. J. 427, 430 (2007) ("Although independent courts are usually viewed as a cause of economic growth, the reverse may be true ....
As
wealth increases, private parties have more to offer the government and become more politically
powerful. As a result, as economic growth occurs, demand for independent courts may increase and
such demands are more likely to be heeded."). Nonetheless, despite acknowledging the reverse
causation argument, Klerman also acknowledges that independent courts promote growth, noting
that "economic theory suggests that effective, independent courts promote investment and economic
growth.... The empirical literature provides some support for the idea that independent courts
encourage economic growth, but causation remains unclear and much work remains to be done." Id.
at 434.
101.
DAM, supra note 62, at 276 ("The econometric evidence examined in earlier chapters
showing that causation runs from institutions to growth rather than vice versa may be interpreted to
say that on balance the causation runs from institutions to growth but that to some extent increasing
wealth helps to build institutions.").
102. See Ohnesorge, supra note 66, at 258-60 (2007). Others point out that in some situations
the rule of law may be weak and foreign investment may be strong or that foreign investment may
not even be required for economic development. See, e.g., Carothers, Steps Toward Knowledge, in
PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 17. For policymakers, unquestioned social scientific proof of the
connection between the rule of law and economic development may be unnecessary or at least only
be a long-term objective; and common sense may sometimes be enough for reasoned decisionmaking.
Even in a country with "weak" rule of law, the rule of law need not be weak in every
aspect. For example, the rule of law may be weak in cases involving the government or the rich, but
not involving two ordinary citizens having a breach of contract case. Or it may be weak in criminal
law cases but not in family law cases.
103.
See DAM, supra note 62, at 277 (China's experience is consistent with the view "that
considerable development is possible without strong legal institutions but sustainable growth to
higher per capita levels requires considerable development of legal institutions."). Dam noted that
"[i]t is certainly too early to accept the notion that recent Chinese experience is a counterexample to
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greater still in those countries if rule of law were stronger; or is substantial future progress possible only with stronger rule of law?
Even some skeptical commentary, however, would not entirely
deny the connection between rule of law reform and economic development, much less suggest that law reform efforts cease; rather, these
commentators suggest law reform efforts go forward.1t 4 For example,
questions about a World Bank study relating to the connection of law to
economic development nonetheless concluded with appreciation for the
work and suggestions for improvement, not cessation.10 5 Another commentator noted:

the need for a focus on institutions in the developing world and, indeed, for a rule of law in China
itself," and that "little thus far in the Chinese experience leads to the conclusion that rule-of-law
issues are not important in economic development." Id.
104.
See, e.g., Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING,
supra note 10, at 101 (objecting to certain aspects of rule of law rhetoric, but noting that "I do not
intend to discourage legal reform or the borrowing of legal rules or institutions from other countries.").
Thomas Carothers singled out as one of the objects of his concern "an unusually strong
initial sense of certainty, often verging on hubris, about such [rule of law] work ...." Carothers,
Steps Toward Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 329. He likewise has referred to the
"enthusiasm of many rule-of-law assistance providers who believe fervently in the centrality and
naturalness of the rule-of-law agenda" and "unrealistic expectations." Thomas Carothers, Rule of
Law Temptations 18 (Oct. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author and Denver University Law Review) (earlier Preliminary Draft, Prepared for World Justice Forum available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20080806033651 large.pdf). See also id. at 2:
The rule-of-law field continues to radiate an almost constant sense of discovery. Policy
actors and aid practitioners continue discovering it and becoming seized with enthusiasm
for the rule of law. They are often surprised to learn that what seems to them a vital discovery is in fact a relatively late arrival to a revival that has been going on for quite some
time.
See also Carothers, Steps Toward Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 337 ("The subject
[of rule-of-law] commands strong interest in many quarters and continues to be invested with high
expectations.").
But Carothers nonetheless applauds the rule of law effort, stating "that something vital
and dynamic lies at the root of rule-of-law promotion, something that will continue to sustain commitment and hope in such work despite the daunting complexities and conundrums that exist all
along the way." Id. at 337. See also Carothers, Rule of Law Temptations, supra at 7. In addition,
when it comes to the connection between the rule of law and economic development, Carothers
notes that it is "real" and "plausible":
This continued attention to rule-of-law development reflects the fact that the connections
of the rule of law to economic and political development, although perhaps not as
straightforward as some early enthusiasts presumed, are real. In the economic domain,
the simplistic idea that the rule of law automatically helps foster economic growth has
come under useful critical scrutiny. Yet at least some positive link appears plausible and
is enough to animate many aid practitioners.
Id. at 2. See also id. at 7 ("The rule-of-law agenda on the international policy stage is of tremendous
potential importance and value.").
105. See Davis & Kruse, supra note 90, at 1117 ("Assessed solely as a research project, the
[World Bank's 2004 Doing Business] project is extremely impressive in terms of the creativity of its
design, scale, and rigor. The criticisms set out above are not meant in any way to detract from our
overall appreciation of the data-collection exercise that the participants in the project have undertaken and its contribution to the enterprise of understanding the relationship between law and development. Our sense is that the limitations of the project reflect challenges inherent in achieving its
ambitious objectives.").
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It is hard to argue that an effective, efficient, and fair judicial system
is not a good thing or that a country will be better off without "an effective system of property, contracts, labor, bankruptcy, commercial
codes, personal rights and other elements of a comprehensive legal
system that are effectively, impartially, and cleanly administered by a
well-functioning, impartial and honest judicial and legal system," and
I will not attempt to do so.106
...I do not intend to discourage legal reform or the borrowing of legal rules or institutions from other countries ....

It would be foolish

and futile to argue against 07it, and it would mean arguing against
transnational legal learning. 1
Still others contend that "[w]hile there appears to be an increasingly
firm empirically grounded consensus that institutions are an important
determinant of economic development.., there is much less consensus
on which legal institutions are important .... ,,t8 In any event, although

doing a study as an academic or future policy matter is undoubtedly
worthwhile and may fall under the heading of "next steps" or "future
challenges," it is unnecessary for the purposes of this article. Nor, as
shown below, need it delay policymakers from making the decisions that
they need to make in light of what they already know.
b. Informal Legal Systems and Incentives
Some contend that formal legal systems are not the only systems
causally linked to economic development or are not essential for development. Instead, they identify informal legal systems consisting of various incentives which also help ensure that persons keep their promises:
for instance, the negative consequences of failing to maintain a good
reputation. 1°9 This, of course, does not prove that formal legal systems
are not linked to economic development, but rather suggests only that
other informal incentives may be at work too.
For example, "[a] vendor who is a member of a community is
unlikely to risk his reputation by failing to perform his obligations under
a contract. The result would be a loss of respect and a subsequent lack of

106. Upham, supra note 104, at 78.
Id.; see also Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 7
107.
("Although its wonderworking abilities have been exaggerated, the desirability of the rule of law is
clear. The question is where to start.").
108.
Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 55, at 945. The authors noted that the reduced consensus
on the role of legal institutions in economic development is affected by "the existence of informal
substitutes, [questions concerning] what an optimal set of legal institutions might look like for any
given developing country, or for those developing countries lacking optimal legal institutions (however defined) what form a feasible and effective reform process might take and the respective roles
of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in that process." Id.
See, e.g., Messick, JudicialReform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 129.
109.
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business."110 In other words, a company which does not carry out the
first bargain may lose the opportunity to have a second bargain, because
the company's reputation was harmed. Alternatively, the company may
not lose the opportunity to do another deal, but it may lose the opportunity to do so at a reasonable price. Thus the cost of credit or sales price
or any other cost indicators may escalate because of the perceived danger
of a breach or noncompliance. "A country that cannot establish to the
satisfaction of the contracting private party that the rule of law will ensure fair treatment can expect to pay more, perhaps much more, just to
cover the risk.""' 1
In developed legal systems, reputation likewise plays a role in ensuring compliance, especially given the uncertainties involved in contract
enforcement even in those systems. The availability of an action for
breach of contract may be of limited benefit even in developed countries.
Even if one has a valid claim, recovery is not assured. For example, the
party in breach may assert defenses or counterclaims or be insolvent; a
lawsuit may be time-consuming, slow and expensive; and the judge or
jury may simply "get it wrong." In many ways, it is important to deal
with someone with a good reputation under any circumstances. Although
reputation is not referred to as law (a phrase generally restricted to formal law), this does not make reputation any less effective as a persuasive
(if not coercive) force to ensure compliance.
Sometimes it will be uncertain which mechanisms (formal or informal) cause some to keep their bargains. Some may keep their bargains
because of reputational or informal legal systems, some may do so because of the formal legal system or threat of lawsuit, and others may do
so because of the mixture of the two. 112 It might be difficult to guess
which is the most efficacious as opposed to supporting both. 1 3 Furthermore, both
systems may provide greater safety than one, resources per4
nitting. 1
110.
Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of Informal Legal Institutions in Economic Development, 32
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1, 14 (2008).
111.
DAM, supra note 62, at 126.
112.
See e-mail from Richard E. Messick, Senior Public Sector Specialist, World Bank to
author (July 18, 2008, 10:01 a.m. EST) (on file with author and Denver UniversityLaw Review):
Consider the following two scenarios-i) Firms observe the terms of their contracts because they fear that if they don't the bad reputation they get will prevent them from doing
future business. 2) Firms observe the terms of their contracts because of the threat of lawsuits. Would you say the rule of law exists only in #2? What if some firms comply with
contracts because of #1, some because of #2, and some because of concerns about both
#1 &#2?
113. Id.
114. See Messick, JudicialReform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 129 (referring to the "incentive to maintain a good reputation."). See also Erik G. Jensen, Justice and the
Rule of Law, in BUILDING STATES TO BUILD PEACE 119, 121 (Charles Call & Vanessa Wyeth eds.,
2008), noting that informal institutions are less costly:
I am pragmatic. Formal institutions are expensive to build. Enforcement through formal
institutions is complex. Formal enforcement is also expensive. These realities ... lead to
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The Policymakers' Decisions

A tension exists in the field of law and development between policymakers and researchers. They have different timetables and different
knowledge requirements. Policymakers (including international financial institutions) and companies and their CEOs may (and will) act on the
basis of sound policy, logic and common sense. None of these factors
requires a demonstration of causation to a reasonable degree of social
scientific certainty. Nor will they insist on such a high level of proof
given their time constraints: if necessary decisions awaited the completion of time-consuming research, the time to act might have passed. Decisions may have to be made on the basis of scientifically imperfect, although otherwise sound, information:
Policy decisions on economic development issues are being made
every day in every developing country and in bilateral and multilateral agencies in the developed world as well. Economy policymaking is necessarily carried out under conditions of uncertaintyuncertainty about the facts and about underlying principles and
causes. So decisions about whether to change legal institutions and
substantive law will be taken-if only by inaction-in substantive
fields, such as land, equity markets, and credit markets as well as in
enforcement, including the role and nature of the judiciary. Since
policymakers know that institutions matter to economic development,
it would be foolish for them to assume that legal institutions-both
the rules of the game
and law's organizations, especially the judici115
ary-do not matter.
That does not mean that research should not proceed and hypotheses and dominant theories should not be tested. Common-sense principles include the concept that economic transactions may be unsafe where
there is no reliable legal system to enforce them, and foreign investment
116
is less likely where the chances of investment protection are uncertain.
The lack of reliable enforcement may make doing business risky and
complicate business planning; among other things, it may impede the

a very practical approach. Figure out what informal institutions are doing; which types of
disputes are handled reasonably well by informal institutions and which are not; and tailor formal institution building to handle matters that are not being handled well by informal institutions yet are crucial to the strategic dependent variables or outcomes identified.
115.
DAM, supra note 62, at 231; see also id., at 230 (describing the position that the law
matters for economic development, or, otherwise stated, that "institutions matter" for development
and "that, in particular, legal institutions matter."). According to Dam, "[p]roof of the correctness"
of the premise that law matters for development "would be an ... exercise.., more appropriate for
economists and perhaps other social scientists than for lawyers and policymakers."). Id. See also
Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 64 ("The new field of rule-of-law reform did not emerge slowly... It
grew from action-action needed right away-as states tried to keep regions from falling into poverty and anarchy ... ").
116.
See DAM, supra note 62, at 94 ("Better courts reduce the risks firms face, and so increase
the firms' willingness to invest more.").
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formation of long-term or complex contracts or contracts involving large
sums:
From the standpoint of economic development, perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of the unreliability of court enforcement is
that it impedes the effective use of long-term and complex contracts.
...Today such contracts are essential in developing countries, especially for electric generating
plants, ports, highways, and many other
7
infrastructure projects.'1

It may also discourage the formation of new business relationships
and lead to more conservative business practices overall. 18 Also, "[the
prospect that courts will resolve these disputes impartially if the contracting parties cannot agree often leads to more reasonable bargaining positions and more prompt compromise." ' 19 The argument connecting judicial reform and foreign investment has "undeniable common sense appeal-investors will want predictability, security, and the like."' 2 °
In addition, although some countries reportedly have attracted businesses to invest in their economies despite a weak rule of law, the weaknesses still may have been a negative factor for businesses considering
whether to invest and may have deterred more investment. 121 Furthermore, even if weak rule of law may not deter investment in some circumstances, strong rule of law may positively encourage it; and investment
may have been greater if rule of law were stronger. No one would be
expected to argue that strong rule of law is a "negative" or that the rule
of law should be weakened or corruption increased in order to improve
the investment climate. 22 Also, no one can preclude the possibility that
117.
Id. at 123.
118.
See THE WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 41
(2003) explaining:
In the absence of efficient courts, fewer transactions take place, and those transactions
involve only a small group of people linked through kinship, ethnic origin, and previous
dealings.
Courts have four important functions. They encourage new business relationships,
because partners do not fear being cheated. They generate confidence in more complex
business transactions by clarifying threat points in the contract and enforcing such threats
in the event of default. They enable more sophisticated goods and services to be rendered
by encouraging asset-specific investments in their production. And they serve a social
objective by limiting injustice and securing social peace.... Companies that have little
or no access to courts must rely on other mechanisms, both formal and informal-such as
trade associations, social networks, credit bureaus, and private information channels-to
decide with whom to do business. Companies may also adopt conservative business
practices and deal only with repeat customers. Transactions are then structured to forestall disputes. Whatever alternative is chosen, economic and social value may be lost.
119. DAM, supra note 62, at 123.
120.
Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supranote 10, at 17.
121.
See id. ("It is clear that what draws investors into China is the possibility of making
money either in the near or long term. Weak rule of law is perhaps one negative factor they weigh in
their decision of whether to invest, but it is by no means determinative.").
122.
But see TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 120 (noting problems with rule of law in service of
an authoritarian regime).
...
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investment may occur even if rule of law is limited: some percentage of
companies may tolerate high transaction risks in exchange for high potential gains or even successfully "navigate" corrupt systems through
bribery or other means. 123 However, that is not the optimal situation.
E. The Consequence of Rule of Law Failuresor Violations

Rule of law failures may have important consequences. Unfair judicial decision-making may lead to adverse judgments which will damage litigants and their families economically, harm shareholders, eliminate jobs, and interfere with society's ability to create goods and services. The causes of failure include lack of judicial independence (e.g.,
cases are not decided on the law and facts but as directed by another
branch of government or person or to favor campaign contributors or
123.

See LINN HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN

LATIN AMERICA 91 (2007):
There are also many less formal means for moving beyond the initial dispute and returning to business as usual. A company, unlike an individual, can factor any additional costs
into its price structure-and this is what commonly happens to bribes, speed money, and
negotiated agreements. Businesses resolve their credit problems by recourse to supplier
credit (a euphemism for not paying your bills on time).
See also Russell Gold & David Crawford, U.S., Other Nations Step Up Bribery Battle, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 12, 2008, at B 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 12211662448992491l .html ("A
global crackdown on companies that use bribery to advance their foreign business interests is rapidly
gathering steam . . . . 'U.S. companies that are paying bribes to foreign officials are undermining
government institutions around the world.... It is a huge destabilizing force."' (quoting Mark F.
Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Justice Department's fraud section)); id. at B-6 ("Until 1999
in Germany and until 2000 in France, tax laws allowed bribes to be deducted from corporate taxes..
. ."); Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, April
at
available
1996,
12,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE3D71039F931A25757COA960958260&sec=
&spon=&pagewanted=print:
[Tithe world's richest nations today took an important step to fight corruption in international business dealings by agreeing that bribes paid to foreign officials, often listed as
commissions or fees, should no longer be tax deductible .... Today's decision by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a club of industrial countries,
commits its 26 members to rewrite tax rules that have effectively encouraged the bribery
of foreign officials by making such payoffs tax deductible.
See also Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Only a Line Item, N.Y.
at
available
2008,
21,
Dec.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq
=siemens&st=cse.
The company [Siemens] turned to markets in less developed countries to compete, and
Inside Siemens, bribes
bribery became a reliable and ubiquitous sales technique ....
were referred to as "NA"-a German abbreviation for the phrase "ntitzliche Aufwendungen" which means "useful money." Siemens bribed wherever executives felt the money
was needed, paying off officials not only in countries known for government corruption,
like Nigeria, but also in countries with reputations for transparency, like Norway, according to court records.
"Bribery
...
was Siemens's business model," said Uwe Dolata, the spokesman for the association of federal criminal investigators in Germany. "Siemens had institutionalized
corruption."
. .. Siemens will pay more than $2.6 billion to clear its name: $1.6 billion in fines and
fees in Germany and the United States and more than $1 billion for internal investigations
and reforms.
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local voters); lack of accountability (judges are uneducated, inefficient,
or otherwise perform poorly); and even criminal conduct, such as corrup-

tion.124 As a commentator noted, the rule of law is particularly important
to developed societies, including their economies:
The relationship between the rule of law and liberal democracy is
profound. The rule of law makes possible individual rights, which
are at the core of democracy.... Basic elements of a modern market
economy such as property rights and contracts are founded on the
law and require competent third-party enforcement. Without the rule
of law, major economic institutions such as corporations, banks, and
labor unions would not function, and the government's many involvements in the economy-regulatory mechanisms, tax systems,
customs structures, monetary policy, and the like-would be unfair,
inefficient, and opaque.125

Besides the economic consequences, such violations may also
threaten the legitimacy of the court system, dissuade people from using
the courts, and effectively deprive them of a fair place for the resolution
of their disputes.
II.

AMERICAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ARE OUR
PRINCIPLES AT HOME CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRINCIPLES ABROAD?

To casual observers, the epitome of the rule of law is the United
States, and the United States is a leading exponent of the new rule-of-law
orthodoxy. When we look closely at the U.S. legal system, however, we
find few of these characteristics.... 126

A dark shadow is falling, fairly or unfairly, upon the perceived integrity ofjudges in many states that elect judges. Justice has been char-

acterized as being "forsale." Impartiality and the judiciary's rule-of124.
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial independence and corruption, in TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 10, at 16; Greg Mayne, Judicial
integrity: the accountability gap and the Bangalore Principles,in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007, supra note 10, at 41.
125.
Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING, supra note 10 at 4-5. The essay
describes its version of the rule of law using a relatively "thick" definition, including "political and
civil liberties," as follows:
The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are
clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political
and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the last halfcentury. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing
and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system,
including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient.
Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation.
Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding.
Id. at4.
126.
Upham, supra note 104, at 83-84.
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. [Clurrent thinking on how to

protect the impartiality of the judiciaryis gravitating toward the use and
refinement of appointive methods of selection and relatedprocesses.121
This section suggests that rule of law dialogue should enter the domestic arena, that domestic reform advocacy should reflect rule of law
values, and that lessons learned
internationally should be introduced into
2
reform in the United States. 1
In supporting the rule of law abroad, Americans are advocating
concepts of judicial reform that our judicial systems sometimes fail to
comply with at home. For example, although international rule of law
efforts stress judicial impartiality, independence and accountability,
many Americans tolerate judicial elections that do not adequately protect
these qualities.1 29 Some judicial elections seem to be efforts to achieve
the opposite: namely, a tilted or slanted judiciary accountable to interest
groups seeking to elect judges likely to decide cases "their
way" or to
1 30
hold judges accountable to popular and party preferences.
In addition, the rule of law embodies the predictable application of
the laws to all because the rules are open, known, and equally applied.
But if the rules for decision depend on which side contributed or might
contribute to (or against) the judge's campaign, or on who votes locally,
the rules are no longer known or susceptible to equal application. Instead, they may shift-or appear to do so-from case to case according
to the varying identities of the parties, depending on whether they are
funders or potential funders, or where they vote.

127.
Donald L. Burnett, Jr., A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault Upon Impartiality of State
Courts and the Challenge to JudicialSelection, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 265, 281-82 (2007).
128.
Various terms come to mind to describe the difference in the approach at home as opposed to the approach abroad, including hypocrisy, inconsistency, or cognitive dissonance. None of
them is necessarily comprehensive or apt. For example, the same actor may not be involved in both
situations so it is difficult to attribute those concepts to a single actor. Thus the United States government or the World Bank may be supporting judicial reforms abroad but are not known to have
taken positions on state court judicial elections. Nonetheless, taking the United States as a whole or
as a single actor, which may or may not be fair, a pattern of at least inconsistency appears to be
arguable. See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 53 ("[R]eformers open themselves to charges of
hypocrisy ....
The highly political process of judicial choice in the United States would never be
permitted by reformers elsewhere."); id. at 52 ("Practitioners are often following an idealized blueprint of their home system that ignores its own difficulties and flaws, such as the intense political
involvement in the picking of the U.S. judiciary or the corruption residing in some European judiciaries.").
129.
See Charles G. Geyh, Rethinking Judicial Elections, BILL OF PARTICULARS, Spring 2003,
at 5, available at http://alumni.indiana.edu/conpubs/archives/Law-sprO3-combined.pdf (last visited
Oct. 17, 2008) ("I have reached the conclusion that judicial elections are fundamentally incompatible
with judicial independence, and fundamentally incapable of adequately promoting judicial accountability. The time has come to rethink judicial elections, to the end of gradually phasing them out of
existence all together.").
130. See, e.g., Upham, supra note 104, at 83-84. See also id. ("The U.S. judiciary is permeated by politics ....
If they [i.e., judges] are not constantly aware of the effect of their important
rulings on the electorate and the party's leaders, they will not be reelected, and they will cease to be
judges.").
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A. The Rule of Law Concept Is Not Merely International:It Should Be
Applied to United States Institutions
The U.S. and U.S.-based or -supported international development
institutions have been looking at rule of law reforms, including judicial

reform, worldwide, sometimes country by country.1 31 They have spent
considerable time studying and assisting foreign states needing such reform.132 While these organizations are looking outward toward reform,
other organizations within the United States are addressing the need for
similar reforms in the United States, though rarely under the banner of
"the rule of law."'133 In the foreign context, rule of law reform is driven
by the need for economic stability and development, and, in some cases,
human rights. 134 In the United States context, however, the same principles should apply, with a similar effort, starting with a closer look at state
court judicial elections.
This is not to say that the words "rule of law" do not appear in the
domestic context. They do, occasionally. Rather, these words do not
appear to be commonly used in the same comprehensive sense domestically as they are abroad; sometimes they appear in passing; and they do
not appear often enough. 135 Notable exceptions include Justice Anthony
131.
See Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong and Independent Judiciariesthrough the New Law
and Development: Behind the Paradox of Consensus Programs and Perpetually Disappointing
Results, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 383 (2002).
132.
See id. at 384-85.
133.
There are many court reform organizations, both national and local; those with a national
focus include the National Center for State Courts, Justice at Stake, and the American Judicature
Society. The Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary at Georgetown University
Law Center has also had a substantial impact. See generally National Center for State Courts,
http://www.ncsconline.org/DAboutindex.htm;
Justice
at
Stake
Campaign,
http://faircourts.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcnimb=8,284;
American
Judicature
Society,
http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs-about.asp; and Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/judiciary/ (all sites in this footnote last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
134.
The focus of this article is on the economic aspect of the rule of law, not the human rights
aspect. The need for judicial reform to ensure human rights is fundamental, even in the United
States. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politicsof Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 832-33
(1995); Norman L. Greene et al., Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who Deserves
Death?, 24 PACE L. REV. 107, 115 n.33 (2002) (relating to the effect of judges' rulings in capital
cases on their ability to remain in office). See also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995)
(Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Arguably, the concepts of human rights and economic rights are linked to
the extent that both relate to having a decent living standard.
135.
See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLuM. L. REV. 265, 327-28
(2008) (commenting in passing on the problem of rule of law and judicial elections):
On account of recent changes to judicial elections making them more open and competitive, elected state courts will indeed have better majoritarian credentials than ever before.
But for anyone whose vision of democracy incorporates robust protections for individuals, minorities and the rule of law, this does not mean that they will be more democratic.
...
In the new era [of judicial elections], the connection between elected state courts and
the people grows ever more vigorous, but at a grave cost to other democratic and rule-oflaw values.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Symposium, supra note 5, at 225; Bright & Keenan, supra note 134,
at 785 ("A few rulings in highly publicized cases may become more important to a judge's survival
on the bench than qualifications, judicial temperament, management of the docket, or commitment to
the Constitution and the rule of law.") (emphasis added).
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Kennedy's observation in a recent concurrence that the aspirations of the
judicial
rule of law "may seem difficult to reconcile" with state court
137
elections, 136 as well as the work of the World Justice Project.
Popular judicial elections are a peculiarly American custom. 38 Research has not disclosed any concerted effort to encourage judicial elections as part of any international program to improve judiciaries in foreign countries. The opposite appears to be true, with judicial elections
simply left out of the sophisticated rule of law and reform dialogue directed internationally. They are not part of the rule of law reform package. Thus it has been observed that the American Bar Association's
Rule of Law Initiative, in promoting the rule of law, does not encourage
the election ofjudges. 139 Instead, it considers judicial elections as

136.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Justice Anthony Kennedy, in his concurrence upholding the constitutionality of New
York's election of state court trial judges, used rule of law language to question state court judicial
elections. Although finding a rule of law violation was beyond the scope of his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy was evidently troubled by the possibility that judicial elections constitute rule of law violations, noting as follows:
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct campaigns and to raise
funds in a system designed to allow for competition among interest groups and political
parties, the persisting question is whether that process is consistent with the perception
and the reality of judicial independence and judicial excellence. The rule of law, which is
a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional attainments, and the absolute probity of its judges. And it may seem
difficult to reconcile these aspirations with elections.
Id. Although not using rule of law language, Justice Stevens's concurrence suggested that the lower
court findings "lend support to the broader proposition that the very practice of electing judges is
unwise." Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137.
See, e.g., World Justice Project, Domestic Mainstreaming of the Rule of Law, supra note
5.
138. Few other countries elect any judges, and even there, the practice is limited. See Adam
Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at Al
("Smaller Swiss cantons elect judges, and appointed justices on the Japanese Supreme Court must
sometimes face retention elections, though scholars there say those elections are a formality.");
Herbert M. Kritzer, Law as a Mere Continuationof Politics, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 423, 431 (2007)
("The United States is almost unique in its use of elections in the judicial selection and retention
process."). See also Posting of Walter Olson to PointofLaw.com, Judicial Elections: A Dissenting
(July 17,
View, http://www.pointoflaw.con/archives/2008/07/judicial-elections-a-dissentin.php
2008, 1:25 EST) ("Again, business litigants widely regard the judicial process of most other advanced democracies-in Western Europe, Japan, Canada-as more predictable and rational than that
of state courts in the U.S. And again, in those other advanced democracies, elected judgeships are
virtually unknown, being widely seen as part and parcel of the distinctive 'American disease' of
law.").
139.
E-mail from Simon R. Cont6, Director, Research & Program Development, American Bar
Association Rule of Law Initiative to author (July 16, 2008, 10:44 EST) (on file with author and
Denver University Law Review). Mr. Conte noted as follows:
I wanted to confirm that, consistent with the relevant international standards, ABA ROLl
[i.e., Rule of Law Initiative] does not encourage the election of judges. Judicial selection
is one of the most important factors analyzed in ROLl's Judicial Reform Index, which is
drawn from various international and regional standards, including the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Council of Europe Recommendation R(94)12
"On the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges," the Universal Declaration on the
Independence of Justice, the Syracuse Draft Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, and the International Bar Association Code of Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence. All of these standards state a clear preference for judicial selection based on
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the method [of judicial selection] least likely to achieve [international] standards [of merit, including professional qualifications, integrity, and independence], due to the politicization of the election
process, the conflict of interest arising from the need to fundraise and
campaign, and the risk that judges140looking ahead to reelection might
be influenced by popular opinion.

"To the rest of the world... American adherence to judicial elec'4
tions is as incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric system."' '
Notably, "[t]he rest of the world.., is stunned and amazed at what we
do, and vaguely aghast. They think the idea that judges with absolutely
no judge-specific educational training are running political campaigns is
both insane and characteristically American.'

42

B. State Court JudicialElections-An Overview of Concerns

Insofar as all state judicial offices arefilled through the electoral
process, every judicial officer in this state is subject to having to decide

the merits of a case that involves a party or attorney who contributed
43to
or supported,or, conversely, opposed his or her campaignfor office. 1
merit, including professional qualifications, integrity, and independence. Electing judges
is the method least likely to achieve those standards, due to the politicization of the election process, the conflict of interest arising from the need to fundraise and campaign, and
the risk that judges looking ahead to reelection might be influenced by popular opinion.
140. Id.; see also Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 31 ("The highly political process of judicial
choice in the United States would never be permitted by reformers elsewhere."); id. at 53 ("Many
legal professionals in the developing world know that the rule of law is a goal toward which even
Western institutions are still evolving.").
141.
Liptak, supra note 138 (quoting Hans A. Linde, a former justice of the Oregon Supreme
Court, at a 1988 symposium on judicial selection); see also e-mail from Donald Chisholm, then an
employee of USAID, to author (Aug. 18, 2008, 16:22:38 EST) (on file with author and Denver
University Law Review), stating as follows:
From 2004-2005, I was the Chief of Party for a USAID-financed Rule of Law project [in
Peru]. One of the project's chief counterparts was ...the Presiding Judge of the AntiTerrorism Chamber. [The judge] was an extremely sophisticated counterpart who had
traveled in the US as part of a Department of State-funded program and had good comparative knowledge about other legal systems ....We... delved into the subject of the
election of state judges in the US. He found it surprising that a country that preached the
doctrine of judicial independence in its work overseas would permit the election of state
court judges by voters.
See also e-mail from Erik Jensen, Co-Director, Rule of Law Program, Stanford Law School to
author (Sept. 5, 2008, 03:28 EST) (on file with author and Denver University Law Review) ("Even
with all of [the] shortcomings... [of the international rule of law industry,] however, I am not aware
of a single international rule of law project that has stooped to consider[] support for a system of
judicial elections. The inherent distorting effects of such a selection process are so obvious that it
does not pass the most minimal plausibility test.").
142.
Liptak, supra note 138 (quoting Mitchel Lasser, a law professor at Cornell Law School).
Professor Lasser compared the American system of judicial selection to the "much more rigorous
French model, in which aspiring judges are subjected to a battery of tests and years at a special
school" where "'you have people who actually know what the hell they're doing ....They've spent
years in school taking practical and theoretical courses on how to be a judge. These are professionals."' Id.
143.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444, at *21 (W. Va. July 28,
2008), (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring) (refusing to recuse himself from the hearing of the case),
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Still another objection to the judicial elections has to do with how
they arefinanced. They are usually financed, at least in the Midwest, by
contributionsfrom practicing lawyers. The result is the same kind of
quasi-corruptionthat campaignfinancing generally produces. The people who contribute heavily are doing so, at least in part, in order either
to obtain the kind ofjudge who will make their practice more successful
or a judge who will be inclined to favor them out of gratitude or hopefor
future support. The combination of the financing and selection effects of
judicialelections is very bad.144
1. Is Justice For Sale? The Dangers of "Cash in the Courtroom"
No citation is required to establish that the sale or apparent sale of
justice does not comply with the rule of law. But concerns arise short of
sales or apparent sales. According to USAID, "[i]f a judiciary cannot be
relied upon to decide cases impartially, according to the law, and not
based on external pressures and influences, its role is distorted and public
confidence in government is undermined."' 145 The United Nations Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary provide that judges must
"decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without . . . improper influences, inducements,
[or] pressures
. . . direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any rea14 6
son."
There is increasing alarm from Sandra Day O'Connor and other
well-known reformers and reform organizations that our system of judicial elections creates precisely the scenario in which money and the need
to be elected influence or appear to influence justice among elected state
court judiciaries. That is, rather than there being a rule of law, there is
cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008) (No. 08-22). See Marcia Coyle, High Court
Review Sought on Judicial Recusals, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202423489061 (discussing Caperton and describing petition
for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and background of contributions to judicial campaigns in the case). See also Editorial, Too Generous, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008 ("Situations like the Massey Energy case create an unmistakable impression that justice is for sale."); Editorial,
Tainted
Justice,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
13,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/opinion/13thu3.html ("The justices would do a great deal to
protect essential fairness by making clear that outsize campaign expenditures trigger a duty of
recusal on the part of the beneficiaries."). On November 14, 2008, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and agreed to review the case. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350,
2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. July 28, 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008)
(No. 08-22); Marcia Coyle, Justices to hear recusal case of W.Va. high court judge, NAT'L L.J.
(Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202426044460
(free registration required).
144.
Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a PoliticalEnvironment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6
(2006).
145.
USAID OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, GUIDANCE FOR PROMOTING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 6 (Jan. 2002, revised ed.), available at

http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-govemancelpublications/pdfs/pnacm007.pdf.
146.
Id. at app. A para. 2.
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47
the rule of the campaign contributor, not to mention the local voter.
As Justice Stephen Breyer noted, judicial "independence means you decide according to the law and the facts. The law and the facts do not
include deciding according to campaign contributions.' 4 8 That is the
subject of this section.

Various groups (loosely called "special interests") have been extensively funding judicial election campaigns intended to seat judges committed explicitly or implicitly to favor their particular interest group or
the group's objectives. These are not the only types of judicial elections,
but they are the most notorious. Other types include elections where
14 9
voters do not turn out to vote or do not know who the candidates are.
Alternatively, the candidates are hand-picked by political bosses or otherwise unopposed,
with the results then provided to the voters for ratifi50
cation.1
Seeking judges inclined to support one side or another in a dispute-whether that side is a business or an individual plaintiff-may be
futile as well as damaging to the rule of law. This is self-evident if only
one category of party is involved in the case. For example, the election
of a "pro-business" judge has little meaning in the cases which are "business-against-business" and no individual is involved. Conversely, the
election of a "pro-individual plaintiff" judge may be futile in cases where
individuals are suing each other and no business is involved. In still
other cases, both litigants may not be businesses or individuals, but instead one party may be the government.

147.
Gur-Arie & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 140. See also id. (providing the quote from Mira
Gur-Arie and Russell Wheeler introducing this article); Upham, supra note 104, at 84 ("Most state
If they are not constantly aware of the effect of
judges are elected and serve for a term of years ....
their important rulings on the electorate and their party's leaders, they will not be reelected, and they
will cease to be judges.").
148.
Frontline: Justicefor Sale (1999) (PBS television interview of Stephen Breyer & Anthony
Kennedy), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/j ustice/interviews/supremo.html.
149.
See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to
Develop a Model Appointive Selection Planfor Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB. L. REV. 597,
601-02 (2005) ("Voters in New York, as elsewhere, generally do not even know who the candidates
for judge are, and they often do not vote for judicial candidates at all."); see also Geyh, supra note
129, at 6 ("[A]s much as 80 percent of the electorate typically does not vote in judicial elections ....
[A]s much as 80 percent of the public-including many who cast ballots in judicial elections-are
unfamiliar with and unable to identify the judicial candidates.").
Given the number of arguments, it "would be impractical (not to mention tedious) to
canvas[s]" all objections to judicial elections or rebuttals to those objections. David E. Pozen, The
Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 293 (2008). See also Norman L. Greene,
Appointive Selection of Judges, Limited-Jurisdiction Courts with Non-Lawyer Judiciaries, and
Judicial Independence, 43 CT. REVIEw 80, 80-83 (2007) (describing problems of judicial elections
and Fordham symposium on what makes a good appointive system)
150. See Norman L. Greene, What Makes A Good Appointive System for the Selection of State
Court Judges: The Vision of the Symposium, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35, 41-47 (2007) (discussing
Second Circuit's decision in N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 462 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.
2006), rev'd 128 S.Ct. 791 (2008) and describing political-boss-controlled elections).
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In sum, fueling judicial races to elect a judge inclined to support one
category of litigant as against another is not only damaging to the rule of
law, but it is pointless in a number of circumstances.
To be fair, some special interest groups consider themselves victims
of a system in which opposing groups are seeking to slant the judiciary
and in order to prevent another interest group from obtaining a slanted
judiciary, they are waging a "defensive" effort to obtain a judiciary with
a different "slant."' 151 Still others involved in judicial elections might
believe that they are supporting candidates who are dedicated to classic
principles of impartiality, independence, and accountability; however, if
that is occurring, it is not making the news.
Judicial elections have drawn the negative attention of many commentators, including, most notably, former United States Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
According to Justice O'Connor,
"[s]pecial interest appeals to emotion and policy preferences tempt voters
to join efforts to control the decisions of judges."' 152 "No other nation in
the world does that [i.e., elects judges] . .. because they realize you're
not going to get fair and impartial judges that way."' 153 She added that
"[w]hat worries me is the manner in which politically motivated interest
groups are attempting to interfere with justice.' 54 Also, the spending of
large campaign sums endangers the legitimacy that the public accords to
court decisions, which has led Justice O'Connor to call for the elimination of judicial elections entirely:
When so much money goes into influencing the outcome of a judicial
election, it is hard to have faith that we are selecting judges who are
fair and impartial. If I could do one thing to solve this problem, it
would be to convince the states that select judges through partisan
elections-that is, when a Democrat and Republican run against one
another-to switch to merit selection instead.' 55
151. See Joanne Albertsen & Malia Reddick, Conference Considers Judicial Reform, 92
JUDICATURE 80 (Sept.-Oct. 2008) (reporting on a conference on the judiciary featuring, among
others, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen Breyer at Fordham Law School on Apr. 8, 2008;
a co-author of the JUDICATURE article, Malia Reddick, was a panelist at the conference; and the
author of this article in the Denver University Law Review was the organizer of the conference).
One panelist observed that the campaign contributions of businesses to judicial elections may be
attempts at "fighting bias with bias." Id. at 82. Although that may explain the reason that certain
businesses believe that they are contributing to judicial campaigns, that would not justify providing
slanted information to the public on judicial candidates, let alone false information, if that were
occurring. Id.
152.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Justicefor Sale: How Special-InterestMoney Threatens the Integrity of Our Courts,WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25.
153.
Liptak, supra note 138 (quoting Justice O'Connor at the conference on the judiciary at
Fordham Law School on Apr. 8, 2008; the reporter, Adam Liptak, was a panelist at the conference,
which, as noted above, the author of this article organized). See also Albertsen & Reddick, supra
note 151.
154.
Sandra Day O'Connor, How to Save Our Courts, PARADE, Feb. 24, 2008, available at
http:llwww.parade.comlarticles/editions/2008/edition_02-24-2008/Courts_0Connor.
155.
Id.
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As Justice O'Connor noted, "We put cash in the courtrooms, and
it's just wrong."' 156 A New York Times editorial referred to the "escalating millions that special interests are pouring into state judicial elections
in an effort to buy favorable rulings. ' 57 The Times added that "special
interests are finding that buying up judges likely to side with them in bigdollar cases is a good investment-the real-life
grist for John Grisham's
158
new fictional legal thriller, 'The Appeal."
Cash distorts the intended purpose of the American judiciarynamely, to decide cases on the law and the facts, not on who the parties
are-and leads some to believe that justice is for sale. Justice O'Connor
echoed her positions in the Wall Street Journal, singling out, among others, the State of Pennsylvania:
The final four candidates running for open seats on the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania raised more than $5.4 million combined in
2007, shattering fund-raising records in Pennsylvania judicial elec-

tions. 159
... Most of this money comes from special interest groups who believe that their contributions can help elect judges likely to rule in a
manner favorable to their causes. As interest-group spending rises,
public confidence in the judiciary declines. Nine out of 10 Pennsylvanians regard judicial fund raising as evidence that justice is for
sale, and many judges agree. 160

Whether bias is a fact or only an appearance, the appearances are
not good. "Elections can be very expensive to win, and elected judges
may well be viewed by the public as being beholden to their supporters. '"
The potential for bias was highlighted in a recent New York
156.
Dorothy Samuels, The Selling of the Judiciary: Campaign Cash "in the Courtroom",
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at A22. See also Roy A. Schotland, Judicial elections in the United
States: is corruptionan issue?, in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2007, supra note 10, at 26 ("[A]buse would occur if the judge's performance on the bench were
affected by [campaign] contributions received, or hoped for.") (with the exception of Professor
Schotland's brief article in the Report, the focus of the Global Corruption Report is international).
157.
Samuels, supra note 156.
158.
Id. See also O'Connor, supra note 152, at A25; John Grisham, THE APPEAL (Doubleday
2008).
159.
O'Connor, supra note 152.
160.
Id.
161.
J. Clifford Wallace, An Essay on Independence of the Judiciary: Independence From
What and Why, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 243 (2001). See also id. (comparing federal to
state elected judiciary):
The method by which federal judges in the United States are selected, appointment by the
President and confirmation by the Senate, is an attempt to free federal judges from the
political pressures associated with elections. Elections can be very expensive to win, and
elected judges may well be viewed by the public as being beholden to their supporters.
The appointment and confirmation process, combined with the constitutional guarantee
of tenure during good behavior and a salary that will not be decreased, is the Constitution's effort both to ensure the independence of the federal judiciary in the face of political pressures, and to assure the people that their disputes will be fairly settled by independent and unbiased arbiters.
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Times study of the Ohio Supreme Court. In that study, the New York
Times "found that [Ohio Supreme Court] justices routinely sat on cases
after receiving campaign contributions from the parties involved or from
groups that filed supporting briefs. 162
On average, they voted in favor of
contributors 70 percent of the time."'
Elections could hardly be advocated, much less exported, to another
country. If judicial elections were occurring in foreign countries, some
of the same international organizations mentioned above would undoubtedly be concerned enough to target the country for rule of law reform.
The rule of law, however defined, encompasses impartial decision making. It is therefore unlikely that any credible institution could validly
advocate in foreign nations a system that not only requires the raising
and expenditure of substantial sums, but which leads the public to believe that courts are deciding in favor of their campaign contributors, let
alone local voters. Instead of encouraging foreign investment in a particular country, this is the sort of enterprise that would cause contracting
parties to doubt that their bargains would be respected, especially the
party which (or who) did not contribute to the campaign, did not vote
locally, or even worse, contributed to the judge's opponent.
A Nigerian commentator grasped this point exactly in rejecting judicial elections for Nigeria on the grounds that elections fail sufficiently
to promote the concept of judicial independence as he defined it:
Those appointed to the bench because of their learning in law, their
experience at the bar and their moral character are likely to support
and defend the independence of the judiciary.... Accordingly, it is
not desirable that judges should be elected by the people, especially
where, in the absence of mutual tolerance, the constituent groups
63
have widely divergent, conflicting and irreconcilable interests.
The commentator told an anecdote about how a Louisiana Supreme
Court judge refused to meet him during his visit to New Orleans because
of a prejudiced electorate. The author noted that the judge informed him
that "such a meeting [with the Nigerian] would be odious to the electorate, making his future election difficult."' 64
The Nigerian article may be dated in terms of its racial references,
and the author was a Senior Lecturer at the University of Nigeria at the
time it was written and perhaps not steeped in the tradition of American
judicial elections. Nor is this article cited to suggest that Nigeria or any
other developing nation enjoys a superior judicial selection system to the
162. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006 at Al. See also Liptak, supra note 138; Geyh, supra note 129, at 6 ("80 percent
or more of the public perceives that when a judge is obligated to raise the monies needed to win
election or re-election, she is influenced by the campaign contributions she receives.").
163.
D.L.O. Ewelukwa, The Independence of the Judiciary, 14 NIGERIAN BAR J. 38,48 (1977).
164. Id. at 48 n.25.
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United States. Indeed, one may readily conjure up worse selection systems, such as one that makes a judge's job virtually dependent on another branch of government so that the judge could be effectively told
what to decide at the risk of losing her job. 165 Examples of this even
appear in United States history. 166 But the Nigerian article recognizes the
same problems with judges pandering to the voters that other modem
American commentators, including Justice O'Connor, have recognized.
The comments in the article are especially significant since they preceded the recent escalation of the costs of such elections, which may
make judicial candidates even more beholden to campaign contributors
and less likely to risk offending them.
Exportation of American judicial elections to foreign nations is a
fantasy. But the scenario is interesting to contemplate. It would undoubtedly result in different elections, consistent with local traditions and
means. For example, in some nations, it is difficult to imagine major
media campaigns. The types of campaign promises would undoubtedly
differ in light of local conditions; the candidates might be subject to different canons of ethics governing what they could say (if anything);
campaigning itself might be different as would be voter education (if
any); and millions of dollars might not be spent on campaigns, although
in relative terms the cost might still be expensive. Also, in some places,
recruitment of candidates might be difficult, since being a judge might
neither be well paid nor desirable; and it might also be dangerous.
The United States has some institutional counterweights and traditions, which some other nations might lack, that would reduce the chance
that an elected judiciary fully subject to the negative incentives to pander, may veer off course. 167 (Conversely, the United States may lack
165.
A modem example of this appears in Justice Stephen Breyer's description of "telephone
justice" in which Russian party bosses told the judges how to decide their cases:
I mean, years ago, we heard Russian judges-I did once at a conference-and they were
talking about what's called "telephone justice." And telephone justice is where the party
boss calls you up on the telephone and tells you how to decide the case. So they said,
Well, don't you have that in the United States? Now, really don't you? So I said, No.
And I looked around and I said, Well I know you're thinking that even if we did, I would
say no. They said, That's right. And I said, Well how can I explain it? It's just that no
one in the United States wants that kind of system and it would be outrageous and beyond
belief that someone would call up on the phone.
Frontline,supra note 148.
166. For example, "in the years immediately following the Revolution," state courts were
placed "very much under the thumb of state legislatures." F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning about
Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STuD. 431, 441
(2004). Thus in Rhode Island, judges who "nullified a legislative act were called before the legislatare to explain themselves and were replaced by the legislature when their terms expired the following year." Id. "The substantial powers exercised by state legislatures over courts were largely the
result of two factors: the lack of a clearly distinct judicial role and an ingrained distrust of colonial
judges." Id. at 443.
167.
For a discussion from an economist's standpoint of the workings of "negative incentives"
on judges see F. Andrew Hanssen, The Political Economy of Judicial Selection: Theory and Evidence, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 413, 413-24 (2000). See, e.g., id. at 418 ("Are there groups today
that judges might be a little leery about displeasing? It depends on the institutional structure, and

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

some of the counterweights that other developing countries might have to
substitute for an adequate judicial system, such as a well-developed body
of informal law.) 168 For instance, appointed courts, such as federal
courts, 169 are available for some cases, as well as alternative dispute resolution. In still others, choice of forum clauses may allow parties to select
particular states for dispute resolution. 70 To observe that elected judiciaries are sometimes avoidable, however, is hardly to compliment the
system that produces them.
Moreover, in some states, such as Indiana and New York, only
some or all lower court judges are elected, with appellate judges appointed, which permits correction, if necessary, by an appointed judiciary. 171 The opportunity for appellate correction should not be overstated.

whether that structure gives particular groups the means to affect a judge's career."). See also id. at
417:
[S]uppose that we are back in the days of King George II and that you are the colonial
judge. You serve at his pleasure, and here is how the system works: You render decisions that he likes, you get a big house, a nice fancy carriage with fancy horses, a lot of
servants to wait on you. If you render a decision he doesn't like, he cuts your head off.
So that is the institutional structure: good decision, nice house and carriage; bad decision, no head.
168.
See, e.g., Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic Development, supra note 10, at 129.
As noted previously, informal legal structures, such as reputation based systems, even if otherwise
adequate, might be inadequate for a number of transactions or the disputes arising from them, including larger and more complex transactions. See Jensen, Justice and the Rule of Law, supra note
114, at 121; DAM, supra note 62, at 125.
169.
Andrew J. Art, Sometimes It's OK to Just Go Ahead and Make A Federal Case Out Of It,
COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Aug. 24, 2007), available at http://www.cwslaw.com/CmsData/Site
/ModuleNews/SDM%20federal% 20case%20reprint.pdf (Ohio article observing that reason for
bringing cases to federal court includes the perceptions that "the system of electing state court judges
can give rise to the appearance of partiality, particularly when the defendant is from out of state" and
"that federal judges are less susceptible to local economic or political pressures."; note that state
judges are elected in Ohio). Certain state court decisions are also reviewable in federal court on due
process grounds. See e.g., State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (review of
punitive damages decision under the due process clause).
170.
Alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration, which is essentially consensual, would
have limited applicability in tort cases.
The use of alternate dispute resolution is, of course, not limited to domestic controversies.
International arbitration tribunals may also provide a method for limiting the negative impact of
certain foreign country court decisions. See Michael Trebilcock and Jing Leng, The Role of Formal
Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REv. 1517, 1541 (2006) ("In
contemporary international trade, three non-state institutions of contract enforcement are utilized

extensively to mitigate contracting problems arising from cross-border transactions" including
"international commercial arbitration ....International commercial arbitration has emerged over the
past two decades as a common mechanism for settling trade and investment disputes among private
parties in different countries."). But see id. at 1541 (2006) (referring to "some persistent forms of
contractual uncertainty relating to the limits of the enforceability of international arbitration awards
within national borders.").
171.
See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Indiana,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/index.cfm?state=IN (last visited Oct. 17, 2008);
American
Judicature
Society,
Judicial Selection
in the
States: New
York,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/index.cfm?state=NY (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
The preferred method is commission-based appointment, and variations exist even among those
systems. For model provisions for such a system, see generally Norman L. Greene, The Judicial
Independence Through FairAppointments Act, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13 (2007). The American
Judicature Society has recently published some of its own model provisions for judicial selection.
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For example, in some states, including New York, the highest court is a
certiorari court, with no automatic right to appeal to that court in most
cases. Furthermore, not every question is reviewable by appellate courts
de novo, and deference in various situations is typically given to certain
trial court decisions. Finally, in order to prevent enforcement of lower
often must be
court judgments pending appeal, a monetary judgment
172
bonded; and appeals may be otherwise expensive.
Much is to be said for getting a fair and impartial decision in the
first instance; and the question remains why any state judicial system
should 73
rely on counterweights, rather than have a good system at the
outset. 1
2. The "Other Problems": Lack of Screening and Voter Knowledge
of Candidates and Participation in Judicial Elections
Judicial competence has been made part of the rule of law dialogue
by the World Justice Project;1 74 and Justice Anthony Kennedy would add
a "functioning judiciary respected for its independence, its professional
' 75 as well as "neutrality," to that dialogue. 76 The concern
attainments,"'
about elections is not only a concern about judges and candidates pandering to the electorate or campaign contributors, or retaliation against opponents. Judicial elections are not the most effective way to secure
highly qualified judges, and such a judiciary is essential to fair adjudication:

See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS (2008 REVISION),

http://www.judicialselection .us/uploads/documents/MJSP..ptr_3962CC5301809.pdf.
172.
The damage caused by unfair justice in the United States may also be softened in some
respects by the availability of insurance to bear or share the costs in some cases. But not every risk
is insurable, covered by insurance, or within policy limits; and although the insured may have some
of its losses covered by insurance, that coverage does not prevent the harm from falling upon the
insurance companies themselves. Thus insurance shifts the risk of substantial loss from one company to another, but loss is still present. Insurance companies may also attempt to recoup some of
their losses from the insured and perhaps others through imposing higher future insurance premiums
and to spread the risk of loss to other companies through reinsurance.
The lack of restriction on judicial campaign speech as a result of the Supreme Court's
173.
decision in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 786 (2002), and subsequent cases
also threatens a loss (or at least perception of loss) of judicial impartiality. Under the rulings of
these cases, judicial candidates may now announce their personal views on certain legal and political
issues, and within limits, may solicit funds for their campaigns.
174.
See World Justice Project, supra note 41 (providing the World Justice Project's definition
of the Rule of Law).
175.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S.Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
176.
Frontline,supra note 148. As Justice Kennedy noted:
We have certain constitutional principles that extend over time. Judges must be neutral in
order to protect those principles .... There's a rule of law, [and it is in] three parts. One:
the government is bound by the law. Two: all people are treated equally. And three:
there are certain enduring human rights that must be protected. There must be both the
perception and the reality that in defending these values, the judge is not affected by improper influences or improper restraints. That's neutrality.
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Most of what courts do is opaque to people who are not lawyers. It is
completely unrealistic to think that the average voter will ever know
enough about judicial performance to be able to evaluate judicial
candidates intelligently. That is a decisive objection to Arizona or
any other state deciding to elect judges. In states like Wisconsin and
Indiana in my circuit, states that have partisan elections of state supreme court justices, the system is putting an unfair burden on the
voter of trying to figure out which candidates would be good
judges. 177

If judges are to be selected with the "utmost care," elections are the
wrong way to select them.178 This is not the same as saying elected
judges are more qualified than appointed judges or vice versa. The question is which method used to select judges is better designed to focus on
the judge's qualifications. For example, judicial candidates for elections
need not undergo mandatory screening179 or evaluation to run for election; and the only qualifications for office are that they have a law degree, have a specified amount of time in practice (if required), and be
elected. These "qualifications" alone are insufficient. A judge requires
legal knowledge and ability, including the capability to understand and
apply the complexity of the law, a good judicial temperament, and rule of
law values. 80 Litigants spend substantial sums in preparing their cases
and rely on the courts properly to evaluate and understand their arguments and experts. But legal ability and temperament are rarely meaningfully discussed in an election campaign. The voters are generally
unaware of the specific judicial qualifications of the judicial aspirant181
177.
Posner, supranote 144, at 5.
178.
See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 125.
179.
New York has a limited amount of bar association screening, political party screening and
certain other voluntary screening known as Part 150 commissions. See generally 22 Rules of the
Chief Administrative Judge, Part 150, Independent Judicial Elections Qualification Commissions,
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/rules /chiefadmin/150.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
None of these screening procedures is mandatory or required to enable one to run for a judgeship,
and an unfavorable rating does not preclude election.
180. See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 125:
[J]udges must be selected with the utmost care, not just focusing on their legal knowledge
and acumen, but with at least as much attention to their commitment to fidelity to the law
(not inclined to manipulate the law's latent indeterminacy), to their willingness to defer to
the proper authority for the making of law (accept legislative decisions even when the
judge disagrees), to their social background (to insure that judges are not unrepresentative
of the community), to their qualities of honesty and integrity (to remain unbiased and not
succumb to corruption), to their good temper and reasonable demeanor (to insure civility), and to their demonstrated capacity for wisdom.
181.
The voters may know the judge's educational background and years of judicial or related
experience. But these factors may or may not relate to the judge's legal skills or temperament which
may be better identified through a screening process which reviews the judge's performance in
detail. This process, most commonly used in connection with retention elections in appointive
systems, such as in Colorado, is known as judicial performance review or evaluation. In Colorado,
judges are initially appointed to the bench through a commission-based system; the only judicial
election is a retention election for a judge whose term is expiring; and in that election, judges are
unopposed.
See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SHARED
EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT (2006), http://www.du.edulegalinstitute/

publications2006.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008) (considering various types of judicial performance
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and as previously noted, what judges do is generally "opaque" to the
public. 182 Moreover, American judges do not receive pre-judicial education before ascending to the bench, and they either83learn on the job or
through post-selection judicial education programs. 1
Electing judges "means that people whom society wants to be exercising a professional judgment, have to engage in a popularity contest
1 84
instead, and the most popular are unlikely to be the most professional."

Voters typically do not know enough about a judge's performance to
decide:
[I]f only a few people can identify the [judicial] candidates, and only
a few people vote, can elections really hold judges accountable in any
meaningful way?... [H]ow are voters supposed to assess the professional competence of judges? It is one thing to expect voters with no
training in the law to decide whether the policies favored by legislators and governors (who may not be lawyers themselves) coincide
with their own, and quite another to expect85them to decide whether
the rulings of judges coincide with the law.1
Among other things, voters may be generally unable to assess a
judge's technical skills, including the judge's mastery of the rules of evidence and the judge's ability to understand complex issues of substantive
law.' 86 Lacking useful information about judicial candidates, voters
sometimes vote "blind" based on cues having nothing to do with judicial
quality or perhaps upon the basis of the last political sign or other political advertisement (regardless of its accuracy) that they observed; many
do not vote at all. 87 "Without accurate and relevant knowledge about
review, including reports on particular judges made available to the public before retention elections
as voter education).
182. Posner, supra note 144, at 5.
183.
See Gur-Arie & Wheeler, supra note 2, at 137; Marc T. Amy, JudiciarySchool: A Proposalfor a Pre-JudicialLL.M. Degree, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 130, 134 (2002) (recommending prejudicial education for U.S. judges).
184. Posner, supra note 144, at 6.
185.
Geyh, supra note 129, at 7.
186. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies Underlying Election of the
Judiciary,4 NEV. L.J. 35, 44-45 (2003).
187. Id. at 51. See also Sarah Elizabeth Saucedo, Majority Rules Except in New Mexico:
Constitutionaland Policy Concerns Raised by New Mexico's Supermajority Requirement for Judicial Retention, 86 B.U. L. REV. 173, 217 (2006) (noting that in retention elections, most voters
abstain or "vote blind" because they have to make a "decision on which they have no basis for
judgment" (quoting Robert C. Luskin et al., How Minority Judges Fare in Retention Elections, 77
JUDICATURE 316, 318-19 (1994)); Karlan, supra note 3, at 1046 ("[V]oters [in judicial elections] are
likely to cast their ballots in ignorance; they often seem to support (or oppose) every incumbent, vote
a straight ticket without any knowledge of the relationship between party and judicial philosophy (if
there is one), or simply not vote at all.").
The problem of voters voting on the basis of false or deceptive political advertising in
judicial campaigns is a matter of concern. One notable example of such advertising was in the 2008
election campaign between Gableman and Butler for the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See Adam
Liptak, supra note 138, observing the following about the campaign:
The vote came after a bitter $5 million campaign in which a small-town trial judge [Gableman] with thin credentials ran a television advertisement falsely suggesting that the
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the specific judges at issue, voters are prone to base their decisions on
factors such as ethnicity, gender, name recognition, party affiliation, or
length of time on the bench. Even worse, without information to inform
their choices, a significant
number of voters apparently cast a vote with188
all."'
at
rationale
out any
only black justice on the state Supreme Court [Butler] had helped free a black rapist. The
challenger unseated the justice with 51 percent of the vote, and he will join the court in
August.
... Judge Gableman's campaign ran a television advertisement juxtaposing the images of
his opponent, Justice Louis B. Butler Jr., in judicial robes, with a photograph of Ruben
Lee Mitchell, who had raped an 11-year-old girl .... "Butler found a loophole," the advertisement said. "Mitchell went on to molest another child. Can Wisconsin families feel
safe with Louis Butler on the Supreme Court?"
Justice Butler had represented Mr. Mitchell as a lawyer 20 years before and had persuaded two appeals courts that his rape trial had been flawed. But the state Supreme
Court ruled that the error was harmless, and it did not release the defendant, as the advertisement implied. Instead, Mr. Mitchell served out his full term and only then went on to
commit another crime.
[Former Justice Butler noted that] "people ought to be looking at judges' ability to analyze and interpret the law, their legal training, their experience level and, most importantly, their impartiality. []They should not be making decisions based on ads filled with
lies, deception, falsehood and race-baiting. The system is broken, and that robs the public of their right to be informed."
Part of the section relating to the problems of judicial elections, particularly the lack of
voter knowledge, is taken from Norman L. Greene, Appointive Selection of Judges, Limited Jurisdiction Courts with Non-Lawyer Judiciaries,and JudicialIndependence, 43 CT. REVtEw 80 (2007).
188.

INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SHARED EXPECTATIONS,

JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INCONTEXT 15 (2006) [hereinafter SHARED EXPECTATIONS] (footnotes
omitted) available at http://www.du.edulegalinstitute/form-shared-expect.html (registration required). See also id. at 3 ("As a consequence, voters tend to vote based on cues unrelated to a
judge's performance, such as ethnicity or party affiliation, where that information is available.").
The importance of a judicial candidate's name recognition was reaffirmed in the West
Virginia Supreme Court election of 2008, where an advertisement connecting the candidate's name
to "ketchup" was concededly helpful in the candidate's success. See Justin D. Anderson, "Ketchup"
spot left its mark on voters deciding Supreme Court race, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Nov. 7, 2008,
availableat http://dailymail.com/News/statenews/200811070217:
It was a short, simple television ad, meant to familiarize voters with the candidate's uncommon last name. And it was arguably the cleverest and most entertaining ad of the
whole election season. [Menis] Ketchum believes it was that ad, and later a sequel, that
got him elected [in 2008] to one of two seats coming open on the [West Virginia] Supreme Court by a surprisingly wide margin. "I worked hard, I worked continuously,"
Ketchum said. "I never stopped. I met a lot of people. But I think the ketchup ad elected
me.

Party affiliation determined the results in 2008 trial court elections in Harris County,
Texas, where 22 out of 26 Republican judges were replaced by Democratic judges. See Mike Tolson, Sweep revises debate on election of judges: Straight-ticket ballots contributed to multiple defeats
at the courthouse, HOUSTON
CHRON.,
Nov.
8,
2008,
available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpUfront/6102615.html (describing, among other things, the
Democratic sweeps or near sweeps in Dallas County in 2006 and in Harris County in 2008). Texas
Supreme Court Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson took the opportunity to comment on the uninformed
electorate in judicial elections:
This is a strange way to select those who guard our legal rights ....
It is time to decide
whether partisan election is the best means to ensure judicial competence. It has become
clear that in judicial elections, the public (particularly in urban areas) cannot cast informed votes due to the sheer number of candidates on the ballot.
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Also, the amount of money required to run a campaign and the po-

litical nature of the election process may discourage qualified candidates
from running. Would-be judges just may not want to go "through all of

that":
[E]lecting judges greatly narrows the field of selection. Most people
do not have the skills or personality to be a campaigning candidate.
Nor is there any correlation between the skills of a judge and the
skills of a political candidate. So we lose a lot of people who would
be excellent judges but would
be total flops as political candidates.
189
And that is certainly bad.

In contrast, seeking a judgeship in an appointment system does not
entail the same costs as in an election system: all that is needed is filling
out an application and interviewing.1 90 The relative simplicity of the
process may encourage those qualified persons unlikely to excel in the
political arena to apply.
None of these considerations-lack of screening, disincentives to
run because of the need for political involvement, or lack of voter
knowledge and insight-pertains to a well-designed appointment system.
In such an appointment system, screening of the candidate according to
established criteria, including knowledge of the law and temperament, is
not only commonplace but required.' 91 Although adopting the federal
system of appointment is rarely suggested for the state courts (and the
federal system has its own flaws), federal judicial candidates typically
are screened by the senators who suggest them, the presidents who appoint them, and the senate which confirms them. While some may question the suitability of certain appointment systems, what makes a good
appointive system
was the subject of a recent symposium and could be
192
studied further.

189.
Posner, supra note 144, at 6.
190.
City of New York Mayor's Advisory Committee on the Judiciary, Judicial Application,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acj/html/application/judicial-application.shtml (last visited October 27,
2008). Cf. Sharon E. Grubin & John M. Walker, Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairnessin the Courts, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 11, 56 (1997) (appointment
system for federal magistrate judge system.).
191.
See, e.g., id. at 52-53 (federal bankruptcy court judges); Greene, supra note 171. But see
Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken is It?, 39 TULSA L. REV.
691, 693-97 (2004) (overview of federal judicial appointment for federal district and circuit court
judges during various past administrations, focusing on problems with the system of appointment).
192.
See Symposium on Rethinking Judicial Selection: A Critical Appraisal of Appointive
Selection for State Court Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2007). My model judicial appointment
legislation, which is part of the symposium, appears at Greene, supra note 171. Compare JOSHUA C.
HALL & RUSSELL S. SOBEL, IS THE 'MISSOURI PLAN' GOOD FOR MISSOURI? THE ECONOMICS OF

JUDICIAL
SELECTION,
SHOW-ME-INSTITUTE
(May
21,
2008),
http://showmeinstitute.org/docLib/20080515-smi study_15.pdf.
HALL & SOBEL overlooks this
symposium in its discussion on the supposedly little work done on the differences among appointive
systems. See id. at 9 ("While there has been a tremendous amount of research about the differences
between elected and appointed systems, there has been almost no empirical work about the differences among appointive systems."). Some defenses of judicial elections suggest that since appoint-
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This does not mean that elected judges are never highly qualified
and that appointed judges are always highly qualified. Furthermore,
"[t]he quality of the elective judiciary, or of any given elected judge,
does not validate the deficiencies of the election system. Good judges
can emerge from poor selection systems. Even a monarch, dictator, or a
political boss can be capable of selecting a good judge from time to time,
but that does not mean that we wish to have our judges selected by such
persons."'' 93 But it does suggest that the system for selecting judges by
election is not conducive to identifying the best qualified judges because
it does not require screening and depends on fund-raising or campaigning, which have little to do with judicial ability.
This article is well aware of the difficulty in measuring quality and
applying the test of quality to each individual judge. 194 An empirical or
quantitative comparison would be a major undertaking. The study would
have to isolate agreed criteria of quality; the criteria would not only have
to be valid but measurable; and the study would need to take account of
the different types of elections and appointment systems. All appointment systems are not the same, and for a study to be useful, it would
have to include the precise system being studied; and that may or may
not be a system that is even in place in any given state.195 From a structural standpoint, however, all commission-based appointment systems
should involve screening of judicial aspirants, and that gives the system
an advantage over any electoral system, if the screening is properly
done. 196

ive systems may have problems, states should stay with the flawed elective systems that they have;
or they engage in rhetorical praise of the so-called benefits of the democratic electoral process used
to select judges. See. e.g., Norman L. Greene, Reflections on the Appointment and Election of State
Court Judges: A Response to Adumbrations on Judicial Campaign Speech and a Model for a Response to Similar Advocacy Articles, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 601, 612-14, 622-23 (2007); cf Stempel,
supra note 186, at 44 (noting not every office needs to be elected in a democracy, and wellfunctioning appointive systems may be substituted for elective systems).
193.
Greene, supra note 149, at 954 n.26.
194.
See Greene, supra note 192, at 613-14.
195.
Id. Even if the appointment system were only a model and not yet in effect, the study
might evaluate whether such a model was conducive to selecting qualified judges. The issue is not
merely what results appointment systems have achieved in selecting qualified judges in the past but
what they may be designed to achieve in the future. By way of comparison, in order to evaluate the
likelihood of an appointive system achieving diversity, one might consider analyzing the extent to
which past comparable appointive systems have done so. But it is also necessary to consider how
appointment systems may be designed so as to maximize the chances of achieving diversity in the
future. See e.g., Leo M. Romero, Enhancing Diversity in an Appointive System of Selecting Judges,
34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485 (2007); see also id. at 487 ("Ensuring diversity is most likely to occur
when the law establishing the appointive system, whether in a constitution or statute, includes language that mandates consideration of diversity.").
196.
The author acknowledges that many of our elected judges may be excellent judges and
that the criticism of the election system is not intended to be a criticism of any of those selected by
it. He trusts that this is obvious regardless whether the criticism of the election system is in this
article or coming from Justice O'Connor, who was both elected and appointed to the bench, herself.
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C. The Economic Consequences of Judicial Elections
Although research is ongoing, considerable international development experience teaches that the presence of the rule of law is linked to
economic progress, and its failures to the reverse. Thus, if judicial elections are or lead to rule of law violations, economic setbacks may be
anticipated in the United States where they occur. 197 Litigants and potential litigants-business and non-business interest groups 98 and policymakers-may consider the evidence, and if the potential consequences
are unacceptable, consider how to respond.
The economic consequences of domestic rule of law violations may
appear in various ways. For example, if the judicial systems of some
states or municipalities are presumed to be unfair, few businesses may
wish to locate or sell there, unless, perhaps, the risk is worth it. That
hurts businesses by depriving them of potential profits, and it injures the
localities by depriving them of tax revenues, jobs, and otherwise available goods and services. In addition, foreign direct investment may be
discouraged in those localities. After all, based on international experience, it is questionable whether companies would wish to invest where
they could not rely on a judicial system which fairly judged and respected contracts. t99 Foreign investment is desirable in the United States
197.
Whether states with elected judiciaries are poorer than states with non-elective judiciaries
or whether they are poorer than they would otherwise be if they had commission-based appointed
judiciaries is beyond the scope of this article. Similarly outside the scope is determining if they are
poorer, the reason is the fact that the judges were elected and for no other reason.
HALL & SOBEL, supranote 192, considers some economic literature with an international
focus relating to legal systems and economic development, without extensive analysis of the subject
or discussion of the rule of law; however, it concludes that there is a "positive relationship between
legal quality and [economic] growth." Id. at 3. The authors contend that "[j]udicial independence is
critical to a well-functioning legal system, and the quality of a state's judicial system is an important
determinant of economic growth." Id. (footnote omitted). After taking "as given the existence of a
positive relationship between legal quality and growth," they note that "the interesting question here
is how judicial selection influences legal quality." Id.
198.
These other interest groups would cover those historically called trial lawyers or plaintiffs
groups, although businesses may equally be plaintiffs as well as defendants. All Americans have a
stake in our economy and business, whether through stock ownership, pensions, jobs, bank accounts,
and other things too numerous to mention, See e.g., Paul Krugman, A Slow-Mo Meltdown, N.Y.
TIMES,
Apr.
4,
2008,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/opinion
/04krugman.html?scp=1&sq=economic%20meltdown%20and%20veiy%20scary%20things&st=cse.
199.
See DAM, supra note 62, at 94 ("Better courts reduce the risks finns face, and so increase
the firms 'willingness to invest more."') (citation to World Bank report omitted). The author acknowledges the comments made by Sheila K. Davidson, General Counsel of New York Life; Mary
C. McQueen, President and CEO of the National Center for State Courts; and Thomas J. Sabatino,
General Counsel of Schering-Plough Corporation, all of whom were panelists at the conference
which the author organized at Fordham Law School on April 8, 2008 entitled Enhancing Judicial
Independence, Accountability, and Selection for the State Court Judiciary:A Programfor Reform.
See Albertsen & Reddick, supra note 151, at 81-82 for an extensive account of the conference.
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Stephen Breyer also made remarks at the conference,
where four panels were presented on topics related to judicial reform. The conference was sponsored by the Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary
(www.law.georgetown.edu/judiciary) and many other organizations, including bar associations, law
schools, and court reform organizations. Press coverage or references to the conference included
Adam Liptak, supra note 138. Other press coverage included Dorothy Samuels, supra note 156;
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as well as internationally. 2° Company employees may even be disadvantaged if they have personal cases to bring before the courts, and an
unfair or otherwise substandard judiciary may make it difficult to attract
and maintain such employees. Such effects have been collectively recognized, as follows:
When entrepreneurs decide where to open a new business, expand
operations, or market a new product, they weigh the comparative
costs and benefits of different locations. The tax structure, education
level of local workers, transportation networks, technological capabilities of area universities, and weather are all factors that are assessed. Another factor is the state's legal system. Is it a secure legal
system that is fair and predictable? Does it protect private property
rights and render timely court decisions? If the answer is yes, the
state will attract entrepreneurs and capital, foster
competition, and
20
experience faster economic growth as a result. 1

Dirk Olin, Judicial Reports: Judicial Abacus (April 9, 2008), http://www.judicialreports.com
/2008/04/judicial-abacus-print.html; and Maggie Barron, O'Connor & Breyer on Judicial Independence
(April
9,
2008),
http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/oconnorbreyeron-judicial-independence/.
This was the seventh conference sponsored by the Sandra Day O'Connor Project: three
were at Georgetown Law Center in 2006, 2007, and 2008, and three others were held in 2007 in
Dallas at Southern Methodist University's Dedman School of Law; Chicago at Loyola School of
Law; and Atlanta at Emory School of Law. The author of this article was a speaker at the Dallas
conference in 2007.
200.
See Frank Lavin, Remarks of Frank Lavin Under Secretary of Commerce for International
Trade at the American Business Group of Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, (Mar. 12,
2007)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary-Gutierrez/2007_Releases/March/03-12_07_Lavin_
UAESpch.pdf):
Perhaps alone among the major economies, the United States has not had a federal government program to attract or retain inward foreign investment. All other major world
economies have mechanisms such as investment boards and investment promotion activities to encourage FDI [i.e., foreign direct investment]... .I am pleased to inform you that
the U.S. Government last week launched the Invest in America initiative to facilitate foreign direct investment into the United States.
See also JAMES K. JACKSON, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTHE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (Aug. 15, 2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organizationl109490.pdf; U.S. Dept. of
State Fact Sheet, How Foreign Direct Investment Benefits the United States (March 13, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/63041.htm (among other things, considering the extent of
foreign direct investment in the United States).
201.
LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABILITY INDEX: 2008
REPORT 53 (Pacific Research Inst. 2008). See also HALL & SOBEL, supra note 192 (relating quality
of courts to economic growth and finding higher quality courts in states using commission-based
appointments relying on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform's State Liability Systems Ranking Study). Hall & Sobel noted:
Judicial independence is critical to a well-functioning legal system, and the quality of a
state's judicial system is an important determinant of economic growth. States with
highly regarded legal systems better protect and define property and contract rights, providing the proper foundation for entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. Bad
court systems, on the other hand, can impede economic development by creating uncertainty, driving up the costs of doing business (such as liability insurance or worker compensation), and infringing on the liberties that underpin a free and prosperous market
economy.
Id. at 3.
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Businesses may also be "more likely to incorporate in states with a
higher quality judicial system., 20 2 This likewise has economic consequences.
Business litigants may or should accept the risk that the courts will
be impartial and they will sometimes lose. But no litigant would or
should have to accept the risk that it is likely to lose unfairly most if not
all the time. 20 3 Fairness and impartiality add predictability to the dispute
resolution and corporate planning process. But judicial elections-as
rule of law violations-result in unpredictability. Roughly the same
facts may lead to different results in different jurisdictions for various
reasons, including the influence of cash and local electorates and varying
and inconsistent rules on judicial recusal under which judges who receive
campaign funds from a litigant may (or may not) disqualify themselves
from cases. 2° It is a common concern that judges make or appear to
make decisions that are favored by their campaign contributors and local
electorates rather than based on the law and the facts; indeed, the danger
of state courts adhering to the whims of the local electorate is a concern
even apart from campaign contributions. All this interferes with the ability of businesses and others to plan their transactions and forecast risk.20 5
202. Marcel Kahan, The Demand for CorporateLaw: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or
Takeover Protection, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 348-49, 363 (2006) (using the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce's 2001 State Liability Ranking Study as its indicator of state court quality). See also
Albertsen & Reddick, supra note 151, at 82 (panelist notes that "corporations, when they are considering branching out to other states, often take into account the reputation of the courts in these states
for fairly and reliably resolving disputes").
203. A study on how much business is not being done in a state because of an unfair judicial
system if properly conceived might be useful. Questions to be asked as part of that study might be
similar to those discussed earlier, such as whether a particular company or companies did or will
investigate a country's legal system before deciding whether or not to invest there. See discussion
supra Part I.C.2.a entitled Recognizing Causation Controversies (citing Perry-Kessaris, supra note
71, at 688). Designing such a study, however, is beyond the scope of this article. Furthermore,
policymakers undoubtedly need to make decisions in advance of such a study.
204. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444, at *31-51 (W. Va.
July 28, 2008) (Benjamin, Acting C.J., concurring) (citing extensive authority to the effect that
campaign contributions from a party or his attorney do not mandate disqualification), cert. granted,
77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2008) (No. 08-22); JAMES SAMPLE, DAVID POZEN & MICHAEL
STANDARDS
18-20
(2008),
COURTS:
SETTING
RECUSAL
YOUNG,
FAIR
The American Bar Association's
http:l/www.ajs.org/ethicslpdfs/Brennancenterrecusalreport.pdf.
Standing Commission on Judicial Independence has an ongoing project on judicial disqualification,
and a draft report for discussion purposes only is available; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDING COMMITrEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
http:llwww.abanet.orgljudindlpdf/JDPPROJECT
(Sept.
2008),
DRAFT_FORDISCUSSIONPURPOSES_9-08.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2008) (on file with
author and Denver University Law Review).
205. The combination of judicial elections and some other element of unfairness, such as the
absence of a right to appeal to a higher court from an adverse trial court judgment, may be a combustible mixture. Yet that occurs in West Virginia where judges are elected, and the losing party has no
automatic right to any appeal from a judgment. In a recent case in West Virginia, the Governor
stepped in to petition the Supreme Court to review a multi-million dollar trial verdict so that the
losing party, DuPont, would have some appellate review. The prevailing party argued that the
procedure was fair despite no appeal and that the first and only decision was sufficient:
trial Judge Thomas Bedell already reviewed the punitive
Attorney Brian Barr said ...
damages for propriety during and after trial. Had Bedell found the amount excessive or
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According to Justice Stephen Breyer, the public's loss of confidence in

the judiciary from the campaigning and fund-raising alone may have a
negative economic impact on business. °6
D. Some Observationson Judicial Selection Reform
1. Considering Judicial Election Reform
Reforming the state court judicial election process may involve
changing it as well as replacing it. Although various commentators suggest such reforms if elimination of judicial elections is impractical in the

short term, some recognize that these are limited remedies for a flawed
207

system.
The types of change available for state court judicial elections
vary in potency and address various deficiencies in the election proc-

ess. 20 8 These include creating private campaign conduct committees to
discourage inappropriate activities; 2 09 increasing the filing and disclosure
of campaign contributions; improving voter education on specific candidates (such as through preparing and making voter guides widely available); lengthening judicial terms to reduce the number of elections; in-

creasing qualifications for judicial office (including using screening
committees, where possible); and instituting nonpartisan elections (which
is not recommended).21 0
Heightened recusal standards and public financing of campaigns
might reduce the incentive or need to contribute to judicial campaigns
unfounded, "The court could have taken the punitive damages away," Barr said. "The
whole idea that DuPont has not had a review at all is senseless," Barr added, accusing
DuPont of stalling. "All DuPont is trying to do right now is protect its money." Only
West Virginia and Virginia give their appeals courts complete discretion on whether to
hear most civil cases, the governor's brief argued. The rest grant the kind of automatic
appeals that West Virginia lacks.
Lawrence Messina, Manchin Seeks Review of Appeal in Du Pont Lawsuit, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
July 3, 2008, availableat http://www.wvgazette.com/News/200807020756. See also John O'Brien,
DuPont appeal accepted by W. Va. SC, THE WEST VIRGINIA RECORD, Sept. 25, 2008, available at
http://wvrecord.com/news/contentview.asp?c=215028.
206.
Frontline,supra note 148. Justice Breyer noted:
It [i.e., raising money for judicial election campaigns and campaign advertisements] demeans the process. We all know there are other countries where, for various reasons, the
public lacks confidence in the judiciary.. .And where those things have happened, I think
there have been bad results for the people who live in the country, not just for the judges,
not just for the lawyers, but for the ordinary man and woman who lives in the country.
There tends not to be a method of fairly resolving disputes. And that means that it's
harderto develop businesses. It's harder to just live an ordinary life in a fair way and it's
harder to protect liberty.
Id. (emphasis added).
207.
See ABA COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 74-81
(2003), http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/report.pdf [hereinafter ABA COMM'N].
208.
See id. at 70-86 (2003) (detailing various options for election reform).
209. See A] Cross & William H. Fortune, Kentucky 2006 JudicialElections, 55 DRAKE L. REv.
637, 642-51 (2007) (describing, among other things, the Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct
Committee). See also id. at 651 ("While the [Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct Committee]
cannot claim a great impact on Kentucky's 2006 judicial elections, the authors of this article believe
that the committee played a positive role.").
210.
See ABA COMM'N, supra note 207, 74-82.
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and therefore might do the most to eliminate cash from the courtroom. 211
The lack of knowledge of candidates by voters may be partly addressed
by voter education, such as voter guides, depending on the content and
accessibility of the guide to voters. 12 Although campaign conduct
committees may have some effect in counteracting unfair judicial2 cam13
paign conduct, the committees have no power to stop such conduct.
Screening of judicial candidates, whether by bar or governmental
committees, is limited and voluntary, and a poor rating does not bar a
candidate from running for election.2 14 Nonpartisan elections appear to
be a poor device, since without party labels, voter knowledge of candidates will be further depleted, leaving the voters to rely on name recognition, demographic factors, or nothing at all on which to base their
choice.215
In sum, while limited election reform is available, it may not cure
the rule of law violations set forth in this article. Based upon international learning in the rule of law field and domestic experience, whether
such reforms are sufficient is doubtful. Hazarding a clich6, one might
view this as rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, or otherwise
stated, futile.

211.
See generally SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 204 ("[Cjurrent recusal doctrine makes it extremely difficult to disqualify a judge for having received contributions from a litigant or her lawyer,
even though there is ample evidence to suggest that these contributions create not only the appearance of bias but also actual bias in judicial decision-making.") (footnotes omitted). Stricter recusal
standards may be necessary not merely in light of the receipt of campaign contributions but also in
connection with things which have been said in judicial campaigns. See also Thomas R. Phillips &
Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a
Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 691, 707-20 (2007) (focusing on recusal in view of campaign
statements made by candidates).
212. Greene, supra note 149, at 602. The utility of the voter's guide will vary, among other
things, depending on the relevance of the information to judicial performance; the adequacy of the
mechanisms used to collect the information; how effectively the information is conveyed to the
voters; and whether the voters are motivated to review the information.
Nothing could be done to remove the incentive on elected courts to favor local voters in
cases where the parties before the court are not all local voters, especially since the judge's future
position depends on the good opinion of the voters. Although a judge will not be able to tell whether
a local voter had voted for her in the past, every local voter is a potential voter for the judge, and
every non-local voter is not a potential voter.
213. Cross & Fortune, supra note 209, at 643. Despite such committees, false and misleading
attack advertisements may still deceive the public into voting for the judge who is the beneficiary of
the attack against her opponent.
214.
For an example of govemmental screening, see Rules of the Chief Admin Judge, supra
note 179. A New York commission had previously recommended state sponsored screening of
candidates for election. See COMM'N TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS,
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 15-26 (2004), available at
http://law.fordham.edu/commission /judicialelections/images/jud-freport.pdf.
215.
Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483,
1513-14 (2005). See also Tolson, supra note 188, stating that:
Texas is one of only four states that uses partisan elected races for all of its state courts.
Some states opt for nonpartisan races, but [former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice
Tom] Phillips and others say removing the label does not eliminate many of the problems
of partisan races, including the involvement of special-interest groups, the need to raise
money and curry votes, and the lack of voter knowledge of judicial candidates.
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2. Commission-Based Appointments: Already an American
Institution
There is an important difference between American judicial selection reform and international rule of law reform. Since Americans are
reforming their own system, the risk of a bad, improper or ill-fitting rule
of law reform is less likely. In addition, the proposed reform is not alien
to Americans; rather, it is very much an American institution. Commission-based appointive systems are in effect in various states already; they
were first established in Missouri in 1940;216 and Americans have experience with them. There is no need to deal with the problem of a strange
or inhospitable institution in the nature of an unreceptive transplant moving from one country to another which may be a concern in international
development work.2 17 Nor should cost be an issue as in the case of international reform. The change to a commission-based appointment system
may even be less costly than an election system since it will eliminate
campaign money-raising and campaigning itself.2 18 Moreover, the appointment system which is to replace an election system should be a
model system which may be the same as or superior to other appointment
systems now or previously in place.21 9
One requirement for reform applies to both developing nations and
the United States: a political will for change. As stated with respect to
developing nations:
Rule-of-law reform will succeed only if it gets at the fundamental
problem of leaders who refuse to be ruled by the rule of law....
Even the new generation of politicians arising out of the political
transitions of recent years are reluctant to support reforms
that create
220
competing centers of authority beyond their control.

216.
Rachel P. Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practicesfor Judicial
Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 163, 170 (2007).
217.
See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The TransplantEffect,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 167-68 (2003); Haggard et al., supra note 27, at 221 ("[N]otwithstanding
the passion of the development policy community for spreading judicial best practice, caution should
be exercised in the introduction of an alien legal system.").
218.
See, e.g., Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain't Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of
JudicialElections, Merit Selection, and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U.L. REv. 625,
647 (2002). Especially since there may be a cost-savings by eliminating judicial elections, there is
no question of added costs to consider. Nor should there be the same concern of scarcity of resources that otherwise may be important when deciding on rule of law reforms in developing countries. The United States is not a "developing" country with the same resource concerns, at least not
on the same scale. Developing countries may also need to choose between various rule of law
reforms, such as between reforming their criminal law or commercial law, increasing their competency and efficiency, and enhancing the government's compliance with law. See, e.g., Thomas
Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 7-8 (2006) (identifying type
one, type two, and type three reforms). It is unlikely that any state in the United States would need
to make the same choice between improving its criminal or civil law-which may well not need any
substantial reform in any case-and reforming its judicial selection methods.
219.
See Greene, supra note 171, at 13-14.
220.
Carothers, Steps Toward Knowledge, in PROMOTING, supra note 10, at 4.
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It would be unfair to suggest that those who support judicial elections do so because they believe that judicial elections subvert the rule of
law. Rather, one may only assume that the supporters share the same
values that the opponents of elections do on judicial impartiality and
fairness, but that they differ on the means to achieve them. However, in
order to bring about change in the United States as well as abroad, a political will to accomplish it is needed.22
E. Reflections on the Money Race in State JudicialElections: What to Do
in the Meantime and the Next Steps

The argument that special interest groups should cease the money
race in judicial elections is a difficult one to make, especially since some
groups think that campaign spending brings at least short-term benefits. 222 However, those benefits seem to be offset by substantial costs,
221.
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 73 (2003)
("To gain traction with the public, judicial selection must achieve the status of a movement.... [and
capitalize] on catalyzing events that galvanize public opinion and give [the] movement focus and
drive."). In most states which have judicial elections, the requirement is in their constitutions, requiring a constitutional amendment in order to effectuate change. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine,
The False Promise of Judicial Elections in Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 559, 560 (2002). The 2008
judicial elections showed a positive trend toward expanding commission-based appointment systems
in certain counties in Alabama (for vacancy appointments) and Missouri and retaining a commission-based appointment system in a county in Kansas. American Judicature Society, Voters in Four
Jurisdictions
Opt
for
Merit
Selection
on
November
4
[2008],
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel-voters.asp (last visited November 9, 2008).
222. Olson, supra note 138. Olson is a senior fellow at The Manhattan Institute who has written favorably about tort reform and against excessive litigation in the United States. See Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research, Walter Olson, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/htmllolson.htm.
The 2008 elections showed some of the polarization noted by Olson, including in the Michigan
Supreme Court race in which incumbent Cliff Taylor was defeated. See Zachary Gorchow, Hathaway pulls off an upset in Michigan Supreme Court race, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 5, 2008, available
at http://www.freep.com/article/20081105/NEWS15/811050449?imw=Y ("Business interests and
Republicans said Taylor and his fellow conservatives have taken a more literal interpretation of the
law that has created a better climate to do business in Michigan. But Democrats and plaintiffs'
attorneys said Taylor has been part of a majority that has overturned years of precedent and stacked
the deck against individuals trying to sue businesses and government."). An advertisement in the
Michigan Supreme Court campaign made a contested charge that Taylor had slept on a case. Justice
at Stake, Attack Ad Targets "Sleeping Judge", Oct. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/ThisWeek/24Oct08.htm#article2.
The fact that the sleeping charge
may have been untrue raises the possibility that voters may not merely have voted without knowledge of the candidates but on the basis of false information concerning the candidates. See also
Dawson Bell, Balance Tilts on State Supreme Court, DET. FREE PRESS, Nov. 6, 2008, available at
http://www.freep.com/article/20081106/NEWS 15/811060419/1215/NEWS 15
(although
Taylor
denied the charge, "[t]he sleeping judge ad, coupled with multiple phone, mail and in-person voter
contacts from party and interest group activists, appeared to have been particularly effective.").
Attack advertisements likewise beset Taylor's opponent. See Ben Timmins, Michigan ChiefJustice
Loses in Nation's "Dirtiest Campaign", http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=701 (last visited Nov. 11,
2008) ("Ads by the state Republican Party and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce portrayed
Hathaway as soft on terrorism and sexual predators, while serving as a County Circuit Court
Judge.").
In 2008, Mississippi's Supreme Court judicial elections reportedly ranked "among the
nastiest in modem state history--this time with third-parties slinging the mud." Jerry Mitchell, Third
party mud prompts cries for election reforms, THE CLARION-LEDGER, Nov. 9, 2008, available at
http://www.clarionledger.com/article/20081109/NEWS/811090363/1001/RSSO].
See also id.
(third-party advertisements in 2008 Mississippi Supreme Court elections unfairly attack candidates,
including, among other things, by an advertisement accusing candidate of supporting baby-killers;
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and today's prevailing party in judicial elections may be tomorrow's
loser. As a commentator noted in observing pro-business gains in judicial elections:
[I]t is a mistake to observe a tide that has been sweeping out to sea,
and conclude that it will continue to sweep out indefinitely. It is hard
to deny that the substantive improvement in some of these courts has
been bought at a cost of politicization and polarization which inevitably invites the other side to respond in kind when its day comes.223
Justice Stephen Breyer expressed a similar thought in an interview
regarding the structural damage to democracy threatened by election
battles over the courts:

no disclosure required by third-parties of source of contributions to such advertisements under
Mississippi law).
223.
Olson, supra note 138.
But see posting of Walter Olson to PointofLaw.com,
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2008/07/judicial-elections-some-reacti.php
(July 17, 2008,
23:59 EST) (providing links to some positive and negative reactions to the prior Olson article). For
a positive reaction, see, for example, posting of Dale Carpenter to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1216311330.shtml (July 17, 2008 23:15 EST) ("Olson makes a good
argument and provides some evidence that, on the whole, business interests are better served by a
merit system where the judges themselves are more likely to understand the law and try to apply it in
a principled way."). For Dale Carpenter's website, see Dale Carpenter's Faculty Profile, University
of Minnesota Law, http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/carpenterd.html (last visited Oct. 14,
2008).
Some negative reactions express the concern that commission-based appointment systems
may be unfair. Among other things, they contend that commissions are dominated by elites or other
special interests, are unaccountable to any elected officials, and operate in secret; some prefer the
views of at least some elected judges as well. See Dan Pero, A Dissent to Olson's Dissent, The
American Courthouse, http://americancourthouse.com2008/07/17/a-dissent-to-olsons-dissent.html
(July 17, 2008), noting how "rule of law judges"-which the author uses synonymously with judges
supporting a particular point of view as opposed to "rule of law" in its traditional sense-have had
great success recently in winning elections. See also Kathy Barks Hoffman, Ever-More-Expensive
Court Races Heading Higher, Assoc.
Press, August 24, 2008,
available at
http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2008/08/evermoreexpensive-courtraces.html,
describing
Pero's position as follows: "Dan Pero, head of the American Justice Partnership, makes no bones
about the fact that his group wants to get more business-friendly judges on state courts." But the use
of the phrase "rule of law" to describe judges as pre-committed to any class of litigants, pro-business
or otherwise-rather than to characterize them as dedicated to the notions of independence, impartiality and accountability-violates the phrase's generally accepted meaning.
Also, the Pero argument, like others of the same sort, focuses on perceived flaws in certain commission-based appointment systems; relies on words with connotations intended to be
negative, such as trial lawyers, unaccountable, secret and elite to characterize them; overlooks or
minimizes the flaws in judicial election systems, including the influence of money and lack of
screening of candidates; ignores the world-wide peculiarity of the system of electing judges, with
judges being appointed essentially everywhere else; and disregards the development and variability
of commission-based appointment systems. See e.g., Symposium on Rethinking Judicial Selection:A
CriticalAppraisal of Appointive Selection for State Court Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2007)
(including my model judicial appointment legislation, Greene, supra note 171, at 21-34). See also
Statement of Gordon L. Doerfer, Regarding Recent Attacks on Merit Selection Systems, American
Judicature Society (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs-whatsnew-statement.asp:
The composition and selection of nominating commissions is different in each state ....
A blanket condemnation of judicial nominating commissions is irresponsible and misleading. Thirty-three states use merit selection to choose some or all of their judges.
[T]he vast majority of merit selection systems operate without political controversy and
promote public confidence in the judges who are selected.
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[11f you have one group of people doing it, you'll get another group
of people doing it. And if you have A contributing to ...

affect a

court one way, you'll have B trying the other way. And you'll have C
yet a third way and pretty soon you'll have a clash of political interests. Now, that's fine for a legislature. I mean that's one kind of a
problem. But if you have that in the court system, you will then destroy confidence that the judges are deciding things2on
the merits...
24
. And as I said our liberties are connected with that.
By accepting less control over judges now, and agreeing to impartiality rather than judges aligned with one's current preferences, even
powerful interest groups may mitigate their losses when they fall out of
power.

225

One might wonder how the world was able to stop the missile race
which was theoretically harder or more dangerous. Although the competitors did not unilaterally disarm, they certainly explored the options
for ending the race while maintaining their defenses. While expecting
unilateral disarmament by either side in the judicial election wars may be
unrealistic, all concerned should consider whether there is a better way
than the uniquely American mode of electing state court judges and how
it may be implemented. In addition, campaign contributors should further consider the importance of the rule of law, how dangerous this continued conduct may be for the rule of law, and whether they should continue to support this practice.
Therefore, while not asking any special interest group to cease their
spending on judicial elections, this article suggests that all those involved
investigate and support alternatives, including individuals and groups
who are working for them. Such alternatives potentially include the election reforms mentioned above but, most importantly, the end of judicial
elections and the development and use of well-designed commissionbased judicial appointment systems to replace them.226 In the meantime,
questions remain over what is happening to the rule of law in the United
States; how severely is our democracy being damaged; what is the financial cost to our economy; and who is being affected and how.

224.
Frontline,supra note 148.
225.
See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependenceof Courts: A ComparativeApproach,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 741-43 (1994). Judicial independence is part of a trade which political
parties are willing to make depending on their view as to whether they believe that they will have to
cede political power at some future time. Parties expecting to lose political power at some point are
more willing to accept independent judges than those expecting never to lose. Id.
226.
An additional alternative is public funding of judicial elections; however, for reasons
stated in this article and elsewhere, that reform would still not remove many problems with judicial
elections. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly FinancedJudicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 1467, 1478-80 (2001).
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CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

The laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or

representatives,and judges who are of sufficient number, have adequate
resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.227
This article seeks to shift the dialogue in the judicial selection debate to the rule of law and economic development and take the lessons
learned from the international development sphere home. Thus it begins
this conclusion by quoting a key definition by the World Justice Project
of the rule of law.
Analyzing judicial elections through the lens of the rule of law
raises substantial concern that judicial elections are threatening or causing violations of the rule of law.228 At a minimum, judicial elections and
the rule of law are difficult to reconcile; 229 however, the better view is
that they are irreconcilable.23 ° If judges are favoring or appearing to favor campaign contributors or local voters, they are disregarding key
components of the rule of law, including fairness, impartiality, independence, and accountability. Also, "to live under the rule of law is not to be
subject to the unpredictable vagaries of other individuals;,, 23' and if
judges are subject to the preferences of campaign contributors and local
voters, litigants and potential litigants are in that very unpredictable position. Nor do elections maximize the selection of qualified judges, let
alone the selection of judges for their understanding of the rule of law.
There is no appropriate screening mechanism for those purposes.
If one were to compare the U.S. judicial system to that of develop-

ing countries, despite its flaws, the American system may come out better overall. "Every lawyer in a developed country can point to numerous
shortcomings in his own country. Yet judiciaries in developing countries

frequently fall far short of developed country standards.

23 2

But that is

227.
The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index, supra note 51 (stating the World Justice
Project's four principles of the rule of law).
228.
By suggesting that the rule of law be applied to the United States, the article in essence is
suggesting that the telescope be turned backward to determine whether rule of law violations are
occurring in the United States as well as internationally and to assess whether the United States
economy is being undermined as well.
229.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
230.
See e-mail from Simon R. Contd, Director, Research & Program Development, American
Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative, to author (July 16, 2008, 10:44 EST) (on file with author and
Denver University Law Review). See e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 10, at 53 ("The highly political
process of judicial choice in the United States would never be permitted by reformers elsewhere.").
See also Burnett, supra note 127, at 281-82.
231.
TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 122.
232.
DAM, supra note 62, at 96. See also Daniel Kaufmann, Illinois Governor Blagojevich:
sign
of endentic corruption
in the
US?, The Kaufmann Governance
Post,
http://thekaufmannpost.net/illinois-govemor-blagojevich-sign-of-endemic-corruption-in-theus/#more-505 (Dec. 11, 2008) (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) ("Granted, the US in general is not a model
for the world in terms of control of corruption. Countries like New Zealand and the Nordics are
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little solace for an American litigant damaged in a case where the rule of
law has failed. The economic damage may be widespread or just in particular states or courts. But for the company or other litigants involved in
an unfair decision-its workers and its shareholders, or their families-a
repair will come too late.233

Policymakers spend billions of dollars on rule of law reforms internationally because they believe, among other things, that the rule of law
and economic development are related. The strength of the connection is
open to discussion. But even those raising questions are reluctant to
deny any relationship and call for the expenditures to stop. The international financial commitment, its rationale, and international learning
overall are too substantial to ignore.
Finally, the rule of law is not something that is only applicable to
other countries but rather is fully applicable to the United States. 234 It is
risky to assume that Americans are the only people in the world who
abide by the rule of law; indeed, this assumption overlooks much of our
past and present history and ignores critiques from respected sources.
American-based or sponsored organizations are trying to uphold the rule
of law worldwide; yet if they do not uphold the rule of law in the United
States, this may be a proverbial case in which the shoemaker's children
have no shoes.235

Americans should carefully consider whether state court judicial
elections violate the rule of law; if so, whether they may disregard the
relationship at home between the rule of law and economic development;
and whether the violation mandates an end to judicial elections. This
article submits that the case has been made; that further study of the
available options and next steps should be undertaken; and that the way

closer to being a model of integrity instead. There are 18 countries rating better than the US in
controlling corruption according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Yet there are about 190
countries rating worse.").
233.
The focus of this article is on the economic effects of rule of law violations, rather than
violations of individual rights. The rule of law concerns reflected in this article, however-e.g., lack
of judicial independence-would also apply to individual rights. See Theodor Mearon, Judicial
Independence and Impartialityin InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 359-60
(2005):
Judicial independence is also instrumental in the protection of individual rights. Such
rights may be enshrined in the country's constitution or laws, but an authority, such as the
courts, must be empowered to review, independently and impartially, citizens' complaints
and, if necessary, order that infringed rights be vindicated. To do so effectively, judges
must be assured that, irrespective of their ruling, no unpleasant repercussions will be visited on them in terms of threats of dismissal, demotion, or even salary diminution.
234.
See, e.g., World Justice Project, Domestic Mainstreaming of the Rule of Law, supra note
5.
235.
See The Shoemaker's Children, MICE Website, http://mice.org/blog/about/theshoemakers-children/ ("[Tihe phrase, 'The shoemaker's children has no shoes' . .. [m]eans ....
[w]hatever a person's skill or talent, those closest to her or him rarely benefit. The proverb appeared
in John Heywood's book of proverbs in 1546. It was used by Robert Burton (1577-1640) in 'The
Anatomy of Melancholy' (1621-51).").

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

Americans select judges where they are presently elected should be comprehensively reformed2 36
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236.
If the international efforts to establish the rule of law in developing countries could be
analogized to the Peace Corps program, it is time to establish its domestic equivalent-a Vista
program-to achieve the rule of law in the United States. See AmeriCorps VISTA: "The Domestic
Peace Corps," VolunteerLounge, April 13, 2007, available at http://www.volunteerlogue.com/
organizations/americorps-vista-the-domestic-peace-corps.html ("Developed in 1964, soon after the
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and Albany Law School; recommendations for improvement in New York's judicial appointment
systems); Appointive Selection of Judges, Limited Jurisdiction Courts with Non-Lawyer Judiciaries,
and Judicial Independence, 43 CT. REVIEW 80 (2007) (Court Review is a publication of the American Judges Association; study and recommendations on judicial selection reform with observations
on New York's use of non-attorney judges in certain courts and on judicial independence); Preface,
Executioners, Jailers, Slavetrappersand the Law: What Role Should Morality Play in Judging, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 863 (1997) (judges deciding against conscience; introduction to symposium on
the subject); Introduction, Politicianson Judges: FairCriticism or Intimidation, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
294 (1997) (observations on judicial independence); A Perspective on Temper in the Court: A Forum
on Judicial Civility, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709 (1996) (judicial intemperance or incivility; introduction to a symposium on the subject); and A Perspective on Nazis in the Courtroom, Lessons
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61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1122 (1996) (introduction to symposium on the functioning of legal systems
in totalitarian regimes; questions of conscience versus complicity on the part of judges and lawyers).

THE USE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TO

ENHANCE JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY, JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, AND PUBLIC TRUST
DAVID C. BRODYt

In the twenty-first century the American judiciary has been under
repeated attacks from multiple sources.' Editorials published in the media have called for the removal of judges from the bench for decisions
made in individual cases and specific issues. 2 Members of Congress and
other politicians have condemned "activist" judges and proposed punitive sanctions against the judiciary for decisions made in high profile,
emotionally charged cases.3 Special interest groups actively seek the
removal of judges at all levels who make rulings contrary to the groups'
beliefs or interests. 4 Dozens of websites are housed on the Internet that
call for increased accountability of judges in general5 and for the removal
of individual judges.6
In 2006, attacks on the judiciary included ballot measures supported
by highly organized campaigns to amend several state constitutions.
t Associate Professor, Criminal Justice Program, Washington State University.
1. Sandra Day O'Connor, Op-Ed., The Threat to JudicialIndependence, WALL ST. J., Sept.
27, 2006, at Al 8; Ruth Walker, O'ConnorAssails 'Pervasive Attacks' on Judges and Judicial Independence, HARV. L. TODAY, Feb. 2007, at 1.
2. Editorial, Forget Judicial Independence, It's Time for Judicial Accountability, N.
COUNTRY GAZETTE, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.northcountrygazette.org/articles/031706
Accountability.html; The O'Reilly Factor (Fox News Channel broadcast Sept. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,296027,00.html.
3.
Charles Babbington, Senator Links Violence to "Political" Decisions, WASH. POST, Apr.
5, 2005, at A4; Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says FederalJudiciaryHas 'Run Amok'
Adding Congress Is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, § A, at 21; Francis J. Larkin, The
Variousness, Virulence, and Variety of Threats to Judicial Independence, 36 JUDGES' J., Winter
1997, at 4, 5-6; William C. Mann, Frist:Judges Forcing Gay Marriage Debate, AP ONLINE, June
20, 2004. For a list of judges who have been criticized and specific anti-judge activities, see American Judicature Society, Judges Under Fire, http://www.ajs.org/cji/cji-fire.asp (last visited Oct. 19,
2008).
4.
American Judicature Society, Judges Under Fire, http://www.ajs.org/cji/cji-fire.asp (last
visited Oct. 19, 2008).
5.
See, e.g., Citizens for Judicial Accountability, http://www.judicialaccountability.org/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2008); Center for Judicial Accountability, http://www.judgewatch.org/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008); PACleanSweep.com, http://www.pacleansweep.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008);
Judicial Accountability Initiative Law 4 Judges, http://www.jail4judges.org/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2008); Get Off The Bench, http://www.getyourjusticelive.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008); Victimsof-Law, http://victimsoflaw.net/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008); A Matter of Justice,
http://www.amatterofjustice.org/amoj/00index.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
6. See, e.g., Vote No Judge Munger, http://www.votenojudgemunger.coml (last visited Oct.
19, 2008); Do Not Vote For Judge Kristin Booth Glen!!!, http://www.anusha.com/notoglen.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2008).
7.
Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to
Promote JudicialAccountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 200 (2007).
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These measures included providing for criminal and civil sanctions
against judges for erroneous rulings, 8 subjecting judges to electoral recall, 9 redrawing judicial election districts,' 0 and imposing retroactive
term limits for appellate court judges."
When considered together, these attacks on the judiciary share a
common element: the belief that judges are not sufficiently accountable
for the decisions they make. This lack of accountability, it is posited,
gives rise to an "activist judiciary" that is free to make law and public
policy contrary to the public will without fear of any consequences. 12
These attacks on the judiciary have met strong resistance from
members of the judiciary and the organized bar.' 3 Judges and bar leaders
generally accept that there needs to be some level of judicial accountability (particularly regarding state court judges). 14 They emphasize, however, that any efforts to increase judicial accountability must not infringe
upon the independence of judges to make
decisions as they deem just and
5
proper under the law and Constitution.

8.
South Dakota Amendment E, Judicial Accountability Initiative Law (commonly known as
J.A.I.L. for Judges). Judicial Accountability Initiative Law 4 Judges, http://www.jail4judges.org
(last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
9. Montana Constitutional Initiative 98 would have amended the Montana Constitution to
provide for recall by petition of state court justices or judges for any reason. Montana Secretary of
State, 2006 Ballot Issues, http://sos.mt.gov/elb/archives/2006/CIICI-98.asp (last visited Oct. 19,
2008).
10. Oregon Measure 40 would have amended the Oregon Constitution to require all appellate
court judges be elected by district rather than statewide. Measure 40, Explanatory Statement,
http://www.oregonvotes.org/nov72006/military-vp/m40_es.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
11.
Colorado Amendment 40 would have applied retroactive term limits for appellate court
judges in Colorado.
Ballot Title Setting Board, Proposed Initiative 2005-2006 #90,
http://www.elections.colorado.gov/VWW/default/Initiatives/Titie%2OBoard%2OFilings/Results%20
90.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
12. Edwin Meese Im & Rhett DeHart, The Imperial Judiciary-And What Congress Can Do
About It, 81 POL'Y REV. 54, 54 (Jan.-Feb. 1997).
13. E.g., Colorado Bar Association, Vote No 40, http://www.cobar.org/judges/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008); Susan Marmaduke & Jim Mountain, Parting Thoughts: Let's Keep Politics Out of
the Courts, OREGON STATE BAR BULLETIN, Oct. 2005, http://www.osbar.org/publications/ bulletin/06oct/parting.html. See also American Judicature Society, Welcome to the Center for Judicial
Independence, http://www.ajs.org/cji/default.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2008 (discussing unfair criticism of judges who issue unpopular decisions and advocating judicial independence); American Bar
Ass'n, Q&A on J.A.I.L. for Judges, Dec. 2006, http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba
/200612/article06.html (discussing State Bar of South Dakota efforts to defeat 2006 Amendment E
ballot initiative in South Dakota).
14.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Thorny Issues And Slippery Slopes: Perspectives On Judicial
Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 4 (2003); Troy A. Eid, Judicial Independence and Accountability:
The Case Against Electing Judges, 30 COLO. LAW. 71, 71 (2001); Sandra Day O'Conner & RonNell
Anderson Jones, Reflections on Arizona's Judicial Selection Process, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 23
(2008); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1 passim (1995); Michael A. Wolff, Chief Justice Michael A. Wolff: 2006 State of the
Judiciary Address, 62 J. Mo. B. 56, 57-58 (2006); James Andrew Wynn, Jr. & Eli Paul Mazur,
Judicial Diversity: Where Independence and Accountability Meet, 67 ALB. L. REV. 775 passim
(2004).
15.
O'Connor & Jones, supra note 14, at 17; Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1056
(2002); Larkin, supranote 3, at 4.
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The debate over the proper limits on judicial accountability and judicial independence is not a recent development. The proper role for
judges in the American system of government has been hotly debated for
more than 200 years.' 6 Advocates of a strong, independent judiciary,
including Alexander Hamilton, argued that the role of judges is to faithfully interpret the law and constitutions without consideration of outside
factors such as politics or popular sentiment. 17 To make fulfilling this
role practical, it is argued that judicial independence must be protected
by insulating the judiciary from popular election.1 8 On the other hand,
proponents of a judiciary that is directly accountable to the public view
judges as governmental policymakers operating in a democracy.' 9 As
with other policymakers in government, it is argued, judges must be directly accountable to the public for their actions by means of periodic
elections,
regardless of the effect this may have on judicial independ20
ence.
This philosophical debate has a practical effect on how judges in
each of the fifty states are selected and kept in office.2' Proponents of a
highly accountable bench favor direct election of judges.22 Those who
advocate a fiercely independent judiciary favor judges being appointed to
their position. 23
In what has been perceived by many to be an appropriate compromise between those advocating for contested election or direct appointment, in 1940 Missouri adopted a "merit selection" system of selecting
state supreme court and court of appeals judges. 24 Under the "Missouri
Plan," when a judicial vacancy arises a nominating commission provides
a list of three candidates to the governor. The governor then appoints

16. White, supra note 15, at 1053-54; Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and
Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV.
397, 403-404 (1999); Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 35-36 (1998); William H. Rehnquist, JudicialIndependence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 582-83 (2004).
17. Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 16, at 48.
18. Id. at 32.
19. PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 28-35 (1980); Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M.
Jensen, Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial Independence, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 975
(2006) (citing BRUTUS, XV, in ESSAYS OF BRUTUS (Mar. 20, 1788), reprintedin 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 437, 438 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)).
20. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence and the Selection of State Judges: The
Role of PopularJudicial Elections,40 Sw. L.J. 31, 38 (1986).
21.
Webster, supra note 14, at 9.
22. David K. DeWolf, Electing Judges Keeps Them Accountable, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Nov. 3, 2006, at B7, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/290941judgeelectionO3.html; Michael R. Dimino, Judicial Elections Versus Merit Selection:
The Futile Quest For a System Of Judicial "Merit" Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 815-18 (2004);
Dubois, supra note 19, at 28.
23.
Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive JudicialSelection
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 304 (2002). See also Webster,
supra note 14, at 13-14.
24. Webster, supra note 14, at 29-30.
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one of the three candidates to fill the vacancy. After a short period of
time-generally a year-the new judge must stand before the voters in a
retention election. If a majority of voters do not vote to have the judge
remain on the bench, the judge is not retained and the process begins
anew. If the judge is retained by the voters, he or she remains on the
bench but is subject to periodic retention elections.26
Proponents of the Missouri Plan argue that it takes politics out of
the initial selection process but still provides for judicial accountability
by requiring judges to stand for retention elections.27 Opponents argue
that since judges are rarely unsuccessful in surviving retention elections,28
any pretence of accountability derived from merit selection is a "sham.,
Central to this contention is the fact that voters have little information
about the qualifications and performance of judges standing for retention.29 Not coincidentally, voter participation rates in retention elections
are nearly always significantly lower than rates in contested elections for
other non-judicial elections held concurrently.3 °
The lack of information about judges available for voters to use in
retention elections and the effect this has on judicial accountability has
been known to be present for a number of decades.31 In 1975, stemming
from concern about voters lacking information to effectively vote in judicial retention elections,32 Alaska became the first state to take steps to
address this issue by requiring the Alaska Judicial Council not only to
evaluate judges appearing on a retention election ballot, but also to provide voters with the results of the evaluations along with recommendations as to whether each judge should be retained in office.3 3 In 1976,

the first judicial performance evaluation (JPE) took place. As of 2008,
eight states provide their citizens with information obtained from official
judicial performance evaluations of at least some of their judges standing
for retention election for the express purpose of enabling voters to cast
intelligent, meaningful votes.34

25.
Id. at 30.
26.
Id.
27.
Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan: A Dinosauron the Edge of
Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 318 (1997).
28.
Dimino, supra note 22, at 806-07.
29.
Webster supranote 14, at 34.
30.
See William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of JudicialRetention Elections
Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 342 (1987).
31.
Id.
32.
Telephone interview with Larry Cohn, Executive Director, Alaska Judicial Council (Aug.
8, 2008).
33.
ALASKA STAT. § 15.58.050 (2008).
34.
The eight states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico,
Tennessee, and Utah. A number of other states operate judicial performance evaluation programs
for self-improvement purposes. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
SHARED EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT app. A (2006), available at

http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/publications2006.html [hereinafter SHARED EXPECTATIONS].
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Judicial performance evaluations are generally centered around responses to standardized, scaled surveys provided by individuals who
have had direct dealings with a judge during an evaluation period.35 The
questionnaires ask these individuals, who may include attorneys, jurors,
witnesses, court staff, and litigants, to rate the judge on behavior-based
items related to process and demeanor, not outcomes. 36 The survey response data, along with other information such as court management
data, recusal rates, courtroom observations, and disciplinary filings, are
considered by a non-partisan commission made up of attorneys and lay
persons.37 After considering a judge's materials, the commission will
come to a conclusion as to whether or not it believes that a judge should
be retained in office. This final rating is presented to the public for use
in retention election decisions.38
The number of states, and in some cases counties, that use JPE programs continues to grow. 39 This growth is being fostered by the American Bar Association, which adopted guidelines for the establishment and
operation of judicial performance evaluation programs in 2005.40 The
ability of JPE programs to provide voters with information they would
otherwise lack is inarguably beneficial to conducting meaningful judicial
elections. It must be noted, however, that support for judicial performance evaluation programs is premised on the assumption that, with the
information JPE programs can provide, voters will be better equipped to
hold judges appropriately accountable for their performance on the bench
without interfering with judicial independence.41
35. Seth S. Andersen, JudicialRetention Evaluation Programs, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1375,
1380 (2001); David C. Brody, The Relationship Between Judicial Performance Evaluations and
JudicialElections, 87 JUDICATURE 168, 170 (2004); Kevin M. Esterling, JudicialAccountability the
Right Way, 82 JUDICATURE 206, 209 (1999); Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using
Judicial Performance Evaluations to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 201
(2007).
36. Andersen, supra note 35, at 1380; Brody, supranote 35, at 170; Esterling, supra note 35,
at 209; Kourlis & Singer, supra note 35, at 201.
37. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supranote 34, at app. A.
38. Id.
39. Kansas recently conducted its first statewide JPE program for use in the 2008 retention
elections. See The Kansas Judicial Report Card, http://kansasjudicialperformance.org/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008). Similarly, in 2008, Pierce County, Washington provided voters with the results of a
JPE program that had attorneys and jurors evaluating judges before whom they appeared. Adam
Lynn, Judging the Judges: Bar Association Survey Rates Pierce County Judiciary, THE NEWS TRIB.
(Tacoma, Wash.), June 1, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/
story/376713.html. In North Carolina, the North Carolina Bar Association is conducting two pilot
studies implementing a JPE program for the state's trial court judges, with plans to launch an actual
evaluation program for use by voters in judicial elections for the 2010 elections. Interview with
Allan Head, Executive Director, North Carolina Bar Association, in Cary, N.C. (June 23, 2008).
Two other states, Minnesota and Indiana have committees examining the feasibility of conducting
JPE programs in the near future. Interview with Jordan Singer, Director of Research, Institute for
the Advancement of the American Legal System, in Denver, Colo. (August 5, 2008).
40.
ABA, GUIDELINES FOR THE EVAL. OF JUDICIAL PERFORM. WITH COMMENTARY app. I
(2005), http://www.abanet.orgjdllawyersconf/pdfjpec-final-commentary.pdf.
41.
Kourlis, supra note 7, at 203; White, supra note 15, at 1061; Roger Handberg, Judicial
Accountability and Independence: Balancing Incompatibles?,49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 135 (1994).
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This assumption, however, is still just an assumption. While logical, it assumes that the presence of several necessary endogenous items.
For a JPE program to fulfill its aim of increasing judicial accountability,
the information provided to the public must be received by potential voters, regarded as trustworthy and reliable by the electorate, and used by
voters in deciding how to vote in judicial elections. Additionally, to be
effective, a JPE program needs to be accepted and trusted by the judges
subject to evaluation.4 2 If the judiciary does not have confidence in the
process or believes that it unduly interferes with judicial independence,
then it may undermine the program's credibility with the public and present political or administrative obstacles that retard the short- and longterm operation of the program. Deficiencies in these areas will limit the
program's ability to foster both judicial accountability and judicial independence.
To date, systematic assessments of whether JPE programs have any
direct or indirect effects on judicial accountability, independence, and
related items have been lacking. This article will attempt go beyond the
theoretical and consider how states can and should assess the effectiveness of judicial performance evaluation programs. After examining the
concepts of judicial accountability and independence, and their relation
to state court judicial elections, the article discusses the evolution and
operation of judicial performance evaluations and the impact they may
have on judicial accountability. The article then examines the specific
impacts JPE programs may have on judicial accountability and sets forth
criteria and means for examining if such impacts exist. The article concludes by examining the importance of evaluating both the methods used
in conducting judicial performance evaluations and the impact the evaluations have on judicial accountability.
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The presence of judicial independence and judicial accountability
are critical to functioning of America's constitutional democracy. 43 Absent either, the American constitutional system of checks and balances
would likely collapse. The following section briefly discusses the definitions of judicial independence and accountability. This will lay an appropriate groundwork for my contention that rather than being contradictory values that are inherently at odds, they are in fact mutually supportive.

42.
Brody, supra note 35, at 177.
43.
See Bruce Fein & Burt Neubome, Why Should We Care About Independent and Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 59 (2000); Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Selection of Judges in Kansas:
A Comparison of Systems, 69-JAN J. KAN. B.A. 32, 35-37 (2000); Ronli Sifirs, Weighing Judicial
Independence Against Judicial Accountability: Do the Scales of the International Criminal Court
Balance?, 8 CHI.-KENT J. INTL & COMP. L. 88, 96 (2008); Roger K. Warren, JudicialAccountability, Fairness,and Independence, 42 CT. REV. 4, 7 (2005).
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A. JudicialIndependence
Judicial independence has been seen as a critical aspect of the
44
American judicial system since before the formation of the nation.
During the colonial era, judges in the American colonies were appointed
by the King of England and served at his will.45 The control the King
had over the judiciary and the direct control he had over the decisions
handed down by colonial judges were sources of great concern and frustration for the colonists.46 The injustices brought about by this system of
"telephone justice ''47 angered the colonists to the extent that the lack of
judicial independence of colonial judges was one of the enumerated
grievances raised in the Declaration of Independence. 48 Following the
colonial experience, it should not be surprising that the tripartite government premised on separation of powers and checks and balances
would take great pains to provide for a judiciary that was coequal with
and independent of the legislative and executive branches.
Legal scholars and social scientists have examined and defined judicial independence in myriad ways.49 Conceptually it can be defined as
having judges that
[Aire free to decide cases fairly and impartially, relying only on the
facts and the law. It means that judges are protected from political pressure, legislative pressure, special interest pressure, media pressure, public
pressure, financial pressure, and even personal pressure.5 °
Judicial independence should be seen as a means to an end.5 1 Beyond its own value, it paves the way for a judiciary that treats people

44. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See
also Burkeley N. Riggs & Tamera D. Westerberg, Judicial Independence: An HistoricalPerspective
the Independence of Judges Is ...Requisite to Guard the Constitution and the Rights of the Individuals ..... 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 337, 351 (1997); Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary:
The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1105 (1976).
45.
Kelly J. Varsho, In the Global Market for Justice: Who is Paying the Highest Pricefor
JudicialIndependence?, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 445, 447 (2007).
Id.
46.
47. Id.
48.
"[King George] has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.
11 (U.S. 1776).
49. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The State of the Onion: Peeling Back the Layers of America's
Ambivalence Toward Judicial Independence, 82 IND. L.J. 1215, 1223 (2007) (defining judicial
independence as a tradition gained over time); G. Alan Tarr, Dep't of Political Sci., Center for State
Constitutional Studies, Rutgers Univ., Presentation of Paper at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association: Rethinking Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability 3-4
(Apr.12-15, 2007), http://www.allacademic.conone/mpsa/mpsa07/index.php (search "Rethinking
Judicial Independence").
50.
David J. Beck, JudicialIndependence: Woe to the Generation that Judges the Judges, 71
TEx. B.J. 572, 572 (2008).
Kathryn Reed Edge, Judicial Independence JudicialAccountability: A Difficult Balance,
51.

TENN. B.J. May-June 1998, at 14; Warren, supra note 43, at 5; Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: GuardianOf JudicialIndependence, 72 S.CAL. L. REV. 625, 632 (1999).
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equally under the law.52 While complaints about activist judges and the
need to rein in their independence are frequently raised, it is generally
accepted that some degree of judicial independence is a necessary component of American government. This acceptable level of independence
centers on the desire for judges to follow the law, to hold the other
branches of government accountable to the Constitution, to treat parties
that come before the bench equally and with impartiality, and to be free
to apply the rule of law without fear of repercussion from the other
branches of government.5 3
B. JudicialAccountability
Just as it is generally accepted that judges must have some degree of
independence to decide matters based on their interpretation of the law
and facts presented before them, it is also widely accepted that judges
should be held to some manner of accountability. 54 An accountable judiciary is important for a number of reasons. An unaccountable court system has a difficult time being perceived as legitimate and maintaining the
trust and respect of the citizenry.
Absent public trust, the judiciary,
which is dependent on other branches of government to enforce its orders
and fund its operation, is greatly imperiled. Moreover, declines in trust
and respect for a court system may ultimately lead to the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public and other branches of government. Such
occurrences make repeated attempts to curtail judicial independence and
authority, such as was seen in the 2006 ballot propositions, much more
likely.
While judicial accountability is appropriate under the American system of government, the questions of who judges should be accountable to
and what this accountability should be based upon depend largely on
what is meant by judicial accountability. As noted by Charles Geyh,
"[t]he peril of leaving judicial accountability ill-defined is that it can be
co-opted and misused more easily. ' '56 A meaningful method defining

52.
Edge, supra note 51.
53.
See Tarr, supra note 49, at 21 (acknowledging the general consensus that judges should
not be punished "for following the law"); Zemans, supra note 51, at 634 (detailing the importance of
impartiality for the judiciary).
54.
Fein, supra note 43, at 59; Handberg, supra note 41 at 134; O'Connor & Jones, supra note
14, at 23; Wolff, supra note 14, at 57.
55.
See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of
Law, 62 U. Cl-n. L. REv. 689, 710 (1995); Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind
the Robe: JudicialElections, the FirstAmendment, and Judges as Politicians,21 YALE L. & POL'Y

REV. 301, 311-12 (2003); David E. Pozen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 265,
273 (2008); Mark S.Cady & Jess R. Phelps, Preserving The Delicate Balance Between Judicial
Accountability and Independence: Merit Selection in the Post-White World, 17 CORNELL J. L. &

PUB. POL'Y 343, 347 (2008).
56.
Charles Gardner Geyh, Rescuing Judicial Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric,56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006).
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criteria:
judicial accountability is to consider two types of performance
57
decisional accountabilityand behavioralaccountability.
1. Decisional Accountability
Decisional accountability involves holding judges answerable for
their judicial decisions. In considering whether we should hold judges
accountable for their decisions, there are several items that must be taken
into account. First, was the decision contrary to established precedent?
If the decision was contrary to established precedent, accountability can
be maintained by appellate review. Were a judge to deliberately ignore
precedent, state constitutions should provide for means of removing or
disciplining the judge.
On the other hand, if a decision was reasonable and based on precedent, the desire to hold a judge accountable for an unpopular ruling is
fraught with peril. It is the impulse to hold judges accountable for legally sound rulings by means of electoral challenges that demonstrates
the danger of majoritarian rule premised on decisional accountability.5 8
The dangers of holding judges directly accountable for making necessary but politically unpopular decisions have been noted throughout
the nation's history by some of its most noted jurists. 59 In Dennis v.
United States, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, "[c]ourts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic
society .... Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence." 60 Similarly, Justice Black, in Chambers v. Florida, noted that
"courts stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those
who might otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement. 61
The classic example of such a campaign involved the defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White in the 1996 retention elec62
Court
to with
the Tennessee
appointed
tion.
thatina
which held
an opinion Supreme
concurred
White
1996 White
Justice was
1994. InJustice

57.

Wendell L. Griffen, JudicialAccountability and Discipline, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

75, 76 (1998).

A third type of judicial accountability, institutional accountability, involves the

accountability of the judiciary as a branch of government.

Institutional accountability concerns

items such as being responsible for maintaining a reasonable budget, operating in an efficient manner, and hearing and deciding matters in an acceptably speedy manner given its resources. See
Geyh, supra note 56, at 917-19.
See Croley, supra note 56, at 725-29.
58.
59.
Judge Peter Webster compiles several of these statements. See Peter D. Webster, Who
Needs an Independent Judiciary?,FLA. B.J., Feb. 2004, at 24, 25-28.
60.
341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
61.
309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
62.
See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial Selection and Their
Application to a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125, 134 (2007);
Traciel V. Reid, The Politicizationof Retention Elections Lessons from the Defeat of Justices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATURE 68, 69-70 (1999).
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murder committed during the commission of a rape was not automatically "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and therefore may not serve as an
aggravating circumstance warranting execution unless there was evidence that the act "involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that
necessary to produce death. 63 A majority of the court, including Justice
White, agreed that such evidence was not present in the case, vacated the
64
death sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing.
In 1996 Justice White was the only member of the Tennessee Supreme Court scheduled to stand for retention election. In response to
Odom, a coalition of conservative organizations, victim's rights groups,
law enforcement agencies, and others organized to mount a campaign to
defeat Justice White. In the end, Justice White was defeated, garnering
only 45% of the vote in favor of her retention. The defeat of Justice
White has been widely viewed as a direct attack on judicial independence based on the improper use of decisional accountability.65
2. Behavioral Accountability
As opposed to decisional accountability, behavioral accountability
involves holding individual judges answerable for their conduct on the
bench. 66 As judges are the human element of the justice system, conduct
which reflects badly on the integrity and impartiality of the justice system is likely to decrease public trust in the judiciary. Explicit statements
or acts of bias and partiality, ex parte communications, rudeness, and a
lack of respect for parties or counsel, are examples of actions for which a
judge may be held accountable. 67 Acts related to behavioral accountability are universally accepted as being appropriate components of judicial
accountability and do not restrict appropriate aspects of judicial independence. Aspects of a judge's performance on the bench are appropriate foci for voters or reappointing authorities to consider in whether a
judge should receive another term on the bench. While appropriate, such
information is difficult for voters to obtain and examine at a broad
enough level to promote judicial accountability.
C. The Potentialof Co-OccurringJudicialIndependence and Judicial
Accountability
Judicial independence and judicial accountability have frequently
been viewed as competing forces which need to be counterbalanced
against one another. 68 On one hand, judges who possess excessive inde63.
State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 24, 26 (Tenn. 1996).
64. Id. at 32-33.
65. See Zemans, supra note 51, at 648-49.
66. Geyh, supra note 56, at 919.
67.
White, supra note 15, at 1064-1070.
68. Michael R. Dimino, supra note 22, at 803; Tillman J. Finley, Note, JudicialSelection in
Alaska: Justifications and Proposed Courses of Reform, 20 ALASKA L. REv. 49, 49 (2003); David
Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State JudicialSelection, 69 ALB. L.
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pendence are free to act without concern for being held accountable for
overstepping their authority, employing expansive interpretations of the
69
Constitution, or simply ignoring or nullifying the law when they see fit.
On the other hand, if a judiciary is overly accountable to the public, then
judges will be fearful
of making correct legal decisions that are contrary
70
to the public will.
In reality, judicial independence and accountability are not at odds
with each other but are rather "different sides of the same coin, 7'1 "yin"
to each other's "yang, ' 72 and "both desirable.

73

In fact, rather than be-

ing seen as counterbalances to each other, it is possible for them to be
mutually beneficial.
For courts to operate effectively, citizens must have trust and confidence in judges to decide matters in a fair and impartial manner.7 4
Courts have no means to enfoice their own orders. The public's use of
the court system to resolve disputes and its compliance with judicial orders is dependent on support for courts as legitimate institutions.7 5 This
legitimacy hinges to a large extent on public trust in the judiciary as an
institution and judges as ministers of justice. A trusted judiciary will be
respected and viewed as legitimate. A judiciary that is not trusted may
have its legitimacy, authority, and eventually orders questioned by the
citizenry or by the other branches of government.76
An important component of public trust in governmental institutions
is the citizenry's ability to hold its officers accountable.77 A governmental institution that is viewed as unaccountable is likely to lack public
trust. On the other hand, as public accountability increases, the trust
afforded the institution is likely to increase as well.78
Beyond increasing perceived legitimacy, the public's ability to effectively hold judges accountable has the potential to generate what Tom
Tyler calls a "reservoir of loyalty" 79 upon which the judiciary can draw.
This reservoir grows as the public's trust in the courts and judiciary operate effectively in a transparent manner. After time, this reservoir can
REV. 985, 987 (2006); Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 SW.
L.J. 53, 111-17 (1986).
69.
See supra notes 2-6.
70.
See Croley, supra note 55, at 908.
71.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315,
339 (1999).
72. Geyh, supra note 56, at 916.
73.

SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at 6.

74.
George W. Dougherty, Stefanie A. Lindquist, & Mark D. Bradbury, Evaluating Performance in State Judicial Institutions: Trust and Confidence in the Georgia Judiciary, 38 ST. & LOC.
GOV'T REV. 176, 176 (2006).
75.
Id. at 177.

76.
77.

Id.
Id.

78.

TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26 (1990).

79.

Id.
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be drawn upon by judges to foster the acceptance and understanding of
politically unpopular decisions that courts are required to make. Such
public acceptance in turn serves to increase judicial independence and
the ability to make difficult decisions without concern for political ramifications.
While this mutually beneficial series of events is theoretically possible, it first requires a foundation of judicial independence accompanied
by appropriate and effective means of judicial accountability. The basis
upon which voters hold judges accountable must not infringe upon their
ability to decide matters based on the law. While judicial elections provide the vehicle to provide judicial accountability to the public and to
provide true accountability that will increase independence, voters need
to be given sufficient information with which to make electoral decisions. This dynamic, and the role judicial performance evaluation programs have in it, will be discussed in later sections.
II. JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In thirty-nine states, judges are theoretically held accountable 80 by
the public through either contested elections or retention elections. 81 As
noted previously, whichever mode of election a state uses to choose or
retain its judges, elections allow the public to hold judges accountable by
use of democratic means. That being said, simply having an election
does not mean it will provide meaningful levels of judicial accountability.
For judicial elections to effectively hold judges accountable, several
things are required. First, it is important that the electorate participate in
judicial elections at a reasonably high level.82 Acceptable turnout levels
are needed for two reasons: 1) to have the election considered legitimate
and 2) to serve as a tool which judges must respect. Elections with dismal levels of participation weaken the perception that they serve as a
genuine means to hold government actors accountable for their job performance.8 3 As Michael Dimino, a strong advocate of judicial elections,
put it, "If judges are to receive the benefit of legitimacy that comes from

80. While beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that states that use partisan and
non-partisan elections as a means of selecting and retaining judges rarely have contested elections.
For example, in 2008 in Washington a state that selects judges via non-partisan elections, 84% of the
judges subject to reelection ran unopposed, removing any semblance of public accountability. This
level of competition is typical in non-partisan election states.
81.
Rachel Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States are Responding to Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REv. 625, 629
(2005). Throughout this article when the generic term "judicial elections" is used, it refers to both
contested judicial elections and retention elections.
82. David Adamany & Phillip Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 731, 736
(1976).
83.

74 (2003).

STEVEN E. SCHIER, YOU CALL THIS AN ELECrION?: AMERICA'S PECULIAR DEMOCRACY
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having periodic elections, it seems that elections84should encourage participation by as many eligible voters as possible."
Low turnout in judicial elections also has the potential to affect the
way judges do their jobs. Should judges know that only a small percentage of potential voters are going to participate in a judicial election, the
number of people a judge is actually accountable to decreases. Moreover, if the demographic, social, or political characteristics of voters
likely to vote in low turnout elections are known, a judge can adjust his
or her behavior to satisfy the preference of those individuals. 85 In this
respect low levels of turnout may serve to negate any increases in perceived accountability and legitimacy of the judiciary obtained through
judicial elections.
A key aspect of increasing turnout and the effectiveness of judicial
elections is providing voters with sufficient amounts of relevant information to use in casting their votes.86 Research has found that low levels of
turnout in judicial elections are due largely to the fact that voters know
little, if anything, about the names appearing on their ballots.8 7 When
voters have no information about the candidates on an election ballot,
their votes are frequently based on heuristics or voting cues.88 This leads
to election outcomes that are based on name recognition, gender, ethnic
preferences, ballot position, or pure luck.89
The lack of information about candidates makes it fair to conclude
that "judicial accountability through the election process is minimal." 90
This is so because elections are, for the most part, contests in which the
public has very little information about the candidates and relatively few
voters choose to participate. While advocates of judicial elections may
argue that elections do provide for judicial accountability, there are several undeniable facts that refute this position.
It is beyond dispute that judicial elections suffer from high levels of
voter "falloff." Falloff is defined as "[t]he difference between how many
people go to the polls and how many people actually vote on a specific

Dimino, supra note 55, at, 374.
84.
85.
Research has consistently shown that in low turnout elections, those who do vote are more
likely to better educated and significantly wealthier than non-voters. Georg Lutz & Michael Marsh,
Introduction:Consequences of Low Turnout, 26 ELECTORAL STUDIEs 539, 543 (2007).
Martin P. Wattenberg, Ian McAllister, and Anthony Salvanto, How Voting is Like Taking
86.
the SAT Test: An Analysis of American Voter Rolloff, 28 Am. POL. Q. 234, 247 (2000).
87.
Matthew J. O'Hara, Student Note and Comment, Restriction of Judicial Election Candidates' Free Speech Rights After Buckley: A Compelling ConstitutionalLimitation?, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 197, 209-210 (1994); Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Knowledge and Judicial
Voting: The Oregon and Washington Experience, 67 JUDICATURE 235,239 (1983).
88.
Sheldon & Lovrich, Jr., supra note 87.
89.
Id. at 235; see also Larry Aspin et al., Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An
Update, 37 Soc. Sci. J. 1, 3 (2000); Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 308-09 (1992).
Handberg, supra note 41, at 132.
90.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

[contest]." 9' This occurs because in most elections there are a number of
matters for which voters are asked to cast votes. These contests may
range from president and governor, to school board and water commissioner. Judicial elections are usually among the lower tier of contests
appearing on a ballot. Normally, some people who vote in top level contests do not vote in other races appearing lower down on the ballot, including judicial elections.
Falloff, also referred to as "dropoff', "rolloff" and "ballot fatigue"
in the legal and academic literature, 92 is not a new development.993 Lawrence Baum reported that in judicial elections between 1980 and 1995
roughly 25% of voters who cast ballots in an election did not vote in state
supreme court elections. 94 The falloff in these elections was over 20%
regardless of whether they involved contested or retention elections.95
While a number of factors can affect falloff levels, their primary
cause is a lack of information possessed by voters about the given contest.96 This phenomenon has been compared to how college applicants
approach the SAT 97 exam in which points are deducted for incorrect answers, but there is no penalty for skipped questions.98 As such, it is prudent for test takers to skip over questions for which they lack the necessary knowledge to answer correctly. This is a strategy frequently taken
by voters in judicial elections; absent any information about the judge or
judges appearing on the ballot, voters skip over the contest and move
onto the next. 99

Of course, not all voters who lack information about judicial candidates refrain from voting. A large number of people who lack any meaningful information about the judge standing for retention or the candidates vying for a contested position nonetheless vote in the contests.
Despite the increased level of spending on judicial campaigns and decreased restrictions on judicial campaign speech, the amount of information used by voters in judicial elections has remained low. 1°° In fact,
having judicial campaigns look more like other election campaigns may
91.
Mathew Manweller, Examining Decreasing Rates of Voter Falloff in California and
Oregon, 36 ST. & LOC. GOV'T. REV. 59, 59 (2004).
92.
Id. at 65 n.2; see also MARK LAWRENCE KORNBLUH, WHY AMERICA STOPPED VOTING:
THE DECLINE OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN

POLITIcs 89-105 (2000).
93.

ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-67 (1957).

94.
Lawrence Baum, Judicial Elections and JudicialIndependence: The Voter's Perspective,
64 OHIO ST.L.J. 13, 19 (2003).
95.
Id. at 19-20 (finding that partisan elections averaged 22% falloff, while nonpartisan and
retention elections averaged 29% and 28% falloff, respectively).
96.
Wattenberg et al., supra note 86, at 236.
97.
The SAT Reasoning Test, formerly known as the Scholastic Aptitude Test.
98.
Wattenberg et. a]., supra note 86, at 236.
99.
Id. at 236-37.
100. Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in New York
City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 819-21 (2004).
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have the effect of decreasing respect for the court as an institution 01 and
voter participation.
These facts create a bit of a conundrum. While the public likes having the ability to hold judges electorally accountable and wants more
information to use in judicial elections, at the same time, it wants judges
to be above politics, sufficiently independent to base rulings on the law
and not public opinion, and insulated from special interest groups. 10 2 In
the following section, I discuss how judicial performance evaluations of
judges standing for retention or reelection may increase the effectiveness
of judicial elections in holding judges accountable.
III. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
As discussed above, judicial performance evaluations were first
used in the 1970s to provide information for voters to use in judicial retention elections. Since that time nearly twenty states have implemented
official JPE systems, with eight doing so to provide information to voters. 10 3 Typically, JPE programs are based on evaluations of how well a
judge demonstrates a number of qualities expected of an excellent jurist
submitted by individuals who have experience appearing before the
judge. These items generally fall into the categories of legal ability, integrity, communication, judicial temperament, and administrative ability.1° 4 The keys to JPE systems are that they 1) involve information only
from individuals who have first-hand knowledge, through observation, of
a judge's performance and 2) expand the sources of information beyond
attorneys to include lay persons, jurors, witnesses, and court staff who
have served, testified, or worked in a judge's court and had the ability to
personally observe the judge's performance. This information is then
considered by a commission which makes a retention recommendation to
the public for use in considering how to vote in judicial elections. 105
The information provided to voters by JPE programs has the potential to provide a missing ingredient for judicial elections to appropriately
and effectively facilitate judicial accountability.
Proponents of an
elected judiciary and merit selection systems both agree that the lack of
information available to voters is a serious problem associated with judicial elections. 10 6 Beyond affecting voter participation, the lack of infor101.
Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive JudicialSelection
Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 282-85, 287 (2002).
102. See Pozen, supra note 55, at 271-72.
103.
See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at app. a.
104.
INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE: A
BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL PERFORM. EVAL. 13-14 (2006), http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs

/TransparentCourthouse.pdf. The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System
provides state-specific information about the criteria and methods used in the JPE programs operated
in Arizona and Colorado. SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at app. b.
105.

See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at 10-11.

106.

See Dimino, supra note 22, at 807; Dubois, supra note 19, at 32.
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mation possessed
07 by voters calls into question the legitimacy of electoral
accountability.'
As stated shortly after the implementation of Colorado's judicial
performance evaluation program:
In order for citizens to maintain popular accountability of the judiciary, citizens must be involved in evaluating judicial performance ...
They need to (1) gather information about judicial performance
from the citizen's point of view, and (2) communicate their opinions
to the judiciary .... [T]he main vehicle of judicial accountability is
the [election or retention of judges]. Yet this ... cannot serve its
function if citizens do not have the interest
08 to vote or the information
necessary to make informed decisions. 1
The possession of reliable and relevant information by voters is an
important ingredient to effective democracy. 0 9 For government to possess democratic legitimacy it is important that the electorate have the
ability to "deliberate" before casting a vote." t0 Moreover, it is important
that the government makes the collection of such information easy for all
citizens."' Absent such information, judicial elections provide little accountability and great peril.
The perceived ability of JPE programs to provide information to
voters and to foster judicial accountability in retention election states has
been widely applauded." i2 This positive reception is likely because a JPE
program that can provide voters with standardized information about a
judge's performance has the potential not only to increase judicial accountability, but to increase judicial independence as well." 13
This position was succinctly summarized in 2006 by the former
President of the Kansas Bar Association and current Chair of the Kansas
Commission on Judicial Evaluation:
107.
Alex B. Long, "Stop Me Before I Vote for this Judge Again": Judicial Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 42
(2003).
108.
White, supra note 15, at 1064 (quoting Anne Rankin Mahoney, Citizen Evaluation of
JudicialPerformance: The ColoradoExperience, 72 JUDICATURE 210, 216 (1989)).
109.

MICHAEL X. DELLI CAPRINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT

POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 5-7 (1996); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A
FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 89 (2002); cf. Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 585, 586 (1997) ("[Ilf we are going to make judgments about the 'democratic' nature of different forms of government, we should do so at least
initially on the basis of the quality or 'correctness' of the political decisions citizens make within that
system of government rather than on the basis of the ways in which those decisions are reached.").
110.
Loren A. King, Deliberation,Legitimacy, and MultilateralDemocracy, 16 GOVERNANCE
23, 25-26 (2003) (defining deliberation as "a process of careful and informed reflection on facts and
opinions, generally leading to a judgment on the matter at hand.").
Ill.
Seeid. at41-42.
112.
A. John Pelander, Judicial Performance Review in Arizona: Goals, Practical Effects and
Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 651-52 (1998).
113.
White, supra note 15, at 1064, 1075-76.
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Why do we need to evaluate our judges? One of the most frequent
complaints about retention elections is that no one knows the record
of a judge who is up for retention. This creates an information vacuum which is too inviting for groups with a philosophical axe to
grind. We've seen recent instances in district court retention races in
Douglas and Shawnee counties where narrow focus groups attacked
judges running for retention by distorting the judge's performance
record to suit the objectives of the attack group. Without unbiased
public is faced with deciding judicial qualifiinformation the voting 114
cations by sound bites.
JPE programs are designed to fill this vacuum. Beyond providing
information for use in holding judges accountable for their performance,
JPE programs may foster judicial independence directly by providing
information voters can use in judicial elections that is not issue-based,
but rather on whether a judge does his or her job as one would expect
from a judge.' 15 Reviews of judicial performance evaluation programs
based primarily on anecdotal evidence have been generally, though not
universally, positive. The assessments, however, are very general in
nature and based largely on anecdotes. Given that JPE programs have
been part of the judicial and electoral landscape for several decades and
have had time to mature and evolve, it is time for independent evaluations of their impact at both the state and national levels. The balance of
this article examines potential criteria for assessing the effectiveness of
JPE programs in increasing judicial accountability, applies these criteria
to select programs, and discusses the importance of such an assessment
for enhancing the judicial independence and judicial accountability of
state judges.
IV. ASSESSING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAMS

While the specific details surrounding the operation of individual
judicial performance evaluation programs vary, a number of programs
are charged with providing reliable, relevant information to the public for
use in deciding how to vote in judicial elections.11 6 This objective is only
a means to other ends. As discussed above, the broader objective behind
these programs is to increase judicial accountability and independence by
facilitating increased voter turnout and informed voting in judicial elections. Evaluating whether JPE programs are able to achieve these ends
requires a mixed method that addresses several questions. 117

114.

Richard F. Hayse, The Needfor Judicial PerformanceEvaluation,J. KAN. B. ASS'N, Apr.

2006, at 4.
115.

SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at 7.

116. See SHARED EXPECTATIONS, supra note 34, at 13-16 and surrounding text.
117.
See Jennifer C. Greene et al., Toward a Conceptual Frameworkfor Mixed-Method Evaluation Designs, 11 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 255 (1989) for an explanation of mixedmethod evaluation design.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

A. Do Judges with PoorEvaluationsReceive Fewer Positive Votes in
Retention Elections?
Logic would seem to indicate that if JPE programs are effective in
holding judges accountable, then this would be evidenced by the behavior of voters in retention elections. More specifically, one would expect
a positive relationship to be present between the rating a judge receives
from a JPE survey or commission and the percentage of voters who vote
that the judge should be retained in office. The manner in which JPE
results are reported in the majority of states makes such an analysis difficult. Most states that conduct evaluations for use in retention elections
do not provide a single numerical measure of a judge's performance.
Instead, they either give a recommendation as to whether the judge
should be retained without a numerical rating, or they provide ratings for
multiple, independent criteria (such as legal ability, integrity, etc.). Absent ordinal rankings of judicial performance that are readily identifiable
and sufficiently varied among judges, examining relationships between
ratings and voter behavior is not practical.
There are two states-Alaska and Utah-that do provide voters
with specific ratings for each judge standing for retention election that
permit such an analysis." 8 In an effort to consider the potential effectiveness of JPE programs in holding judges accountable, I examined the
relationship between the evaluation ratings received from attorneys by
judges standing for retention in the state of Alaska and the percentage of
voters who voted that the judge should be retained in office. 1 9 Figure 1
presents a scatter diagram of these items for the eighty-six judicial retention elections held in Alaska between 2000 and 2006. In the chart presented in Figure 1, each dot represents a judge standing for retention.
The percentage of voters voting to retain the judge is measured along the
vertical axis, while the overall rating received from attorneys completing
20
evaluation questionnaires is measured along the horizontal axis.'

118.
In 2001, Susan Olson examined the impact evaluations had on the results of judicial
retention elections involving judges in the Salt Lake City area over three election cycles. Susan M.
Olson, Voter Mobilization in JudicialRetention Elections: PerformanceEvaluations and Organized
Opposition, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 263, 267 (2001). While Olson found that the three judges who received
poor evaluation ratings during that time period received fewer votes in favor of retention than their
colleagues, she also reported that the active campaigns against one of the judges had a much greater
impact on voters than did the judicial performance evaluations. Id. at 278.
119.
Alaska election results obtained from the State of Alaska Division of Elections website.
State of Alaska Division of Elections, http://www.elections.alaska.gov (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
Judicial evaluation ratings obtained from the Alaska Judicial Council website. Alaska Judicial
Council, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).
120. In addition to criteria specific behavior based questions, attorneys were asked to provide
an overall performance rating for a judge ranging from I (unacceptable) to 5 (excellent). See, e.g.,
ALASKA

JUDICIAL

COUNCIL

RECOMMENDATION

2

(2008),

http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retent08/coats08.pdf. The average of these ratings received by each judge
is used in this analysis.
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Figure 1: Alaska Judicial Retention Elections, 2000-2006

As can be readily seen in Figure 1, there is a significant linear relationship between the rating received as part of the JPE program and the
percent voting that the judge should be retained (higher rating associated
with increased yes votes received).12 1 While one cannot prove direct
causation between evaluation ratings and election results, this simple
122
analysis does suggest such an effect is present to some degree.
B. Do Judges Who Receive PoorEvaluations Remain in Office?
A fundamental question about the effectiveness of JPE programs in
holding judges accountable is whether judges who receive poor evaluations are leaving the bench. While the question itself is straightforward,
arriving at an accurate answer is not.
It is an undeniable fact that only a very small number of retention
elections result in a judge being voted out of office.123 Larry Aspin reports that between 1964 and 2006 only fifty-six of the 6,306 judges facing judicial retention elections were defeated. 124 Moreover, there is no
121.
The statistically significant correlation between the two variables is .34.
122.
Further multivariate analysis could be conducted controlling for possibly confounding
variables including location of judgeship, gender, race, presidential election year, as well as many
other state-specific factors.
123.
Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Questfor a System of Judicial "Merit" Selection, 67 ALB.
L. REv. 803, 807 (2004); Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends 1964-2006, 90
JUDICATURE 208, 210 (2007).

124.

Aspin, supra note 123, at 210.
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significant difference in retention election outcomes for states with judicial performance evaluation programs as opposed to states without. 2 '
Such statistics have frequently been used by opponents of merit selection
as ammunition for their position that retention elections are ineffective in
holding judges accountable. 126
At first glance, these statistics would seem to indicate judicial performance evaluation programs do little to actually hold judges accountable. Such a conclusion would be purely speculative. One must keep in
mind that judicial accountability is premised on holding judges performing below acceptable standards accountable. It does not operate as a
quota system or with a mandatory curve by which only a limited number
of judges can be found to be performing well. As over 90% of judges
evaluated across the country receive positive recommendations from
their JPE commissions, 127 the fact that an equally high number of judges
are retained in office in retention elections should not be surprising. One
might even posit that it is appropriate. After all, if good attorneys are
appointed to the bench, and they perform well as judges, voters should
happily vote for retention.
From time to time judges do receive negative evaluations that recommend citizens to vote against retention. The election results in such
instances have been mixed. In Alaska, of the two judges who have received non-retention recommendations since 1984, one was retained by
the voters while one was voted off the bench. 128 In Colorado, of the six
judges who have been removed by the voters in retention elections since
1988, five received "do not retain" recommendations. 129 Prior to 2008,130
the Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review found only
one judge did not meet judicial performance standards. 131 The judge was
subsequently retained by the voters. 132 On the other hand, two Arizona
judges who received positive recommendations
from the commission
1 33
electorate.
the
by
retained
not
were
From the results noted above, it would appear JPE does little to remove poorly performing judges from the bench. In reality, however, it
125.
Id. at 213.
126. See John Andrews, Judges Coddled by Sweetheart Process,DENVER POST, Feb. 18, 2007,
at E-3.
127.
Id.
128.
ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SELECTING AND EVALUATING ALASKA'S JUDGES: 19842007, at 36 (2008), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/Reports/JudgeProfile08.pdf.
129.
E-mail from Jane Howell, Executive Director, Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
(Sept. 10, 2008) (on file with author).
130. In 2008, the Arizona Commission on Judicial Review recommended one Maricopa County Superior Court judge not be retained.
131.
Mark I. Harrison, Sara S. Greene, Keith Swisher & Meghan H. Grabel, On the Validity
and Vitality of Arizona's Judicial Merit Selection System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 239, 257 n.127 (2007).
132.
Id.
133.
Id. at 258.
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does. In states that use JPE in conjunction with retention elections, if a
judge chooses not to seek another term in office, then his or her performance evaluation is not released to the public. 134 While it is unknown how
many retirements from the bench were hastened by poor judicial performance evaluations which were not publicly disseminated, such occurrences take place routinely. 135 Such instances are surely examples of
substandard judges being held accountable for their performance.
The clearest example of a judicial performance evaluation program
having a direct impact on a judicial election and judicial accountability
occurred in 2008 in Pierce County, Washington-a state that does not
use the Missouri
plan to select judges but rather contested non-partisan
136
elections.
In 2007, the Tacoma-Pierce County Bar Association (TPCBA) contracted to have a judicial performance evaluation conducted of the twenty-two judges sitting on the Pierce County Superior Court bench. 137 As
with the JPE programs operated in states with retention elections, the
Pierce County JPE was designed to provide information to the judges for
self-improvement purposes and to provide information to voters to be
used in considering how to cast their votes in judicial elections. 38 An
additional purpose behind the bar association's conducting the JPE was
to provide information to potential candidates for the superior court
bench about which of the sitting judges are performing below expectations. 13 9
It is with the goal of fostering the potential for poorly performing
judges to be held accountable that the TPCBA made two significant decisions. First, it was decided that the results of the evaluations would be
released to the public four weeks before attorneys planning on entering a
judicial election must notify the Secretary of State which position on a
court they wish to run for."40 The specific basis for this decision was to
enable potential candidates to use the evaluation results to determine
which of the sitting judges would be the most vulnerable in an election.
134.

See Pelander, supra note 112, at 685; Editorial,Judging the Judiciary: Keep Public In-

formed, DENVER POST, Nov. 9, 2007, at B-2.

135.
Judging the Judiciary,supra note 134; Interview with Louise Baca-Sena, Manager, N.M.
Jud. Perform. Eval., in Denver, Colo. (Aug. 6, 2008); Interview with Jane Howell, Exec. Dir., Colo.
Office of Judicial Perform., in Denver, Colo. (Aug. 7, 2008).
136.
See WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5. A caveat to this system is that if nobody files with the
secretary of state to challenge a sitting judge, the judge automatically retains his or her position for
another term. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 29.

137.
See Adam Lynn, Judging the Judges: Bar Association Survey Rates Pierce County Judiciary, THE NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.),
June 1, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.thenewstribune.com/newslocal/story/376713.html.
138.
Id.
139.
Bar's Judicial Ratings Will Aid the Voters, THE NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), June 3,
2008, availableat http://www.thenewstribune.com/opinion/story/379136.html.
140.
E-mail from Sal Mungia, Co-chair, Tacoma-Pierce County Bar Ass'n Jud. Perform. Eval.
Comm. (Apr. 24, 2008) (on file with author).
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The second decision made by the TPCBA was to release to the public the written comments provided by the attorneys and jurors who evaluated the judges. This decision generated considerable controversy and
consternation among the superior court's judges as well as other interested individuals and organizations in Washington. Opponents of releasing the comments, including this author, argued that individual comments about a judge can be taken out of context, have no indicia of reliability due to their anonymity, and may shift the focus from a quantitatively reliable evaluation based on established criteria toward salacious
innuendo and cherry-picked, non-performance-based comments. 14 Proponents of releasing the comments, including all members of the TPCBA
judicial evaluation committee, argued that the comments provided specific and vivid examples of a judge's performance that could not be adequately conveyed by numerical ratings. In the end, the TPCBA decided
to release the comments to the public on May 6, one month before the
June 6 filing deadline for the election.
While the Pierce County JPE report did not provide an overall score
for each judge from the four categorical indices and the responses to the
twenty-five specific questions that were reported, there were two judges
who were rated significantly lower than the rest of the bench. 142 One of
these judges was Sergio Armijo. 143 Based on attorney evaluations, Judge
Armijo was the lowest rated judge in the areas of legal ability, integrity,
and impartiality, and was near the bottom in the other two categories.
His ratings were such that the local newspaper singled him and another
judge out as being the worst judges on the bench. 144
In late May, Michael Hecht, an attorney from Tacoma, Washington,
filed to challenge Judge Armijo for his seat on the superior court
bench.145 The campaigns, which ran from late May until election day on
August 19, were fascinating in the dissimilarity.
As an incumbent, Judge Armijo ran a traditional, well-funded campaign. He focused on his service to the community and his experience
on the bench. 146 He was endorsed by nearly all of the other superior
court judges and the local prosecuting attorney's association. 147 He also
141.
Bar's JudicialRatings Will Aid the Voters, supra note 139.
142.
Id.; Lynn, supra note 137. The Tacoma News Tribune developed an interactive web site
to allow visitors to generate their own rankings of the judges based on their preferred criteria.
143.
Lynn, supra note 137.
144.
Id.
145.
Judge Armijo was the only Pierce County Superior Court judge to face electoral competition in 2008. Pierce County Superior Court Challengers Face Off, THE NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.), Aug. 4, 2008, available at http://www.thenewstribune.comnews/electionlstory/
433275.html.
146.
Id.
147.
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1 48
raised over $45,000 between June and August for his campaign.
These funds included nearly $3,000 from judges sitting in Pierce County,
$400 from the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney's Association, and
several thousands of dollars from attorneys; 149 each of these groups is a
regular source of campaign funding for incumbent judges facing an electoral challenge. Judge Armijo's campaign spent its money on direct
mailings (over $20,000), yard signs ($8,000), and a campaign manager
(over $2,000).150

His opponent, Michael Hecht, ran a much different campaign.
Hecht raised only $6,700 for his campaign, none of which came from
sitting judges and less than $1,000 of which came from attorneys. 51 The
focus of his campaign was on the need to hold Judge Armijo accountable
for his poor performance. This is exemplified by the personal statement
he provided to the local newspaper, the Tacoma News Tribune:
My opponent's dismal performance has harmed the citizens of Pierce
County. Families broken and financially ruined, minorities, senior
citizens and women victimized, law enforcement disrespected. It is
time for a change. I will not run personal business from my court. I
will not ask lawyers who practice before me for their endorsements.
Fundamental fairness is a cornerstone of justice, ability to apply the
law is paramount. For a fair day in court, elect Hecht Judge. 152
Similarly, when asked why he would be the best candidate for the
position, he responded:
Necessity. Tacoma Pierce County Bar Association got it right, 2008
Evaluation www.tpcba.com. Judge Armijo rated last of all 22 judges
in legal ability, integrity and impartiality. I pledge decisions based
on applying the law; fairness and impartiality, protecting families and
children, reading and being prepared, and avoiding conflicts of interest. I respect law enforcement and cultural diversity. The judicial
than any one individual. I am committed
process is more important
153
to being a good judge.
MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS (2008) [hereinafter MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS II], available at
http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimg/Default.aspx?docid=1212507.
148.
WASH. STATE PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM'N, CANDIDATE SUMMARY, FULL REPORT,
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES, http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimg/Default.aspx?docid= 1221563.

149.
See MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS I, supra note 147; MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS II, supra
note 147. This figure is from donors who had their occupation listed as attorney on campaign finance disclosure forms submitted to the Washington Public Disclosure Commission. A number of
other donors were also attorneys by trade but not listed as such.
150.

WASH. STATE PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM'N, EXPENDITURES CONTINUATION SHEET (2008),

available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimglDefault.aspx?docid=1 192260.
WASH. STATE PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM'N, CAMPAIGN SUMMARY RECEIPTS &
151.
EXPENDITURES (2008), available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimg/Default.aspx?docid=1214451;
WASH. STATE PUB. DISCLOSURE COMM'N, CASH RECEIPTS MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS (2008),

available at http://www.pdc.wa.gov/rptimg/Default.aspx?docid= 1192049.
Pierce County Superior Court Challengers Face Off, supra note 145.
152.
153.
Id.
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This focus was made even sharper with the launching of the campaign's website, hechtforhelp.com.154 Throughout the multipage website, references and links to materials pertaining to Judge Armijo's results in the Pierce County Superior Court Judicial Performance Evaluation are found. A page titled "Why I am Running" lays out repeatedly
how Judge Armijo was viewed as being the worst judge in Pierce County
in the performance evaluation and needed to be replaced. 155 Also on the
site are numerous verbatim comments provided by attorneys as part of
their evaluation of Judge Armijo.
In an upset, Michael Hecht defeated Judge Armijo in the August
election, receiving 5 1% of the vote. 156 While exit polling was not done
after the election-and given the disparity in funds and endorsements-it
is safe to say that the performance evaluation was taken to heart by the
electorate and served as a primary factor behind Judge Armijo's defeat.
C. Do JPEProgramsEncourageHigher Voter ParticipationRates in
JudicialElections?
As noted above, a common complaint raised by opponents of merit
selection and retention elections is the lack of information provided to
voters in retention elections and the low level of voter participation.
Research has indicated that there is a distinct relationship between the
lack of information possessed by voters regarding judicial candidates and
voter turnout. Professors Lovrich and Sheldon found that citizens who
voted in judicial elections possessed significantly more knowledge about
judicial candidates than citizens who did not vote. 157 Similar results
have
158
been found in studies examining falloff and non-judicial elections.
It stands to reason that if lack of information is related to lower voter participation, then providing voters with more useful information
should increase participation rates. If we accept this premise and if judicial performance evaluation programs are meeting their goal of informing voters about judges standing for retention, then falloff in judicial
retention elections should decrease, indicating increased voter participation.
154.
Michael Hecht, Elect Hecht: Hecht for Help Homepage, http://hechtforhelp.com (last
visited Oct. 21, 2008).
155.
Michael Hecht, Elect Hecht: Hecht for Help, Why I am Running,
http://hechtforhelp.com/abouthecht.why.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
156. See Adam Lynn, Incumbent 15-Year Judge Armijo Ousted in Final Election Result, THE
NEWS
TRIB.
(Tacoma,
Wash.),
Sep.
12,
2008,
available
at
http:llwww.thenewstribune.com/news/localstory/480441 .html.
157.
Sheldon & Lovrich, supra note 88, at 238; Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Charles H. Sheldon,
Voters in JudicialElections: An Attentive Public or an Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 23,
30(1984).
158.
See Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan & Trudi Happ, Ballot Propositionsand Information
Costs: Direct Democracy and the Fatigued Voter, 45 W. POL. Q. 559, 560-61 (1992); John E. Mueller, Voting on the Propositions:Ballot Patternsand Historical Trends in California, 63 AM. POL.

SCI. REV. 1197, 1200 (1969); Wattenberg et al., supra note 86, at 236, 247.
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To see if this is in fact taking place, I reviewed election turnout data
in Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico. Each of these states selects its
appellate court judges via merit selection and retention elections and has a
well established JPE program. The charts presented in Figures 2, 3, and 4
present a level of falloff between the number people who submitted a
ballot in an election and the number of people who, on average, in a
statewide judicial retention election that appeared on the ballot. Each
chart has a line bisecting the horizontal axis, indicating the year in which
judicial performance evaluation information about appellate court judges
standing for retention was made available to the public for use in retention
elections. If the proposition that increased information about judges
standing for retention will lead to increased voter participation in retention elections, then the level of falloff should decrease after JPE programs
are established. As is evident from the charts, falloff decreased as predicted in two states, Colorado and New Mexico, but increased in Arizona.

New Mexico
35%
Percent Falloff 30%

111
__A\

25%

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000 2002 2004 2006

Figure 2

Colorado
Percent Falloff 30%

-

25%
20%

1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Figure 3

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

Arizona
40%
35%
Percent Falloff 30%
25%

--------------------------------.---------------- ----.-.-------------- --.-------20%%
1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2004

2006

Figure 4
What can be gleaned from this information? First and foremost,
such a cursory analysis should be considered exploratory. Not only is it
impossible for one to make any causal inferences from the results, but
there are also a number of items that need to be controlled for statistically before one can make any concrete findings about the effect of JPE
programs on voter participation.1 59 While preliminary, the information
does suggest that JPE programs, in and of themselves, are not likely to be
sufficient to eliminate voter falloff.
D. How do Judges Perceive the Impact of JPE on JudicialAccountability
and JudicialIndependence?
A critical component of the ability of JPE programs to promote judicial accountability without negatively impacting judicial independence
is how the judges under evaluation perceive the program. Given the sensitive nature of judicial performance evaluation programs in the eyes of
judges subject to evaluation, it is important to obtain input on the design,
implementation, and assessment of JPE programs from the judges being
evaluated. 160 Input from the judiciary is likely to make for smoother
implementation and more reliable results than if judicial feedback is not
considered. 16 1 Moreover, by considering the thoughts and concerns of
the judges, judges will attain "ownership" of the process which would

159.
State and election-specific items such as methods of distributing evaluation recommendations, population transiency, ballot design, length of ballot, and other items must be taken into account before definitive findings and attributions can be made.
160. Daina Farthing-Capowich, Designing Programs to Evaluate Judicial Performance,9 ST.
CT. J. 22, 23-24 (Summer 1985).
161.
Id.
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help quell potential concerns raised by judges who are rated more criti162
cally than they feel is warranted.
There are several methods that can be used to gather this information from judges. Individual judges can be interviewed in private regarding their perceptions of a JPE program. Interviews have the ability to
obtain detailed information and thoughts from judges that can provide
much insight. In practicality, however, to interview a representative
sample of judges in a state would be a daunting task. Such interviews
would likely be very time consuming, expensive, and logistically cum63
bersome. 1
A second option would be to conduct a series of focus groups with
members of the bench. This would entail meeting with groups of judges
and having structured discussions of their perceptions about JPE programs. While this is less time consuming and expensive than individual
interviews, it does not provide the confidential atmosphere present with a
one-on-one interview setting. It is not unrealistic to expect judges to be
less candid in discussing their thoughts about evaluations of the judiciary
in front of their fellow judges than they would be in a private setting.
Accordingly, the information obtained in focus groups may be incomplete and skewed based on the dynamics of the group.
A third method of gaining insight into what judges think about JPE
programs is by conducting a survey. Surveys have the advantages of
providing anonymity, being able to obtain quantifiable responses that can
be examined for an entire judiciary using standardized scales, and not
being cost prohibitive. Additionally, in asking open-ended questions,
surveys can contain significant levels of detail and opinions of individual
judges.
The limited number of surveys of judges who have been evaluated
by JPE programs have revealed interesting attitudes about JPE's effect
on judicial independence and accountability. As part of its multistate
examination of JPE programs, the American Judicature Society (AJS)
surveyed the judges from Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah who were
evaluated by their state's JPE program in 1996 about their perceptions of
the programs. 164 AJS found that a significant majority of those judges
surveyed believed the JPE programs in their states helped make them
"appropriately accountable for [their] job performance."1 65 According
to

162.
Id.; See Gary E. Roberts, Employee Performance Appraisal System Participation:A
Technique that Works, 31 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 333, 334 (2002) (noting that employees are more
likely to accept negative feedback if they believe the evaluation process is fair).
163.

FRANK H. HAGAN, RESEARCH METHODS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY 186

(7th ed. 2006).
164.
Esterling, supra note 35, at 211-14.
165. Id.at211.
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one judge, "the public is better informed when making voting decisions
and can weed out incompetent judges.' 66
Recently, members of the Colorado judiciary participated in a survey which sheds a great deal of light on the Colorado JPE process. 167 In
2008, the author of this article, in conjunction with Jordan Singer of the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System, conducted
a study to gain insight into what members of the Colorado judiciary
thought about Colorado's system of judicial performance evaluation. As
part of the study, surveys inquiring about judicial perceptions of the JPE
program were sent to Colorado's 270 district and county court judges as
well as the state's twenty-six appellate court judges. 68 In all, 172 (64%)
trial court judges and seventeen (65%) appellate court judges returned
completed surveys.
While the survey did not ask the judges specifically about whether
the JPE process affects judicial accountability, a number of judges raised
the issue sua sponte in their written comments submitted as part of the
survey. A number of judges noted that JPE makes them more accountable to the public. For example, one county court judge noted, "My belief is that the process requires me to be more accountable than I would
be without it. The process helps prevent 'black robe disease.' 1 69 Similarly, a district court judge wrote, "I think the existence of the process is
useful. Knowing that you will be evaluated is a good hedge against judiout some appointees who
cial arrogance. I also think the process weeds
170
job."'
the
for
suited
well
be
to
out
don't turn
From these and similar comments, it appears that Colorado judges
perceive that the JPE process increases their accountability to the public.
Furthermore, this increased accountability appears to have a positive
impact on judicial behavior. By helping judges identify occasions where
they may be suffering from "judicial arrogance" and "black robe disease," the accountability associated with the performance evaluation
process appears to operate beyond electoral defeat for the betterment of
the judicial system.
In conjunction with considering JPE's impact on judicial accountability, it is worthwhile to examine its effect on judicial independence.
Recall, the establishment of JPE programs was based largely on the premise of preserving judicial independence by increasing the ability of
Id.
166.
167.
David Brody & Jordan Singer, 2008 Survey of the Colorado Judiciary About Judicial
Performance Evaluation, Mar. 26, 2008 [hereinafter Colorado Judicial Survey] (on file with author).
168.
Id. (response data on file with author). See also INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL Sys., THE BENCH SPEAKS ON JUDICIAL PERFORM. EVAL.: A SURVEY OF COLORADO

JUDGES (2008), available at http://www.du.edulegalinstitute/publications2008 (for a presentation of
an executive summary of the findings).
169.
Colorado Judicial Survey, supra note 167 (comment of Trial Judge 15).
170. Id. (comment of Trial Judge 27).
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voters to use retention elections to hold judges accountable based on
appropriate, non-decision-based criteria.' 7' An evaluation program that
fails to adequately preserve judicial independence is likely to lose the
support of a large segment of individuals and organizations that worked
for its establishment.
The 2008 survey of the Colorado judiciary asked the judges whether
the JPE program increases judicial independence, decreases it, or has no
effect on it. As can be seen in Figure 5, it is fair to say that the judges
were evenly split on what the impact of JPE is on judicial independence.

82
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Figure 5
Colorado Judges' Opinions on Effect of Judicial Performance
Evaluations on Judicial Independence
When one considers the written comments that were provided by
the judges relating to judicial independence, several items become evident. First, judges who believe JPE increases independence viewed it as
a necessary component of Colorado using the Missouri Plan to select
judges. As clearly summed up by a district court judge, "Without JPE
and its . . .reports to the voters, the retention system would collapse.
'72

Therefore, JPE has a significant impact on judicial independence."1
Similarly, another district court judge stated, "I believe that JPE increases judicial independence because I think it is the price we must pay
73
to continue to have a merit selection system for judges."1
As for those who believed JPE decreased judicial independence, no
judge provided information about how it did so. Rather, much of the
concern about its effects on independence centered on procedural issues
associated with the survey process. The importance of considering and
171.
172.
173.

See supra Section IV.
Colorado Judicial Survey, supra note 167 (comment of Trial Judge 4).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 52).
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evaluating the procedures used in conducting a JPE program and the
effect the procedures have on perceptions of the effectiveness and trustworthiness of a program are discussed below.
E. Are ProperProcessesBeing Used to Evaluate JudicialPerformance?
"The effectiveness of any judicial performance evaluation project
will depend, in large measure, upon the reliability of the information it
generates. 174 This statement, included in the American Bar Association's first set of judicial performance evaluation guidelines over twenty
years ago, is as true today as it was when written. For judicial performance evaluations to effectively hold judges accountable while not inhibiting judicial independence, the results of the evaluations and
75 the methods
used to obtain them must be unquestionably trustworthy. 1
The methods used and the recommendations and reports generated
must be viewed as being trustworthy by the judges being evaluated, the
voters who are being asked to use them, the state commissions and overseers who must stand behind them, and state policy makers who make
funding decisions. 176 A lack of trust in the methods selected to obtain the
information used in the evaluation process by any of these groups is likely to have immediate and long-term consequences for the program. As
Seth Andersen, Executive Director of the American Judicature Society
put it:
While the current trend appears to favor adoption of official retention
evaluation programs in more states, it is important to note that only
six of the nineteen states that hold retention elections at some or all
levels of court have adopted such programs. Concerns about the fairness of survey methodologies and evaluation commission procedures,
as well as a general reticence among many judges to subject themselves to an evaluation process that may be seen as a threat to decisional independence, have helped to stall the expansion of retention
evaluation programs.177
Despite the logic behind Andersen's observation, there have not
been any external evaluations of the survey methodologies used by JPE
programs since the 1990s. Given the importance the trustworthiness and
validity of a program's methods and results have on the effectiveness of
JPE programs in promoting judicial accountability, it is important that
states routinely assess the survey methodologies, commission proceSPECIAL COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, AMERICAN BAR
174.
ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 26 (1985).

175.

Id. See also ABA, supranote 40, at 6.

176.
See N.C. BAR ASS'N JUDICIAL PERFORM. EVAL. STUDY GROUP, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCBA JPE STUDY GROUP ON JUDICIAL PERFORM. EVAL TO THE N. C.
at
available
(2006),
27
OF
GOVERNORS
BOARD
ASS'N
BAR

http://www.ncbar.org/download/ncba/jpeDraftReport.pdf.
177. Andersen, supra note 35, at 1375-76 (footnote omitted).
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dures, and distribution of results being used, before negative perceptions
of their fairness undermine public and political acceptance. The import
of such assessments is evident from the activities and events surrounding
Colorado's judicial selection and performance evaluation process over
the past several years. The following section presents a truncated case
study of JPE in Colorado.
V. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION IN COLORADO

Colorado has one of the longest running and most well respected
judicial performance evaluation programs in the nation. 78 Established
by the Colorado legislature in 1988, the Commissions on Judicial Performance conduct evaluations of each appellate and trial court judge
prior to the end of the judge's term. 179 The statutes and rules governing
the processes and criteria used in the evaluation of judges lay out detailed
requirements regarding what the commissions are to consider in conducting their evaluations and how the information should be reported to the
public. 8 °
As discussed previously, in 2008 1 collaborated with the Institute for
the Advancement of the American Legal System at the University of
Denver to conduct a survey of the members of the Colorado judiciary
about their thoughts regarding the JPE program. The judicial survey was
the first part of a multistep plan to evaluate the processes used and impact resulting from the JPE program. To help lay the groundwork for
future areas of inquiry, the judicial survey was designed to be exploratory and to garner as much information about the process as possible
from the people directly affected by the JPE program.
According to Daina Farthing-Capowich, a forerunner in the design
of JPE programs, in developing and assessing the effectiveness and validity of a performance evaluation program it is important that judges be
given the chance to "vent frustrations, comment, offer suggestions, and
review the work product as it takes shape."1 8' Input from the subjects of
a performance evaluation gives insight into matters that are worthy of
assessment and contemplation and provides the impetus in the discovery
of systemic shortcomings that can be easily remedied.182 The 2008 Colorado judicial survey, discussed above, is a classic example of this phenomenon.

178.
Jean E. Dubofsky, JudicialPerfonnance Review: A Balance Between Judicial Independence and Public Accountability, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 315 (2007).
179. Commissions on Judicial Performance, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-5.5-101 to -106
(West 2008). Colorado has 22 local commissions which evaluate trial court judges and a state commission that evaluates supreme court and court of appeals judges.
180.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5.5-105.5 (West 2008).
181.
Farthing-Capowich, supra note 160, at 24.
182.
Id.
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The judges' responses to the survey showed that nearly all of them
were very supportive of the continued use of judicial performance evaluations in Colorado. Over 70% of judges who had been through the process at least once reported that it provided them with information that allowed them to improve their job performance, and nearly 90% believed
the Commissions' recommendation process for use in retention elections
was fair. 83 They did, however, have a number of strong opinions about
the validity of the survey methodology and how the evaluation process
could be improved. While much of this information is critical of the
process, it also provides important information for the Commission to
consider. Given the Colorado Commission's internal assessment of the
evaluation process following each round of retention elections, and its
support and assistance in the implementation of the survey, the feedback
provided by the bench and discussed below will be used to make a model
JPE program even stronger.184
A. Perceived Problems with the Survey Methodology
To help us learn about how judges feel about JPE, the 2008 survey
asked the judges whether certain aspects of the evaluation process were
problematic to them. As can be seen from the figures in Table 1, most of
the judges considered specific procedural items to be of major concern.
Specifically, a clear majority of the judges felt that the number of respondents, the manner in which respondents are selected, and the groups
of individuals identified to participate were a problem. Perhaps most
importantly, only 15 judges (12.3%) responded that the validity and accuracy of the survey responses were not a problem with the Colorado
JPE system.
Table 1: Perceived Problems with JPE Survey Process
Not a
problem

Minor
problem

Major
problem

How job performance criteria are measured.

32.1%

49.5%

18.3%

The targeted survey respondent groups.

31.0%

36.2%

32.8%

Number of survey respondents.

13.5%

33.3%

53.2%

The methods by which respondents are selected.

28.9%

40.2%

30.9%

Validity & accuracy of survey responses.

13.3%

46.0%

40.7%

As striking as these figures are, the magnitude of the dissatisfaction
felt by the judges regarding the evaluation methodology is better illus183.
184.

Colorado Judicial Survey, supra note 167.
Interview with Jane Howell, supra note 135.
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trated from the following comments that were provided by a number of
judges.
85
* Survey is unscientific and a joke.1
"

Asking non-lawyers to address questions of legal knowledge is problematic-there is no legitimate way to know
whether the respondents have the requisite 186
knowledge or
adequate information to support their ratings.

* The surveys
are not statistically valid and are totally unreli187
able.
"

The evaluation information is based on a survey process
that has been inherently flawed,88 thereby limiting the value
of any information we receive.

"

I have now been on both sides of this evaluation process.
Many years ago I was a member of our local judicial performance commission. Back then the methodology of the
process of obtaining information from attorneys, witnesses,
jurors was more than flawed. The survey methodology astoundingly remains horrible and unreliable. I am shocked
that [the contractor] has not improved its process.... When

a judge's career may hinge on these surveys and the opinion of the commission it is not acceptable to me
that the
189
methodology is flawed. All judges deserve better.
"

The surveys are a major concern for many judges, including
me. For a survey to be valid it must be provided to a wide
group of people in various categories, including prosecutors, defense attorneys, court staff, probation officers, police officers, and pro se parties. Many of the results I have
seen have a significant number or group that is underrepresented. 190

To better understand the nature of these concerns, and in an effort to
see if there were any areas where the JPE process could be strengthened,
I examined the 2008 judicial performance evaluation reports prepared for
the Colorado trial court judges standing for retention elections. Three
major items involving the evaluation of county and district court judges
stood out that should be considered by the Colorado commission.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Colorado Judicial Survey, supra note 167 (comment of Trial Judge 14).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 1).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 18).
Id. (comment of Appellate Judge 1).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 134).
Id. (comment of Trial Judge 82).
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B. Survey Sample Issues
A key component of JPE programs is their obtaining evaluation information from individuals who actually appeared before a judge. In
Colorado, this information is generated through government records and
provided to the consulting firm who administers the JPE surveys for the
Commissions on Judicial Performance. These individuals include attorneys, witnesses, jurors, litigants, and victims. 191
A concern raised repeatedly by the Colorado judges was the small
number of attorneys who completed surveys and what the makeup of the
attorney sample looked like. In large jurisdictions, an attorney may have
appeared before multiple judges during an evaluation period. Out of
concern for potential "survey fatigue," 192 Colorado has adopted a unique
policy whereby attorneys are only asked to evaluate up to two judges
before whom they have appeared rather than ask all attorneys who appeared before a judge to complete a survey. 193 If an attorney appeared
before more than two judges being evaluated by the Commission during
an evaluation period, the consultant who administers the evaluation survey process draws a small sample of the attorneys who appeared before194a
judge, and selects those attorneys to receive evaluations for the judge.
While the sampling is based on the number of times an attorney appeared
before a judge, it ignores the makeup of the sample and how
it may af95
fect the outcome of the evaluation or perception of fairness.
Ideally, a sample would include a weighted cross-section of respondents stratified by key characteristics. 196 In the case of a JPE program,
any sampling should consider an attorney's general area of practice (civil
or criminal), and whether the attorney is a district attorney/prosecutor, or
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-5.5-101-13.5.5-101.5 (West 2008); COLO. RULES
11 (a).
192.
While survey fatigue or response burden is a concern in asking individuals to complete
multiple surveys or evaluations, other JPE programs have attorneys complete many more than two
evaluations during an evaluation period without response shortfalls due to survey fatigue. Moreover,
as attorneys in the Denver area are likely to appear before fewer than fifteen judges under evaluation
in a given year, as opposed to fifty-two in King County, Washington and over seventy in Maricopa
County, Arizona, survey fatigue should not be an issue. See JUDICIAL EVAL. COMM., KING COUNTY
BAR ASS'N, 2007 JUDICIAL EVAL. SURVEY 1 (2007), available at http://www.kcba.org
/judicial/pdf/2007judicial.pdf; Arizona Comm'n on Judicial Perform. Rev., Judicial Perform. Reports, http://azjudges.info/reports/lastname.cfm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008).
193.
The methodology used in the Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation program is discussed in the individual judge reports. For ease of reference, I will provide the web page and report
page number for one report when discussing system wide methods. For explanation of sampling
methods and survey fatigue, see COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., MARTIN F. EGELHOFF 2008
JUDICIAL PERFORM. SURVEY, 91 (2008), available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.coml images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst%2002%20Martin%20F.%20Egelhoff.pdf.
194.
Id.This method of selecting who an attorney may evaluate rather than letting attorneys
select what judges they feel capable of evaluating has the potential to severely curtail response rates
and levels.
195.
See id.
196.
Edward L. Kom & Barry I. Graubard, Examples of Differing Weighted and Unweighted
Estimates from a Sample Survey, 49 AM. STATISTICIAN 291, 291 (1995).
191.

GOVERNING THE COMM'NS ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., R. 10(a),
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a criminal defense attorney. In addition to concerns about the small
number of attorneys involved in the JPE process, it is this sampling process that is the cause of the judges' complaints.
To illustrate the nature of these problems, Table 2 contains the attorney samples used for the 2008 performance evaluations for District
Court judges sitting in Denver. 197 First, consider the overall number of
attorneys included in the sample and completing evaluations. Despite
the fact that each of the district court judges sitting likely has hundreds of
attorneys appear before him or her annually, on average only seventyfour attorneys received requests to complete surveys per judge. Furthermore, an average of only thirty-four attorneys completed evaluations
per judge. Having only thirty-four attorneys evaluate a judge is not an
unreasonablylow figure, but the goal of any JPE program should be to
have as great a number of respondents as possible. 198 To achieve this
goal, one should not deliberately use small sample sizes when they are
not necessary. This is especially true for urban areas with where large
numbers of attorneys are likely to have appeared before each judge. 199

197.
Information used in this analysis was obtained from the 2008 individual judge reports
prepared by the Colorado Commission on Judicial Performance: COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM.,
ANNE

MANSFIELD

2008

JUDICIAL

PERFORM.

SURVEY,

93

http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst

(2008),

02

available

at

Anne

Mansfield.pdf;
COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., JOHN MADDEN 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM. SURVEY, 93 (2008),
available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 John Madden.pdf; COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., LARRY J. NAVES 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM. SURVEY, 93
(2008), available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.conimages/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 Larry
J. Naves.pdf; COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., MARTIN F. EGELHOFF 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM.
SURVEY, supra note 193, at 93; COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., ROBERT S. HYATT 2008 JUDICIAL

PERFORM.
SURVEY,
93
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cojudicialperformance
.com/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 Robert S. Hyatt.pdf; COMMI'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM.,
ROBERT L. MCGAHEY, JR. 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM. SURVEY, 93 (2008), available at
http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 Robert L. McGahey,
Jr..pdf; COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., SHEILA ANN RAPPAPORT 2008 JUDICIAL PERFORM.
SURVEY,
93
(2008),
available
at
http://www.cojudicialperformance.com
/images/retentionpdfs/2008_Dst 02 Sheila Ann Rappaport.pdf.
198.
See JUDICIAL EVAL, COMM., supra note 192, at 3.
199.
In rural counties, low numbers of attorneys completing surveys may be unavoidable to the
small population of attorneys practicing locally. This is generally not the case in urban locales such
as Denver.
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Table 2: 2008 Attorney Evaluation Participants, Colorado
District Court Judges, District 2
Civil
Attorneys

District
Criminal
Judge(Unknown
Attorney
Defense

Judge

Attorneys
Role)

TOTAL
ATTORNEYS

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Egelhoff

28

14

25

14

11

4

35

15

99

47

Hyatt

27

18

3

0

34

17

9

4

73

39

Madden

3

2

45

20

9

0

0

0

57

22

Mansfield

1

0

51

15

4

2

13

4

69

21

McGahey

13

5

8

3

43

25

9

4

73

37

Naves

13

9

2

1

6

3

16

6

37

19

Rappaport

20

13

0

0

32

20

9

6

61

39

Table 3: 2008 Non-Attorney Evaluation Participants, Colorado
District Court Judges, District 2
Judge

Law
Enforcement

Criminal
Defendant

Other

Civil Litigant

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

Sent

Complete

161

18

116

5

141

Hyatt

4

0

99

3

Madden

1

0

195

Mansfield

0

0

McGahey

113

Naves
Rappaport

Egelhoff

Jurors

Senat Complete

Sent

Complete

20

38

1

284

107

21

0

10

0

137

84

9

0

0

1

0

170

71

239

13

119

15

85

25

143

53

7

77

5

147

9

20

1

247

126

1

1

14

0

37

1

0

0

184

102

5

0

45

4

8

0

1

0

272
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Of greater concern with the samples used for the Denver judges is
the professional makeup of the attorneys. Ideally there should be a reasonable balance between the number of prosecutors and defense attorneys who evaluate a judge. While this is the case for two of the Denver
judges, Eglehoff and McGahey, the same cannot be said for the five other judges. For three of the judges, surveys were sent to more than a dozen district attorneys while three or fewer defense attorneys were included. For the other two judges the opposite is true. For Judges Madden and Mansfield, surveys were sent to forty-five and fifty-one criminal
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defense attorneys, but to only three and one district attorneys, respectively. Given that a judge who hears criminal matters is likely to have
both prosecutors and defense attorneys appear in his or her court, this
disparity is puzzling and of understandable concern to the bench.
The same is true for the distribution of surveys to witnesses and litigants. As shown in Table 3 above, there was great disparity in the numbers of surveys sent to law enforcement officers for each judge. For two
judges over 100 surveys were sent to law enforcement personnel, while
for the other five judges five or fewer were sent to police officers per
judge. At the same time, judges who had the opportunity to be evaluated
by five or fewer law enforcement officers had surveys sent to dozens of
criminal defendants each.
The fact that it is done intentionally is problematic; however, improved perceptions of the reliability and trustworthiness of the process
can be obtained when these items and the judges' concerns about them
are addressed in future evaluations.
C. Use of a Single Survey for Non-Attorney Evaluators
The second area of concern raised by the judges involves the nonattorney survey instrument that is used in the JPE process. The reason
behind having lay persons evaluate judges as part of a judicial performance evaluation is that they bring different perspectives into the assessment process. 200 To make use of the different perspectives it is important
that a survey questionnaire be specifically tailored to the nature of the
interaction each group of respondents had with a judge.2 0 ' While all lay
persons have some common interactions with a judge, the nature of sitting on a jury for several days or weeks makes the experience and perspective it provides inherently different than that of a witness who testified for one hour. For this reason, all state JPE programs have evaluation
questionnaires tailored specifically for jurors, apart from those used with
witnesses and litigants. This gives respondents an opportunity to provide
in-depth evaluations about the judge involving certain events and observations that are not relevant or applicable to other lay persons.
Under the Colorado JPE process, all non-attorneys complete the
same evaluation questionnaire. The practice of having jurors, litigants,
criminal defendants, social workers, law enforcement officers, and victims complete the same survey limits the value of the information they
can provide. Compounding the matter, when evaluation reports are prepared for each judge, the responses of all non-attorney respondents are
pooled together and reported as one measure.20 2 Given the fact that in
the aggregate jurors may perceive a judge's behavior differently than law
200.
201.
202.

ABA, supra note 40, at 14; Esterling, supra note 35, at 210.
See SHARED EXPECrATIONS, supra note 34, at 65.
COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., supra note 193, at 92.
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enforcement officers who evaluate a judge, a judge's rating could potentially be increased or decreased depending on the number of each type of
lay person that complete an evaluation.2 °3
D. Non-Attorneys Rating Legal Ability
While one of the most important aspects of judicial performance
evaluations is their ability to provide information about a judge's performance as seen from lawyers and non-lawyers alike, it is essential that
both groups evaluate judges only on areas in which they are competent.2° Of particular import is having only individuals with legal training
and experience evaluate a judge's legal ability.20 5 Under the Colorado
JPE system, not only do all non-attorneys complete the same survey, but
they are also asked to evaluate the judge on matters involving his or her
"application of the law." Specifically, jurors, litigants, witnesses, and
court judges on three criteria
other non-attorneys are asked to rate trial
26
under the heading "Application of Law": 0
1. Giving reasons for rulings.
2. Willing to make decision without regard to outside pressure.
3. Being able to identify and analyze facts.
While such questions are appropriate for attorneys to answer, expecting non-attorneys to be able to intelligently assess whether a judge
applied the law appropriately is unacceptable, and justifiably troubling to
the bench.2 °7 The problems with the information obtained from nonattorneys are further amplified by having non-attorneys rate the judge's
sentencing practices. The Colorado survey explicitly asks non-attorneys
to assess whether the judge's sentencing practices are generally too harsh
or too lenient. This is unacceptable for several reasons. First, rather than
focus on a judge's behavior, this asks for assessments on decision-based
criteria. More importantly, it asks people to rate a judge on information
for which they have no basis of knowledge.20 8 Jurors are not present at a
203.

This problem is exasperated by the decision to rank judges based largely on these evalua-

tion scores. See Matt Masich, Judge Performance Evals To Be Released At 1 P.M., L. WK. COLO.

ONLINE, Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://www.lawweekonline.com/default.asp?sdetail=6673.

For

the rankings, see COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., COMBINED OVERALL AVERAGE & RANK 1-2

(2008), available at http://www.cojudicialperformance.con/CO%2OWeb%2oRanking%20%200804-08a.pdf.
204.
Daina Farthing-Capowich & Judith White McBride, Obtaining Reliable Information: A
Guide to Questionnaire Developmentfor Judicial Performance Evaluation Programs, 11 ST. CT. J.

5, 7 (Winter 1987).
205. Id.
206.
COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., supra note 193, at 98.
207.
Beyond the appropriateness of having non-lawyers rate legal ability, the fact that jurors,
witnesses, litigants, and the like are frequently not privy to bench and in chambers conferences and
rulings, not a complete view of all of the facts at issue in a matter before the court. As such, any
evaluation on such matters is pure conjecture.
208.
A rudimentary premise in the design of any performance evaluation program is that evaluations by subjects who have not had the opportunity to observe the behavior they are evaluating is a
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criminal sentencing, and therefore have no basis to provide a rating. The
same is true for most witnesses and other non-attorneys who appear before a judge. While criminal defendants may be present at sentencing,
many will not have a basis to evaluate the judge's relative harshness.
Having non-attorneys address sentencing practices can do nothing but
negatively affect the creditability of the JPE process.
These concerns expressed by the Colorado judiciary have the potential to have a negative impact on the future of the state's judicial performance program. Recall, in 2006, Colorado voters were asked to consider a ballot initiative that was anti-judiciary. The initiative was born
out of a belief in some quarters that the Colorado judiciary was unaccountable to the public with or without a JPE program.2°
Critics of the Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance believe that it fails to effectively hold judges accountable. 210 They cite the
fact that, since 1988, fourteen trial court judges and no appellate court
judges have received "do not retain" recommendations. 211 During this
time period six trial court judges have not been retained by voters and no
appellate court judges have been voted off the bench.212
Due to what was perceived as a lack of judicial accountability, particularly among appellate court judges, in 2006 a political committee
titled Limit the Judges was established. The goal of this group was to
remove sitting appellate court judges by establishing retroactive term
limits. The group's efforts led to Amendment 40 appearing on the November 2006 general election ballot. Amendment 40 provided for retroactive term limits of ten years for Colorado Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals judges.2 13 Proponents of the amendment argued that the current
system of retaining judges, including the Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance, serves as a rubber stamp for judges seeking another
term in office.214
Opponents of the amendment argued that it is foolhardy to deprive
state
of its most experienced jurists arbitrarily. They also argued that
the
judicial performance evaluations do work to hold judges accountable, but
major source for unreliability in performance measurement, and must be avoided. See Bryant F.
Nagle, Criterion Development, 6 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 271, 277 (1953); Hannah R. Rothstein,
Interrater Reliability of Job Performance Ratings: Growth to Asymptote Level With Increasing
Opportunity to Observe, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 322, 322 (1990).
209.
See John Andrews, Judges Coddled by Sweetheart Process, DENVER POST, Feb. 18, 2007,
at E3.
210.
See id.
An additional ten judges have received recommendations of "no opinion." For more
211.
information, see COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., JUDICIAL PERFORM. FACT SHEET 3 (2008), avail-

able at http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/2008%20fact%20sheetl .pdf.
212.
Id.
213.
COLO. SEC'Y OF STATE, PROPOSED CONST. AMEND. FOR 2006 BALLOT (2006),
http://www.elections.colorado.gov/WWW/default/Initiatives/Title%2OBoard%2OFilings/Final%20T
ext%2090.pdf.
214. See John Andrews, The Casefor JudicialTerm Limits, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2008, at 44, 46.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

acknowledged that the system needs be improved. 2 5 After a bitter campaign in which over one million216dollars was spent, the Amendment was
defeated by a 57% to 43% tally.
Limit the Judges and their allies did not take this loss lying down.
After their defeat, the forces vowed to ask the voters in 2008 to vote to
adopt a refined version of Amendment 40.217 In response to this threat,
opponents of term limits and supporters of a strong, independent judiciary went on the offensive to assure the public that the state's judges are
and will be increasingly accountable. As part of this effort, not only was
the use of judicial performance evaluation in Colorado emphasized, but
acknowledgements of the need to strengthen and improve the evaluation
system were made.218
In 2008, the Colorado legislature and State Commission on Judicial
Performance did enact several reforms aimed at increasing the openness
of the evaluation process and the improved ability of voters to hold poorly performing judges accountable. Several public and community hearings were held by the legislature in which representatives of the state bar,
civic organizations, and other interested parties spoke in support of the
renewal of the JPE program. The Commissions on Judicial Performance
were reauthorized by the legislature. Importantly, representatives from
the judiciary also testified in support of retaining judicial performance
evaluation. With a comfortable margin, the Commissions on Judicial
Performance were reauthorized in the spring of 2008.219 Reforms enacted as part of the reauthorization bill included the implementation of a
notice and comment period for enactment of rules governing the evaluation process and additional evaluation criteria provided for. None of
these reforms generated much controversy.
In a more drastic move designed to increase the accountability of
judges, the Colorado Commissions on Judicial Performance chose to not
only release retention recommendations for judges standing for retention
election in 2008, but to also rank the trial court judges based on an average of the ratings attained in attorney and non-attorney evaluation questionnaires. 220 The premise behind this move was that by presenting evaluation results in this manner, it would be possible that judges who scored
215.
See Bruce Finley, Performance Reviews Proposedfor Judges, DENVER POST, Oct. 3,
2006, at B4.
216.
Colorado Cumulative Report, http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/electionresults2006G (last
updated Dec. 13, 2006).
217.
Limit the Judges: Campaign for Judicial Term Limits, Judicial Term Limits Target 2008
Ballot, http://www.limitthejudges.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
218.
Rebecca Love Kourlis, Facing a Need for Reform: More Openness Would Aid Courts,
DENVER POST, Nov. 26, 2006, at El.
219.
The
Colorado
Index:
Illuminating
Colorado
Issues,
http://thecoloradoindex.typepad.com/the-colorado-index/2008/03/senate-bill-054.htmi; SB 08-054,
66th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2008).
220. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORM., supra note 203.
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relatively poorly in the evaluation surveys, but were judged worthy of
retention by the commissions, could still be held accountable by the voters.
This effort may well increase judicial accountability. It may also,
however, have a negative effect on the judiciary's continued support of
the JPE process. An unscientific survey found that judges were overwhelmingly opposed to the new ranking system.2 21 Given the move to
increase accountability, and the judiciary's frustration with the methods
used in conducting the evaluations, judicial support for the performance
evaluations may begin to erode if their concerns are not taken into account.22 2
CONCLUSION

The selection of state judges in the United States is riddled with
contradictory values and preferences. The public wants a fair and impartial judiciary that decides cases according to the law independent of political or professional consequences.223 At the same time Americans
want the ability to hold judges accountable should they abuse their power
or betray the public trust. 224 While they prefer being able to hold judges
electorally accountable, a large segment of voters, when given the opportunity to vote in judicial elections opt not to participate due to not having
the information necessary to make an informed decision in a judicial
225
election. 2 When provided information about judges via expensive, vigorous campaigns, voters express concerns about special interest groups
"buying judges" and the negative effect campaigning and having to raise
money has on judicial independence and impartiality.22 6 While these
contradictions provide great challenges for states to overcome, they are
not insurmountable.
Any efforts to address these issues must center on trust. While the
public wants an independent judiciary, its general lack of trust in governmental institutions and democratic ideals has led to the wide use of
judicial elections and expensive campaigns and an informational vacuum. Judicial performance evaluations have the ability to provide information that can be used to hold judges accountable and limit the need
for special interest groups and issue based campaigns to fill the informaMasich, supra note 203.
221.
222. As the Colorado Commission is committed to providing a system the judges can trust, in
all likelihood, the Colorado State Commission will consider the thoughts of the judiciary in planning
for the future. Interview with Jane Howell, supra note 135.
223. Bert Brandenburg, Seizing the Accountability Moment: Enlisting Americans in the Fight
to Keep Courts Fair,Impartial, and Independent, 42 CT. REv. 22, 24 (2006); see also Pozen, supra
note 55, at 272.
224. Brandenburg, supra note 223, at 24; Pozen, supra note 55, at 272.
225. See supra Part IV.
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 54-55
226.
(2003).
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tion void. For JPE programs to achieve this aim it is necessary that the
methods used and the product produced are deemed trustworthy, reliable,
and valid by the public and the judiciary. Put another way, JPE programs must be accountable before voters will fully use them to hold
judges accountable.
The development and maintenance of transparently accountable JPE
programs can help build this public trust as well as the trust of the judiciary and policy makers. The potential impact of this is impressive. With
this increased ability to hold judges accountable, the public is likely to
forestall efforts to curtail judicial independence at the ballot box. With
increased ability to hold judges accountable, voters may vote to replace
poor performing judges on the bench with greater frequency and, in the
process, help increase the quality of the judiciary. With increased reliable information to use in judicial elections more voters will likely participate in selecting their judges. With increased trust in the method
upon which they are evaluated judges may publicly support JPE programs and encourage voters to make informed decisions when voting in
judicial elections. With reliable information about the effectiveness of
JPE programs achieving their stated goals, policy makers and legislators
are more likely to support their continued operation, and potentially their
expansion.
Much can be gained by taking the steps needed to maintain effective
and trustworthy JPE programs. It is up to those conducting the evaluations of the judges to evaluate themselves with an eye towards selfimprovement and the betterment of the judicial system.

ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDICIARY: THE RIGHT AND THE WRONG KIND
EDWIN L. FELTER, JR.t
Accountability, n. The mother of caution.
-Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary
INTRODUCTION
How many forms of accountability are there in the administrative
law judiciary? And, by comparison, how many forms of accountability
are there in the judicial branch? Let me count the ways. This article
begins with an analysis of the interplay, and mutual dependence of, judicial independence and accountability. It next illustrates how various
judicial philosophies maintain different ideas about judicial accountability. Thereafter, an analysis of the importance of judicial independence to
our system of justice follows.
Delving into more specific forms of judicial accountability, the article moves from accountability through "reasoned elaboration," as an
underpinning of meaningful appellate rights, to accountability through
judicial review, and the requirement that lower tribunals must follow
precedent in all but the most unusual instances. The article illustrates the
implications of an official refusal to follow precedent, for example, the
Social Security Administration's (SSA) policy of non-acquiescence
(which maintains that SSA administrative law judges need not follow
precedent established by federal circuit courts of appeal outside the circuit in which the administrative law judge sits).
The next form of accountability with which this article deals is the
most significant and compelling form of accountability, the accountability of judges to the controlling codes of judicial conduct in their jurisdictions, the underpinnings of which are effective complaint mechanisms to
enforce those codes. For the sake of comparison to the administrative
law judiciary, there is an analysis of disciplinary mechanisms for judges
in state judicial branches. Also, there is an analysis of the newer phenomenon of judicial performance commissions in the states (which, in
theory, exist to assist judges in improving their performance).
t Edwin L. Felter, Jr. is Senior Administrative Law Judge at the Colorado Office of Administrative Courts. He was Chief Judge from 1983 to 1998. He is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at
the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, 2006 to present. He was Chair of the National
Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary, Judicial Division, American Bar Association, in
2001. Judge Felter acknowledges the research assistance of Law Clerks Audrey Buehring, Elizabeth
Meyer, and Kelly Williams.
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Judgmental evaluations (evaluations that may result in pay raises,
demotions, or even firings) are contrasted with developmental evaluations (for the purpose of self-improvement) of administrative law judges.
Lastly, inappropriate judicial performance evaluations and their
negative consequences on the American values of integrity, impartiality,
and judicial independence of our judges are considered.
I. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Jane Q. Public cherishes independent judges, especially when she
prevails over the establishment in court, or before an administrative law
tribunal. Yet, she demands judges who are accountable. The proposition
is as simple as the idea that freedom comes with certain responsibilities.
Judicial independence comes with great accountability.
Judges have a great deal of power over the lives and fortunes of
those who appear before them. It is not always obvious to the litigant
that judges are constrained to apply the law to the facts, to obey codes of
judicial conduct and, in the case of the administrative law judiciary, to
meet specific performance objectives for civil servants, plus observe the
rules of professional conduct for lawyers.
Perhaps the greatest source of misunderstanding (and demand for
more accountability) concerning judges stems from their remoteness
from the public, which is based in part on the standards of conduct contained in the code of judicial conduct.1 Also, the process by which
judges arrive at decisions in cases is sometimes mysterious to the public.
In ancient times, people believed that judges were merely interpreting the
divine will. 2 This concept evolved into the belief that judges' interpretations of the law became a sacrosanct component of our jurisprudence.
The concept extended down to the trial level whereby the trial judge's
findings of fact were considered to become the absolute and immutable
truth concerning the facts in controversy. The findings assumed a quality
of unassailable dignity, above and beyond the evidence upon which they
were based. The school of judicial realism maintains that judges should
not deceive themselves concerning the true nature of their findings of
fact-guesses on the guesses of the witness's human and imperfect grasp
of the facts. 3 Judges have an obligation to avoid fueling the fires of arrogance and misunderstanding. What judges do is not by consecration into
the holy order of the robe. They are technicians who apply the law to the

1.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).

2. Charles D. Reid, Jr., Judicial Precedent in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth
Centuries: A Commentary on Chancellor Kent's Commentaries, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 52
(2007).
3.
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE, (Princeton Univ. Press 1973).
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facts and, in doing this the application of the law should be laced with
human understanding, common sense, compassion, and justice.
Indeed, judges (through codes of judicial conduct) are, in fact, subject to higher standards of conduct than those applicable to lawyers, who
are subject to the rules of professional conduct. Judges in the administrative law judiciary-insofar as they must be attorneys in good standingare also subject to the rules of professional conduct for lawyers in addition to judicial ethics codes and civil service performance standards.
There is a public clamor for more accountability of judges, especially when a legally correct, but unpopular and misunderstood opinion,
is released by an appeals tribunal and receives a lot of press coverage.
Indeed, if judges do not ensure that accountability measures and mechanisms, meaningful to the public, are in place, interest groups, through
citizen initiated constitutional amendments, will get ill-advised and inappropriate accountability measures on the ballot, and launch expensive
campaigns to defeat judges whose "minds are not right," in the opinion
of a few crusaders to get-the-judges. One extreme example was South
Dakota's 2006 "Jail for Judges" initiative (J.A.I.L: Judicial Accountability Initiative Law), which would have abolished judicial immunity for
South Dakota judges and made them liable in criminal and civil actions
for official acts, deemed improper by dissatisfied litigants.4 There is no
authority for the proposition that "judicial immunity" is a right protected
by the U.S. Constitution. Judicial immunity, in some cases, may be
statutory, or in a state constitution (within the "sovereign immunity"
family), but it has mainly evolved through case law. 5 Fortunately, South
Dakota voters defeated the "Jail for Judges" measure by eighty percent,
thus indicating that they valued judges who could function "without fear
or favoritism." It is hard to imagine who would want to be a judge in
South Dakota if the "Jail for Judges" measure had passed.
Rebecca Love Kourlis, former Colorado Supreme Court Justice and
present Executive Director for the Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System at the University of Denver, states, "there is a
buzz of public dissatisfaction about our courts, fueled at least to some
extent by the perception that our courts and judges are remote and unaccountable."6 She also states:
The willingness of judicial leaders in places lilke Colorado, Utah, and
New Hampshire to promote accountability measures is heartening
and heralds a new mind-set among judges. This new judicial attitude
is also reflected in eloquent remarks by Chief Justice John Broderick
of New Hampshire, who is working to export key elements of Colo4.
5.
6.
DENVER

S.D. CONST. amend. E (2006).
See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985).
Rebecca Love Kourlis, Op-Ed, Guest Commentary: Colorado Judiciary a Leader, THE
POST, June 29, 2008, at D3 (emphasis added).
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rado's program to their court system. [Chief Justice Broderick observed] "Our best ally is public trust and confidence.
Without it, we
'7
will lose support.... Sunlight and openness purify."
Justice Kourlis indicates: "We have now also taken to measuring
the courts, from public opinion polls, to state-by-state rankings and performance evaluations. This is a very healthy development." 8
Although the administrative law judiciary often "flies under the radar," perhaps because administrative law has a reputation for being a
boring subject, the administrative law judiciary could be especially vulnerable if an interest group, affected by a decision of the administrative
law judiciary it did not like, decided to launch a campaign to make the
administrative law judiciary more "accountable" to the group's preferred
way of thinking about issues. The reason for the greater vulnerability
would be due to the narrow and specialized subject matter with which the
administrative law judiciary deals.
Indeed, some members of the public believe that administrative law
judges are mere extensions of the agencies that are at odds with them.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Administrative law judges stand
between the agency and the person. The agency stands as another litigant before the administrative law judge, and the administrative law
judge's job is to provide a fair and impartial hearing to all sides. Sometimes the agency loses and it has the right to appeal in the same manner
as any other appellant.
II. JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Colorado State Senator Mark Hillman, who the author describes as
a textualist, states: "Conservatives have long decried 'activist judges' and
'judicial activism.' Those terms have a specific meaning, referring to
courts that do not simply interpret the law but instead change the meaning of the law under the guise of interpretation." 9 The Senator goes on to
state: "Writing the law is the constitutional role of the legislative branch,
which is elected by and accountable to the people. The role of the judiciary is to interpret, which The American Heritage Dictionary defines as
'to explain the meaning of."' 10 Therein lies some public misunderstanding and dissatisfaction with some high profile judicial opinions, perceived to be the product of "activist" judges. Political campaigns against
these opinions add more fuel to the fires of misunderstanding.

7. Id.
8.
Rebecca Love Kourlis, Perspective: Do Our Courts Measure Up?, THE DENVER POST,
July 11, 2008, availableat http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_9844319.
9.
Senator Mark Hillman, The Essence of JudicialActivism, John Jay Institute for Judicial
Interpretation Journal (Mar. 15, 2004) http://www.Iibertyparkusafd.org/lp/Jay/Journal/2004/
The%20Essence%20of%20Judicial%20Activism.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
10. Id.
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Judicial philosophies, labeled as textualism" and originalism, 12 are
the banners under which those calling for more judicial accountability
often fly. Pragmatism 13 (which has become the subject of public opprobrium among those clamoring for more "judicial accountability") bears
the stigma of judicial liberalism and those who appear to subscribe to this
philosophy are often labeled as "judicial legislators," or "judicial activists." The late Justice Thurgood Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court, in
response to a question about the "original intent" of the founding fathers,
reputedly indicated that the founding fathers did not contemplate the law
of the air or space. Justice Marshall was considered a judicial legislator
by some because he would be flexible in interpreting the law of transport
for horses and buggies as applicable to aircraft and space craft.
I1.

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: AN AMERICAN VALUE

In 2001, when I was Chair of the National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary of the American Bar Association, I was invited to speak at an international administrative law conference in Quebec City, the theme of which was "Universal Values in Administrative
Law." 14 I decided on a presentation entitled "Judicial Independence: A
Universal Value." Part of the presentation made reference to Steven
Spielberg's 1997 movie Amistad, starring Djimon Hounsou as the leader
of the 1839 slave rebellion on the schooner Amistad, and Anthony Hopkins, starring as John Quincy Adams, his lawyer. A rebellion broke out
on the schooner along the coast of Cuba and the schooner was taken over
by a group of captives who had earlier been kidnapped in Africa and sold
"Textualism" looks to the ordinary meaning of the language of the text, not merely the
11.
possible range of meaning of each of its constituent words. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 319 (1988). Justice Scalia has written:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of
which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with
context and ordinary usage, and the most likely to have been understood by the whole
Congress which voted on the words of the statute, (not to mention the citizens subject to
it), and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision
must be integrated-a compatibility which, by benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in mind.
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
12.
"Though I have written of the understanding of the ratifiers of the Constitution, since they
enacted it and made it law, that is actually a shorthand formulation, because the ratifiers understood
themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time would have understood
the words to mean." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (The Free Press 1990)
(emphasis added).
"[T]he pragmatist judge believes that constitutional interpretation involves the empathic
13.
projection of the judge's mind and talent into the creative souls of the framers rather than slavish
obeisance to the framers' every metronome marking. In the capacious, forward-looking account of
interpretation that I am calling pragmatic, the social consequences of alternative interpretations often
are decisive; to the consistent originalist, if there were such a person, they would always be irrelevant." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 253 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).

14.
Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Judicial Independence: A Universal Value, Speech at the Council of
Canadian Administrative Tribunals Fourth International Administrative Law Conference, Quebec
City, Quebec (June 2001).
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into slavery. The Africans were later apprehended on the vessel near
Long Island, New York, by the U.S. Navy and taken into custody.
Widely publicized litigation ensued. The movie depicts one lonely federal judge standing up against the administration of President Martin Van
Buren (whose administration, trying to avoid a conflict between North
and South, supported the property rights of those to whom the alleged
slaves were consigned) and Congress. The federal judge found that the
initial transport of the Africans across the Atlantic (which was not on the
Amistad) had been illegal and the rebels were not legally slaves but free.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this finding on March 9, 1841, and the
Africans traveled home in 1842.15 The movie presents a moving portrayal of the cherished American value of judicial independence, standing firm against the weight of public sentiment, Congress, and the presidential administration of Martin Van Buren. Indeed, without judicial
independence implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may have
been a long-time coming.
The decisional independence of judges, including judges in the administrative law judiciary, is the cornerstone of our constitutional system
of separation of powers. Legislative bodies make the laws, based on
their perceptions of the popular will, and they have the power to implement the laws through the power of appropriating monies. The executive
branch enforces the laws through its police and sheriffs. The judicial
branch, including the administrative law judiciary (within the executive
branch), has neither the power to appropriate monies nor the police force
to enforce its decrees. It has been characterized as the weakest branch of
government, yet it has the last word. The judicial power lies in the public's silent and enduring agreement to abide by the decisions of the judiciary, and to treat the decisions as final unless appealed. Indeed, the judiciary's legitimacy and efficacy derives largely from the public's confidence in its fairness and fidelity to the law. 16 Public confidence is essential to the judicial branch.' 7 To citizens of those countries where independent judiciaries are not a given, the respect Americans accord judicial
decisions (whether they agree or disagree) is a great mystery. The administrative law judiciary is meant to represent a fair and impartial
mechanism in the executive branch, whereby the individual person and
the government agency stand on equal ground. Indeed, the administrative law judge's obligation to be decisionally independent is the same as
the obligation of a judicial branch judge.

15.
(1841).
16.
17.

United States v. Libellants & Claimants of The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 597
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999).
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist said that an independent
judiciary is the "crown jewel of our democracy."' 8 A colleague tells a
story about his experience as a civil procedure consultant in Vietnam.
He told his Vietnamese audience about the U.S. Supreme Court opinion
that affirmed a federal judge's decision ordering President Harry Truman
to cease and desist from barring a strike of one of the nation's largest
steel companies at the beginning of the Korean War. 19 A member of the
audience asked if the judge was taken out and shot. My colleague replied, "No, he went on to his next docketed case." In our system, even
the President of the United States must obey court orders.
Judicial independence is a cherished international and national
value. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002),20 Value 1,
provides: "Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and
a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold
and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institu,,2 I
tional aspects.
Canon 1 of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (2007) states: "A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary ....

,

Most jurisdic-

tions in the United States have provisions in their codes of judicial conduct concerning the independence of the judiciary similar to those in the
ABA Model Code.23

Decisional independence, especially for members of the administrative law judiciary, does not come without great accountability. Indeed,
the American Bar Association felt it necessary to adopt a resolution supporting the decisional independence of administrative law judges, conditioned on the proposition that "members of the administrative [law] judistandards adapted
ciary be held accountable under appropriate ethical
24
from the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.,

Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance Between JudicialIndependence and Judi18.
cialAccountability in AdministrativeLaw, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 89, 93 (1997).
19.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002) (adopted by the Judicial Group on
20.
Strengthening Judicial Integrity, as revised at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the
Peace Palace, The Hague, November 25-26, 2002 (those countries participating included Brazil, the
Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Mexico, Mozambique, The Netherlands, Norway, The Philippines,
Madagascar, Hungary, Germany, Sierra Leone, United Kingdom, and the U.S.A)).
Id.; Value 1: Independence, Principle. Application 1.1 provides: "A judge shall exercise
21.
judicial function independently (emphasis added) on the basis of the judge's assessment of the facts
in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free from any extraneous influences,
pressures, threats, or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason." Id.
22.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007).

23. See, e.g., COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (stating "A judge should
uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.").
24.

ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES RES. IOIB (2001) (enacted) (on file with author).
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IV. ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH "REASONED ELABORATION" AND THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL

Legislative bodies make decisions, based on public comment and
perceptions of the public will, without being required to support those
decisions with underlying reasons (other than a prefatory statement in a
bill to the effect: "In order to protect the public health, safety and welfare
...

.").

Legislative decisions are reflected in bills that become laws. The

executive branch, charged with enforcing those laws, may or may not be
required to give reasons in support of executive branch enforcement actions (administrative law adjudications are not part of these enforcement
actions). The policeman 'making an arrest is not required to articulate
underlying reasons for doing so, other than stating the facts, which must
establish probable cause before a court. A court then decides whether or
not there was probable cause to believe that the subject committed the
crime and should be bound over for trial. Because judicial branch decisions are not based on majority vote reflecting the popular will, or on a
clear mandate to enforce the law, one of the forms of accountability for
judicial outcomes is a requirement of "reasoned elaboration, 25 applying
the law to the facts and giving reasons why the judge arrived at the specific outcome in the case.
The right to appeal is another form of accountability, whereby the
appeals tribunal must state reasons why the judge below was correct or
incorrect. This requirement is especially visible, and more pronounced,
in the administrative law judiciary, after an agency takes final agency
action on the administrative law judge's findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and order. Although the AU functions in the executive branch, the
ALJ performs a judicial function. In the judicial branch, "reasoned
elaboration" may not always be formally required at the trial level. It
most certainly is required at the appellate level. "Reasoned elaboration"
is almost universally prescribed by a codified and formal mechanism at
the first level of adjudication by the administrative law judiciary.26
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA),2 7 as well as the
APA of almost every state,28 requires the administrative law judge to
25.
"Reasoned elaboration" is the notion that the rules and guidelines involved in judicial
decisionmaking are sufficient to create substantial constraint on both process and outcome, and,
when properly followed, will incline courts towards the substantively best outcome. The constraints
emphasized in "reasoned elaboration" are public explanation, consistency, and sensitivity to (legislative) purpose. ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL PosIvisM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 126-27, 13842 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
26. See Professor Michael Frost, The Unseen Hand in Administrative Law Decisions: Organizing Principlesfor Findingsof Fact & Conclusions of Law, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES
151, 171 (1997).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3) (2008) (providing "All decisions, including initial, recommended,
and tentative decisions ... shall include a statement of findings and conclusions, and the reasons or
basis therefore, on all material issues of fact, law or discretion presented on the record ....
").
28. ALA. CODE § 41-22-15 (2008); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1063 (2008); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 25-15-210 (West 2008); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.50 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT.
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articulate findings of fact and conclusions of law that tie the findings of
fact into the applicable rules, statutes, or cases, and stating the reasons
for the decision. The Proposed Model State Administrative Procedure
Act (2008), requires that a recommended or final order "must include
separately stated findings of fact and conclusions of law on all material
California's Administrative Proissues of fact, law, or discretion ....
cedure Act adds one more measure of accountability in ALJ decisions:
an ALJ is required to articulate reasons supporting credibility determinations.3 ° On judicial review, the reviewing tribunal "shall give great
weight to the [credibility] determination" to the extent that it "identifies
demeanor, manner, or attitude of the witness that supports
the observed
t
it.

, 3

V.

RIGHT TO APPEAL / ACCESS TO THE COURTS

The right of access to judicial review of executive branch actions
was first clearly pronounced in Marbury v. Madison.32 One hundred and
sixty-four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a presumption
of reviewability of administrative agency actions, including ALJ deciprovides for judicial resions. 33 The Federal APA and each state APA
34
view of final administrative agency actions.
APA provisions for judicial review set forth appellate standards for
correcting lower tribunal errors. The scrutiny of an appellate tribunal is
an important accountability measure for outcomes in specific cases. InANN. § 4-179 (West 2008); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 10128 (2008); D.C. CODE § 2-509(e) (2001);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(1)(k) (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-17(b) (West 2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 91-12 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5248 (2008); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/1050(a) (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3-27 to -28 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A. 16
(West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-526 (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13B.120 (West 2008); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:958 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9061 (2008); MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV'T § 10-221 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 11 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 24.285 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 14.62 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14B-10(c) (West 2008); N.M.
STAT. § 12-8-12 (West 2008); N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 307 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
150B-34 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 119.09 (West 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 75, § 311
(West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-12 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-350 (2007); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 1-26-25 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-314 (2008); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
2001.141 (Vernon 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-208(1) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 812
(2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4020 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.461 (LexisNexis 2008); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-3 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 227.47 (West 2008); WYO. STAT.

ANN. § 16-3-110 (2008); see TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(e) (Vernon 2008) (providing that
"a state agency may change a finding of fact" and must state written reasons for the legal basis of the
change); see also Shelia Bailey Taylor, The Growth and Development of a Centralized Administrative Hearing Processin Texas, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 113, 115 (1997).
29. MODEL STATE ADMIN. ACT § 417(d) (Proposed Draft 2008). The corresponding provision
in Colorado, for example, requires the same ingredients in an ALU decision. See COLO. REV. STAT. §
24-4-105(14)(a) (2008).
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
75, § 318

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11425.50(b) (2008).

Id.
5 U.S. 137, 146 (1803).
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
5 U.S.C. § 704 (2008); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-212 (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit.
(2008).
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deed, appeal is the appropriate remedy to address legal errors at lower
court and administrative agency levels.
Adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis,35 or precedent, in the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence provides another measure of
judicial accountability. Once a precedent-setting court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to
that principle, and apply it in all future cases, where the facts are substantially the same. 36 Nevertheless, when a judge commits a legal error, appeal on the merits, as opposed to judicial discipline, is usually the appropriate avenue of recourse.37 Legal error, however may amount to judicial
misconduct in unusual cases, making judicial discipline appropriate.
Such recourse is highly sensitive because of the potential impact on decisional independence.38
In Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance,39 the California Supreme Court distinguished legal error from judicial misconduct,
setting forth the following factors relevant to a finding of misconduct:
repeated error, bias, abuse of authority, disregard for fundamental rights,
intentional disregard of the law, or any purpose other than the faithful
discharge of judicial duty. 4°
In a highly publicized California case, Justice Anthony Kline (of an
intermediate appellate court) stated in a dissenting opinion that he would
decline to follow the decision of California's highest appellate court,
indicating that the opinion in question was "analytically flawed and empirically unjustified," and Justice Kline opined that his dissent constituted one of the "rare instances in which a judge of an inferior court can
properly refuse to acquiesce in the precedent established by a court of
superior j urisdiction."4 1
Justice Kline was charged with "refusal to follow the law as established by the California Supreme Court in violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. ' 42 Ultimately, the Commission applied Oberholzer standards
and concluded that Justice Kline's "argument for a narrow exception to

35.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) ("To abide by, or adhere to, decided

cases.").
36.
Moore v. City of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410 (1885).
37.
See, e.g., In re Quigley, 32 N.Y.S. 828, 829 (1895); Murtagh v. Maglio, 195 N.Y.S.2d
900, 905 (1960); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Sullivan, 596 P.2d 864, 869 (Okla. 1979).
38.
See Gerald Stem, Is JudicialDiscipline in New York a Threat to Judicial Independence?,
7 PACE L. REv. 291, 303-45 (1987).
39.
20 Cal. 4th 371 (1999).
40.
Id. at 397-98.
41.
Morrow v. Hood Commc'ns, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 924, 926-27 (1997) (Kline, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied).
42.
In re Kline, No. 151 (Cal. Comm'n on Jud. Performance August 19, 1999) (decision and
order of dismissal).
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the stare
decisis principle
,43
able.

was [not] so far-fetched as to be unten-

Some agencies, however, have refused to adhere to stare decisis as
a matter of policy. In the 1920s, the Internal Revenue Service created
the concept of non-acquiescence as a method to inform taxpayers of its
intention not to follow a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, which
Congress created to provide an independent tribunal to hear taxpayer
appeals. 44 The Social Security Administration (SSA) follows a policy of
non-acquiescence, which is that the SSA only follows the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court and not those of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals unless it decides to change regulations based on a court of appeals
opinion, or unless the SSA decides to acquiesce in a particular decision.
Its rationale is to maintain uniformity throughout the United States.45
This policy forces the SSA administrative law judges to choose between
obeying the administrators of the SSA, or following the law as interpreted by the respective circuit court of appeals, as is ordinarily done by
other litigants. 46
Anecdotally, a friend, who is a U.S. District Judge, characterizes the
SSA's policy of non-acquiescence as a "recipe for anarchy." The author
agrees and sees the policy as significantly undermining the principle of
stare decisis, which in fact extends into the administrative law judiciary,
and replacing the supremacy of the courts with the supremacy of the executive branch bureaucracy at the top of the SSA. This may be reminiscent of one of the banana belt republics of yore, where the highest court
of the country was accountable to, and obeyed, the president of the republic. Originalists and textualists must concede that this is not what our
founding fathers (original framers) had in mind.
VI. ACCOUNTABILITY TO CODES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
A code of judicial conduct provides every canon or rule necessary
to make judges accountable in all respects. Administrative law judges in
three central panel 47 states (Colorado, Georgia and Minnesota) are officially subject to the code of judicial conduct for the respective state's

43.

Id.

44.

Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils

of Pluralism,39 VAND. L. REV. 471,474 n.5, 478 n.17 (1986).
45.
See Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1139 (D.D.C. 1984).
Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Courtfor Social Security? A Critiqueof Recent Proposals,
46.
15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 8-10 & n.60 (1987). For a thorough discussion of the predicament of AIJs
at the SSA, see Robin J. Arzt, Recommendationsfor a New Independent Adjudication Agency to

Make the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J. NAT'L
ASS'N ADMiN. L. JUDGES 267 (2003).

A "central panel" is an independent agency in which a jurisdiction's adjudications are
47.
centralized. Central Panels are best described as an executive branch judiciary.
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judicial branch.48 Several states provide that the rules of professional
conduct for attorneys apply to the ALJs. 49 Other states have adopted
their own codes of judicial conduct, patterned after the ABA Model Code
of Judicial Conduct for State Administrative Law Judges. 50
Members of a state administrative law judiciary, who are civil servants, are subject to their respective constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules dealing with performance of duties by state employees, and
providing sanctions for misconduct. In Colorado, for instance, members
of the administrative law judiciary are appointed to their positions under
the State Personnel System, which is in the state constitution. 51 According to the Colorado Constitution:
A person certified to any class or position in the personnel system
may be dismissed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined by the appointing authority upon written findings of failure to comply with
standards of efficient service or competence, or for willful misconduct, willful failure or inability to perform his duties, or final conviction of a felony or any other offense which involves moral turpitude.
52

By virtue of the fact that the judicial branch code of judicial conduct
applies to the administrative law judges in Colorado's central panel, 53 it
follows that a breach of the code of judicial conduct would be either
"failure to comply with standards" or "willful misconduct" under the
constitutional state personnel system and, if proven after notice and a
hearing, the AU could ultimately be dismissed, suspended, or otherwise
disciplined for a violation of the code of judicial conduct.
The American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(2007) notes: "Each jurisdiction should consider the characteristics of
particular positions within the administrative law judiciary in adopting,
adapting, applying, and enforcing the Code for the administrative law

48.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1003(4)(a) (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-40(c) (2008)
(subjecting ALJs by virtue of the chief administrative law judge's adoption of a rule); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 14.48(d) (2007).
49.
COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., Comparison of Central Panel States Chart, Table B (2003)
(citing Arizona, California, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, and South Carolina)
(on file with author).
50.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:996 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 9-1604(a)(9)
(2008) (stating that the Chief Administrative Law Judge is required to develop a code of professional
responsibility for administrative law judges); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5 (2008); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 4-5-321(a)(4)(b) (2008); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2003.022(d)(3) (2008) (emulating the
ABA Model Code for State ALJs).
51.
COLO. CONST. art. Xn, § 13, cl.
8; see also Dep't of Insts. v. Kinchen, 886 P.2d 700, 704
(Colo. 1994) (en banc).
52.
COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13, cl.
8 (emphasis added); see also COLO.REV. STAT. § 24-50125(1) (2008).
53.
COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 49.
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judiciary., 54 The ABA Federal ALT Model Code and the ABA State
ALJ Model Code are both endorsed
55 by the ABA National Conference of
the Administrative Law Judiciary.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the applicability of the ABA's Model Code for Federal administrative law
judges and found that the Code is not binding on those judges within the
because the SSA had not specifically
Social Security Administration
56
adopted it as binding.
For the purposes of this article, reference is made to the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007) to illustrate tenets of conduct in
typical codes of judicial conduct. Also, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) 57 set forth fundamental principles of judicial conduct.
The ABA Model Code sets forth four principal canons: (1) "A judge
shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary, and shall avoid the appearance of impropriety"; (2) "A
judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently,
and diligently"; (3) "A judge shall conduct the judge's personal and extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with the obligations
of judicial office"; and (4) A judge or candidate for judicial office shall
not engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with the
independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary.58 The canons,
which state overarching principles of judicial ethics, are broken down
into rules, which are enforceable in judicial disciplinary actions.5 9
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct present six judicial
ethics values: (1) Independence; (2) Impartiality; (3) Integrity; (4) Propriety; (5) Equality; and (6) Competence and Diligence. These values
are broken down into tenets, referred to as "Application," which deal
with more specific mandates relating to the specific "Value. 6 °
The Bangalore Principles, the ABA Model Code, and all other
codes of judicial conduct set forth a comprehensive set of performance
standards for judicial branch and executive branch judges (administrative
law judges). An examination of the enforceable rules under the ABA
54.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Application, pt. VI, cmt. n.1 (2007); see, e.g.,
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1989); MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1995).
55.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Application, pt. VI, cmt. n.1 (2007); MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1989); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1995).

56.

Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2003).

57.
See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Values, supra note 20.
58.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2 (2007) (emphasis supplied); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3
(2007); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2007).
59.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope, para. 2 (2007).
60.
See BANGALORE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Values, supra note 20.
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Model Code illustrate that no other performance standards are necessary
in order to achieve a high degree of judicial accountability.
For those administrative law judges who are not subject to a code of
judicial conduct, but only to the rules of professional conduct for lawyers
(assuming a law license is necessary to serve), the code of judicial conduct is the only yardstick available to hold a lawyer and administrative
law judge accountable for misconduct of a purely judicial nature. Indeed, judicial misconduct, when there is no adopted code of judicial conduct, would amount to "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice,"'6' under the rules of professional conduct for attorneys.
Administrative law judges who are licensed attorneys may be subject to three separate legal schemes of accountability and discipline: the
code of judicial conduct; the rules of professional responsibility for lawyers; and, civil service rules concerning ethical and efficient standards of
public service. If certain administrative law judges are neither lawyers
nor civil servants, they will be subject to internal standards developed by
their respective organizations, and potentially to political accountability,
depending on how politically responsive their employing agencies are on
adjudication issues. The administrative law judges, however, may dodge
the bullet of political accountability depending upon the good graces of
their supervisors and their appointing authorities.
In Colorado for instance, a certified civil servant may be "dismissed, suspended, or otherwise disciplined. . upon written findings of
failure to comply with standards of efficient service or competence, or
for willful misconduct, willful failure or inability to perform his duties,
or final conviction of a felony or any other offense which involves moral
turpitude ... ,62 Violation of the code of judicial conduct in the performance of judicial duties qualifies as a violation of the civil service
provisions. For misconduct of a purely judicial nature, attorney regulation systems and state appointing authorities that are responsible for dealing with civil servant misconduct and discipline, if appropriate, will use
the code of judicial conduct as a yardstick, whether or not it has officially
been made applicable.
VII. AN EFFECTIVE COMPLAINT SYSTEM Is NECESSARY FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability to "reasoned elaboration," appeals on the merits,
codes of judicial conduct, and performance codes will only be meaningful if an effective enforcement mechanism to address misconduct exists.
Such mechanisms exist for the federal judiciary, and for the judiciary of

61.
62.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.4(d) (1980).
COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 13(8); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50-125(1) (2007).
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every state in the U.S. 63 One hundred years ago, the only way to remove
a federal, Article III, judge was through impeachment and conviction by
Congress. 64 Now, there is a mechanism for the discipline of errant federal judges.65 State administrative law judges who are civil servants are
accountable to their respective state performance codes. These performance codes derive authority either from the state constitution or from
statutory law.
Federal administrative law judges, who are under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), are independent of the agencies over
whose adjudications they preside. The Office of Personnel Management
66
prescribes their pay without regard to agency evaluations.
A federal
agency cannot take disciplinary action against a federal AU, who is under the Federal APA. The agency stands in the position of a party litigant (complainant), and it must establish that good cause for discipline
exists through a formal adjudicatory proceeding before the Merit System
Protection Board (MSPB), an independent agency that has its own independent administrative law judges. The MSPB then may impose discipline, if appropriate.67
State administrative law judges are treated as "employees" on the
one hand, and as "judicial officers" on the other hand. 68 These individuals either work in an agency or in an independent central panel.6 9 With
the exception of New Jersey (the Governor appoints each ALJ) and
South Carolina (the House of Burgesses appoints each ALJ), the Chief
ALJ or Director of the central panel is usually the appointing authority
with the duty of hiring and firing ALJs. 70 The power to hire and fire
administrative law judges for the central panel of the District of Columbia is in its Commission on Selection and Tenure of Administrative Law
Judges.71 In central panel states, where the judges are civil servants, the
chief's (appointing authority's) firing decisions are subject to appeal to a
state civil service commission, which frequently has its own independent
63.
American Judicature Society, http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth-conduct-orgs.asp (last visited
Oct. 18, 2008).
64.
See Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D. Smith, How to Remove a FederalJudge, 116 YALE
L.J. 72 (2006).
65.
See Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2008).
66.
5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2008).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2008).
68. See Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53 ADMIN.
L. REV. 403 (2001).
69.
See Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46
ADMIN. L. REv. 75 (1994) (describing central panels as operating in complete independence from
agencies). At present there are 25 state central panels (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming), and three city central panels (Chicago, New
York City and Washington, D.C.) COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., Comparison of OAC to Other Central
Panels, Table A (on file with author).
70.

COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 69.

71.

D.C. CODE § 2-1831.11 (2008).
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administrative law judges.72 In jurisdictions without central panels, administrative law judges are generally hired and fired by the agency or by
the agency's general counsel. In these jurisdictions, if the agency employees are civil servants, the administrative law judges in the agency are
generally civil servants.
State administrative law judges who are civil servants are ordinarily
accountable through "judgmental" performance evaluations, which could
result in a firing, demotion, pay raise or promotion. 73 "Judgmental evaluations" count in terms of pay, status, tenure, promotion, demotion or
firing, and they have been a fact of life for state administrative law
judges, who are civil servants, for a long time. "Developmental evaluations" cannot affect pay, status, tenure, promotion, demotion, or firing.
They are for the edification and improvement of the judge being evaluated. Developmental evaluations are becoming more and more prevalent
for the judicial branch with the establishment of twenty state judicial
performance evaluation programs,74 which are discussed in more detail
below. The results of developmental evaluations in the judicial branch,
as structured and analyzed below, can have career-ending consequences
for the judicial branch judges evaluated.
With the exception of the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings (where performance evaluations are done by a commission 75), the chief administrative law judge usually ratifies the one-on-one
performance evaluation of a supervisory judge. Potential flaws, and potential inappropriate influences on judicial independence, are noted in an
article indicating that the goals of any system are often difficult to meet
because of inherent weaknesses of human beings.76 Alexander Hamilton
noted in the Federalist papers that "in the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will. ' 77 In contrast, judicial branch performance evaluations may have
less potential for being flawed because they are done by commissions
that are appointed in a manner similar to the method of appointment for
judicial discipline commissions, and members of the commissions presumably end up being accountable to each other.
Colorado's central panel of the administrative law judiciary sets
forth a detailed system for the handling of complaints against administra-

72. Felter, supra note 68, at 406 (including California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Washington, and Wisconsin).
73.

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 55.

74. Rebecca Kourlis, Op-Ed., Colorado Judiciary a Leader, THE DENVER POST, June 29,
2008, at D3.
75.

D.C. CODE, supra note 71.

76.

See Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Premises, Means,

and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (1997).

77.

THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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tive law judges on its website.7 8 Section II (b) of the policy states:
"Complaints about a particular judge must be in writing, and must be
addressed to the Office Director (Chief Judge). 79 Section I (a) provides: "In no instance shall the complaint be disclosed to the judge during the pendency of the matter in question., 80 Section M (c) states:
Following the final conclusion of the matter, the Chief Judge shall
discuss the complaint with the judge (this includes an investigation, if
necessary) to determine whether it is well grounded and whether any
changes are warranted. Complaints found to be both warranted and
serious may be made a part of the judge's personnel file (inherently
included in such a finding is the potential
of discipline, up to and in81
cluding termination from employment).
VIn.

DISCIPLINE IN THE JUDICIAL BRANCHES

OF THE STATES

State judicial discipline commissions are housed within the judicial
branch of government. These commissions ordinarily do not have jurisdiction or authority over administrative law judges because they are in
the executive branch of government. The creators of the commissions
implicitly recognized a constitutional separation of powers problem if the
power to hire and fire executive branch employees (administrative law
judges), outside of the context of an appeal, were bestowed on a judicial
discipline commission. Other than those discussed herein, there are additional judicial discipline commissions at the state level.8 2

78.
Colorado
Office
of
Administrative
Courts
Homepage,
http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/oac/DirectorsPolicies.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.
Id.
82. See
Florida
Judicial
Qualifications
Commission,
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pubinfo/jqc.shtml; Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission, http://www.georgiacourts.org/agencies/jqc/; Indiana Judicial Qualifications Commission,
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-quallabout.html; Iowa Judicial Qualifications Commission,
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/Self Help/Complaints/About Judges/index.asp; Kansas Commission
on Judicial Qualifications, http://www.kscourts.org/Appellate-Clerk/General/commission-onjudicial-qualifications/default.asp; Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission, http://courts.ky.gov/jcc/;
Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities, http://www.mdcourts.gov/cjdlabout.html; Missouri
Commission
on
Retirement,
Removal,
and
Discipline
of
Judges,
http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/0/d9e62cc0dfa6cfl f86256620005b4f38?OpenDocument;
Montana Judicial Standards Commission, http://courts.mt.gov/supreme/boards/jsc.asp; Nebraska
Commission on Judicial Qualifications, http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov; New Hampshire Judicial
Conduct Committee, http://www.courts.state.nh.us/committees/udconductcomm/index.htm; New
York
State
Commission
on
Judicial
Conduct,
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Legal%20Authorities/legal.htm;
Ohio Board of Commissioners on
Grievances and Discipline, www.sconet.state.oh.us/boc; Oregon Commission on Judicial Fitness and
Disability, www.ojd.state.or.us/aboutus/cjfd/index.htm; Rhode Island Commission on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, www.courts.state.ri.us/supreme/jtd/defaultjtd.htm; South Carolina Commission on
Judicial Conduct, www.judicial.state.sc.us/discCounsel/conmmissionJC.cfm; South Dakota Judicial
Qualifications Commission, http://www.sdjudicial.com/index.asp?category=jqc&nav--0; Tennessee
Court
of
the
Judiciary,
www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPlNIONS/TSC/RULES/TNRulesOfCourt/ctjudindex.htm; Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/; Utah Judicial Conduct Commission,
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Common threads of similarity run through judicial discipline
mechanisms in the states. Most commissions are creatures of their respective state constitutions and their members are appointed by a constitutionally prescribed mix of individuals, e.g., the chief justice, the governor, the attorney general, the bar association.
In some cases, the commissions have the power to remove judges
from the bench or impose other discipline. In other cases, the commissions make recommendations for removal or discipline to the highest
court of the state. In all cases, the commissions function as tribunals that
deal with complaints against judges. They are constituted to function in
a manner similar to an attorney discipline system, i.e., receiving complaints, handling the complaints informally, conducting "probable cause"
proceedings, and conducting full blown hearings on the merits where the
judge is afforded the full panoply of due process rights, including the
right to be represented by counsel, the right to discovery, and the right to
have the charging authority prove the allegations against the judge by a
recognized standard of proof, ordinarily by "clear and convincing evidence."
In appropriate cases, a commission may also provide for diversion
of a judge with mental or substance abuse problems. Ordinarily, the proceedings are confidential until and unless public discipline is imposed.
The unwritten, inherent reasons for the confidentiality are that it would
not be good to air the dirty linen of the judiciary in public on a frequent
basis because of the great potential of eroding the public confidence and
independent and competent judiciary. 83
IX. JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDICIARY: ANOTHER FORM OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Judicial performance evaluations for administrative law judges, who
are civil servants, are ordinarily performed by a supervisory ALJ. Using
Colorado as an example, primarily as a concession to the shortness of
life, there are three principal tools for the measurement of performance
and the accountability of Colorado administrative law judges. These
tools include: (1) "judgmental" performance evaluations mandated by the
State Personnel System: (2) an annual, anonymous ALJ performance
survey; and, (3) a "quality assurance review" program (a developmental,
confidential peer process for the review of decisions).
Board,
Judicial
Conduct
Vermont
http://jcc.utah.gov/aboutus.html;
www.vermontjudiciary.org/Committees/boards/jcbcomplaint.htm; Virginia Judicial Inquiry & Review Commission, www.courts.state.va.us/jirc/main.htm; Washington State Commission on Judicial
Commission,
Judicial
Investigation
West
Virginia
Conduct,
www.cjc.state.wa.us;
Judicial
Commission,
Wisconsin
http://www.state.wv.us/wvscalJIC/geninfo.htm;
http://www.wicourts.gov/aboutcommittees/judicialcomnmissionlindex.htm; Wyoming Commission
on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, http://judicialconduct-wy.us/const.php (all websites listed supra last
visited Oct. 17, 2008).
83. See Appendix infra, at pp. 24-28.
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A. Judgmental Evaluationsof ALJs
Performance criteria for administrative law judges in the Office of
Administrative Courts (Administrative Courts) are included on a standard form prescribed by the State Department of Personnel and Administration.84 There are general criteria for all employees of the Department, 85 designated as core competencies (communication, customer ser86
vice/interpersonal skills, and credibility/accountability/job knowledge).
Adherence to the code of judicial conduct is measured under the "Core
Competency" standards. 87 Next, there are specific performance measurement standards for administrative law judges, including "decision
quality, ' 88 "quality of hearings" ' 89 ("conducting hearings effectively and
fairly"), and "timeliness of decisions." 90
There are three levels of rating in the Department's and Administrative Court's Performance Management System: (1) exceptional; (2) successful; and (3) needs improvement ("needs improvement" is tantamount
to an unsatisfactory rating). An overall "exceptional" rating results in a
non-base building cash bonus for the year (usually $500). An overall
"successful" rating results in the maximum base building cost-of-living
increase for the professional class of which administrative law judges are
a part. An overall "needs improvement" rating may result in a "corrective action," and if the ALJ does not meet the goals of the corrective action in the time specified in the corrective action for meeting those goals,
it may result in dismissal from state service. 91
B. Developmental,Anonymous Performance Surveys of ALJs
Besides the "judgmental" performance evaluations of ALJs in Colorado, the Integrated Document Solutions (IDS) Unit of the State Department of Personnel and Administration conducts an anonymous, "developmental" survey of each ALJ,sending out questionnaires to 2,000 people, selected by IDS, who appeared or were otherwise present before an
administrative law judge for the year surveyed.92 Neither the OAC nor
the Department of Personnel and Administration have access to or know
the names of those surveyed; and, they do not have access to the process
until the process is completed.9 3 Respondents to the survey are asked to
84. COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., Performance Management Form (on file with author).
85. The Colorado Office of Administrative Courts is a division of the State department of
Personnel and Administration. See Colorado Department of Personnel & Administration, Office of
Administrative Courts, http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/oac/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
86. COLO.OFFICE ADMIN. CTs., supra note 84, at 1 (on file with author).
87.
See Appendix infra at 28.
88.
Id. at 29.
89.
Id. at 30.
90.
Id. at 3 (on file with author).
91.
Id. at 4 (on file with author).
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
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grade each ALJ from "A" to "F" (fail) in a number of different performance areas.
Respondents to the IDS Survey are asked to grade each ALJ, from
"A" to "F", in the following categories: (1) explaining the proceedings,
and what's going on in the hearing; (2) being prepared for the hearing
and familiar with the case; (3) treating all participants with courtesy and
respect; (4) providing adequate time for both sides to present their case
("allowing the questioning of witnesses without excessively or unnecessarily interrupting them"); (5) maintaining appropriate control over proceedings; (6) conducting proceedings in a neutral manner; (7) demonstrating knowledge of the applicable law; (8) applying rules of procedure
and evidence appropriately; (9) timeliness of ruling on motions and other
pre-hearing matters; (10) being clear and understandable; (11) showing
an understanding of the issues in the case; (12) addressing all of the legal
and factual issues in the case; (13) giving reasons for decision; (14) timeliness in issuing post-hearing decision; and, (15) doing a good job overall. Respondents are then encouraged to make written, anonymous
comments on the administrative law judges' strengths and weaknesses.94
C. The Quality Assurance Review Program
An additional accountability measure in the Colorado Office of
Administrative Courts involves a "developmental" and confidential
"Quality Assurance Review (QAR)" of decisions by peers. The QAR
program is collegial and non-binding. Judges periodically submit up to
six decisions a year to a colleague for a quality review. There are seven
factors on the QAR Checklist: (1) appropriate title for decision; (2) clarity of language; (3) clarity of format; (4) grammar; (5) findings of fact
support conclusions of law; (6) findings of fact properly distinguished
from5 conclusions of law; and, (7) legal reasoning and citations to authority.
X.

9

PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS OF JUDGES IN THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

Originally, judicial performance evaluations were performed by bar
associations for the purpose of imparting meaningful information on a
judge's performance to the voting public. These evaluations were "developmental" (non-binding) and the results were for the judge's and the
public's edification so the under performing judge could develop better
judicial attributes. Now, many states have established official judicial
performance evaluation commissions, often constituted in a manner quite
similar to the manner judicial discipline commissions are constituted.
These commissions have taken the place of bar association surveys, but
they have far more clout. A judge with problem surveys is generally
94.
95.

COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., Performance Survey (on file with author).
COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., Quality Assurance Review Program (on file with author).
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required to meet with the commission and address the problems indicated. One example of how a judicial performance commission functions was a situation where the public survey revealed that a judge, who
shall remain unnamed, had an anger problem. The commission met with
the judge and gave him an opportunity to respond. After the meeting, the
commission and the judge agreed that the judge would attend anger management classes. This fact later appeared in the local newspaper, not
because there was a leak, but because the commission's actions, for the
most part, are deemed a matter of public record. In most instances, the
outcomes are made public.
XI. INAPPROPRIATE JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

Despite (1) the widespread existence of constraints on judicial behavior, both public and private, (2) judicial discipline mechanisms and
criteria for discipline, and (3) judicial evaluation mechanisms and criteria
for evaluations, most of which is available to the public in order that it
may make informed decisions on the retention or reelection of judges,
there continues to be a public clamor for more accountability. The public sometimes does not seem to be quite sure of what kind of accountability they mean, or of what precise problems require more accountability.
They just seem to know that those "darned judges go against the public
will, make unreasonable decisions, and are accountable to no one the
way legislators and other elected officials are accountable."
The U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White96 opened the door to the potential of more inappropriate judicial
accountability measures. Essentially, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the "announce clause" in the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct, which prohibited candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, violated the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 97 Although an application of
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White is limited to judicial election and
reelection campaigns, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively determined
that the First Amendment trumps state codes of judicial conduct concerning extra-judicial statements of judges in their campaigns.98
James Bopp, Jr., a Terre Haute, Indiana lawyer, who successfully
argued Republican Party of Minnesota v. White before the U.S. Supreme
Court, is on a crusade to eliminate prohibitions "against judicial candidates making 'pledges,' 'promises' or 'commitments' on controversies or
issues that are inconsistent with impartiality on the bench." 99 Mr. Bopp
is also challenging judicial canons that prohibit "partisan political activi96.
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
97.
Id. at 788.
98.
Id.
99.
Terry Carter, The Big Bopper: This Terre Haute Lawyer is Exploding the Cannons of
JudicialCampaign Ethics, 92 A.B.A. J. 30, 32-33 (Nov. 2008).
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ties and direct solicitation of campaign funds" by judicial "candidates."
He states, "While his clients want to know a candidate's personal values
on issues such as abortion, they expect judges to follow the facts and law
wherever they lead.' 1°° According to Mr. Bopp, "judicial candidates can
be prohibited from saying 'I'll throw all drunk drivers in jail' or 'I'll
overturn Roe v. Wade if given the chance ....
Mr. Bopp's argument is disingenuous. It maintains that unless the
judge announces a clear-cut pre-judgment, outright, e.g., "I'll overturn
Roe v. Wade as soon as I get a chance," the judge can publicly express
whatever controversial views he so desires without exposure to any consequences. Presumably, a logical extension of Mr. Bopp's argument is
that the First Amendment trumps the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2007), and its state counterparts, which provide that a judge should
not "participate in activities that will lead to frequent disqualification of
the judge."'' 0 2 The underlying rationale of the argument would also appear to be at odds with the judicial ethics value of "helping one's colleagues with their caseloads."
Indeed, it is not that difficult to imagine the loneliest judge on the
bench, who has received substantial reelection contributions from the
Right-to-Life Committee, The Sons of Italy, and MADD (Mothers
Against Drunk Driving) and who, in the exercise of her First Amendment
right to speak publicly about controversial issues, says that she has very
strong feelings against abortion, stem cell research, political demonstrators against our patriotic Columbus Day Parade, drunk drivers, and others. Thereafter, she gets a rash of cases involving any one or more of
these controversial issues. The judge is then faced with motions to disqualify herself. Arguably, she could deny the motions, stating that, despite the political contributions and despite the public announcement of
her strongly held views, she will be fair and impartial because she never
said that she would rule against abortion clinics, drunk drivers, criminals,
or Native American demonstrators at the Columbus Day Parade.
An appeals court may, however, reverse her on the basis that she
should have disqualified herself; thus, the parties would have to go back
to square one with another judge. Based on this scenario, the lonely
judge could wind up being not very busy, and her colleagues would have
to shoulder the added load resulting from her frequent disqualifications,
triggered by the reversal of her previous refusal to disqualify herself.
Nevertheless, under Mr. Bopp's inherent argument, the First
Amendment may trump the judge's ethical obligation to "cooperate with
other judges and court officials in the administration of court busi100.
101.
102.

Id. at 33.
id.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.1(B) (2007).

2008]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ness." 0 3 Indeed, one can imagine judicial campaign rhetoric, reminiscent of the movie Hang 'Em High, starring Clint Eastwood and Pat Hingle, stating, "elect me and I'll string 'em up high" (regardless of any considerations or factors contained in the Probation Department's presentence report, or other considerations concerning the imposition of an
appropriate sentence based on the facts and the law).
Mr. Bopp is forcing the issue of judges' views on controversial political issues with the use of interest-group questionnaires being sent to
judges up for retention or re-election, and to their challengers. The message behind the questionnaires is "judge, you can no longer hide behind
the code of judicial conduct, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, and if you decline to
answer what my client constituency wants to know, it'll most likely cost
you their votes.'' °
The receipt of the political questionnaire forces a different kind of
accountability, such as: Is the respondent-judge the interest group's kind
of judge? The other side of the controversy concerning the controversial
political issue may have a problem with the judge's fairness and impartiality on that issue.
CONCLUSION

The central question is whether we truly want judges who are politically accountable to the political clamor of the moment. If so, it may be
better to have a legislative body, which represents constituencies of the
public, vote on the resolution of specific controversies between litigants.
Legislators are better suited to withstand the slings and arrows of public
opinion. And, if they are wrong they can be tossed out of office in the
next regular election. This is not what the founding fathers intended
when they set up a system of separate but equal branches of government,
with checks and balances. Indeed, the real strength of the United States
is embedded in the legal mechanisms designed to respect the rights of
minorities, no matter how unpopular or repugnant to the majority the
exercise of those rights may be.
Indeed, if we could read the deepest hopes and values in the hearts
of people in this country, we would find evidence that the judicial independence of their judges is a cherished value. We may find that Jane Q.
Citizen believes that she has a chance to win against big government or
big business or, in the case of administrative law, the big agency. We
may also find an appreciation of the fact that judges are far more accountable than any other public official in the legislative or executive
branch of government. We may find an appreciation of the proposition
103.
104.

Id. at Canon 2.5(B).
See Carter, supra note 99, at 34.
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that "with great responsibility comes great accountability." The isolated
horror stories in the press, concerning a few cases of extreme judicial
misbehavior, and what happens to the misbehaving judges, illustrate that
judges are accountable. Things do not end well for these judges.
Judges themselves must constantly create, develop and implement
accountability measures and mechanisms that demonstrate to the public
the high degree of accountability to which they are subject. Like Caesar's wife, they must at all times be above reproach, not only refraining
from improprieties, but avoiding even the appearance of impropriety,
despite the fact that they are human beings and heir to the frailties of the
flesh. 10 5 The continued well-being of our system of government is dependent upon independent judges who are accountable to "reasoned
elaboration," (i.e., giving reasons for their decisions); to being appealed
and reversed if they make a legally wrong decisions; and to an appropriate code of judicial conduct that ensures that their conduct is above reproach; that they are fair and impartial to all; and, that they dispatch judicial business in a timely fashion. Judges have a continuing mission to
educate the public that it is in their best interests to make sure that inappropriate judicial accountability measures are clarified so the public that
cherishes judicial independence can see the measures for what they are,
to get judges who are bought and paid for by one interest group or another. 106 By the same token, judges have an obligation to constantly
demonstrate to the public that they are accountable to fairness, propriety,
and the rule of law.
APPENDIX

This appendix expands on the discussions in three of this article's
sections: "Discipline in the Judicial Branches of the States"10 7 ; "Judgmental Evaluation of ALJs"10 8; and "Performance Evaluations of Judges
in the Judicial Branch."'1 9
First, "Discipline in the Judicial Branches of the States" provides an
overview of eighteen states' mechanisms for judicial discipline, and includes citations for interested readers.
Second, "Judgmental Evaluation of ALJs" gives a full account of
the criteria used by the Office of Administrative Courts for judgmental
105. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1.2, which states: "A judge shall act at
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." When faced with
removing "the appearance of Impropriety" language from the Rule, the National Conference of State
Chief Justices voted to leave it in. See Mark .Harrison, The 2007 Model Code of JudicialConduct:
Blueprintfor a Generation of Judges, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 257, 262 (2007).
106.

See JUDGE RICHARD FRUIN, JUDICIAL OUTREACH ON A SHOESTRING: A WORKING

MANUAL (Judicial Division, ABA 1999).
107.
108.
109.

See discussion supra Part VIII.
See discussion supra Part IX.A.
See discussion supra Part X.
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evaluations. Because of the difficulty of obtaining the source for these
criteria (it is on file with the author), the pertinent parts of its text are
included here.
Finally, "Performance Evaluations of Judges in the Judicial Branch"
discusses, in greater depth than the main text, Colorado's performance
evaluation system for judges in the judicial branch, and then surveys
thirteen other states' judicial performance evaluation mechanisms.
A. Discipline in the JudicialBranches of the States
The Constitution of the State of Alabama establishes a Court of the
Judiciary, consisting of one appellate judge, two judges of circuit courts,
one district judge, two members of the state bar, two non-lawyers appointed by the Governor, and one person appointed by the Lieutenant
Governor.1 10 The Court of the Judiciary has authority, after notice and
public hearing:
(1) to remove from office, suspend without pay, or censure a judge,
or apply such other sanction ...for violation of a Canon of Judicial
Ethics, misconduct in office, failure to perform his or her duties, or
(2) to suspend with or without pay, or to retire a judge
who is physi11
cally or mentally unable to perform his or her duties.
The Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct consists of three judge
members, three attorney members and three public members." 2 Under
the Commission's Rules of Procedure, Rule 15 (a), the Commission may
recommend a full range of sanctions, up3 to and including removal from
office, to the Supreme Court of Alaska." 1
The Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct was created in
1970.114 It consists of eleven members with diverse backgrounds. Six
judge members are appointed by the state supreme court: two from the
court of appeals, two from the superior court, one from a justice court,
and one from a municipal court." 5 Two attorney members are appointed
by the board of governors of the State Bar of Arizona. Three public
members who cannot be attorneys, or active or retired judges, are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate. 1 6 The Com110.
ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 157.
111.
Id.
112.
Alaska Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/CONDUCT.htm (last
visited Oct. 18).
113.
Alaska Judicial Conduct Comm'n Rules, http://www.state.ak.us/courts/jcc.htm#15 (last
visited Oct 18).
114.
Arizona
Comm'n
on
Judicial
Conduct,
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/Commission onJudicialConductOverview.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
115.

ARIZ. CONST. art. 6.1 § 1.

116.
Arizona
Comm'n
on
Judicial
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/Commission onJudicialConductOverview.htm
ited Oct. 18, 2008).

Conduct,
(last vis-

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

mission enabling provisions explicitly state that it "does not have jurisdiction over court employees, administrative law judges or federal
judges."'1 17 The commission may reprimand an Arizona judicial branch
judge informally for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct, or in some
cases, the commission may file formal charges and hold a public hearing
to consider evidence about the judge's conduct. If it finds that the judge
committed misconduct, the commission can recommend that the state
supreme
court censure, suspend without pay, or remove the judge from
18
office.'
The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission of Arkansas
may reprimand or censure a judge or, after notice and hearing and by
majority vote, may recommend to the supreme court that a judge or justice be suspended, with or without pay, or be removed. Through silence,
the Commission has jurisdiction and authority over constitutional judges
but not over administrative law judges. Ina hearing involving a justice
of the Arkansas Supreme Court, all justices shall be disqualified from
participation." 9
The California Commission on Judicial Performance 120 hears cases
involving judicial misconduct, 121 handles judicial disability retirement
applications, 122 and is responsible for enforcement of the restrictions on
judges' receipt of gifts and honoraria. 123 Ithas jurisdiction over California constitutional judges.
The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline consists of two
judges of district courts and two judges of county courts, each selected
by the supreme court; two licensed attorneys appointed by the governor
with the advice and consent of the state senate; and four citizens, none of
whom shall be a judge, active or retired nor admitted to practice law,
appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. 124 By virtue of
its constitutional status, the Commission has jurisdiction over constitutional judges but not over executive branch statutory judges (administrative law judges). The Commission may order a formal hearing concerning discipline and, if the charges are substantiated, may recommend to
the Colorado Supreme Court
removal, retirement, suspension, censure,
25
reprimand, or discipline.

117.
118.
119.
120.
2008).
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
ARK. CONST. Amend. 66(a), (c).
CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 18-18.1 18.5; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68701-68756 (West
CAL. CONST. art. VI,§ 18 (i).
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 75060-75064.
CAL. Civ. PRoC. § 170.9.
COLO. CONST. art. VL § 23(3)(a).
Id. § 23(3)(e).

20081

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In Connecticut, the Judicial Review Council was created by statute. 126 It has jurisdiction of judicial officers, including state referees,
within the judicial branch. 127 The Commission has the authority8 to recommend removal of a judge to the Connecticut Supreme Court.12
The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana has jurisdiction over justices and judges of all courts, including commissioners, magistrates, justices of the peace, and mayors performing judicial functions. 129
The Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission "strives to hold state
judges, magistrates, and referees accountable for their misconduct without jeopardizing or compromising the essential independence of the judiciary. The basis for Commission action is a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct or Rules of Professional Conduct ....
The Massachusetts Commission on Judicial Conduct has jurisdiction over all judges in the judicial branch. Grounds for discipline include, inter alia,
(c) willful misconduct which, although not related to judicial duties,
brings the judicial office into disrepute; (d) conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer,
whether conduct in office or outside judicial duties, that brings the
judicial office into disrepute; or (e) any conduct that constitutes a
of the codes of judicial conduct or professional responsibilviolation
1
13

ity.

A majority of the Commission members may recommend discipline
13 2
to the supreme judicial court, up to and including removal from office.
Minnesota's 1971 Legislature created a Board on Judicial Standards
to assist the Supreme Court 133 and to implement the constitutional removal or discipline of judges for cause. 34 The Minnesota Supreme
Court has adopted the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct that applies,
by statute,
to Minnesota's central panel of the administrative law judici135
ary.
The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance may recommend to the state supreme court a public censure or reprimand through
removal from office for misconduct including, inter alia,

126.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-51g (2008).

127.
128.
129.

Id. § 51-51h.
Id. § 51-51j.
LA. CONST. art. V, § 25.

130.
131.
132.

MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 30; MICH. CT. R. 9.200.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211C § 2 (2008).
Id. § 7 (10).

133.

MINN. STAT. §§ 490A.01-.02 (2008).

134.
135.

MINN. CONST. art. 6,§ 9.
MINN. STAT. § 14.48 (3)(d).
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(c) willful and persistent failure to perform... duties; (d) habitual intemperance in the use of alcohol or other drugs; or (e) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office
into disrepute; and may retire involuntarily any justice or judge for
physical or mental disability seriously interfering with the performance of his duties,
which disability is likely to become of a perma36
nent character.]
The website of the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline
states that it does not have the authority to consider complaints concerning legal errors, alleged to have137been made by a judge: "That is the role
of the Appellate Court system."'
The Judicial Standards Commission of New Mexico 38 conducts
hearings on judicial misconduct complaints and may recommend to the
Supreme Court removal from office or retirement of a judge or magistrate.
North Carolina's constitution provides for the impeachment of
judges, 139 but statutory law provides for the investigation and resolution
of inquiries concerning the qualification or conduct of any judge, including the procedure for discipline before the Judicial Standards Commission. 14°

The Oklahoma Council on Judicial Complaints has jurisdiction over
all persons subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct, including state, municipal and administrative law judges.' 4' If any part of the administrative
law judiciary in Oklahoma were subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct,
by statute, the judicial branch would ostensibly have jurisdiction and
authority to remove an ALJ serving in the executive branch. Such a
situation would appear to violate the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine, whereby the judicial branch commission would be in the position of functioning as the ultimate appointing authority for executive
branch AU found culpable of misconduct.
The Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board as part of the judiciary is
an independent entity having its own constitutional and statutory provisions regarding proceedings. 142
The website of the Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct states:
136.

Miss. CONST. art. VI, § 177A.

137.
State of Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, Purpose of the Commission,
http://judicial.state.nv.us/purposenjdc3new.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008); see NEV. CONST. art. VI,
§ 21(5); NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.4677 (2008).
138.
N.M. CONST., art. VI, § 32; see also N.M. STAT §§ 34-10-1 to -4 (2008).
139.
N.C. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 17.
140. N.C. STAT. §§ 7A-374.1 to -378 (2008).
141.
Oklahoma
Bar
Ass'n,
Oklahoma
Council
on
Judicial
Complaints,
http://www.okbar.org/public/judges/council.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
142.

PA. CONST. art. V, § 18; see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2101-2106 (2008).
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All fifty states and the District of Columbia have judicial conduct
agencies to receive and investigate allegations of judicial misconduct.
These agencies only act on complaints involving judicial misconduct
do not serve as appellate courts reviewing
and disability. 1They
43
judges' rulings."
B. Judgmental Evaluationsof ALJs

The criteria for "quality of decisions" includes three principal
groupings: (1) "well reasoned;" (2) "well written;" and (3) "supported
by applicable law." "Well reasoned" includes "conclusions are supported by applicable law"; and "reasoning employed is understandable,
logical and persuasive." 144 "Well written" includes eleven criteria:
(1) rationale for decision is clear and understandable; (2) paragraphs and sentences are properly structured; (3) paragraphs and
sentences are logically related to each other and in an order
which lends itself to a clear understanding of the discussion; (4)

decision employs correct grammar and spelling; (5) format of
decision assists the reader to understand the conclusions reached
and their underlying rationale; (6) specific findings of fact are

made and cover all material factual areas; (7) decision deals
with all significant arguments raised by the parties (to the extent
determinable from the four corners of the decision); (8) decision
avoids use of intemperate or injudicious language or language
that indicates bias; (9) findings of fact are properly distinguished
are understandable; and,
from conclusions of law; (10) issues
145
(11) title of decision is appropriate.
The general criterion of "supported by applicable law" includes: (1)
"relevant or controlling statutes, judicial and administrative decisions,
and regulations are considered"; and' 146(2) "authorities cited support the
propositions for which they are cited."
The criteria for "conducting hearings effectively and fairly are divided into six major groupings: (1) "opening remarks in merits hearings"; (2) "control of proceedings/demeanor"; (3) "handling of exhibits";
(4) "questioning of witnesses"; (5) "ruling on motions and objections";
and (6) "closing the hearing.' 47 The "opening remarks" grouping is
broken down into ten criteria: (1) identifies case; (2) permits parties/counsel to enter appearances or identifies them; (3) allows opportunity for preliminary matters or questions; (4) allows opportunity for
opening statements; (5) identifies self; (6) states date; (7) defines issues;
Background,
on
Judicial
Conduct,
State
Comm'n
143.
Washington
http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/AboutCJC/background.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) (emphasis
added).
144.
COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 84, at 1 (on file with author).
145.
Id. (on file with author).
146.
COLO. OFFICE ADMiN. CTS., supra note 84, at 4 (on file with author).
147.
Id. at 5 (on file with author).
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(8) indicates party bearing burden of proof; (9) describes hearing procedures; and, (10) explains and seeks waiver of right to counsel, if appro14
priate. 1
The "control of proceedings/demeanor" grouping is broken down
into eleven criteria:
(1) begins hearing promptly at beginning of day and after recesses (or
explains any unavoidable delay); (2) controls hearing in firm but fair
manner, including interactions of participants; (3) evidences familiarity with file and adequate preparation; (4) permits off-the-record discussions only when justified and makes record of discussions; (5)
treats litigants, counsel and witnesses with respect and courtesy; (6)
provides appropriate explanations/guidance to self-represented litigants; (7) uses no intemperate or injudicious language or language
that indicates bias; (8) shows no favoritism to one party over another;
(9) makes effort to make parties and witnesses feel at ease; (10) accommodates special needs of participants; and (11) is attentive to

proceedings.149
The "handling of exhibits" grouping is broken down into five criteria:
(1) ensures exhibits are marked and identified; (2) ensures copy of
exhibits available to other party; (3) makes supportable rulings on
admissibility of exhibits; (4) has system of recording exhibits admitted or excluded; and (5) collects/receives all exhibits offered and not

withdrawn. 150
The "questioning of witnesses" grouping includes five criteria:
(1) administers oath; (2) permits cross, redirect, and re-cross of witnesses; (3) offers opportunity for rebuttal and surrebuttal; (4) limits
number of own questions, asks questions that do not reflect bias, only
questions when necessary (to clarify), avoids questions that reflect
advocacy; and (5)15 1 encourages efficient examination of witnesses,
when appropriate.
The "ruling on motions and objections" grouping sets forth two criteria: (1) rules on all motions and objections; and (2) rulings are supportable. 152 The "closing the hearing" is a criterion that is defined as: "Offers the opportunity for closing statements in
merits hearings and indi1 53
cates procedure for issuance of the decision."

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
COLO.OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 84, at 5.
Id.
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The "timeliness of decisions" criterion is described as follows: "To
issue decisions, dispositive orders and orders upon remand within the
time limits set forth by statute, regulation or Office of Administrative
Courts policy."' 54 To receive an "exceptional" performance rating, in
this category, for any given performance year, an ALJ must issue "no
unexcused late orders, a majority of decisions were issued ahead of time,
and the judge had a higher than average workload." 155 For a "successful"
rating, an ALI is required to have "issued no more than two unexcused
late orders" for the performance year.1 56 An AU who "issued three or
more57unexcused late orders" would receive a "needs improvement" rat1
ing.
C. Performance Evaluationsof Judges in the Judicial Branch
1. Colorado
Colorado first established judicial performance evaluation commissions in 1988.58 The Colorado General Assembly created a state commission on judicial performance 159 to develop techniques for evaluating
judges and to make recommendations concerning the retention of justices
of the Supreme Court, and judges of the court of appeals. 6° The Colorado Legislature also created commissions on judicial performance for
each judicial district in the state. 16' These district commissions are empowered to interview judges and other appropriate persons, accept information and documentation from interested parties, conduct public
62
hearings,1
make63 recommendations on the retention of district and
county courtand
judges.1
The 2008 Colorado General Assembly established an Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation in the Judicial Department.164 This new
law spells out explicit review duties of the commissions, including the
review of decisions.165 It also details performance criteria upon which
judges are reviewed. 66 The criteria for the state commission and the
district commissions are as follows:
(a) integrity, including but not limited to whether: (I) the justice or
judge avoids impropriety or the appearance of impropriety; (II) the
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
COLO. OFFICE ADMIN. CTS., supra note 84, at 5.
COLO. REV .STAT. § 13-5.5-102 (2008).
Id. § 13-5.5-103.
Id. § 13-5.5-106.
Id. § 13-5.5-104.
Id. § 13-5.5-105.

163.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-106.

164.
165.
166.

Id. § 13-5.5-101.5.
Id. § 13-5.5-103(l)(a)-(q).
Id. § 13-5.5-105.5.
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justice or judge displays fairness and impartiality toward all participants; and (III) the justice or judge avoids ex parte communications;
(b) legal knowledge, including but not limited to whether: (I) ...
opinions are well-reasoned and demonstrate an understanding of substantive law and the relevant rules of procedure and evidence; (II)...
opinions demonstrate attentiveness to factual and legal issues before
the court; and (III)... opinions adhere to precedent or clearly explain
the legal basis for departure from precedent: (c) communication
skills, including but not limited to whether: (I) . . . opinions are
clearly written and understandable, and (II) . . .questions or statements during oral arguments are clearly stated and understandable;
(d) judicial temperament, including but not limited to whether: (I)...
demonstrates courtesy toward attorneys, litigants, court staff, and
others in the courtroom; and (II) ...maintains appropriate decorum
in the courtroom; (e) administrative performance, including but not
limited to whether: (I) . . .demonstrates preparation for oral argument, attentiveness, and appropriate control over judicial proceedings; (II) ...manages workload effectively; (III) . . . issues opinions
in a timely manner and without unnecessary delay, and (IV) participates in a proportionate share of the court's workload; (f) service to
legal profession and the public by participating in service-oriented efforts designed to educate67the public about the legal system and to improve the legal system. 1
A few differences in the stated criteria for the district commissions
include: Subsection (b) (III) "the judge appropriately applies statutes,
judicial precedent, and other sources of legal authority"; Subsection (c)
(II) "the judge's oral presentations are clearly stated and understandable
and the judge clearly explains all oral decisions; and (DI) the judge
clearly presents information to the jury"; Subsection (d) (II) "the judge
maintains and requires order, punctuality, and decorum in the courtroom"; Subsection (e) (II) "the judge uses court time efficiently ...(IV)
the judge effectively manages cases ...(V) the judge takes responsibility for more than his or her own caseload and is willing to assist other
judges, and (VI) the judge understands and complies with directives of
1 68
the Colorado Supreme Court."
2. Other States
Based on available information, judicial branch performance
evaluation (as opposed to judicial discipline) mechanisms are discussed
for several (twelve) but not all twenty of the states having such mechanisms.169

167.
Id. § 13-5.5-105.5(1)(a) - (), (2)(a) - (f).
168.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-105.5.
169.
Alaska, Arizona, California, [Colorado has been discussed at length], Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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Arizona's Commission on Judicial Performance review has thirtyfour members appointed by the Supreme Court, who are: (1) public
members; (2) attorneys; (3) judges; and, (4) legislators. 170 The duties of
the Commission are:
(1)(a) to develop, review and recommend amendments on written
performance standards, to be approved by the Supreme Court; (b) to
formulate policies and procedures for collecting information and conducting reviews; and to create and supervise a program of periodic
review of the performance of each judge and justice who is subject to
the merit selection system; (2) to identify key areas where improvement is needed and work with the Committee on Judicial Education
and Training to prioritize areas and offer required courses to meet
educational needs; and, (3) to request public comment and hold public hearings on the performance of all judges and justices subject to
retention. 171
The California Commission on Judicial Performance consists of one
judge of a court of appeal and two judges of superior courts, each appointed by the Supreme Court; two members of the State Bar of California, who have practiced law for ten years, each appointed by the Governor; and six citizens who are not judges, retired judges, or attorneys, two
of whom are appointed by the Governor; two by 1the
72 Senate Committee
on Rules; and two by the Speaker of the Assembly.
The Connecticut Judicial Selection Committee 173 is charged with
making a performance evaluation of any judge made by the Judicial Department available to members of the legislative joint standing committee on the judiciary prior to any public hearing on the nomination of any
74
such judge and to the members of the Judicial Selection Commission.1
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has established a Judicial Performance Program. Its stated goal is ". .. the periodic evaluation of a judge's
performance is a reliable method to promote judicial excellence and
competence."' 175 "All full-time, part-time and specially appointed justices and judges are subject to the exclusive evaluation processes of the
supreme court and the special committee to be appointed by the Chief
Justice ....
The Kansas Commission on Judicial Performance is charged with
implementing the following functions: (1) "creating surveys of court
users who have directly observed judges' or justices' performance or

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

ARIZ. JuD. PERF. REV. R. 2 (2006), available at http://azjudges.info/about/procedure.cfm.
Id. at 2(g)(1)(a)-(g)(3).
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44a (2008).
Id.
HAW. SuP. CT. R. 19.1 (1996), available at http://www.state.hi.usljudlctrules/rsch.htm.
HAW. SUP. CT. R. 19.2 (2002), available at http://www.state.hi.us/jud/ctrules/rsch.htm.
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interacted with" judges or justices, including attorneys, litigants, jurors or
other persons the Commission deems appropriate ("the surveys shall ask
those surveyed to evaluate the" judge's "ability, integrity, impartiality,
communication skills, professionalism, temperament and administrative
capacity suitable to the jurisdiction and level of court"); (2) developing
"clear, measurable performance standards upon which the survey questions are based"; (3) developing dissemination plans; (4) protecting "confidentiality when the judicial performance evaluation is used only for
self-improvement"; (5) making "the judicial performance evaluation
results widely available when they are to be used to assist voters in
evaluating the performance of judges and justices subject to retention
elections"; (6) making "public recommendations regarding whether or
not to retain judges or justices subject to retention elections"; (7) developing "a procedure for judges and justices to receive and respond to survey results before such results are made public"; and, (8) establishing "a
mechanism to incorporate
evaluation results in designing judicial educa177
tion programs."'
A majority of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts itself, in
consultation with the chief justice, is responsible for the performance
evaluation program for judges in Massachusetts. 178 The program includes, but is not limited to, a questionnaire to be designed and implemented by the supreme judicial court and given to attorneys, parties, and
jurors appearing before a judge so they may evaluate the judge. 179 The
questionnaire "shall include, but not be limited to, questions relative to
the judge's performance, demeanor, judicial management skills, legal
ability, attentiveness, bias and degree of preparedness."' 180 Massachusetts
further provides for a similar performance evaluation system for all civil
service employees, which would
include administrative magistrates in
81
panel.1
central
Massachusetts'
The chief justice and a majority of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, in consultation with the administrative judges (judicial branch) of
the superior, district, and probate courts, are responsible for designing
and implementing by court rule, a program for performance evaluation of
judges. 182 The program includes a questionnaire and a self-evaluation
form to be completed by the judge. The questionnaire includes questions
relative to "the judge's performance, temperament and demeanor, judicial management skills, legal knowledge, attentiveness, bias and objectivity, and degree of preparedness.' 83 "Upon consideration of nomina177.
KAN. STAT. § 20-3204 (a)-(e) (2006), amended by 2008 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 145 (H.B.
No. 2642).
178.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211 § 26 (2008).
179. Id. § 26A.
180. Id.
181. Seeid.ch. 31 § 6A.
182. N.H.REV. STAT. § 490:32() (2008).
183. Id. § 490:32(1).
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tion for another judicial appointment," a judge's84performance evaluation
is made available to the governor upon request.1
The administrative judge (a judicial branch judge with administrative duties) of a superior court is charged with evaluating each justice
and marital master a minimum of once every three years. 185 The administrative judge of a district court and a probate court must
86 evaluate judges
years.'
three
every
once
of
minimum
a
courts
of those
The judicial evaluation process in New Hampshire consists of: (1) a
"review of complaints about the judge"; (2) a review of the completed
questionnaires; (3) a review of the self-evaluation completed by the
judge; (4) a summary of the results of the evaluation, "which identifies
any judicial performance standard that has not been met and sets forth
the steps the judge" must take to improve performance; (5) a meeting
between the person performing the evaluation and the judge to discuss
the results of the evaluation to advise "whether the judge has met the
applicable performance standards and, if not, to identify the steps the
judge" must take to improve performance; and "within 30 days of 'the
187
meeting," the judge "may submit a written response to the evaluation."
If performance standards have not been met by a New Hampshire
judge and the judge "has failed to take steps to improve the performance
specified in the evaluation summary, the chief justice or the administrative judge" of the court on which the judge "serves may take steps to
and "whatcorrect non-compliance, including administrative discipline,"
' 88
ever other steps are necessary to ensure compliance."'
The judicial performance evaluation process is confidential189 unless
and until the judge "fails to meet performance standards for two consecutive" evaluations, the judge "is deemed to have waived any right to confidentiality," and the results of the evaluation are made public, "with the
exception of the identity of persons furnishing information about the
judge."' 190
New Jersey's central panel, the Office of Administrative Law,
charges the director and chief administrative law judge with developing
and implementing a program of judicial evaluation, focusing on three
principal areas of judicial performance: Competence; productivity; and,
demeanor. 19' The evaluations consider:

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. §490:32(V)(b).
N.H. SUP. CT. Rule 56(rl)(A) (2008).
Id.
Id. at 56(11)(B).
Id. at 56(Il)(D)(3).
Id. at 56(IV)(A).
Id. at 56(1V)(B)(3).
N.J. STAT. § 52:14F-5.s (2008).
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[I]ndustry and promptness in adhering to schedules, making rulings
and rendering decisions; tolerance, courtesy, patience, attentiveness,
and self-control in dealing with litigants, witnesses and counsel, and
in presiding over contested cases; legal skills and knowledge of the
law and new legal developments; analytical talents and writing abilities; settlement skills; quantity, nature and quality
of caseload dispo192
sition; and, impartiality and conscientiousness.
The New Mexico Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, in
evaluating a judge's performance, may consider: (1) "an analysis of a
judge's results from completed surveys"; (2) "a review of a judge's
workload, conformance with judicial time standards, the number of excusals and recusals, cases pending and cases completed"; (3) "any findings and recommendations of the Judicial Standards Commission and
Supreme Court on extrajudicial conduct that reflected adversely on the
judiciary"; (4) surveys; (5) interviews; 'and,
(6) "any other information
93
deemed appropriate by the commission."'
The criteria for evaluation in New Mexico are:
(A) integrity and impartiality:
(1) the judge's conduct is free from impropriety or the appearance of impropriety; (2) the judge makes findings of
fact and interpretation of law without regard for the possibility of public criticism; (3) the judge treats all parties equally
and fairly regardless of race, national or ethnic origin, religion, gender, social or economic status or disability; (4) the
judge's behavior is consistent and free from the appearance
of favoritism; (5) the outcome of cases is not prejudged;
and, (6) the judge's actions and decisions display basic fairness and justice;
(B) knowledge and understanding of the law:
(1) the applicable rules of procedure; (2) the rules of evidence; (3) substantive law; and, (4) the ability to understand
the facts presented and apply the law to those facts;
(C) communication skills:
(1) the sensitivity of the judge to the impact of the judge's
nonverbal communications; (2) the courtesy and fairness
displayed to all parties and participants in proceedings; (3)
whether the judge's verbal communications are clear, complete and logical; and (4) whether a judge's written communications are clear, complete and logical;

192.
193.

Id.
N.M.R. PERF. EvAL. Comm. Rule 28-301(A)-(F) (2008).
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(D) case management:

(1) discharging responsibilities diligently; (2) meeting time
commitments and acting as promptly and efficiently as possible in scheduling and disposition of cases; (3) considering
the availability of settlement and alternative resolution processes and the cost of litigation; (4) punctuality and efficient
use of time;194and (5) maintenance or proper control over the
courtroom.

The New Mexico Commission may conduct interviews with persons who have appeared before a judge on a regular basis; observe a
judge in the performance of
duty in the courtroom; and evaluate statisti1 95
cal information on a judge.
Rhode Island has a Judicial Performance Evaluation Committee,
appointed by the Supreme Court, to develop and administer, under the
court's supervision,
"a program for the continuing evaluation of judicial
1 96
performance."
Utah has a Standing Committee on Judicial Performance Evaluation
that uses "professionally recognized methods of data collection that may
include surveys, onsite visits, caseload management data and personal
interviews.' 97
The Supreme Court of Virginia is responsible for establishing and
maintaining "a judicial performance evaluation program that will provide
a self-improvement mechanism
for judges and a source of information
' 98
process."'
reelection
for the

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 28-401(A)-(D).
Id. at 28-204 (F)-(H).
R.I. Sup. CT. art. VI, Rule 4.1(a) (2008).
UT. R. J. ADMN RuLE 2-106.05(1) (2008).
VA. CODE § 17.1-100 (2008).

How NOT TO REFORM JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: DAVIS,
WHITE, AND THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN

FINANCING
JAMES BoPP, JR.t & JOSIAH NEELEYtt
INTRODUCTION

Judicial elections are nothing new. Thirty states select some or all
of their judges through elections, and the practice of electing judges has
been common since the early days of the republic.1 There are good reasons to do so. Since state court judges have a robust role in making law
through the development of common law, democratic theory requires
that they do so with the consent of the people through elections. 2 Elections make sure that judges are accountable to the people, rather than
political elites and insiders.3 And judicial elections also provide a means
for the people to keep judges within their legitimate bounds by providing
an opportunity for the people to remove judicial activists from the
bench.4
Despite this history and the significant benefits of judicial elections,
some commentators have raised concerns about the practice of judicial
t
James Bopp, Jr., B.A., Indiana University, 1970; J.D., University of Florida, 1973; Attorney, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, Indiana; General Counsel, James Madison Center for
Free Speech; former Co-Chairman of the Election Law Committee of the Free Speech and Election
Law Practice Group of the Federalist Society; Commissioner, National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws. Mr. Bopp argued Republican Party of Minnesota v. White in the United
States Supreme Court successfully.
tt Josiah Neeley, B.A. University of Texas, 2000; J.D. Notre Dame Law School, 2004;
Attorney, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, Indiana. The authors would like to thank Anita
Y. Woudenberg, Richard Coleson, and Jeffery Gallant for offering valuable contributions to this
article.
1. Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States. A Special Report, 64
JUDICATURE 176, 176-78 (1980) reprinted and updated in AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y, JUDICIAL
POLITICS: READINGS FROM JUDICATURE 44-45 (Elliot E. Slotnick ed., 2d ed. 1999), available at
http://books.google.com/ (search "Search Books" for "Judicial Politics"; then follow "Judicial Politics: Readings from Judicature" hyperlink).
2. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) ("Not only do state-court
judges possess the power to 'make' common law, but they have the immense power to shape the
States' constitutions as well. Which is precisely why the election of state judges became popular.")
(citations omitted); see also James Bopp, Jr., PreservingJudicial Independence: JudicialElections
as the Antidote to JudicialActivism, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 180, 181-82 (2007) ("[J]udicial
elections are different from elections for the legislative or executive branch in a very important way
because, unlike other public officials, judges have a dual role. One of the roles that state court judges
share with the political branches is to make law, most notably in the development of the common
law.").
3.
See Bopp, supra note 2, at 185 ("If judges were given a predominant role in setting public
policy, then it would deny popular sovereignty and democracy to make them independent of appropriate accountability to the people.").
4.
Id. at 190-91 (citing instances of judges who were defeated at the polls based on judicial
activism).
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elections.5 Chief among these concerns has been the way in which judicial elections are financed. 6 To some extent, objections to private fundraising by judges and judicial candidates are pedestrian. Fundraising is
unpleasant and time consuming for candidates and awkward for potential
contributors.7 Other objections, such as that privately funded judicial
campaigns erode public confidence in the judiciary, are, if true, much
more serious.
In this article, we examine both the supposed ills of a privately financed judicial election system, as well as one possible cure: public
funding of judicial elections. Part I looks at the current system of privately funded judicial campaigns. We argue that a common criticism of
this system-that it leads to corruption and imperils judicial impartiality-is overblown. In Part II, we look at two methods currently used to
fight alleged corruption within the privately funded system: (1) contribution limits, and (2) restrictions on personal solicitation by candidates.
We argue that contribution limits are constitutional, so long as the limits
are high enough to allow candidates to wage an effective campaign. We
conclude that bans on personal solicitation by candidates, however, do
not serve an interest in preventing corruption and are inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White. 8 Part III looks at public funding of judicial elections. We conclude that while public funding of judicial elections is not per se unconstitutional, many public funding schemes contain features, such as the
provision of so-called "rescue funds" based on spending by a publicly
funded candidate's opponent or by an independent group, as well as burdensome asymmetrical disclosure requirements needed to effectuate rescue funds, which are unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Davis v. FEC.9
I. WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS?

Criticism of the role of money in judicial campaigns comes in a variety of forms. Many such objections are quotidian. Candidates generally do not enjoy asking others for money, and the costs of fundraising to
the candidate both in money and in time can be significant. Those solicited may feel uncomfortable turning down contribution requests. And
some people may feel a general uneasiness about the level of spending
5.
E.g., Roy A. Schotland, Professor of Law, Georgetown University, Remarks at the Conference entitled Bulwarks of the Republic: Judicial Independence and Accountability in the American System of Justice (December 1998), in 61 SUM. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 150 (1998)
(arguing that judicial elections have gotten "nastier, noisier, and costlier" in recent years).
6.
See generally RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 61-80 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
7.
See generally Mark C. Alexander, Let Them Do Their Jobs: The Compelling Government
Interest in Protectingthe Time of Candidatesand Elected Officials, 37 LOY, U. CHI. L.J. 669 (2006).

8.
9.

536 U.S. 765 (2002).
128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
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on political campaigns divorced from any specific objection. While
these sorts of criticisms may explain some of the hostility to the idea of
privately funded judicial campaigns, they hardly justify the degree of
opposition that this system has endangered.
Two objections, however, are more serious. First, it is claimed that
campaign contributions threaten judicial impartiality.' 0 If a judge receives a contribution from a particular individual or group, it is argued,
he will be more likely to rule in favor of that individual or group should
they appear before him as litigants." Money, then, tips the scales of
justice towards certain parties and away from others not according to the
merits of their claims, but according to the size of their contributions.
Corruption is a serious charge, and serious charges demand serious
evidence. To date, however, evidence supporting claims of corruption
based on contributions has been mixed at best.' 2 Judges are human beings, and it is always possible that they may be influenced by factors
other than the law and the facts of a given case. 13 Judges can be tempted
to alter their decisions in order to get re-elected,' 4 to receive appointment6
to higher office,' 5 or even simply to receive praise or avoid criticism.'

10. Lawrence Baum & David Klein, Voter Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Campaigns,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 6, at 140, 140; see also Penny J. White & Malia Reddick, A
Response to Professor Fitzpatrick: The Rest of the Story, 75 TENN. L. REV. 501, 542 (2008) ("According to recent national surveys, between two-thirds and three-fourths of Americans believe that
the need to raise money to conduct their campaigns influences judges' decisions."); George D.
Brown, PoliticalJudges and PopularJustice: A Conservative Victory or a Conservative Dilemma?,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1560-61 (2008) (surveying popular opinion polls in New York,
Ohio, & Pennsylvania, as well as a national poll, which show registered voters believing judges
influenced by campaign contributions ranging from 75 percent to 95 percent); Thomas J. Basting,
Sr., Gutter Politics and the Wisconsin Supreme Court, WiS. LAW., May 2008, at 5 (citing a January
2008 survey in which 78 percent of Wisconsin registered voters believed that campaign funding
influenced judges' decisions).
Brown. supra note 10, at 1563 ("Public perception of [state courts] as places where all
11.
citizens can receive impartial justice may falter. Extensive campaign promises and political debts
may lead to prejudgment. Campaign contributions, in particular, may create a class of favored
litigants."). Curiously, those who support public funding of elections do not likewise conclude that
government contributions will make a judge more likely to rule in favor of the government. See
Jessica Gall, Living with Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: The Birth and Death of the Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 97, 120 (2008) (suggesting that a candidates agreement to participate in public funding of judicial campaigns could "lessen the suspicions
of ties between money and judicial behavior.").
12.
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394 (2000) (noting conflict among
academic studies on the effect of contributions on candidate behavior).
Del Vecchio v. 111.Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Judges are hu13.
man; like all humans, their outlooks are shaped by their lives' experiences. It would be unrealistic to
suppose that judges do not bring to the bench those experiences and the attendant biases they may
create.").
14.
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782 (2002) (noting that "elected
judges ... always face the pressure of an electorate who might disagree with their rulings and therefore vote them off the bench.") (emphasis in original).
15.
See Guido Calabresi, Circuit Justice, 2d Cir., Remarks at Roundtable Discussion, Is There
a Threat to Judicial Independence in the United States Today?, in 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7, 26
(1998) ("If I were to identify the single greatest threat to judicial independence today, it would be the
fact that judges want to move up.").
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The danger to impartiality posed by such a judge is present under any
system of judicial selection, and there is no reason to believe that campaign contributions pose a particularly strong danger in this regard.' 7 To
limit the danger that judges will succumb to temptation, courts have
adopted various structural checks to limit the risk of injustice caused by
the occasional "bad judge."1 8 Ultimately, though, our judicial system
presupposes that judges will take seriously the duty of their office to decide cases fairly and impartially. 19
In addition to threatening actual impartiality, campaign contributions are said to threaten the perception of impartiality by the general
public. This threat is particularly acute in the case of the judiciary because of its inherent weakness as a constitutional actor. As famously
stated by Alexander Hamilton, the judiciary is the "least dangerous"
branch, as it has "no influence over either the sword or the purse., 20
Because courts have neither the power to levy taxes nor command armies, the only way for their decisions to have effect is if they are widely
perceived as being impartial arbiters of justice rather than mere political
actors.2'
As with charges of actual corruption, however, the evidence to support this argument is largely lacking. Polling data has consistently
shown a generalized public cynicism about government institutions.22
16. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 988-89
(2001) (noting a case where public criticism of a judge's decision regarding the admissibility of
evidence led the judge to change his ruling).
17.
Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign
Speech By Candidatesfor Judicial Office, 35 UCLA L. REV. 207, 258 (1987) ("A sitting judge who
is willing to manipulate his decisions in order to assure retention in office will find the opportunity
to do so in either an appointive or an elective system."); see also Jonathan M. Hooks, In Defense of
Judicial Elections, 68 ALA. LAW. 295, 298 (2007) (noting the error of thinking that "the elimination
of elections will somehow result in the elimination of ambition.") (emphasis in original),
18.
James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, An Announce Clause By Any OtherName: The
Unconstitutionalityof Disciplining Judges Who Fail to Disqualify Themselves ForExercising Their
Freedom to Speak, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 723, 727 (2007) ("A judge who is biased in favor of a particular side in a case cannot simply rule in favor of that case. A judge must provide a legal rationale for
his decision, the weaknesses of which will often become readily apparent. The law also provides for
a wide-ranging system of appeals in which legal errors committed by a judge due to bias can be
corrected. Many cases are also heard by multiple judges, further diluting the chance that bias from
an individual judge will lead to an incorrect result.").
19.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 562 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[W]e accept the notion that the 'conscientious judge will, as far as possible, make himself aware of his
biases of this character, and, by that very self-knowledge, nullify their effect.' The acquired skill
and capacity to disregard extraneous matters is one of the requisites of judicial office." (citation
omitted) (quoting In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1943))); Del Vecchio v. Ill.
Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1372 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We expect-even demand--that judges rise
above these potential biasing influences, and in most cases we presume judges do.").
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
21.
James L. Gibson, Nastier, Nosier, Costlier-And Better, MILLER-MCCUNE, August 2008,
at 27, available at http://www.miller-mccune.com/article/495 ("Because courts are weak, they
require institutional legitimacy, the belief that an institution has the right to make binding decisions
for a constituency and that such decisions must be complied with.").
22.
E.g., AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION
AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: ARE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CROOKED 1958-2004 (2005),
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This is a good thing. Cynicism about the actions and motives of government officials can serve as a powerful check on the abuse of government power,2 3 including by the judiciary.24 And while some degree of
perceived legitimacy is obviously necessary not only for the judicial but
for other branches of government, experience has shown that democracy
and cynicism about government institutions generally are capable of coexisting in the same society indefinitely.
The assumption that public concerns about campaign contributions
translates into a lack of confidence in the judiciary is also not supported
by the evidence. A 2002 poll by the American Bar Association, for example, found that 72% of respondents were at least "somewhat concerned" about whether "the impartiality of judges is compromised by the
need to raise campaign money to successfully run for office. 25 Yet, the
same poll found that 75% of respondents thought elected judges were
more fair and impartial than appointed judges.26 According to a recent
poll, only five percent of respondents believed campaign contributions
made to judges had no influence at all on decisions judges made in Minnesota state courts. 27 Nonetheless, the same poll found widespread public confidence in the courts, with 74% of respondents saying that they
had "a great deal" or "some" confidence in the courts, and 76% saying
that they had "a great deal" or "some" confidence in judges (higher rates
than for any other category except the medical profession). 28 The courts
are consistently among the highest ranked institutions in terms of public
confidence. 29 And while the majority of Americans will express some
http://electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_4.htm (finding that, in 2004, 35% of respondents
thought "quite a few of the people running the government are crooked," while 53% thought "not
many" were crooked, and 10% said "hardly any" were crooked).
23. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527 (noting the "the value that free speech, a free press, and free assembly can serve in
checking the abuse of power by public officials."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (Madison),
supra note 20, at 80 ("It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these
clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not
always be at the helm.").
24.
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) ('The assumption that respect for the
judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of
[A]n enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preAmerican public opinion ....
serving the dignify [sic] of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt
much more than it would enhance respect.").
HARRIS INTERACTIVE, INC., HARRIS INTERACTIVE TELEPHONE OMNIBUS SURVEY: A
25.
STUDY ABOUT JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY, PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 6 (August 2002) (on file with author).
Id. at 4.
26.
27.

DECISION RESOURCES LTD., JUSTICE AT STAKE STUDY, MINNESOTA STATEWIDE 5

(2008), http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/MinnesotaJusticeatStakesurvey.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2008). This despite the fact that Minnesota prohibited judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions.
Id. at 1-2.
28.
According to a 2001-2002 survey, 96% of respondents rated the job being done by courts
29.
and judges of their state as being either "excellent" or "good." JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,
STATE JUDGES FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE (Nov. 5, 2001-Jan. 2, 2002) (on file with author). A

1999 survey found that 77% of respondents had either "a great deal" or "some" confidence in the
United States Supreme Court, and 75% had similar confidence in local courts. And, 79% agreed
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level of concern about the potentially corrupting effect of money in elections, this does not appear to be their most pressing concern.30
II. STOPPING CORRUPTION WITHIN A PRIVATELY FUNDED SYSTEM

While privately funded judicial elections may not be perfect, campaign contributions are a necessary part of the judicial election process.
Campaigns cost money.31 So long as judges are elected, funding for their
campaigns is going to have to come from somewhere. As former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has noted, "[u]nless the pool
of judicial candidates is limited to those wealthy enough to independently fund their campaigns, a limitation unrelated to judicial skill, the
cost of campaigning requires judicial candidates to engage in fundraisg.32

in

States have traditionally sought to combat any risk of corruption
from campaign contributions by placing limits on judicial fundraising,
rather than by abolishing it altogether. First, most states place limits on
the size of contributions that can legally be made to a candidate by an
individual or group. 33 Second, many states prohibit judicial candidates
themselves from soliciting campaign contributions and require all such
solicitations to be done through a committee.3 4

A. ContributionLimits
A majority of states place limits on the amount of at least some
forms of contributions to judicial candidates.35 While contribution limits
"implicate fundamental First Amendment interests," namely the freedoms of 'political expression" and "political association,, 36 they can be
constitutional, as long as there is a demonstrable relationship between the
size of the contributions allowed and a realistic threat of corruption, and

with the statement that "[j]udges are generally honest and fair in deciding cases."
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS:

A 1999

NATIONAL
NATIONAL

SURVEY (1999) available at http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/Publications/ResAmtPTCPublicView
CrtsPub.pdf.
30.
Scott Rasmussen, 55% Say Media Bias Bigger Problem Than Campaign Cash, Aug. 11,
2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.comnpublic-Content/politics/election-20082/2008-presidential
election/55_say-media -bias bigger..problem thanscampaign_cash (last visited Oct. 22, 2008)
(reporting poll finding 55% of respondents thought media bias posed a bigger problem in politics
than large campaign contributions).
31.
See Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Campaigning for elected
office necessarily entails raising campaign funds and seeking endorsements from prominent figures
and groups in the community.").
32.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789-90 (2002).
33.
See American Judicature Soc., Judicial Campaigns and Elections: Campaign Financing,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selectionlcampaigns.and-elections/campaign-financing.cf
m?state= (last visited October 19, 2008).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976).
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they are not so low as to prevent "candidates and political committees
37
from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.,
To the extent that large campaign contributions do pose an actual
threat to judicial impartiality, reasonable contribution limits are an effective means of dealing with this threat. A judge is not likely to be swayed
in favor of a particular litigant by the fact that the litigant has given him a
small contribution in the past, nor by the hope of receiving a similarly
sized contribution in the future.
B. Restrictions on PersonalSolicitationby Judicial Candidates
In addition to limiting the amount of contributions, many states prohibit judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions, while allowing their campaign committee to make contribution
solicitations. The extent to which this committee system actually insulates judges and judicial candidates from the supposed dangers of fundraising is unclear. Bans on personal solicitation by judicial candidates
do, however, allow states to maintain the fiction that judges are not directly involved in the campaign fundraising process.
Early cases involving bans on personal solicitation by judicial candidates tended to uphold the provisions against constitutional challenges. 38 The legal landscape governing judicial elections changed dramatically, however, in 2002, when the United States Supreme Court decided Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,39 involving a First
Amendment challenge to a Minnesota judicial canon barring judicial
candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political
issues.
Previous cases had split on the question of whether a canon
prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing their views was constitutional. 4' In White, however, the Supreme Court held that the Announce
Clause violated the First Amendment.
Central to the Court's opinion in White was an analysis of the different possible state interests that fell under the term "judicial impartiality." As traditionally understood, judicial impartiality referred to impartiality towards parties and prohibited a judge from hearing a case when
she had a bias for or against one of the litigants. 42 This interest, the
Court held, was compelling and grew out of the right of due process,
which would be violated if a litigant was forced to have his case heard by
Id. at 21; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 233 (2006) (finding Vermont contribu37.
tion limits so low as to impede candidates' right to effective advocacy); see generally James Bopp,
Jr & Susan Lee, So There Are Campaign Contribution Limits That Are Too Low, 18 STAN. L. &
POLY REV. 266 (2007).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 138 (3rd Cir. 1991).
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
Id. at 768.
Compare Buckley, 997 F.2d at 225, with Stretton, 944 F.2d at 138.
White, 536 U.S. at 775-76.
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a judge biased against him personally or biased in favor of his opponent
in the case.43 While White held that the state did have a compelling interest in preserving judicial impartiality towards parties, it concluded that
the Announce Clause was "barely tailored to serve that interest at all,
inasmuch as it does not restrict speech for or against
particular parties,
44
but rather speech for or against particular issues."
The White court also considered the possibility that judicial impartiality could be defined in two non-standard senses. First, the Court considered whether impartiality includes a lack of preconceptions on legal
issues.
Some had argued that just as a judge might be biased for or
against a particular party, so she might be biased for or against a particular conclusion regarding a legal issue. The Court found, however, that
the state's interest in judicial impartiality did not include a lack of preconceptions on legal issues, as having a judge with no such preconceptions was neither possible nor desirable.46
Finally, the Court considered whether judicial impartiality included
judicial open-mindedness. Open-mindedness would require of a judge
"not that he have no preconceptions on legal issues, but that he be willing
to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to
persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case. 47 Judicial openmindedness "seeks to guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to win
the legal points in the case, but at least some chance of doing so. ' '48 The
Supreme Court declined to state whether open-mindedness was encompassed within the state's impartiality interest, holding instead that the
Announce Clause was not narrowly tailored
to that interest and thus
49
event.
any
in
it
by
justified
be
not
could
White went on to note that to the extent judges announcing their
views on disputed legal and political issues did raise impartiality concerns, those concerns were inherent in the state's decision to elect judges
in the first place. Quoting Justice Marshall, the Court stated that "[i]f the
State chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it must accord the participants in that process ...the First
Amendment rights that attach to their roles., 50 The White Court therefore concluded that states cannot use the impartiality concerns created by
43.
Id. at 776
44. Id.
45.
Id. at 777.
46.
See id. at 778 ("Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not
lack of bias." (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972)).
47.
White, 536 U.S. at 778.
48.
Id.
49.
Id. ("It may well be that impartiality in this sense, and the appearance of it, are desirable
in the judiciary, but we need not pursue that inquiry, since we do not believe the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the announce clause for that purpose.").
50.
Id. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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their decision to popularly elect judges to justify restricting First
Amendment rights.5 1
Since White, federal courts have struck down a variety of state judicial canons on First Amendment grounds.52 In particular, four federal
courts-two district courts and two courts of appeals-have enjoined
state judicial canons prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions.53
Like the Announce Clause, a judicial canon banning personal solicitation of funds by candidates "depends wholly upon the subject matter of
the speech for its invocation.
As such, a solicitation clause is a con55
tent-based regulation of core political speech subject to strict scrutiny.
And while the justification for the solicitation clause-that there is a
danger a judge will be biased in favor of a litigant or attorney if he
knows that she has donated money to his campaign-might seem to be
addressed to preserving judicial impartiality toward parties in a way the
Announce Clause was not, federal courts since White have held that the
solicitation clause is not narrowly tailored to that interest. 56 The reason
for this is simple. What raises impartiality concerns is not the solicitation of funds, but rather a judge's knowledge of the source of the contribution itself. Since judges can know, and are often legally required to
know,57 who has donated money to their campaigns and in what amount,
banning judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds does nothing
51.
See id. at 792 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Minnesota has chosen to select its judges
through contested popular elections .... In doing so the State has voluntarily taken on the risks to
judicial bias described above. As a result, the State's claim that it needs to significantly restrict
judges' speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is particularly troubling, If the State has a
problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the
practice of popularly electing judges.").
52.
See Republican Party v. White (White 11),
416 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cit. 2005); Family Trust
Found. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm'n, 388 F.3d 224, 226-27 (6th Cit. 2004) (order denying stay
of preliminary injunction); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1319-20, 1322 (1lth Cir. 2002);
Carey v. Wolnitzek, 2008 WL 4602786 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 15, 2008); Bauer v. Shepard, No. 3:08-CV196-TLS, slip op. at 20 (N.D. Ind. May 6, 2008) (preliminary injunction granted); Duwe v. Alexander, 490 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007); Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 463 F. Supp.2d
879, 890 (N.D. Ind. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007); Kan. Judicial
Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1232 (D. Kan. 2006) (preliminary injunction granted); Alaska
Right to Life v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (D.Alaska 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 504
F.3d 840 (9th Cit. 2007); N.D. Family Alliance v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1042 (D. N.D.
2005); Family Trust Found. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672, 694 (E.D. Ky. 2004); Spargo v. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp.2d 72, 88-90 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated on other
grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003); Smith v. Phillips, No. A-02 CV 111 JRN, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14913, *1-3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2002); O'Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir.
2008).
53.
White 11,
416 F.3d at 765; Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322; Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36KKC, slip op. at *22 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2006); Kan. Judicial Watch, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1237, injunction modifiedon standinggrounds by 519 F.3d 1107 (10th Cit. 2008).
54.
White I, 416 F.3d at 763 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 763-64; Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322.
56.
See cases cited supra note 55.
57.
See, e.g., White I, 416 F.3d at 766 n.16 (noting that "very specific information about
campaign contributions are [sic] publicly available, notably on the Internet").
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to further a state's interest in preserving judicial impartiality towards
parties. 58 In addition, as with the Announce Clause, any impartiality
concerns raised by the personal solicitation of campaign funds are inherent in the state's decision to elect judges and cannot be used as a rationale to limit candidates' First Amendment rights.59
Post-White, two state courts have upheld solicitation clauses against
constitutional challenge. In re Dunleavy60 upheld Maine's solicitation
clause against First Amendment challenge by potential contributors, but
did not consider whether the provision violated judicial candidates' First
Amendment rights. Additionally, Dunleavy's holding was explicitly
made contingent on the fact that judges in Maine were not elected. 61 The
case is thus of limited applicability.
The Arkansas Supreme Court also recently upheld the state's solicitation clause in Simes v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission,62 partially on the grounds that "[a]ttorneys ought not feel
pressured to support certain judicial candidates in order to represent their
clients. 63 This reasoning is out of step with the White decision and its
progeny, as it attempts to justify the solicitation clause not because of the
effect such solicited contributions might have on candidates, but rather
because of concern about the subjective feelings of those solicited. The
state does have an interest in preventing corruption, and, therefore, could
justifiably prohibit contributions that were solicited as part of a quid pro
quo. Similarly, the state undoubtedly has an interest in preventing actual
coercion of contributions by candidates. Whether protecting attorneys'
sufficient to
subjective feelings of pressure is a compelling state interest
64
justify restricting political speech, however, is doubtful.

58.
See Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23 ("[Elven if there is a risk that judges will be tempted to
rule a particular way because of contributions or endorsements, this risk is not significantly reduced
by allowing the candidate's agent to seek these contributions and endorsements on the candidate's
behalf rather than the candidate seeking them himself. Successful candidates will feel beholden to
the people who helped them get elected regardless of who did the soliciting of support."); see also
Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, slip op. at *18 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2006) ("Even with the
prohibition against direct solicitations, however, judges are able to find out who contributed to their
campaigns and the amounts they contributed. Thus, if a judge is predisposed to favoring those
parties who agree to make contributions, the Solicitation Clause's prohibition against personal solicitation does not prevent such actual partiality.").
59. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon
itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges."); see also Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322
("The impartiality concerns, if any, are created by the State's decision to elect judges publicly.").
60. 838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003).
61.
Id. at 349 ("The Committee correctly notes an important distinction between the restrictions at issue in White and Weaver and this case. Both of those cases concerned restrictions on
candidates for judicial office in states where judges are elected.").
62. 247 S.W.3d 876 (Ark. 2007).
63. Id. at 882.
64.
Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, slip op. at *18 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2006) ("This
Court finds no compelling state interest in prohibiting speech that makes it easier for potential donors to 'just say no."').
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It should be noted that feeling pressured to contribute is in no way
confined to contributions solicited by judicial candidates. A person may
"feel pressured" to support a candidate for legislative or executive office.
In fact, the felt coercion could arguably be greater in the case of legislative or executive office candidates because it is generally unknown prior
to an election whether a judge will ever sit on a case involving a potential
contributor, whereas legislators and executive officers have the authority
to influence the law on whatever matters they so choose. The state's
assertion of this interest only in the context of judicial elections suggests
that it is insincere, or, in constitutional terms, is fatally underinclusive.6 5
Challenges to state solicitation clauses are currently pending in five
states. 66 When Wisconsin amended its judicial canons in 2004, two justices dissented from the amendments relating to the solicitation clause,
arguing that the comprehensive ban on solicitation by judges and judicial
candidates likely violated the First Amendment. 67 And in 2006, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected a request to add a ban on personal solicitation to its state judicial code, citing First Amendment concerns. Given
the emerging legal landscape post-White, state bans on candidate solicitation of campaign contributions cannot be considered an appropriate or
effective means of safeguarding the judiciary from the purportedly corrupting effect of contributions.

I1. THE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC FUNDING
In the previous section, we considered two ways in which states
have tried to limit any perceived negative effects of campaign contributions while keeping their system of privately funded judicial campaigns.
In this section, we turn to a more radical solution to the problems of
campaign contributions in judicial races: public funding of elections.68
Public funding would seem to address the worries about the effect
of money in judicial races, while still allowing states to tap the accountability and legitimizing force that elections can bring. In 2002, the
American Bar Association endorsed the concept of public funding and
recommended that individual states adopt public funding schemes suited

65. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994) (noting that underinclusiveness "diminish[es] the credibility of the government's rationale for restricting speech"); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002) ("As a means of pursuing the objective of openmindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully underinclusive as to
render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.") (citations omitted).
66.
See Wolfson v. Brammer, No. 08-CV-8064-FJM (D. Ariz. 2008); Bauer v. Shepard, No.
08-CV-196-TLS (N.D. id. 2008); Wersal v. Sexton, No. 08-CV-613-ADM-JSM (D. Minn. 2008);
Siefert v. Alexander, No. 08-CV-126-BBC (W.D. Wis. 2008); Yost v. Stout, No. 06-CV-4122-JARKGS (D. Kan. 2006).
67.
In the Matter of the Amendment of Supreme Court Rules: SCR Chapter60, Code of Judicial Conduct-Campaigns,Elections, Political Activity, 2004 WI 134 (Wis. 2004)
68.
See generally Deborah Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of
Judges and the Rules of Campaign Finance,64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (2003).
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to their particular state circumstances. 69 According to the report, of the
"many threats to judicial independence, one of the more pervasive problems is the nature and cost of running for the bench., 70 That same year,
North Carolina became the first state in the nation to provide for full
public funding for all state judicial offices. 7 1 Since then, only New Mexico has adopted public funding for judicial races. 72 Several other states,
however, are currently considering public funding proposals, many of
which are modeled off of the North Carolina scheme.73
Public funding of elections is not per se unconstitutional. 74 States
generally have broader authority when it comes to the distribution of
public funds than in the case of regulation, and so long as they do not
engage in viewpoint discrimination, a state may choose to give money to
candidates for particular public offices, at least when voluntarily contributed by taxpayers for this purpose.75 Simply giving money to candidates,

however, is unlikely to address the concerns raised about the current system of campaign financing. Without some limit on the ability of candidates to raise and spend private funds, candidates would be able to simply add what they receive in government funds to what they can raise
privately, severely disadvantaging any candidate who relied exclusively
on government funding to finance their campaigns.
To avoid this result, almost all public funding schemes make candidates agree to abide by certain expenditure and contribution limits as a

69. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 38 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org
/judind/pdf/commissionreport4-03.pdf. The recommendations of the Commission report were approved by the ABA House of Delegates in February of 2002.
70. Id. at 61.
71.
While Wisconsin has had public funding for state Supreme Court races since the 1970s,
public funding even for those races has been limited. See WIS. STAT. § 11.50(3)(a)(2) (2007). The
Wisconsin public funding scheme does not contain any provision for rescue funds based on opposing
expenditures. For a description of how the Wisconsin scheme operates, see Charles Gardner Geyh,
Publicly Funded JudicialElections: An Overview, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1476-77 (2001).
72.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-13(D)(2), (1) (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.001-70
(West 2007). Several states and localities have also adopted public funding schemes for certain
elections. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-901.01, -940 to -961 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 9-600 to -674, 9-700 to -751 (2008); HAW.REV. STAT. § 11-217 to -225 (2008); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1121-1128 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-30 to -47 (West 2008). A proposal
to adopt public funding for U.S. Senate races is currently before Congress. Fair Elections Now Act,
S.936, 110th Cong. (2007).
See, e.g., H.B. 251, 57th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2003); H.B. 4610, 49th Gen. Assem.,
73.
2006); S.B. 171, 98th Leg., 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2007).
2nd Reg. Sess. (Ill.
74.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) ("Congress has power to regulate Presidential
elections and primaries, and public financing of Presidential elections as a means to reform the
electoral process was clearly a choice within the granted power .... Whether the chosen means
appear 'bad,' 'unwise,' or 'unworkable' to us is irrelevant.") (citation omitted); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S.Ct., 2759, 2772 (2008).
75.
See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65 ("Congress may engage in public financing of
election campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate
to abide by specified expenditure limitations.").
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condition of receiving government funds.76 The Supreme Court has held
that this is constitutional so long as participation in the scheme remains
voluntary. 77 To be voluntary, a public funding scheme must allow candidates the option of not participating in the system 78 and may not unconstitutionally burden the First Amendment rights of candidates who
opt not to participate.7 9
A public funding scheme must also not burden the First Amendment rights of independent groups. States cannot constitutionally place
limitations on the amount of independent expenditures made during a
campaign. 80 Public funding schemes that do burden First Amendment
rights are subject to strict scrutiny and will be deemed unconstitutional
unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 8'
While crafting a public funding scheme that meets these requirements may seem like a simple task, in practice, constructing a public
funding scheme that is both efficient and complies with the First
Amendment is not easy. States generally provide funds at a level comparable to average spending in prior races. This amount, however, is often
based on all races, not just competitive ones, and does not account for
increased costs. This leaves the publicly funded candidate vulnerable to
higher spending by privately funded candidates or independent spenders.
This problem could be avoided if states were willing to provide publicly
funded candidates with sufficient funds to run an effective campaign.
However, few public funding schemes do this because one of the principal goals of public funding is to reduce the overall amount of campaign
spending. For this reason, many schemes make additional distributions
of public funds, called "rescue funds," to make up for the insufficiency
of their original government allotment. The use of rescue funds, however, proves upon examination to pose insurmountable constitutional
difficulties.

76.
National Conference of State Legislatures, Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview
(2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/about/PubFinOverview.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2008).
77.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65 ("Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the

contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and accept public
funding.").
78.
See Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 38 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[V]oluntariness has
proven to be an important factor in judicial ratification of government-sponsored campaign financing
schemes." (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 95-96)).
79.
See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1425 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
ban on certain contributions to privately funded candidates was unconstitutional because it prevented
privately funded candidates from gaining access to funding sources to which they would be entitled
but for the choice to eschew public funding).
80.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46 ("[1]ndependent advocacy ... does not presently appear to
pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign
contributions."); see also Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Buckley drew a
line in the sand, and prohibited the government from restricting a candidate's ability to make expenditures on his own behalf.").
81.
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
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A. The Problem of Rescue Funds

In order to "level the playing field" between a publicly funded candidate and her privately funded opponent, most public funding schemes
attempt to tie the level of government funding to the amount of money
spent in opposition to that candidate's campaign. For example, under
North Carolina's public funding scheme, once a candidate qualifies for
public funding, she receives an initial distribution based on the office the
candidate is seeking, whether or not she is opposed, and whether the
funds are to be used in a primary or a general election campaign.82 If the
publicly funded candidate faces no serious opposition, no further government funds are provided.83 However, additional government funds
are available to the candidate if the combined sum of (a) contributions
from a nonparticipating opponent, (b) independent expenditures 84 made
in support of that opponent, and (c) independent expenditures in opposi85
tion to the publicly funded candidate exceeds a certain trigger amount.
These "rescue funds, 86 are made in an "amount equal to the reported
excess. '' 7 That is, for every dollar spent by a privately funded candidate
or independent group on behalf of a privately funded candidate or in opposition to a publicly funded candidate, the publicly funded candidate
receives a dollar of government contributions." Thus, under the rescue
funds provision, expenditures by a candidate can result in additional
government contributions to that candidate's opponent, and independent
expenditures made in opposition to a candidate or in support of her opponent can, likewise, result in government contributions to the opposed
candidate.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.65(a)-(b) (West 2007).
83. Id. § 163-278.65(b)
84. An independent expenditure is defined as "an expenditure to support or oppose the nomination or election of one or more clearly identified candidates that is made without consultation or
coordination with a candidate or agent of a candidate whose nomination or election the expenditure
supports or whose opponent's nomination or election the expenditure opposes." N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 163-278.6(9a) (West 2007).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.67(a) (West 2007). The trigger amount is determined
by statute and, in the case of a general election, is equal to the amount of the initial distribution.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.62(18) (West 2007).
86. The name given to funds distributed in this way varies depending on the public funding
scheme. In North Carolina they were originally called "rescue funds," but were re-labeled "matching funds" in 2007. See id. § 163-278.67. Other schemes refer to them by other names. See Fair
Elections Now Act, S. 936, 110th Cong. § 511 (2007) (providing "fair fight" funds to publicly
funded candidates based on opposition spending). None of these terms is entirely accurate. "Matching funds" is too broad, as a public funding scheme can choose to give matching funds based on
something other than opposing expenditures. "Rescue funds" is not a completely neutral term, but at
least better conveys the conditions in which funds are granted. For lack of a better term, this article
will refer to government contributions to candidates based on opposing speech as rescue funds, and
to the portions of a public funding scheme providing for these rescue funds as the rescue funds
provision.
87. Id. § 163-278.67(a).
88. Id. Importantly, independent expenditures in support of a publicly funded candidate or in
opposition to a nonparticipating candidate are not factored into calculating the trigger amount, and
no rescue funds are issued to privately funded candidates nor deducted from a publicly funded candidate's government funding based upon independent expenditures so made. See id.
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Until recently, courts have been divided over whether First Amendment rights are burdened by public funding schemes which provide rescue funds based on spending by privately funded candidates and independent groups. The First and Fourth Circuits have found that providing
government funding to candidates based on opposition speech does not
burden First Amendment rights and is, therefore, constitutional,89 while
the Eighth and arguably the Ninth Circuit have found them constitutionally suspect. 90 Treatment of the issue by other federal courts has often
been analytically confused, leaving the validity of rescue funds provisions open to question. A brief summary of the relevant cases follows.
1. The Lower Courts
The first federal court case to address the rescue funds issue was
Day v. Holahan.91 Day involved Minnesota's public funding scheme,
which distributed government funds to publicly funded candidates based
on independent expenditures made in opposition to their campaign, over
a trigger amount. 92 The Eighth Circuit struck down this provision because it penalized First Amendment rights.9 3 The Day court reasoned
that independent groups would be chilled from expending money opposing a candidate if they knew that doing so would result in government
funds to that candidate's campaign. 94 Accordingly, the rescue funds provision turned independent expenditures over the trigger amount into de
facto contributions to an opponent's campaign and was, therefore, an
impermissible burden on First Amendment rights. 95
In Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election
Practices,96 the First Circuit upheld the rescue funds provision of
Maine's public funding scheme against a constitutional challenge.97
Maine's scheme provided rescue funds to publicly funded candidates and
reduced contribution limits for privately funded candidates to between
$250 and $500, depending on the office sought. 98 The court was dismissive of any adverse effect on the complaining party, noting that the
scheme "in no way limits the quantity of speech ...

nor ...

threaten[s]

89. Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 472
(1st Cir. 2000); N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427,
437-38 (4th Cir. 2008).
90. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994); see Ass'n of Am. Physicians and
Surgeons v. Brewer, 494 F.3d 1145, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiffs' complaint
requesting injunction against the Arizona statute stated a cause of action).
91.
34 F.3d at 1358.
92. See id. at 1359.
93. Id.at 1361.
94. Id. at 1360 ("The knowledge that a candidate who one does not want to be elected will...
receive a public subsidy equal to half the amount of the independent expenditure, as a direct result of
that independent expenditure, chills the free exercise of that protected speech.").
95. See id. at 1360-61.
96. 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000).
97. Id. at 472.
98. Id. at 451-52.
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censure or penalty" 99 and, instead, focused on the voluntary nature of the
scheme.100
Recently, the Fourth Circuit has followed Daggett and upheld the
constitutionality of North Carolina's rescue funds for judicial elections. O1 Duke rejected Day's conclusion that the rescue funds provision
chilled speech, arguing instead that "North Carolina's provision of
matching funds is likely to result in more, not less, speech."10 2 The
Fourth Circuit also held that North Carolina's public funding scheme was
not to participate
not coercive, in that a candidate might rationally choose
10 3
in the scheme despite the advantages it provided.
While Day, Daggett, and Duke offer conflicting analyses of the rescue funds provision, the holdings of these decisions are at least clear.
The same cannot be said, unfortunately, for Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons v. Brewer.1°4 Brewer involved a coalition of
candidates and independent organizations who brought suit challenging
various aspects of Arizona's public funding scheme, including its provision for rescue funds.10 5 The district court dismissed the suit, holding
failed to state a
that the plaintiff's challenge to the rescue funds0provision
6
claim because the provision was constitutional.1
On appeal, defendants argued that the case was moot, as the election
at issue had long since passed.10 7 The Ninth Circuit initially agreed and
issued an opinion dismissing the appeal on mootness grounds.'0 8 Soon
thereafter, however, the court withdrew its opinion when it was determined that the panel's original mootness holding was inconsistent with
prior binding Ninth Circuit precedent.1°9 The court then issued a third
99. Id. at 464.
Id. at 466-67.
100.
101.
N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Expenditures v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir.
2008). At the district court level, the case was styled Jackson v. Leake. 476 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D.
N.C. 2006). Plaintiff Jackson, however, was voluntarily dismissed from the case on appeal, and thus
the case was restyled as N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Expenditures v. Leake in the
Fourth Circuit. This, however, has led to some confusion, as on the same day that it handed down its
opinion, the Fourth Circuit also handed down its opinion in the separate case of N.C. Right to Life v.
Leake, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008). On July 24, 2008, plaintiffs' filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, styled Duke v. Leake. 77 USLW 3074 (U.S. Jul 24,
2008) (NO. 08-120). For consistency, and in order to avoid confusion, for purposes of this article
the Fourth Circuit's decision on the rescue funds provision shall be referred to as Duke v. Leake, or
simply Duke.
102.
Duke, 524 F.3d at 438.
Id. at 436 ("The plaintiffs do not make coercion a central aspect of their arguments, and,
103.
indeed, we conclude that North Carolina's public financing system is not unconstitutionally coercive. The incentives to choose public funding, while not insubstantial, are rather modest in comparison to those in similar systems that have been upheld against First Amendment challenges.").
363 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Ariz. 2005).
104.
105.
Id. at 1198-99.
Id. at 1202-03.
106.
107.
Assoc. of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Brewer, 486 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g
granted,494 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2007), amendedby 497 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007).
108. Id. at 589.
109.
Brewer, 494 F.3d at 1146.
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opinion, clarifying that it had reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action in their challenges to the
public funding scheme, and remanding the case back to the district
court." 0 By finding that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action, the court
appears to have sided with Day in finding the public funding scheme
constitutionally problematic, though the Ninth Circuit's subsequent opinion contains virtually no substantive discussion of the merits of the rescue funds challenge.1 1'
While these four cases are as yet the only decisions dealing explicitly with the constitutionality of the rescue funds, several other cases also
warrant further mention. First, in Rosentiel v. Rodriguez," 2 publicly
funded candidates in Minnesota were given an initial distribution of government funds in exchange for agreeing to spending caps. 13 The publicly funded candidates were released from these caps, however, if their
non-publicly funded opponents spent more than a given amount. 4 The
court upheld this provision on the basis that removing the publicly
funded candidate's spending caps did not burden First Amendment
rights.' "
The Sixth Circuit has also dealt with the constitutionality of other
aspects of public funding schemes in two cases. Gable v. Patton"6 involved a Kentucky scheme where publicly funded candidate slates were
allowed to raise up to $600,000 in private contributions and were given
two dollars in government funding for every privately raised dollar up to
that amount. Further, if a slate of candidates were to face a privately
funded slate that had raised more than $1.8 million, the publicly funded
candidates were released from the otherwise applicable contribution limits and could continue to receive two dollars in government funding for
every dollar raised privately. Despite these very generous benefits, Gable found that Kentucky's public funding scheme was not coercive and
so was constitutional.' 17
Kentucky's public funding scheme also contained a provision, similar to the one at issue in Rosentiel, that removed the applicable expenditure limits for publicly funded candidates if an opposing slate of candidates spent more than the trigger amount. While Gable upheld this feature of the Kentucky scheme, in Anderson v. Spear,' 18 the Sixth Circuit
struck down the definition of "contribution" that applied to Kentucky's
110.

Brewer, 497 F.3d at 1057.

Ill.
112.

Id.
101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1546.
Id. at 1547.
Id. at 1557.
142 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 949.
356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004).
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matching funds provision on the grounds that it included contributions by
a candidate to his own campaign. 119 The court held that including candidate contributions when calculating the trigger amount served to deter
candidates from contributing funds to their own campaign, and "[t]hus,
by failing to exempt candidate contributions to their own campaigns
from the trigger
provision, Kentucky applies an indirect regulation on
120
expenditures."'

2. Davis v. FEC
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. FEC12 1 provides
important guidance as to how to resolve this conflict among the lower
courts. Davis involved a challenge to the so-called "Millionaire's
Amendment" to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA). 122 This provision tripled the contribution limit applicable to a
candidate when that candidate's opponent had "self-financed" his campaign, that is, where he contributes more than $350,000 to his own campaign. 123 Contribution limits for the candidate who had self-financed,
however, were not raised. Jack Davis, a self-financed congressional
candidate in New York, challenged the provision, arguing that he was
deterred from contributing personal funds to his campaign by the knowledge that if he did so he would trigger the deferential contribution limits.124
Davis held that by making the trigger for the asymmetrical contribution limits turn on the amount of personal spending by Davis on his own
campaign, the Millionaire's Amendment chilled and penalized Davis's
First Amendment rights. 125 Under this scheme, "a candidate who wishes
to [make unlimited personal expenditures had] two choices: abide by a
limit on personal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that
right by the activation of a scheme of discriminatory contribution limits.' ' 126 The Court endorsed the rationale of Day to support its conclusion
that the Millionaire's Amendment burdened free speech:
Many candidates who can afford to make large personal expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to do so despite § 319(a), but they must shoulder a special and potentially
significant burden if they make that choice. See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-1360 (C.A.8 1994) (concluding that a
Minnesota law that increased a candidate's expenditure limits
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 667.
Id.
128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
Id. at 2767.
2 U.S.C.A. § 441a-l(a)(1)(A) (2002).
Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2767, 2770.
ld.at2771.
Id.at 2772.
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and eligibility for public funds based on independent expenditures against her candidacy burdened
the speech of those mak127
ing the independent expenditures).
Because the Millionaire's Amendment entailed that "the vigorous
exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance campaign speech
produces fundraising advantages for opponents in the competitive context of electoral politics," 28
the Court found that the provision burdened
protected political speech. 1
Having found that the Millionaire's Amendment burdened First
Amendment rights, Davis went on to find the provision unconstitutional,
129
as it was not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
According to the Court, the Millionaire's Amendment was not justified
by any anti-corruption interest, as "reliance on personal funds reduces
the threat of corruption."'' 30 Furthermore, the Davis Court rejected the
argument that the Millionaire's Amendment could be justified by a state
interest in "fairness," "equality," or "leveling the playing field" with regard to elections. 31 Quoting a prior opinion by Justice Thomas, the
Court noted that "preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption
are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far
identified for restricting campaign finances."' 132 Far from being compelling, the Court held that equality in campaign financing was not even a
legitimate interest of the state. 133 A purported interest in equality justifies restricting speech that would have "ominous implications because it
would permit Congress to arrogate the voters' authority to evaluate the
strengths of candidates competing for office."' 134 Finally, Davis held that
the "resulting drag on First Amendment rights [caused by the Millionaire's Amendment] is not constitutional simply because it attaches as a

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (noting that the Millionaire's Amendment imposes a substantial burden on the exercise
of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech and thus cannot stand
unless it is "justified by a compelling state interest" (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 256 (1986))).
130. Id. at 2773.
131.
Id.
132. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)).
133.
Id.; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (noting that "equal resources" or
"equalizing" is "not... a legally cognizable right" (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S.
238, 257 (1986) and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam)); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 705 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting as "antithetical to
the First Amendment" "the notion that the govemment has a legitimate interest in restricting the
quantity of speech to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections"); Buckley, 424 U.S. at
48-49 ("[T]he concept that govemment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.").
134. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2773.
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The provision was

Davis sheds new light on the constitutionality of rescue funds in
several important respects. First, the Supreme Court endorsed Day's
conclusion that rescue funds burden First Amendment rights of independent spenders. 137 This means that Day was right when it struck down
a rescue funds provision that granted government contributions based on
speech by independent groups. 38 Second, like Anderson, Davis involved
contributions made by candidates from personal funds, not independent
expenditures. 39 If the law struck down in Davis was analogous to a rescue funds provision in Day, then its holding must likewise apply to rescue funds issued based on the spending by a privately funded opponent.
It should also be noted that the constitutionality of the regulation at
issue in Davis did not turn on any calculation of the overall benefits and
burdens involved in the public funding scheme. A state cannot justify
imposing burdens on the speech of non-publicly funded candidates on
the grounds that publicly funded candidates have voluntarily adopted
other burdens, such as voluntary expenditure limits; nor are these burdens justified as a means of encouraging participation in a public funding
scheme. 140
3. Can the Rescue Funds Provision Be Saved?
Viewed through the lens of Davis, it is clear that the rescue funds
provision burdens First Amendment rights. As in Davis, the rescue
funds provision presents candidates with a stark choice: "abide by a limit
on personal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that
right" by the provision of rescue funds.' 4 ' Likewise, independent groups
who want to advocate against publicly funded candidates or for their
privately funded opponents must either limit their expenditures, or face
the prospect that their speech will result in additional funding to the candidate whose election they oppose. This choice may chill some speech
by privately funded candidates, and it may lead other candidates to face a
"potentially significant burden" based on their speech. 142 As a result,
rescue funds must pass strict scrutiny.

135.
Id. at 2764.
136.
Id. at 2765.
137.
Id.at 2772.
138.
See Opinion of the N.J. State Legislature Office of Legislative Servs., 1, July 21, 2008
(concluding that a proposed New Jersey bill creating a public funding scheme with rescue funds
would be unconstitutional under Davis).
139.
Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2763.
140.
Id. at 2772 ("The resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not constitutional simply
because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice.").
141.
Id.
142.
Id. (citing Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (8th Cir. 1994)).
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Rescue funds are sometimes justified as a means to "level the playing field" between publicly funded candidates and their privately funded
opponents. After Davis, it is obvious that this is not a compelling government interest. 143 But rescue funds do not even have this effect, for
several reasons. First, by providing rescue funds dollar for dollar over
the government's original grant of funds, the publicly funded candidate
will always have more money for campaign speech than her privately
funded opponent. That is because neither the calculation of the trigger
amount nor the calculation of the amount of rescue funds take into account the fundraising costs incurred by the privately funded candidate in
raising private funds. This can readily account for a third to a half of the
total funds raised. 44
Second, in schemes like North Carolina's, if a group makes independent expenditures in support of a publicly funded candidate or opposing his privately funded opponent, this is not counted in the rescue funds
calculation. 45 If, on the other hand, a group opposes the publicly funded
candidate or supports his or her privately funded opponent, this triggers
rescue funds. 146 Thus, the provision of rescue funds does not achieve

equality even in the sense of dollars spent in support of each campaign.
Finally, rescue funds provisions do not serve an interest in "leveling
the playing field" because they do not take into account the electoral
advantages that come from being an incumbent. Were the rescue funds
provision designed to further equality, it would take into account the
advantages of holding office-an established staff, paid travel, franking
privileges, media access-along with the benefits derived from having
143. Id. at 2773 ("The argument that a candidate's speech may be restricted in order to 'level
electoral opportunities' has ominous implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate the
voters' authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for office."); see also McConnell
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 227 (2003) (noting that "equal resources" or "equalizing" is "not ... a legally
cognizable right" (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) and Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam))); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (suggesting that a state cannot
"abridge the rights of some persons to engage in political expression in order to enhance the relative
voice of other segments of our society"); Id. at 54 ("[An] ancillary interest in equalizing the relative
financial resources of candidates competing for elective office .... is clearly not sufficient to justify
... infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.").
144. There is not even a requirement that the expenditure triggering rescue funds be adverse to
the interest of the publicly funded candidate who receives the rescue funds. For example, in a three
person race, money spent by Candidate A attacking Candidate B (both privately funded candidates)
would result in a government contribution to Candidate C (a publicly funded candidate) even though
C has benefited from the original expenditure. Likewise, funds gained via expenditures by independent groups may be used against a candidate even though, by definition, such expenditures are
outside the candidates control and may not even benefit his candidacy. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47
("[I]ndependent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and
indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate."). By contrast, a privately funded candidate is never eligible for
rescue funds, no matter how much money is spent in opposition to his candidacy or in support of his
participating opponent by independent groups.
145.

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.67 (2008).

146.

Id.
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run for office before. These advantages are exacerbated under public
funding schemes with rescue funds, which ensures that publicly funded
incumbents can always maintain a funding advantage over a nonpublicly funded challenger, removing the only advantage that challenger
may have. 147 The result of all this is a significant advantage to publicly
funded candidates, particularly incumbents.
This raises two constitutional concerns. First, it brings into question
the sincerity of the claim that the rescue funds are needed to "level the
playing field." Where considerable First Amendment freedoms are at
stake, a state "must demonstrate its commitment to advancing [its] interest by applying its [requirements] evenhandedly.' ' 48 Underinclusiveness
with respect to a given state interest thus belies the claim that the regulation was actually designed to serve this interest. Furthermore, government contributions are given to a publicly funded candidate based
on the
149
viewpoint of that speech, which renders them unconstitutional.
Since the rescue funds cannot be justified as a way of "leveling the
playing field," they must be justified by the state's interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance thereof.1 50 The use of rescue funds, however, is not narrowly tailored to advance this interest for two reasons.
First, the state's interest in preventing corruption does not justify burdens
on independent expenditures, 5 since independent spending does not
give rise to the threat of corruption. 152 Second, contributions made by a
candidate to his own campaign, and spending money lawfully raised by a
campaign does not implicate any corruption interest. 153 The rescue funds
provision is therefore not narrowly tailored to any compelling anticorruption interest.
Finally, the rescue funds provision cannot be justified as being a
necessary component in a larger public funding scheme. As Davis noted,
the "resulting drag on First Amendment rights [caused by an election
147.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 249 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that "[A]s everyone knows, this is an area in which evenhandedness is not fairness. If all electioneering were evenhandedly prohibited, incumbents would have an enormous advantage. Likewise, if
incumbents and challengers are limited to the same quantity of electioneering, incumbents are favored.").
148.
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).
149. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 378, 381 (1992).
150.
Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008) (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 428 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting
campaign finances.")).
151.
152.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,46,53 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 46 ("[I]ndependent advocacy... does not presently appear to pose dangers of real

or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.").
153.

Id. at 53 ("[The prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the political process does

not support the limitation on the candidate's expenditure of his own personal funds.... Indeed, the
use of personal funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and thereby
counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which the Act's contribution limitations are directed.").
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regulation] is not constitutional simply because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice. ' ' 54 Public funding of elections
may be viewed as desirable by a candidate for a whole host of reasons,
but whatever advantages accrue from the scheme do not justify burdening core political speech.
If the rescue funds provision is so ill-fitted to a state's interests in
equality or the avoidance of corruption, what interest does it actually
serve? First, as indicated above, the provision serves as a form of incumbent protection. By accepting public funding, an incumbent can
ensure that he will not be outspent by an opponent, thus protecting his
incumbency advantage and removing one of the few serious threats to his
re-election.
Second, the rescue funds provision serves the desire to reduce overall campaign spending by inducing candidates to accept public funds on
more favorable terms than they could achieve through private means.
Sometimes this goal is explicit. The North Carolina public funding
scheme's stated purpose, for example, is "to protect the constitutional
rights of voters and candidates from the detrimental effects of increasingly large amounts of money being raised and spent to influence the
outcome of elections .... ,

But even where this purpose is not made

explicit, it is implicit in the way that rescue funds operate. If reducing
the corrupting influence of contributions really were the goal behind public funding, a state could achieve this goal by awarding sufficient funds
for a candidate to run an effective campaign' 56 without the necessity of
awarding rescue funds. This would induce virtually all candidates to
sign up for the scheme. Doing this, however, would entail more total
spending on campaigns, not less.
Through the use of a rescue funds provision, the state can keep public funding a viable option for candidates without abandoning the
scheme's purpose in reducing total spending. In effect, then, rescue
funds are an attempt to rescue publicly funded candidates not from their
opponents, but from the scheme itself. Needless to say, the state does not
have a compelling interest in reducing the total amount spent on a cam-

154.

Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 2772.

155.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.61 (2008).

156. In North Carolina, for example, "the base amount of funding for a contested state supreme
court campaign was $216,650" in 2006. Duke v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 2008). By
contrast, Roy Cooper, the winning candidate for Attorney General in 2004, raised $1,574,350 in
campaign contributions. See National Institute on Money in State Politics, Candidate Profile for Roy
(last
Cooper,
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/candidate.phtml?c=67817
visited Oct. 19, 2008).
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paign. 157 As such, the provision is unlikely to survive constitutional
scrutiny.
B. The Problem of Disclosure
In order for a rescue funds provision to operate effectively, the state
must have accurate and up-to-date information about expenditures made
by privately funded candidates and independent groups opposing publicly funded candidates. Without this information, the state's promise to
rescue publicly funded candidates from the inadequacy of their public
funding is meaningless. And the only practicable way to get this information is through some form of expedited disclosure.
Since the provision of rescue funds to a candidate based on opposing speech violates the First Amendment, any disclosure scheme directly
15 8
tied to a rescue funds provision will likewise be unconstitutional.
Even if this were not so, however, the methods of disclosure typically
used in a rescue funds provision would be constitutionally problematic,
as they involve significant burdens on protected political speech which
fall more heavily on privately funded candidates than on publicly funded
ones.
1. General Burdens Caused by Disclosure
While mandatory disclosure may at first blush seem innocuous, disclosure requirements have the potential to impose significant burdens on
candidates and independent groups. Potential donors may face retaliation if the fact that they have contributed to a particular candidate or
group becomes public knowledge. Retaliation may come in the form of
social ostracism, 59 economic sanctions,' 6° harassment by vengeful politicians, 16 or even violence.1 62 A soldier who donates to pro-gay causes
157.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 9 (holding that expenditure limits were unconstitutional because
they "necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached").
158.
See, e.g., Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2775 ("The § 319(b) disclosure requirements were designed
to implement the asymmetrical contribution limits provided for in § 319(a), and as discussed above,
§ 319(a) violates the First Amendment. In light of that holding, the burden imposed by the § 319(b)
requirements cannot be justified, and it follows that they too are unconstitutional.").
159.
Bradley A. Smith, A Moderate, Modem Campaign Reform Agenda, 12 NEXUS 3, 15
(2007) (noting that some people "would not want their contributions to the Log Cabin Republicans,
an organization of gay Republicans, to be disclosed publicly").
160.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995) (noting that the desire
to contribute anonymously to a political organization or campaign "may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation").
161.
Smith, supra note 164, at 15 (noting that some contributors "will prefer to give anonymously in order to avoid retaliations by vengeful politicians"); see also Ben Smith, Obama lawyer
warns of 'reckoning' for Clinton 527 donors and staff, POLrICO, Feb. 21, 2008,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0208/Obama-lawyer.warns.of-reckoning-for_Clinton_52
7_donors and -staff.html; Michael Luo, Group Plans Campaign Against G.O.P. Donors, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, available at http:/lwww.nytimes.com2008/08/08/us/politics/O8donate.html
(detailing letter sent by group Accountable America warning donors to conservative 527 groups of
exposure).
162.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958).
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may risk being discharged under the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy. 163 A union member or corporate employee may risk ostracism or
be denied advancement if he or she contributes to candidates or causes
not in line with those of management.' 64 Businessmen and other professionals may not want to alienate potential customers,1 65 and those whose
careers depend on reputation and avoiding controversy, such as doctors,
ministers, or journalists, may not wish to have their political views publicly advertised. 166 The risk of retaliation is particularly acute for individuals who contribute to "unpopular or unconventional" causes and
candidates.1 67 And recent advances in computer technology and the
digitized information on the Internet
availability of readily-searchable,
68
only exacerbate this problem.'
Even apart from any risk of retaliation, compelled disclosure of contributor information raises serious privacy concerns. In Buckley, the Supreme Court recognized that "compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the
First Amendment."1 69 Legal protections for privacy have multiplied in
recent years, forbidding the disclosure of personal information in a wide
variety of areas. Likewise, courts have long recognized the importance
have repeatedly invaliof protecting privacy in the political arena and 70
dated restrictions on anonymous political speech.1

163.
See McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 216-18 (D.D.C. 1998) (considering a sailor
discharged for discussing his sexual orientation in an anonymous online profile).
164. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 237 (1976) (per curiam) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("Rank-and-file union members or rising junior executives may ... think
twice before making even modest contributions to a candidate who is disfavored by the union or
management hierarchy. Similarly, potential contributors may well decline to take the obvious risks
entailed in making a reportable contribution to the opponent of a well-entrenched incumbent.").
165. See Leigh Jones, Boycott ThreatenedOver Meeting Site of Association of American Law
Schools, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://www.law.comljsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp
?id=1202423529779.
166. William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution
Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17 (2003) ("Those who rely on trust and identification with
others to do their work-such as ministers, psychotherapists, or schoolteachers-may find their roles
undermined if congregants, patients, or parents know and judge their personal political activity.").
at 22.
Id.
167.
Id. at 11-12 ("In the last five years, campaign contribution disclosure suddenly joined the
168.
trend of online compilation and availability. This change in technology qualitatively transformed the
nature of disclosure laws. No longer can a contributor assume that disclosed information is unlikely
to be seen by anyone. The law remains the same, but its effect is entirely different." (footnotes
omitted)).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,64 (1976) (emphasis added).
169.
See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153, 159-60, 169
170.
(2002) (striking down ban on anonymous solicitation); Buckley v. Am.Constitutional Law Found.,
525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999) (finding that a person gathering petition signatures retains an anonymity
interest); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding unconstitutional
an Ohio law mandating disclosure for low level, individual expenditures regarding a ballot initiative); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63-66 (1960) (striking down a California law prohibiting
anonymous leafleting regarding a commercial dispute); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466
(1958) (striking down a state law mandating disclosure of members).
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Fear of retaliation and concern over privacy undoubtedly deters
some potential donors from making contributions to candidates and independent groups where they know disclosure will be required. This
chilling effect may be significant. In a 2007 survey, fifty-six percent of
respondents objected to having their name and address posted on the
Internet as a contributor, and seventy-one percent objected to having
their employer's name listed. 171 Sixty percent said they would think
twice about contributing if their name and address would be disclosed,
1 72
and forty-nine percent said the same if their employer were reported.
Among the reasons listed for this reluctance were: "I would never want
my employer to know who I give money to," and fear "that [disclosure]
would jeopardize my job."' 173 Courts have also taken
judicial notice of
1 74
the deterrent effect compelled disclosure can have.
Compelled disclosure can also impose significant burdens on candidates and groups in terms of the time and effort needed to comply with
the specified disclosure requirements. For example, Citizensfor Responsible Government State Political Action Committee v. Davidson 75 involved a challenge to the disclosure requirements of the Colorado Fair
Campaign Practices Act. 176 Under the Colorado law, independent expenditures exceeding $1,000 had to be reported to all candidates and to
the Secretary of State. This notice had to be in writing and had to include: "(1) the amount of the expenditure, (2) a 'detailed description' of
the use of the expenditure, and (3) the name of the candidate whom the
expenditure is intended to support or oppose."' 177 Violations were punishable by a "'penalty of ten dollars per day for each day that a statement
or other information required to be filed ...is not filed by the close of
business on the day due."" 178 As the Davidson court recognized, "[tlo
require ' 79such immediate notice severely burdens First Amendment
rights."'

171.
See DICK M. CARPENTER H, INST. FOR JUSTICE, DISCLOSURE COSTS: UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 7 (2007), available at http://www.ij.org/images

/pdf-folder/other-pubs/DisclosureCosts.pdf.
172.
Id.
173.
ld. at 9.
174.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam); see also McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.
Supp. 2d 176, 227-29 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting evidence of retaliation and deterred contributions
ranging from: large numbers of contributions at just below the disclosure trigger amount; to vandalism after disclosure; to non-contribution because of concerns about a group's ability to retain confidentiality; to concerns about employers, neighbors, other business entities, and others knowing of
support for causes that are not popular everywhere and the results of such disclosure); AFL-CIO v.
FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting statements by labor organizations "that releasing
the names of hundreds of volunteers, members, and employees will make it more difficult for the
organization to recruit future personnel").
175.
236 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000).
176.
Id.
at 1181, 1197.
177.
Id. at 1196 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-113(4) (2000)).
178.
Id.(quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-113(4) (2000) (alteration in original)).
179.

Id. at 1197.
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Individuals or groups who fail to meet these requirements can face
serious penalties based on what amount to technical violations of the law.
In 1996, for example, California imposed an $808,000 fine (the largest
ever) on Russell Howard and Steve Cicero (president and treasurer) of
Californians Against Corruption (CAC), a small grassroots organization
that only spent $103,091 in an unsuccessful effort to oust by recall a
powerful state senator whom they considered to be corrupt.1 80 In the
flurry of activity and with few resources, CAC had trouble keeping up
with the reporting of the name, address, occupation, and employer of
anyone contributing over $100.181 The information was always requested, but contributors did not always follow up with the needed information.1 82 California's Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC)
levied the maximum $2,000 per violation for each failure to provide a
piece of the required information, even though the total was about eight
addresses
times the total amount spent, and most of the contributors'
1 83
were provided on copies of the checks given to the FPPC.
2. Specific Burdens Caused by Disclosure under Rescue Funds
Provisions
Aside from the sorts of burdens mentioned above-which apply to
most election-related disclosure-the disclosure requirements commonly
imposed by a rescue funds provision also impose additional burdens.
Specifically, compelled disclosure under a rescue funds provision requires the disclosure of campaign spending which exposes the privately
funded candidate's campaign strategy, thus undermining her ability 1to
84
engage in "effective advocacy" and to wage an effective campaign.
This is especially true where, as with most rescue funds provisions, disclosure requirements are asymmetrical, placing more stringent reporting
burdens on privately funded candidates.
Under the disclosure requirements of North Carolina's scheme, for
example, privately funded candidates with publicly funded opponents are
required to "report total income, expenses, and obligations to the Board
by facsimile machine or electronically within 24 hours after the total
amount of campaign expenditures or obligations made, or funds raised or
borrowed, exceeds eighty percent (80%) of the trigger for rescue funds,"
Brian Doherty, Disclosure Flaw, REASON, Mar. 1996, available at http://www.reason
180.
.com/news/printer/29856.html.
181.

Id.

Id.
182.
183.
Id. During the proceedings, "the FPPC explicitly stated as an aggravating factor that
Howard told a newspaper reporter that 'the little guy can't participate [in politics] without running
afoul of technical violations."' Brian Doherty, How Campaign Finance Law Hurts Participationin
Politics, REASON, Apr. 2001, available at http://www.reason.com/news/printer/32341 .html.
184.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Cf. AFL-CIO v.
FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting compelled disclosure of "confidential internal
materials" violates privacy right and "seriously interferes with internal group operations and effectiveness").
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and must file periodic reports thereafter according to an expedited reporting schedule set by the North Carolina Board of Elections. 85 Likewise,
"any entity making independent expenditures in support of or opposition
to a [publicly funded] candidate or in support of a candidate opposing a
[publicly funded] candidate" is required to "report the total funds received, spent, or obligated for those expenditures ...to the Board by
facsimile machine or electronically within 24 hours after the total amount
of expenditures or obligations made, or funds raised or borrowed, for the
purpose of making the independent expenditures.., exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000)."' 186 Subsequently, such groups must follow the
same expedited reporting schedule as privately funded candidates. Disclosure is not required, however, for independent
expenditures made in
87
opposition to a publicly funded candidate.
Electoral politics is a zero-sum game, and any benefit conferred on
one candidate is by its very nature a disadvantage to his opponents. Required reporting, both as to actual and planned expenditures (obligations), can provide valuable information to an opposing candidate as to
when major media buys and other readily-identifiable, big-ticket expenses are in the works, all long before they would be known under the
regular reporting required of all candidates. Information on spending is
strategic information that a candidate would ordinarily keep private until
all candidates are equally required to disclose their activities. These ongoing, unilateral disclosures of strategic information impose a clear
handicap, and also disincentives, on speech by privately funded candidates.
3. How to Deal with Disclosure
The fact that compelled disclosure imposes burdens on First
Amendment rights does not mean that all disclosure requirements are
unconstitutional. It does mean, however, that the "significant encroachments" on privacy and speech caused by mandatory disclosure "cannot
be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest." 188 In Buckley, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine the constitutionality of disclosure requirements. First, as a threshold requirement, the affected speech or activity be unambiguously campaign related. 89 Second, if the law passes this threshold requirement, a
disclosure requirement "must survive exacting scrutiny."'1 90
185.
186.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.66(a), (b) (2008).
Id. § 163-278.66(a).
187. See id. § 163-278.66(b).
188.
Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct.2759, 2775 (2008) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64).
189.
See N. C. Right to Life v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 281 (2008) ("[A]fter Buckley, campaign
finance laws may constitutionally regulate only those actions that are 'unambiguously related to the
campaign of a particular ...candidate.' " (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80) (alterations in the original)).
190.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
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a. The Unambiguously Campaign Related Threshold
Requirement
Buckley held that disbursements for political speech may not be
subjected to compelled disclosure, unless they are for communications
"unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate," to assure that "the relation of the information sought to the purposes of the Act [was not] too remote," 191 and to ensure that the proviof publicity on spending that is unambigusion only "shed[s] the light
192
related."
ously campaign
Buckley applied this unambiguously-campaign-related requirement
to: (1) expenditure limitations, 193 (2) Political Action Committee (PAC)
status and disclosure,' 94 (3) non-PAC disclosure of contributions and
independent expenditures, 195 and (4) contributions. 196 Because Buckley
expressly applied this unambiguously-campaign-related requirement to
the disclosure of expenditures,'97 it has direct application to the disclosures required to provide rescue funds.
Buckley employed two tests to implement this unambiguouslycampaign-related requirement. First, for determining PAC status, Buck198
"Exley endorsed the major-purpose test for "political committees."'
can
so
construed
committees'
and
of
'political
candidates
of
penditures
be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be addressed by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign related."'99 Second, to limit
the speech subject to FECA to only campaign-related speech, the Court
created the express-advocacy test, i.e., whether a communication contains explicit words expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate. 200 This test assures that expenditures are
"unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate."2 0 '

Id.at 80.
191.
Id. at 81.
192.
193.
Id. at 42-44.
194.
Id. at 79.
195.
Id. at 79-81. "Independent expenditure" is a term of art referring to an express-advocacy
communication that is not coordinated with a candidate. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006).
Id. at 23 n.24, 78 ("So defined, 'contributions' have a sufficiently close relationship to the
196.
goals of the Act, [i.e., regulating elections,] for they are connected with a candidate or his campaign.").
Id. at 80.
197.
198.
Id. at 79 ("To fulfill the purposes of the Act, [i.e., regulating elections,] they need only
encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is
the nomination or election of a candidate."); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S.
238, 252 n.6 (1986) (reaffirming major purpose test).
199. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
Id. at 44, 80; MCFL, 479 U.S. at 262 (holding that the major purpose of an organization
200.
was determined by express-advocacy "independent spending").
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
201.
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The Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL

ited the BCRA's new "electioneering communication '

1/)202

2°3

also lim-

corporate pro-

hibition ° 4 to only "campaign speech, 20 5 when it stated its test for the
extent of the prohibition: an ad may be prohibited "only if the ad is sus-

ceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote
for or against a specific candidate.,, 206 So WRTL Irs appeal-to-vote test
was the application of the unambiguously-campaign-related requirement

to electioneering communications, just as the express-advocacy test was
the Buckley Court's application of the requirement to reporting independent expenditures and the major-purpose test was its application of

the requirement to determination of PAC status.
The purpose of the unambiguously-campaign-related requirementand the appeal-to-vote test applying it-is twofold. Negatively, it confines government within the pale of its constitutional authority to regulate elections.20 7

speech,'2

Positively, it protects what WRTL II called "political

a term it equated with "genuine issue ads,

or "issue advo-

cacy, '' 2t ° as distinguished from "campaign speech" or "express advocacy.
WRTL H explained that "[i]ssue advocacy conveys information
and educates, ,,212 and reaffirmed Buckley's statement that, because issue
advocacy and candidate advocacy often look alike, bright-line tests are
required to protect political speech, or issue advocacy, from being
chilled.21 3 And to remove any doubt as to the necessity of speechprotective lines, WRTL H reiterated that "the benefit of any doubt [goes]

to protecting rather than stifling speech. 21 4
As explained, the disclosure requirements tied to rescue funds are
often triggered by spending by the privately funded opponent or by independent expenditures of third party groups. Since such speech is cam-

202.
127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
203.
Under BCRA, "electioneering communication" was defined as "any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which- (I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is
made within- (aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the
candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a
political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and
(111) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or
Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate." 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006).
204.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
205.
WRTL /, 127 S.Ct. at 2672 (emphasis added).
206.
Id. at 2667.
207.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (per curiam) ("The constitutional power of Congress to regulatefederal elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties in
this case." (footnote omitted and emphasis added)).
208.
WRTL /, 127 S.Ct. at 2659.
209.
Id. at 2659 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003)).
210.
Id. at 2667.
211.
Id. at 2659 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205-206).
212.
Id. at 2667.
213.
Id. at 2669.
214.
Id. at 2667; see also id. at 2669 n.7, 2674.

2008]

FUTURE OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING

225

paign speech, 1 5 then the disclosure requirements would be unambiguously campaign related. Whether disclosure was constitutional, therefore,
would depend on whether the disclosure provision passed strict scrutiny.
b. Strict Scrutiny
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court has been clear that electionrelated disclosure requirements are subject to "exacting scrutiny. ' '21 6 It
has been less clear, however, in defining exactly what sort of scrutiny
this "exacting scrutiny" requires. Some courts have held that exacting
scrutiny is simply a synonym for strict scrutiny and that compelled disclosure based on core political speech must be narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest to be constitutional, regardless of the
level of burden that disclosure placed on the exercise of First Amendment rights.21 7 Other courts have applied a lesser standard of scrutiny
when evaluating the constitutionality of mandatory disclosure provisions. 218

Evidence that "exacting scrutiny" means strict scrutiny can be found
in the Buckley decision itself. In its discussion of the disclosure requirements, for example, the Buckley Court expressly described "exacting
scrutiny" as "[t]he strict test," and included a discussion of "least restricWhen
tive means" in its analysis,2 19 a hallmark of strict scrutiny.22
making
for
persons
disclosure
compelled
to
consider
Buckley turned next
independent expenditures and certain contributions, it said that it "must
apply the same strict standard of scrutiny" as it had just applied to the
previous disclosure provision to protect the "right of associational privacy. , 22 1 More tellingly, Buckley also used "exacting scrutiny" to describe the level of scrutiny given to the expenditure limits at issue in the
linked "exacting scrucase. 222 The Supreme Court has also explicitly
tiny" with strict scrutiny in other contexts in Buckley v. American Consti-

If, however, the disclosure requirements on independent spending went beyond express
215.
advocacy communications to require the disclosure of issue advocacy, the disclosure requirements
would be unconstitutional as not being campaign related.
216.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam).
217. See Alaska Right to Life Comm. v. Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 787 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the "'exacting scrutiny' standard in Buckley was later characterized by the Court as requiring that a
restriction on corporate political expenditures be 'narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest."' (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990))); AFL-CIO v.
FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 176 (2003) (stating that Buckley "conclud[ed] that the disclosure requirements..
* survived strict scrutiny"); Cal. Pro-Life Council v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1101 n.16 (9th Cir.
2003) ("[W]e subject California's disclosure requirements to strict scrutiny."); R.I. ACLU v. Begin,
431 F. Supp. 2d 227, 235 (D.R.I. 2006) (stating that disclosure requirements "are subject to 'strict'
or 'exacting' scrutiny").
Duke v. Leake, 524 F.3d 427, 439 (4th Cir. 2008); C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583
218.
F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that disclosure regulations for express ballot measure advocacy may be enacted "without a showing of a compelling state interest").
219. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
220.
221.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
Id. at 44.
222.
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tutional Law Foundation (Buckley I/), 223 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission,22 4 and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.2 25

To date, one of the best attempts to synthesize these seemingly inconsistent lines of cases is Justice Thomas's concurrence in Buckley 11.226
Justice Thomas begins his analysis by addressing a puzzling feature of
constitutional jurisprudence, namely that political speech concerning

elections is often subject to greater regulation than is non-election related
speech. The answer to this puzzle lies in the state's authority to regulate

elections. 227 States must hold elections, and this necessity requires regulations of the various aspects of the election process.228 To require that
every election regulation pass strict scrutiny "would tie the hands of

States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. 229 Since it would not be appropriate or practicable to subject
every election-related law to strict scrutiny, courts have developed a special framework for addressing the constitutionality of some sorts of election-related regulations. Under this framework, while regulations that
impose significant burdens on freedom of speech and association remain
subject to strict scrutiny, regulations imposing light burdens are subject

to a lesser standard of review. 230 However, when an election-regulated
regulation burdens core political speech, the Supreme Court has "ordinarily applied strict scrutiny without first determining that the State's law
severely burdens speech ' 23' because "restrictions on core political speech

223.
525 U.S. 182, 192 n.12 (1999) ("Our decision is entirely in keeping with the 'now-settled
approach' that state regulations 'impos[ing] 'severe burdens' on speech .. .[must] be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest." (citation omitted)). Although the Court used strict
scrutiny language, it concluded that the challenged provisions were "no more than tenuously related
to the substantial interests disclosure serves," so that they "'fail exacting scrutiny."' Id. at 204.
(citing Am. Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1105 (10th Cir. 1997)).
224.
514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("When a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting
scrutiny,' and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state
interest."); see also id. at 348 (referring to exacting scrutiny as "the strictest standard of review").
225.
435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) ("[When] exacting scrutiny [is] necessitated ... 'the State may
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,' 'and the burden is on the
government to show the existence of such an interest."' (citations omitted)); but see McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (holding that disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act were constitutional because they served "important state interests").
226.
Buckley 11, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring).
227.
See, e.g., id. (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4)).
228.
Buckley 11, 525 U.S. at 206. (Thomas, J., concurring).
229.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
230.
Buckley 11, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("When a State's rule imposes severe
burdens on speech or association, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest; lesser
burdens trigger less exacting review, and a State's important regulatory interests are typically
enough to justify reasonable restrictions.").
231.
Id. at 207.
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so plainly impose a 'severe burden.' 23 2 This analysis appears to have
in 233
been adopted by the Court inDavis.
The provision of rescue funds and the accompanying disclosure,
however, are not necessary to conduct elections in the way that, say,
regulations concerning voting, ballots, and candidate eligibility are. The
justification for lower scrutiny of some election-related regulations-that
such regulations are necessary to effectuate the state's obligation to hold
fair elections-would therefore not apply to compelled disclosure under
the rescue funds provisions. 234
A word should also be said here about the use of synonyms in Supreme Court opinions, which can cause confusion or be used in an attempt to evade the required strict scrutiny. Writing is often enhanced by
the use of synonyms to avoid repetition of the same term, so it is common to find synonyms in legal opinions as a stylistic device. But where,
as in Supreme Court legal opinions, advocates may attempt to place
heavy reliance on any variant reading, precision is preferred. Confusing
synonyms are often used without any intent to change the analysis, and
analytical language often changes over time.
For example, McIntyre used "overriding," not "compelling," to describe the required strict-scrutiny standard.235 In Bellotti, the Court spoke
of "exacting scrutiny" as requiring the State to "show[] a subordinating
interest which is compelling," and "means 'closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment ....

,,,236 Bellotti also referred to "exacting scru-

tiny" as "critical scrutiny, 2 37 and after further analysis held that
"[a]ssuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling'
interest

. . .

we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the

governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking., 238 While Bellotti employed standard strict-scrutiny
language by speaking of a "compelling interest," the "narrow tailoring"
requirement was described with synonyms that might lead one to mistakenly believe that some intermediate standard applied-or even that the
Court was speaking of the relevant-and-substantial-relation requirement
that it had stated in Buckley in the disclosure context. From these examples, it is apparent that the use of synonyms does not alter the required
level of scrutiny.
232. Id. at 208 (citation omitted).
233. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2775 (2008) ("[T]he strength of the governmental interest
[justifying disclosure] must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment
rights.").
234. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
235. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
236. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (outlining Buckley's contribution-limit analysis using intermediate
scrutiny)).
237. See id. at 786-87.
238. Id. at 795 (citation omitted).
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4. Are There Compelling Reasons for Compelled Disclosure?
In Buckley, the Supreme Court found that there were three government interests sufficiently compelling to justify some form of disclosure:
(1) an informational interest in allowing voters to know who was financially supporting a given candidate's campaign; (2) an anti-corruption
interest in deterring both actual corruption and its appearance; and (3) an
enforcement interest allowing a state to more easily detect violations of
its contribution limits. 239 The third interest obviously has no application
to disclosure under the rescue funds provision, as the disclosure requirements apply to independent expenditures and the campaign spending of
opposing candidates, for which contribution limits do not apply. 240 The
first two interests, however, warrant further comment.
a. Informational Interest
The first interest cited by Buckley as potentially justifying compelled disclosure was informational. Disclosure "provides the electorate
with information 'as to where political campaign money comes from and
how it is spent by the candidate' in order to aid the voters in evaluating
those who seek federal office., 24 1 Done appropriately, disclosure "allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches," and can "alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of
future performance in office." 242

Disclosure requirements associated with rescue funds provisions
will generally not be narrowly tailored to this interest. As discussed
above, under the disclosure requirements of North Carolina's scheme
privately funded candidates with publicly funded opponents are required
to "report total income, expenses, and obligations to the Board by facsimile machine or electronically within twenty-four hours after the total
amount of campaign expenditures or obligations made, or funds raised or
borrowed, exceeds eighty percent (80%) of the trigger for rescue funds,"
and must file periodic reports thereafter according to an expedited reporting schedule set by the North Carolina Board of Elections.24 3 Likewise,
"[a]ny entity making independent expenditures in support of or opposition to a [publicly funded] candidate or in support of a candidate opposBuckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
239.
240.
In McConnell, the Supreme Court expanded the understanding of data-gathering as a
compelling interest in holding that the important state interest of "gathering the data necessary to
enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions" applies to "the entire range of electioneering
communications." McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (emphasis added). Even as broadened by
McConnell, however, the state's interest in data-gathering has no relevance to the rescue funds
provision.
241.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-67.
242.
ld. at 67.
243.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.66(a) (2008).
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ing a [publicly funded] candidate" is required to report the total funds
received, spent, or obligated for those expenditures or payments to the
Board by facsimile machine or electronically within 24 hours after the
total amount of expenditures or obligations made, or funds raised or borrowed, for the purpose of making the independent expenditures or electioneering communications exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000).244
Again, such groups must follow the same expedited reporting
schedule as privately funded candidates. The disclosure requirements
imposed by the rescue funds provision are also far more burdensome
than would be necessary for the state to achieve legitimate informational
*24 24s
Under the disclosure requirements, candidates and indeinterests.
pendent groups must report contributions, obligations, and expenditures
within 24 hours. The State's interest in disclosure is served so long as
disclosure is made before the election and with enough time for voters to
make informed voting decisions.
The disclosure burden required by a rescue funds provision is also
often unilateral. Publicly funded candidates are only required to file a
few reports during the election campaign, and these reports need not be
made on any sort of expedited basis.246 Similarly, the disclosure requirements for independent expenditures differ greatly according to
whether the expenditures involve a publicly funded or privately funded
candidate. In North Carolina, for example, disclosure is not required
under the rescue funds provision for independent expenditures made in
opposition to a candidate opposing a publicly funded candidate, i.e. to
independent expenditures opposing a privately funded candidate.247
Where considerable First Amendment freedoms are at stake, a state must
"demonstrate its commitment to advancing [its] interest by applying its
[requirements] evenhandedly. 24 8 The rescue funds provision's disclosure requirements, however, do not do this.
In any event, the public will receive full information about campaign contributions and receipts in the less-restrictive quarterly and preelection reports that both candidates must file, and in the normal independent expenditure reports that groups must file, so the special, unilateral disclosure requirements are redundant as to any public informational
interest. Any asserted informational interest would be "insubstantial

244. Id.
245. See Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1197 (2001)
("None of the State's compelling interests in informing the electorate, preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption, or gathering data would be at all compromised by a more workable deadline.").
246. See, e.g., § 163-278.66(a), (b).
§ 163-278.66(b).
247.
248. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989).
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because voters may identify [the relevant information] under [other] provisions. 2 49
b. Anti-Corruption Interest
Compelled disclosure has also been justified as a means of deterring
actual and apparent corruption. 250 Disclosure can act as a safeguard
against corruption in two ways. First, the exposure that comes from disclosure "may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either before or after the election., 25' In addition, a "public armed
with information about a candidate's most generous supporters is better
able ,to
detect any post-election special favors that may be given in re,252
turn.

The disclosure requirements provided for under typical rescue funds
provisions, however, are not narrowly tailored to the state's interest in
preventing actual or apparent corruption. First, the rescue funds provisions' disclosure requirements apply to independent and candidate expenditures. These expenditures pose no threat of corruption. 3 In addition to requiring disclosure based on expenditures, compelled disclosure
under a rescue funds provision also typically applies once a candidate
has received contributions over some set amount (usually a percentage of
the trigger amount). In North Carolina, for example, disclosure is required once the total contributions by a privately funded candidate combined with the total of independent expenditures made in support of that
privately funded candidate and in opposition to his publicly funded op25
ponent reach 80% of the trigger amount. 25 Yet, if anything, the corrupting influence a contribution has is likely to decrease the more total funds
a candidate has raised, as each individual contribution will make up a
smaller percentage of the total. A contribution is no less likely to have a
corrupting influence on candidates who do not end up raising 80% of the
trigger amount than on candidates who do. Despite this fact, reporting is
required for the latter, but not the former. Likewise, whether a contribution is corrupting does not depend on whether a candidate's opponent is
publicly funded or privately funded. Yet disclosure is only required for
privately funded candidates who face publicly funded opponents. Thus,
compelled disclosure required by the rescue funds provision does not
serve an anti-corruption interest.
249.
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1981) ("It is
clear, therefore, that [the challenged disclosure provision] does not advance a legitimate governmental interest significant enough to justify its infringement of First Amendment rights.").
250.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam).
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
253.
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (reaffirming Buckley's holding regarding the
unconstitutionality of expenditure limits); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (suggesting that independent
expenditures do not pose threat of corruption).
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.66(a) (2008).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Concern about corruption, in the judiciary as much as in other
branches of government, is a matter of great importance. One should not
make the mistake, however, of equating increases in the amount of money spent on judicial campaigns with an increase in corruption. Furthermore, if states are going to adopt measures designed to combat corruption, they must take care that the proposed antidotes do not impose unconstitutional burdens on the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates or independent groups. If a state does attempt to restrict protected
speech via election regulations, whether through bans on personal solicitation, rescue funds based on opposing speech, or burdensome and
asymmetrical disclosure, this will only serve to deform, rather than reform, the judicial election process.

Six FATAL FLAWS: A COMMENT ON BOPP AND NEELEY
ROY A. SCHOTLANDt
INTRODUCTION

Let us enter a scene that James Bopp Jr. and Josiah Neeley urge us
to allow:
In Judge J's courtroom one morning, this occurs: The judge is
about to hear argument between two leading local lawyers. As the argument opens, he says: "Gentlemen, you know I'm running for reelection and you know how much I'd appreciateyour support." Counsel
answer, "Yes, your Honor, we certainly support you." To which the

Judge replies, "Well, I haven't yet had any contributionfrom either of
you, can I count on you?"

To which each counsel responds, "You'll

have my check before I leave."

[Would you react to this differently if

one lawyer promised $1,000 and the other said he could send only

$100?] The priorafternoon, as the judge ended a jury trial with his customary in-chambers chat with the jurors, he asked them too for contributions.
As for Judge J's opponent: A respected local lawyer is considering
running against J. She's told by friends-eagerto see her on the bench
because they believe she'd be a stellarjudge-that she'll have to raise a
substantial campaign fund. In her view, campaigning is an unpleasant
hurdle but one she can tolerate,and she's confident she can put together
a strong campaign committee. However, when she learns that to be effective in fund-raisingshe'll have to do the solicitation herself she calls
off her effort.'

t
Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Center. He serves as a senior adviser to the
National Center for State Courts; he organized and co-chaired the 2000 Chief Justices' National
Summit on Improving Judicial Selection and 2001 Chief Justices' Symposium on Judicial Campaign
Conduct and the First Amendment. The author is greatly indebted to several wise readers of drafts.
I. The above scenario stems from the comment by an ex-President of the ABA shortly after
the Eleventh Circuit's Weaver decision, invalidating the entire Canon on personal soliciting.
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1315, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc denied, 57 F.
App'x 416 (11th Cir. 2003). I asked him whether he thought lawyers would be asked for contributions before or after oral argument. He said: "Why not during?"
The scenario, to one reader of these pages, is "far-fetched." But given the sweep and
absolutism of the Bopp-Neeley argument that limits on judicial candidates' personal soliciting are
unconstitutional, this scenario is not merely taking their position to its logical extreme. The point of
the scenario is to ask whether any limits on personal soliciting are constitutional. For example, the
Eighth Circuit narrowly tailored the Canon, drawing a line that is at least arguably sound. Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White 11), 416 F.3d 738, n.23 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Bopp-Neeley
misleadingly treat the Eighth Circuit decision as simply supporting their position. See James Bopp,
Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections: Davis, White, and the Future of Judicial Campaign Financing,86 DENV. U. L. REV. 202-204, nn. 50, 51,58 (2008).
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According to Bopp-Neeley, the only negative aspects of allowing
judicial candidates to personally solicit campaign funds are these: It is
"unpleasant and time consuming for candidates and awkward for poten2
tial contributors. Other objections ... are, iftrue, much more serious.,
Banning personal solicitation does "allow states to maintain the fiction
that judges are not directly involved in the campaign fundraising process." 3 Any bans on personal solicitation "do not serve an interest in preventing corruption" and are inconsistent with White and have been enjoined by four federal courts. 4 "What raises impartiality concerns is not
the solicitation of funds, but rather a judge's knowledge of the source...
. [A]ny impartiality concerns raised by the personal solicitation ...

are

inherent in the state's decision to elect judges and cannot be used as a
rationale to limit candidates' First Amendment rights."5
Allowing scenes like the ones suggested above has six fatal flaws.
The flaws listed here are not in order of priority because, although all of
Certainly some line-drawing may improve the Canon; the above scenario aims at two
points: 1)To say that no limits are constitutional, goes too far; e.g., the reader just mentioned considers it preposterous to argue that it is unconstitutional "to prohibit solicitation in the courthouse
with your robe on." 2) What line-drawing does make sense? I reject lines like these: if the soliciting
is outside the courthouse the same day as the oral argument; if the soliciting is to lawyers or litigants
in a pending or imminent case; if they come before that judge with any frequency or he or she is the
only judge in their jurisdiction or reasonably likely to hear any case they are involved in. In short,
any one-on-one or small-group soliciting by a sitting judge (or candidate for that seat) seems inescapably freighted with so much pressure, that there is undue risk to both impartiality in fact and the
perception of impartiality.
Bopp-Neeley claim that "any impartiality concerns raised by the personal solicitation of
campaign funds are inherent in the state's decision to elect judges." Id. at 204; but that assumes that
judicial elections must be the same as elections for non-judicial offices, which White rejected explicitly (and clearly correctly, see infra Part I.B).
Last on this: Bopp-Neeley equate the pressure in solicitations by judicial candidates with
solicitations by legislative and executive candidates. Bopp-Neeley, supra at 205. But a judge's
decisions, reached after a constitutionally cabined process, impact directly and specifically X lawyer
or litigant. In contrast, it is inherent in executive and legislative action that they almost always affect
many people, and all who may be affected are free to engage with the officials in all kinds of contact, argument and support.
2. Bopp-Neeley, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
At the outset let me note that I agree with Mr. Bopp and Mr. Neeley on several issues.
For example, on public funding (which I do not oppose but which I believe is severely oversold,
distracting us from steps that will be more productive), I agree on many aspects that they list and I
expect they would agree with others that I have listed. See Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland,
Justice in Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1251, 1254-58 (2008).
Although Bopp, Neeley and I do not agree about White and other issues, this comment
treats only the matter of soliciting campaign contributions, which has drawn little attention and is, I
believe, incomparably more important than generally realized. Even on this matter, I only note here
that regulation of campaign contributions is not subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247-48 (2006) (adhering to the treatment since Buckley); see also Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000). Even applying strict scrutiny, the Maine and
Arkansas courts have upheld this Canon since White, and the Third Circuit and Oregon Supreme
Court did so earlier. In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124, 30, 838 A.2d 338, 350 (Me. 2003); Simes v.
Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 879, 884 (Ark. 2007); see Stretton
v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 141-43 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31,41 (Or. 1990).
3.
Bopp-Neeley, supra note 1,at 201.
4.
Id. at 203.
5.
Id.
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them are powerful, they would draw different priorities from different
observers:
1. For generations, and in almost all states with judicial elections,
judicial candidates have been barred from personally soliciting campaign
funds.
2. All states that have chosen to have some or all of their judges
face some form of election have also chosen an array of stateconstitutional differences between the judges and other elective officials.
We cannot ignore that array. Nor can we say that because there are judicial elections the campaign conduct cannot be regulated; an analogy is
our limiting highway speed even though we have superhighways and
powerful cars.
3. White is, to understate it, distinguishable. The lower-court decisions are, as noted more fully below, (a) far from the Bopp-Neeley position (Eighth Circuit), (b) only a sua sponte departure from White (Eleventh Circuit), (c) still on appeal (Tenth Circuit), (d) only a preliminary
injunction that explicitly did not review for constitutionality (Kentucky
District Court), or (e) flatly contrary to Bopp-Neeley (Arkansas Supreme
Court).
4. Not only First Amendment rights are involved but also litigants'
Due Process rights to an impartial judge, as well as protecting the Separation of Powers values served by preserving the differences between
judges and other elective officials.
5. Not only constitutionality is at issue. We cannot ignore how noholds-barred election campaigns will affect who will be willing to run for
the bench, and for re-election. Many, probably most, of the kind of people who would be fine judges are undeniably different personalities from
the kind of people who enjoy campaigns or are at least willing to get into
them.
6. To allow conduct like that in the scenes described above will
jeopardize public confidence in the courts to an unusually acute and demonstrable degree. Scenes like those above bring the risk, even the likelihood, that some observers will see little or no difference between contributions and bribes. Empirical studies of voters' reactions to the postWhite reduction of limits on campaign speech show there is little concern
about that change but high concern about campaign contributions.6

6.
James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy
Theory and "New-Style" JudicialCampaigns, 102 AM. POL. Sci.REP. 59 (2008) (Kentucky voters);
James L. Gibson, "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns and the Legitimacy of State High Courts: Results from a National Survey (forthcoming) ("When judges express their policy views during campaigns... no harm is done to the institutional legitimacy of courts .... At the same time, the current system of campaign contributions does appear to be injurious to courts.") (manuscript at 19-20,
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I. SIX FATAL FLAWS

A. PersonalSolicitationof Campaign Funds

For generations, and in thirty-four of the thirty-nine states with judicial elections, judicial candidates have been barred from personally soliciting campaign funds; their campaign committees do the soliciting. As
the Conference of Chief Justices put it in an amicus brief,
[w]ithout this Canon, even the most highly respected judges will be
forced to join a "race to the bottom".... One can imagine the very
dire, yet very real, consequences if the Canon is stricken. Will
judges be free to solicit funds in the courthouse, before or after oral
argument (or, as asks a former ABA President, "Why not during oral
argument?")? Will judges be free to solicit from jurors? While new
Canons surely could limit such
extreme practices, the "race to the
7
bottom" is bound to dominate.

Three courts have stated the reasons for this Canon. First, the Third
Circuit:
[A]s a practical matter, so long as a state chooses to select its judges
by popular election, it must condone to some extent the collection
and expenditure of money for campaigns. Unquestionably, that practice invites abuses that are inconsistent with the ideals of an impartial
and incorruptible judiciary ....
There is no aspect of the electoral
system of choosing judges that has drawn more vehement and justifiable criticism than the raising of campaign funds, particularly from
lawyers and litigants likely to appear before the court. Plaintiff is
correct that the currently approved practices do involve the candidate
deeply, albeit indirectly, in the process. Nevertheless, we cannot say
that the state may not draw a line at the point where the coercive effect, or its appearance, is at its most intense-personalsolicitation
by the candidate. [P]laintiffs contention that this is the most effective means for raising money only underscores the fact that solicitation in person does have an effect-one that lends itself to the8 appearance of coercion or expectation of impermissible favoritism.

The Oregon Supreme Court wrote this:

on file with author), available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1023785 (follow "Download" hyperlink).
7.
Brief of Conference of Chief Justices Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants/Appellees,
at 20, 22, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004) (No. 99-4021). This
article draws upon that amicus brief as well as the CCJ's amicus brief at the Supreme Court in White
in 2002; I co-authored both briefs.
8.
Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 144-46 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). The
Third Circuit was prescient in writing, "[tlhere is no aspect of the electoral system of choosing
judges that has drawn more vehement and justifiable criticism than the raising of campaign funds...
" The public's strong criticism has been consistent and widespread. See infra, note 47 (discussing
the results of many polls).
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[The Canon] protects ...the state's interest in maintaining, not only
the integrity of the judiciary, but also the appearance of that integrity.
...
The impression created when a lawyer or potential litigant, who
may from time to time come before a particular judge, contributes to
the campaign of that judge is always unfortunate ....
[T]he outside
observer cannot but think that the lawyer or potential litigant either
expects to get special treatment from the judge or, at the least, hopes
to get such treatment. It follows that, if it is at all possible to do so,
the spectacle of lawyers or potential litigants directly handing over
money to judicial candidates should be avoided
if the public is to
9
have faith in the impartiality of its judiciary.
And the Maine Supreme Court:
It is exactly this activity that potentially creates a bias, or at least the
appearance of bias, for or against a party to a proceeding. If a contribution is made, a judge might subsequently be accused of favoring
the contributor in court. If a contribution is declined, a judge might
be accused of punishing a contributor in court. 10
All three courts essentially found the same compelling state interests: "[t]he stake of the public in a judiciary that is both honest in fact
and honest in appearance . . . ."11 The most
recent decision, noted fully
12
below, strongly affirms the same position.
B. State ConstitutionalDifferencesfor Judicial Elections
All thirty-nine states that have chosen to have some or all of their
judges face some form of election have also chosen an array of stateconstitutional differences between the judges and other elective officials.
We cannot ignore that array. The Supreme Court has long recognized a
"fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office
and the real world of electoral politics . . . ,,13 Acutely aware of that
tension, the states that have chosen some form of judicial election have
included in that choice an array of constitutional provisions unique to the
judiciary to assure that judicial independence is protected. Most of these
provisions would be unthinkable for other elected officials in the legislative and executive branches. For example, in all thirty-nine states,
judges' terms are longer than any other elective officials' terms.14 In
9.
In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 41 (Or. 1990).
10. In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124, 1 31, 838 A.2d 338, 351 (Me. 2003).
11.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 145; In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 40; see also In re Dunleavy, 838
A.2d at 346-51; Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977) (calling the state's
interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system "grave and honorable").
12. Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 881-82 (Ark.
2007).
13.
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991).
14. Except that Nebraska's Regents' terms are longer than their judges' terms. Of appellate
judges facing elections, thirty-nine percent have terms of ten to fifteen years and another sixty-one
percent have terms of six to eight years. Of trial judges facing elections, thirteen percent have terms
of ten to fifteen years, and another sixty-eight percent have terms of six to eight years. CrrIZENS FOR
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almost all, only judges are subject to both impeachment and special disciplinary process. In thirty-three states, judges are the only elective state
officials subject to requirements of training or experience or both (except
that in ten of those, the attorney general is subject to similar requirements). In twenty-three states, only judges are subject to mandatory retirement.
This pattern of provisions shows that the choice of elections, as the
Third Circuit put it, "while perhaps a decision of questionable wisdom,
does not signify the abandonment of the ideal of an impartial judiciary
carrying out its duties fairly and thoroughly." 1 5 The thirty-nine states
have recognized that, far from fulfilling the historic purpose in allowing
for the popular election of judges, any effort to treat judicial elections
like others wholly undermines the judiciary's independent role under
their constitutions. The states' balanced approach to the proper structure
for an elected judiciary embodies the understanding that
the word "representative" connotes one who is not only elected by
the people, but who also, at a minimum, acts on behalf of the people.
Judges do that in a sense-but not in the ordinary sense .... [T]he
judge represents
the Law-which often requires him to rule against
16
the People.
Judges are subject to the array of unique provisions because the
judges' jobs are so different:
[O]ther elected officials are open to meeting-at any time and openly
or privately-their constituents or anyone who may be affected by
their action in pending or future matters, but judges are not similarly
open; nonjudicial candidates [are free to] seek support by making
promises about how they will perform; [o]ther elected officials are
advocates, free to cultivate and reward support by working with their
supporters to advance shared goals; other elected officials pledge to
change law, and if elected they often work unreservedly toward
change; other elected officials participate in diverse and usually large
multi-member bodies; other elected incumbents build up support
through "constituent casework," patronage, securing benefits for
communities, etc.; almost all other elected officials face challenges in

INDEPENDENT COURTS, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: REPORT OF THE CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS
TASK FORCE ON SELECTING STATE COURT JUDGES 77, 90-92, 116-17 (2000).

Other unique provisions on the judiciary: in twenty-one states, only judicial nominations
go through nominating commissions; in six states, this applies even to interim appointments. Last,
in eighteen states, only judges cannot run for a nonjudicial office without first resigning. For citations to examples of all these provisions, see Brief of Amici Curiae Conference of Chief Justices in
Support of Respondents, at 6-7 nn.6- 11, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)
(No. 01-521).
15.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142.
16.
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410-1l (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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every election; [and last, fundraising by judicial candidates is
uniquely constrained].17

To say that when judges face elections "an election is an election"meaning that these elections cannot be regulated differently from other
elections-would be to deny the differences between judges and other
elective officials, and to deny the recognition of those differences in so
many constitutional provisions. It would be like saying that because we
have superhighways and powerful cars, we cannot limit highway speed.
Of course regulation must be narrowly tailored, but the fact that the obsolete, never-enforced "Announce" clause was unconstitutional does not
sweep the field-as is explicit in the recent Arkansas Supreme Court
decision noted last in the following review of the decisions.
C. White is Distinguishable
White does not touch this Canon. "[The] solicitation clause fundamentally differs 8from the announce clause analyzed by the Supreme
Court in White."'
Bopp, who deserves credit for his successful argument of White, has
always read it expansively, even elastically. He argued, as a good lawyer, that the decision of the issue in White (the "Announce" clause's constitutionality) would not touch even the most similar Canon (the
Pledge/Promise clause).' 9 But ever since winning that case he has used it
(in understandable advocacy but merely that) to challenge the

Pledge/Promise clause, the solicitation Canon, the political-activities
Canon, and others.2z
In the first federal court decision after White, an Eleventh Circuit
panel in Weaver v. Bonner invalidated the Georgia Canon-a provision

that was law in thirty-four states-requiring that judicial candidates not
personally solicit campaign contributions but instead have it done by
their campaign committees. 21 But, the Weaver panel (1) acted sua
17. Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35 IND.
L. REV. 701,716-17 (2002).
18.
Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d at 881.
19.
See Brief for Petitioners Republican Party of Minn., at 31, Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521).
20. Bopp has represented plaintiffs in more than half of the 33 post-White cases attacking
various Canons. E.g., Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 2008) (injunction vacated in part and certified in part to the Kansas Supreme Court).
21.
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1315, 1322-23 (11 th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc denied,
57 F. App'x 416 (11 th Cir. 2003).
How has Weaver fared in operation? In 2008, in Georgia's only contested statewide
judicial election, an unofficial judicial campaign conduct committee succeeded in getting pledges
from most judicial candidates that they will not do any personal soliciting. With seven candidates
for this open seat, four signed the committee's pledge and, of the three others, one says he is doing
no personal soliciting. In the three election cycles in Georgia since Weaver, a few candidates apparently have done personal soliciting but not actively; the only certainty is that one candidate happened
to personally solicit the young lawyer who is "staff' for the committee. Apparently, after some
candidates engaged in personal soliciting, their opponents did the same to meet the challenge.
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sponte: the provision had not been challenged by plaintiff nor argued at
trial or on appeal (Georgia's appeal was from a decision limiting the applicability of another Canon); 22 (2) incorrectly read White to require judicial elections to sound the same as legislative and executive elections,
despite the White majority's explicit limitation to the contrary; 23 (3) simply ignored three contrary decisions, one by the Third Circuit, another
after White by the Maine Supreme Court, and one by the Oregon Supreme Court; 24 and (4) wrongly chose strict scrutiny. That panel's sua
sponte activism led it to sweep away the entire Canon, in contrast to the
tailoring by the Eighth Circuit, noted in the next paragraph.
The next decision on which Bopp-Neeley rely-the Eighth Circuit
on remand in White-did indeed find the solicitation Canon unconstitutional, but only in part. The court upheld the limit on personal solicitation but found that it must be narrowly tailored to allow a candidate's
"personally signing a solicitation letter or making a blanket solicitation to
a large group":
An actual or mechanical reproduction of a candidate's signature on a
contribution letter will not magically endow him or her with a power
that
to divine, first, to whom that letter was sent, and second, whether
25
person contributed to the campaign or balked at the request.
There is no question that the Eighth Circuit's line upholding the ban
on personal solicitation (thus banning scenes like those that open these
pages) but allowing "blanket solicitation" to large groups and also solicitation by mail (at least via mass mailings), seems reasonable, perhaps
advisable-whether one agrees with it, or disagrees as I do. Like the
Bopp-Neeley reading of White, this decision they more than stretch: they
distort it.
As for two other decisions on which Bopp-Neeley rely, one, as
noted earlier, is now on appeal.26 In the other, they cite a District Court
Gresham's Law rules again. Telephone interviews with a Georgia judge and (10/8/08) with Jeremy
Berry, Co-chair, Ga. Comm. for Ethical Judicial Campaigns, in Atlanta, Ga.
22.
All-out "judicial activism," which normally Bopp actively opposes. "[1]t is judicial activism that threatens judicial independence .... Judicial activism is at the core of the attacks on judicial independence." James Bopp Jr., PreservingJudicial Independence: Judicial Elections as the
Antidote to JudicialActivism, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 180, 185, 191 (2007).

23.
Compare White, 536 U.S. at 783, with Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23.
24.
Sttetton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124,
838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31 (Or. 1990).
25.
White 11, 416 F.3d 738, 765-766 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
26.
Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 2008) (injunction vacated
in part and certified in part to the Kansas Supreme Court, which answered certified questions on
other issues, No. 100, 170 (Kan. Dec. 5, 2008)).
As these pages go to press, the District Court issued another opinion, saying that it had
earlier "inappropriately" enjoined the solicitation of funds provision; now for the first time considered its constitutionality, and found it constitutional. The judge ignored the narrow tailoring that the
8th Circuit had done in White II (supra note 25). Yost v. Stout, Case No.06-4122-JAR (D. Kan.,
Nov. 2008).
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decision that was only a preliminary injunction which explicitly did not
reach a constitutional decision; however, last month that court did find
the Canon unconstitutional.27
Most recent is a 2007 Arkansas Supreme Court decision-Simes v.
Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission-explicitly
against the Bopp-Neeley position, which they try to put aside as "out of
step" with White and as unduly concerned about "the subjective feelings
of those solicited. 28 What Simes says is that "[a]ttorneys ought not feel
pressured to support certain judicial candidates in order to represent their
clients"-which I would not characterize as mere "subjective feelings. 29
And Simes relies on much more:
Allowing a judge to personally solicit or accept campaign contributions, especially from attorneys who may practice in his or her court,
not only has the possibility of making a judge feel obligated to favor
certain parties in a case, it inevitably places the solicited individuals
in a position to fear retaliation if they fail to financially support that
candidate. Attorneys ought not feel pressured to support certain judicial candidates in order to represent their clients. In addition, the
public should be protected from fearing that the integrity of the judicial system has been compromised, forcing them to search for an attorney in part based upon the criteria of which attorneys have made
the obligatory contributions. Thus, we take this opportunity to acknowledge that, in Arkansas, avoiding the appearance of impropriety
is also a compelling state interest.
... In the instant case, the petitioner was found to have made direct,
personal solicitations [including to an attorney who "appeared before
the petitioner about two or three times a quarter and had cases pending in the petitioner's court at the time of the solicitation"] ....
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's finding.., it is very likely in the instant
case that the petitioner, or any other judge making such a personal
solicitation, would have a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion [for or] against [a particular litigant in
a case]" based upon that litigant's support.

27. Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, 2008 WL 4602786, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 15,
2008).
28. Bopp-Neeley, supra note 1, at 204.
29. Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d at 882. A lawyer is
likely to feel pressured for several reasons: she may be concerned about being able to remain effective for her clients; she may believe the soliciting judge is unworthy of support; she may fear that the
soliciting judge's opponent is the kind of person who would keep track of who contributed to whom;
she may lack the funds to make a notable contribution; and/or she may well feel the personal solicitation and surrounding circumstances involve unprofessional conduct. Solicitation by a judge raises
possible pressures different from any raised by solicitation for non-judicial campaigns. That is why,
as Simes noted, the Canons not only address campaign contributions but also preclude judges "from
using their office for fundraising or membership solicitation at any time." Id. at 883.
Even totally subjective feelings may be rational, e.g., when one does all one can to avoid
contact with a person carrying a contagious disease.
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• . . Arkansas's Canon 5C(2) seeks to insulate judicial candidates

from the solicitation and receipt of funds while leaving open, ample
alternative means for candidates to raise the resources necessary to
run their campaigns. To this end, Canon 5C(2) provides that candidates may establish campaign committees to conduct fundraising on
their behalf. . . . [T]he state is doing nothing more than seeking a
balance between allowing people to elect theirjudges and safeguard-

ing the process so that the integrity of the judiciary and due process

will not be compromised. For all of the above reasons, we reject the
arguments presented by the petitioner and find that Canon 5C(2) of
the Arkansas Code of Judicial30 Conduct is narrowly tailored to serve
the compelling state interests.
D. Litigants' Due Process Rights to an ImpartialJudge

Not only First Amendment rights are involved but also litigants'
Due Process rights to an impartial judge. And also the constitutional
structure at stake in protecting the Separation-of-Powers values served
by preserving the differences between judges and other elective officials.
The Due Process Clause's guarantee of impartial judges, both as a
matter of fact and as a matter of perception, is a compelling state interest.3
As for the separation of powers: in choosing judicial elections,
states have not abandoned their concern with preserving fully separated
powers. The States know that if candidates for judicial office appeal for
voters' support on the same basis as legislative candidates-if they answer to the same electoral majorities-the courts run the grave risk of
becoming second legislatures. As electoral twins to the legislatures,
courts would lose the independence-and the crucial public perception
of that independence-required for them to discharge their high constitutional duty of judicial review.
E. Elective Campaignsand the JudicialPool

Not only constitutionality is at issue. We cannot ignore how noholds-barred elective campaigns will affect the pool of people willing to
run for election to the bench, and for re-election.
The whole goal of efforts surrounding judicial selection is to bring
to the bench people as suitable as we can find for the unique responsibilities and powers of judges. Debate about the strengths and weaknesses of
different systems has drawn more ink and sweat than any other subject in
American law. But the fact is-whether one applauds it (as do Bopp-

30. Id. at 878, 882-84 (emphasis added).
31.
See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1059, 1069, 1074 (1996).
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Neeley) or abhors it (I do not, I am an unwavering agnostic)-the overwhelming majority of state judges face some type of election.32
What kind of election campaign looms at the entry to the bench is a
significant filter affecting who will seek a seat or seek re-election. There
are differences between the average person who seeks to be a judge and
the average person who chooses elective politics. Politicians like campaigns, or at least tolerate them well. Politicians are out-going personalities ready for the rough-and-tumble. Of course views will differ about
"the judicial personality." In my view, the more wide-open and lively
(let alone nasty) are judicial election campaigns, the more would-be
judges will be hesitant or even unwilling to run for the bench or for reelection. For example: when the California Judges Association in 1983
sent its members a questionnaire about their campaign experience, one
judge's reply included this: "The best lawyers are not applying for judgeships because of lack of faith in the appointment process and they33do not
want to engage in political campaigns in order to gain reelection."
One example, even before judicial elections became "nastier, noisier and costlier:, 34 Pennsylvania's revered Judge Edmund B. Spaeth Jr.
("the kind of person a judge ought to be-a
sequoia in a Philadelphia
35
judiciary sometimes noted for its saplings"),
thinks electing judges is a bad idea, but it's not the reason that he
finds the process distasteful. "The worst thing is," he says with sadness baked on his face, "is raising money." He says "money" the
way a sick man says the name of his disease ....

[H]e announced

that he would not seek retention in [Novemberi because political
campaigning by judges is "fundamentally incompatible with the judicial process"-thus ending, prematurely, one of the most distinguished legal careers in Pennsylvania.36
That was long before White. Spaeth's approach, when asked how he
would decide cases, was to reply, "I can only tell you that I will decide
each case as conscientiously as I can.",37 Spaeth had originally been appointed to a vacancy and soon faced a contestable election for a full term
32.

See data infra note 5 1.

33.
AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS'
POLITICAL CONTRIBuTIONS: PART Two 17 (1998) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE] (quoting Roy A.
Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes

ofAmerican Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 app. b at 162 (1985)).
34. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless JudicialSelection Debate and Why it Mattersfor
Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1269 (2008) ("If Professor Roy Schotland
had licensed his characterization of judicial races ... when he made the statement in the 1980s, the
royalties would have made him a rich man today."); see, e.g., James L. Gibson, Nastier, Noisier,
Costlier-and Better, MILLER-MCCUNE.COM,
July
14,
2008,
http://www.millermccune.com/article/495 (using the phrase in applauding the changes).
35. William Ecenbarger, The Judge Who Wouldn't Run, THE PA. LAW., Oct. 15, 1985, at 23.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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but lost after unluckily drawing a poor ballot position; soon after, he was
appointed to another vacancy, ran again, campaigned vigorously
throughout the state, and won.38
The "judicial personality" has been studied by the presiding judge
of the San Bernardino trial courts, using the "most appropriate psychometric tool" (Myers-Briggs Type Inventory, "MBTI"). Studying more
than 1,300 American judges with the MBTI distinction between "extroversion" and "introversion" (differentiating between those "who tend to
be concerned with the opinions of others" and those who focus "on their
own thoughts and values"), the study found that about sixty percent of
judges are introverts, unlike two-thirds of the adult public.39
This should be no surprise, as the law, by definition, is an introvert's
design. It deals with core values and principles, and resists change
based on transitory shifts in the tide of popular public opinion.
Moreover, the judiciary calls to service those who are willing to apply legal values and principles even when the results are highly unpopular.... In our society, most introverted characteristics are disfavored. This may partially explain why the public tends to entertain
40
negative opinions about judges, believing them cold and aloof.
Of course these are only "broad caricatures of judges ....[N]o one fits
neatly into any one... category .... [V]ery few judges can be found at
the extremes. All types can be excellent judges; there is no 'best' type
for the judiciary. ''41
Strikingly, in a later study Kennedy found that nearly sixty percent
of female judges are extroverts, in contrast to only about forty percent of
male judges.42
Judge Kennedy's findings support the prediction-or fear!-that the
kinds of unrestrained campaigns that are the norm for politicians,
38.
39.
Summer
40.
41.

See id. at 25.
See John W. Kennedy, Jr., PersonalityType and JudicialDecision Making, 37 JUDGES' J.,
1998, at 4, 5-6, 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at9.
One former clerk for a federal judge, who very helpfully read this article in draft, wrote
this: "Frankly, the judge for whom I clerked, and for whom I have utterly immense respect as a
jurist, fits the MBTI test to a 'T' (excuse the alphabet pun). Were the federal judiciary elected, I
couldn't even conceive of the possibility of him as a candidate. That is not to say there aren't great
state candidates and great state jurists in elected states.... [Y]our article made me think of this in a
way that I never had previously ......
And one of the student editors of these pages: "I found [the judicial pool argument] to be
especially convincing as a more or less introverted person who has judicial aspirations-I would
never put myself through an election."
42.
John W. Kennedy, Jr., Judging, Personality,and Gender: Not Just a Woman's Issue, 36
U. TOL. L. REv. 905, 906 & n.2 (2005) (commenting on his sample, Kennedy notes, "I strongly
suspect that far more than 60 percent of the male judiciary is introverted"); see also id. at 906 n.2
(finding one sample of appellate judges to be "a whopping 76 percent" introverts). Perhaps this
difference between female and male judges is some of the reason why, in recent years, female candidates for the bench are generally deemed to have an edge over male candidates.
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would-for a significant proportion of the kinds of people likely to be
fine judges-be an entry barrierresulting in a weaker bench.
F. Public Confidence in the Courts

Allowing conduct like that in the scenes described at the outset will
jeopardize public confidence in the courts to a destructive degree. Situations akin to those above bring the risk, even the likelihood, that "outside
observers ' '43 (including lawyers and litigants) will see little or no difference between contributions and bribes. As Senator Russell Long put it:
"[W]hen you are talking in terms of large campaign contributions.., the
distinction between a campaign contribution and a bribe is almost a
hair's line difference.. .."44
How campaign funds are raised has become dramatically more important as campaign spending has soared. In the past four election cycles
(2000-2006), judicial candidates "have raised over $157 million, nearly
double the amount raised by candidates in the four cycles prior [1992-

43.
In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31,41 (Or. 1990).
44.
Quoted by the Courts of Appeals in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES
622-62 (1984) (writing before he went on the Ninth Circuit).
A Chief Justice sent me this comment on Senator Long's statement: "I never saw that a
campaign contribution bore much relationship to a bribe. Campaign money goes to consultants, TV
stations, printing companies, rent, etc. Bribes go into one's pocket."
Campaign contributions present several problems that must be separated: 1) They may
"buy" the kind of action the donor seeks. How large this problem is may depend on how large is the
contribution relative to the candidate's total funds, or how great is the concentration of such contributions (e.g., if a large proportion of the candidate's total funds come from people or entities who
want X action). 2) They may not buy or even influence action but only support a candidate who
will, if elected, take the kind of action the donor seeks with or without the donor's contribution.
(This motivation is supported by "the weight of anecdotal evidence at least", according to Kyle
Cheek, an academic authority, in an e-mail (on file with author) to Professor Vernon Palmer at
Tulane Law School, who is the author of a relevant recent article, on Oct. 21, 2008.) That raises
real problems of who reaches office but reflects upon the institution and the system, not the particular candidate. 3) A candidate may attack contributions to her opponent, depending on factors like
how much is raised overall, or how large or concentrated are particular contributions, or who and
where the contributions come from. Such attacks may be mere campaign moves or may point to real
problems. 4) Especially with judicial candidates, given the "neutrality" that judges are supposed to
bring to their job, contributions may reduce public confidence.
If judicial candidates face some form of election, they will have to raise funds. Campaign
funding may raise acute problems whether or not any direct contributions are problematic: Because:
even if there is public funding (as three states have for some of their appellate courts), instead of
direct contributions there may be "independent" spending to support X candidate; in fact, in several
of the highest-spending recent campaigns (e.g. in Illinois and West Virginia), a great deal or even
almost all of the spending was "independent", not contributions.
It is unrealistic and unfair to criticize any candidate whose contributions are within legal
limits (or, if there are no limits, are reasonable) and are unconcentrated, and if independent spending
is not significant in that race. Campaign funds in judicial races "unquestionably [jeopardize] confidence in the courts", which increases the need for knowledgeable observers to speak and write
realistically about this (quoting from Roy A. Schotland, Judicial elections in the United States: is
corruption an issue?, in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007 at
26, 29).
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1998]." 45 Since 2006, the sharp escalation has continued, setting new
records in many states; for example, in 2007 in a Pennsylvania contest
$9.5 million was raised and in Wisconsin $2.7 million, not counting major "independent" spending. 46
Many public opinion polls, both national and single-state over many
years, consistently show that large majorities of the public "believe that
campaign contributions have at least some impact on judges' decisions. 47 An interesting addition to those polls are the recent empirical
studies of voters' reactions to the post-White reduction of limits on campaign speech. These studies found little concern about the change in
campaign speech but high concern about campaign contributions.48 As a
Florida judge wrote shortly after the Eleventh Circuit panel wiped out
Florida's limits on personal soliciting: "What sort of appearance of fairness will be fostered by a system where judges are now expected to not
49
only go on the campaign stump, but go there with hands outstretched?"
II. FEASIBLE REFORM STEPs

This Canon, like all regulation (indeed, all law!), has strengths and
weaknesses. But first, is a Canon like this "merely a band-aid" that
leaves uncorrected the undeniably major problems raised by campaign
contributions to judicial candidates, and by having judicial elections at
all? If it were feasible to replace contestable judicial elections with another system, the matter would be very different. But despite the sharp
rise in concern about judicial elections since spending started soaring in
2000, with problems compounded by the intensifying of campaigns and
coarsening of campaign speech, states are not ending judicial elections.
Yes of course that may change. 50 But a century of experience is relevant.
45. See JAMES SAMPLE, LAUREN JONES & RACHEL WEISS, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,
THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006 app. at 15 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2007),
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf.
Strikingly, the escalation in judicial campaign spending is far greater than in campaign
spending generally. See Brandenburg & Schotland, supra note 2, at 1230 (providing comparative
data). And, campaign spending matters in major ways even during uncontested elections. Id. at
1234 n.18.
46.
Data compiled and forthcoming by Justice At Stake, www.justiceatstake.org.
47.
Ten polls from 1997-2004 are cited by Thomas A. Gottschalk, Judicial Recusal as a
Campaign Finance Reform, Appendix, a paper presented at a 2008 Conference: Our Courts and
Corporate Citizenship (Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary, at Georgetown
Law Center (publication forthcoming). The quotation is from the 2004 national survey by Justice at
Stake. A new nationwide Harris Poll, with input from the ABA, finds that fifty-five percent of the
voting-age public think elections should be used to select judges. See Poll finds most voters want to
elect
judges,
MINN.
LAWYER,
Oct.
24,
2008,
available
at
http://www.minnlawyer.com/type.cfmLegal%20News (scroll down for link, registration required).
48.
Gibson, supra note 6, at 60, 62-63.
49.
Charles Kahn, Will [Weaver] Leave State Judges with Their Hands Out?, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002.
50.
The 2008 elections produced local successes in Greene County, Missouri and also (for
interim appointments to vacancies) in two Alabama counties, joining six other Alabama counties. In
Missouri, "merit" selection (often referred to as "the Missouri plan") has been in place since 1940
for their appellate judges (and some trial judges), and since 1970 and 1973 for counties totaling
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First, in 2001, I wrote that despite all-out efforts since 1906 to change
from roughly eighty-six percent of state judges facing contestable elections, we shifted about one percent per decade on trial judges and about
three to four percent per decade on appellate judges.5' Second, given
how up-hill (to understate it) are efforts to end contestable judicial elections, that naturally attractive goal must not be allowed to distract from
work on feasible steps.
For those two reasons, the most feasible reform steps are ones like
(i) relying on the Canons; (ii) having appropriate limits on campaign
contribution amounts (as almost all states have although lacking coverage of aggregate contributions) 52 and on disclosure (as almost all states
about one-third of Missouri's trial judges. See American Judicature Society, http://www.ajs.org
/selection/selvoters.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); see also http://www.jud icialselection.us/judicial-selection/reform-efforts/formal-changes-since-inception.cfm?state=MO
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2008) (providing a history of reform efforts in Missouri).
Three recent statewide efforts are notable (leaving out places that don't get beyond a bill
being introduced). In Minnesota in 2008, a well-organized, strong drive to end contestable elections
failed when it was opposed by the trial judges. That effort may succeed in the next few years if
limited to appellate judges. Such limited systems are found in five states: California, Florida, Maryland, South Dakota, and Tennessee. In New York, both the high court and intermediate appellate
courts are appointive, but the intermediate appellate judges are appointed from the trial bench and
when their terms are up, must run for re-election. See ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 33, at app. 2. I
am among the people who believe that trial judges run greater risk of voter retaliation for unpopular
decisions than do appellate judges.
In Nevada in 2007, the legislature took the first step to switch from the state's current
nonpartisan elective system to a retention system for all judges. If the next legislative session approves, the change will go before the electorate in 2010. See AJS website noted above. (Without
implying any prediction, note that (a) Nevada voters have twice rejected such a change, and (b) in
recent years, voters in three other states have rejected, by large margins, ending contestable elections. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' JudicialSelection, 95 GEO.L.J. 1077, 108182 (2007).)
But in Tennessee, their "merit" plan for appellate judges (which had been adopted by
statute) "sunsetted", effective in early 2009. In Spring 2008, the legislature failed to extend it and
so, unless the legislature acts in 2009, Tennessee will become the first jurisdiction ever to move back
to contestable elections. Richard Locker, Judicial selection system backed-Chief Justice Holder
againstgeneral elections, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Sep. 4, 2008, at B6.

51.
"In 2005, a conference of thirty-eight states' chief justices, justices, judges, and others,
sent to the CCJ a Call To Action that included this: 'The fact-which becomes constantly clearer
and more widespread-is that whatever may be the view of a state's courts and lawyers, "Don't let
them take away your vote" (to use the phrasing of ads in more than one state) has been an insuperable hurdle."' Schotland, supra note 50, at 1090.
For almost a century-starting in 1906 with a landmark speech to the ABA by Roscoe
Pound-the Bar, and so much more than the Bar, has given enormous energy to getting
rid of competitive elections. Back in 1900, roughly 14% of our judges did not face competitive elections. Today, after that century of major effort, we boosted that 14% to 23%
of our trial judges of general jurisdiction and 47% of our appellate judges. That's a shift
of 1% per decade for the trial judges, and 3-4% per decade for appellate judges. At that
rate we'll end contestable elections for trial judges in only another 770 years, and for appellate judges in only another 160 years.
Roy A. Schotland, Introduction:Personal Views, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1361, 1366-67 (2001) (introducing Call to Action and papers from National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection) (citations omitted). Updating the data to 2004, we find little change other than a slight increase in the
proportions facing contestable elections, because of the reorganization of courts in California and
Oregon. See Schotland, supra note 50, at 1092.
52.
See Roy A. Schotland, ProposedLegislationon JudicialElection Campaign Finance,64
OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 128-30 (2003).
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have although lacking coverage of "independent" spending); (iii) improving recusal when campaign-related connections loom large; 53 and
(iv) implementing unofficial steps like having campaign conduct committees and "educating" judicial candidates.54
As for the strengths and weaknesses of this particular Canon:
(a) Having a committee do the soliciting does not assure that the
judge or candidate is unaware of who is solicited and who contributed.55
We should go further, as the Minnesota Canon does almost uniquely, 56 to
explicitly prohibit the committee from disclosing to the candidate the
names of who did or did not contribute. But even such a provision is
porous. As a "distinguished Arkansas intermediate appellate judge" said:
I go out of my way to know nothing about the contributors.
I never look at the information in the official filings, I never
talk with my campaign committee about who gives what, I
don't have fundraisers, I really do all I can. But there I am

at a bar association dinner or some event, and lawyers come
up to me and in the middle of something else, eagerly tell
me that they gave
so-and-so to my last campaign. What
57
more can I do?
It would be cynical to believe that many judges, perhaps even most,
aren't trying as hard as they can to avoid all involvement in fundraising
and all information about their contributions. But it would be naive to
believe that it doesn't happen, even with some fine judges and to an extent that is troublesome-and the public surely is suspicious. 58
53.
Deborah Goldberg, James Sample, & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected
Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 528-30 (2007); Thomas R. Phillips &
Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and FairAppeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a
Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 691,710-11 (2007).
54.
David B. Rottman, Conduct and Its Oversight in Judicial Elections: Can Friendly Persuasion Outperform the Power to Regulate?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1295, 310-12 (2008).
55.
A nationally respected trial judge (Judge Kevin Burke, formerly Chief Judge, Hennepin
County, Minnesota) sent me this comment:
Almost every candidate for judicial office runs the ad which lists the lawyers supporting
him or her. What does the public think? That judges don't look at their own ads? Or
that they don't look at the list of supporters of an opponent? Can I ask you to be on my
steering committee? Yes in every state. Can I ask the steering committee to go raise
money for me? Yes in every state. Should contributions be publicly disclosed? Yes!
Available on line so the public can see easily where the money came from? Yes for all
branches of government!!! Why then does anyone think the public is not at least going to
be suspicious that a judge might not go on line and find out who helped.
56.
Colorado and Utah (both with only retention elections) have similar provisions. ABA
TASK FORCE, supra note 33, at 40 n.73.
57. Id.
58.
A Mississippi judge reported a telling example:
In January 1997, at one of the [Mississippi] House of Representatives' committee meetings, a judge was asked whether or not having a big contributor bring a case before the
judge would give the judge cause to question the judge's own impartiality. When the
judge explained that under the Code of Judicial Conduct the judge would not know who
was a big contributor, there was disbelief on the part of the legislative committee mem-
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(b) What of the Canon's impact on the Incumbent-versusChallenger picture? Here, another distinction from White, as Simes
noted: "Implicit in the . . . opinions in White is that Minnesota's announce clause, partisan-activities clause, and solicitation clauses were
pro-incumbent. ... [This] Canon . . . does not have a pro-incumbent
character . . . ,59 Limiting candidates' "requests" obviously has more
impact on incumbents, whose "requests" carry more weight. As a Pennsylvania lawyer said in explaining his contribution to a local judge (to
[his]
whom many local lawyers contributed "although they doubted
60
qualifications"): "What could I say? He was a sitting judge.,
CONCLUSION

A Chief Justices' 2001 Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct
and the First Amendment adopted four principles (and also recommendations), starting with "Judicial elections are different from other elections.
." and ending with this:
Principle 4: Efforts to ensure that judicial campaigns remain different
depend ultimately on the success of steps to assure candidate professionalism and to strengthen the norms and culture that enable judicial
elections to fulfill their proper role in the balance of electoral accountability and judicial independence.
The Canons, campaign conduct oversight committees, education of
candidates and of the press, etc. all draw upon the deepest traditions
of the role of the courts and of the bar. Political campaigning places
most judicial candidates in unfamiliar situations, and involves challenging time pressures and incentives. The goal is to strengthen the
norms and the culture of judicial campaigns so as to protect the ability of state courts to meet61their responsibilities in our federal system
and under the rule of law.
Judicial elections exist to assure accountability in our pluralist democracy by putting choices to the voters. No one can be surprised that
democracy is not problem-free. Nor is it any surprise that among the
best answers to such problems are more active pluralism and more informed democracy. We must continue pursuing all feasible steps to assure that judicial elections bring an appropriate balance between judicial
accountability and judicial independence.

bers that anyone would be naive enough to follow those rules ....
be one of credibility or accountability ....

The problem seems to

Id.
59.
Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d at 883 (citing White
If, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005)).
60.

Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing:Are State Judges' Robes the

Emperor'sClothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 63 (1985) (citation omitted).
61.

The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct

and the FirstAmendment, 35 IN. L. REV. 649, 652-53 (2002).

"THE APPEAL" TO THE MASSES
PENNY J. WHITEt
INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, dozens of legal scholars have written to decry the politicalization of state court judiciaries.' The decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White 2 only increased the concern and the
opportunity, by creating an environment ripe for control by moneyed
interests. But largely we have been talking to ourselves, sharing pages in
law review symposia and meeting in law school classrooms to lament the
threats to judicial independence and, occasionally, to propose reform.

t
E.E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law Director, Center for Advocacy and Dispute
Resolution University of Tennessee College of Law. Professor White has served as a state intermediate appellate judge and a supreme court justice.
I appreciate being invited by the Denver University Law Review to contribute to this issue
and being allowed to do so in a nontraditional format. I also want to thank several people who
helped on this Essay. First, I want to thank Professor Judy Cornett who encouraged me and answered many questions; second, I want to thank Mike Okun, who provided excellent ideas and
valuable internet research. I am most appreciative to Norene Napper and Patricia Graves, exceptionally talented students at the University of Tennessee College of Law, who followed every research
lead I suggested and inspired me with their interest and enthusiasm, and to Chip Howorth and Mark
Ensley who aided us in our work.
1. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Keynote Address, Thorny Issues and Slippery Slopes: Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 9-10 (2003); Lawrence Baum, Judicial
Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter's Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 13 (2003);
James J Brudney & Lawrence A. Baum, Foreword to Symposium, Perspectives on Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1 (2003); Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "JudicialIndependence?," 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 324 (2003); Kevin S. Burke, A Judiciary That Is as Good as Its
Promise: The Best Strategy for PreservingJudicial Independence, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 4, 5;
Kevin S. Burke, The Tyranny of the 'Or' Is the Threat to Judicial Independence, Not ProblemSolving Courts, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 32, 32; Harry L. Carrico, Call to Arms: The Need to
Protect the Independence of the Judiciary, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 575, 576 (2004); Michael G.
Collins, JudicialIndependence and the Scope of Article III-A View from the Federalist,38 U. RICH.
L. REV. 675, 677-78 (2004); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST.
L.J. 43, 49-50 (2003); Lawrence G. Myers, JudicialIndependence in the Municipal Court: Preliminary Observationsfrom Missouri, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 26, 26; D. Dudley Oldham & Seth S.
Andersen, Commentary, Role of the Organized Bar in Promoting an Independent and Accountable
Judiciary, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 341, 342 (2003); Thomas R. Phillips, Keynote Address, Electoral Accountability and Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 138 (2003); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Three Independences, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 603 (2004); William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 579 (2004); Jeffrey Rosinek, Some Thoughts on the Problems of
Judicial Elections, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 20, 20; John Russonello, Speak to Values: How to
Promote the Courts and Blunt Attacks on Judiciary, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 10, 10; Roy Schotland, Resource Materials on Judicial Independence, CT. REV., Summer 2004, at 38, 38; Rodney A.
Smolla, ChiefJustice Harry L Carricoand the Ideal of JudicialIndependence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
571, 571 (2004); Kenneth W. Starr, Legislative Restraint in the Confirmation Process, 38 U. RICH.
L. REV. 597,598 (2004).
2. 536 U.S. 765, 777-78 (2002).
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After giving dozens of lectures and writing several articles on the
topic of judicial independence, I, too, began to feel like a doomsday predictor, or at least like Henny Penny in the story of Chicken Little. 3 Often, I struggled when it was suggested that I should end an address on a
high note, unsure whether I could, in good conscience, reach one. Because I felt that my message was stale and dispiriting, I was hesitant
when Denver University Law Review editor Forrest Plesko asked me to
contribute to this issue. Within a few weeks, as a matter of pure coincidence,4 I listened to John Grisham's book The Appeal5 during a lengthy
road trip. I realized immediately that John Grisham may have done what
none of us could do: through the medium of literature, he has told the
story of what is happening in our state courts to a heretofore-unreached,
but indispensable-to-any-solution, audience-the American public.
A detached reader's first reaction might be that The Appeal tells a
pretty good story, but that it is only a story. This essay tests the reader's
likely reaction by contrasting some 6 of the imaginary, 7 and perhaps outlandish, facts of Grisham's book with what is actually happening in state
judicial elections. Its goal is to chronicle the present condition of state
court judicial selection.

3.
The story of Chicken Little, who first alerts Henny Penny that "the sky is falling" before
the two set off a flurry of panic, dates to the Jataka Tales of Buddhist Indian folklore, but was made
popular in modem times by the Australian author Joseph Jacobs in his book Henny Penny. My
previous expressions of woe about the demise of judicial independence include the following:
Penny J. White, A Matter of Perspective, 3 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 5, 7-8 (2004); Penny J.
White, If Justice is for all, who are its Constituents?, 64 TENN. L. REV. 259, 260 (1997); Penny J.
White, "It's a Wonderful Life," or is it? America Without Judicial Independence, 27 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (1996), as reprinted in 80 JUDICATURE 174, 174 (1997); Penny J. White, Judging
Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by use of JudicialPerformance Evaluations, 24 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1053, 1056 (2002); Penny J. White, Preserving the Legacy: A Tribute to Chief Justice
Harry L Carrico,one who Exalted JudicialIndependence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 615, 615-16 (2004);
Penny J. White, "The Good, the Bad, and the [Very, Very] Ugly" and (its Postscript), "A Fistful of
Dollars:" Musings on White, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 626, 627 (2004); Penny J. White, The Aftermath
of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 1 (July, 14, 2007) (unpublished article, on file with the
Pound Foundation).
4.
The choice of The Appeal was not completely accidental. Judge Mary Anne Majestic,
Tempe, Arizona, prompted my taking the time to listen to the book, and I thank her for that.
5.

JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008) [hereinafter THE APPEAL].

6.
Because of time constraints and page limitations, I address only a very few of the assertions in Grisham's books, having to give short shrift or totally omit many, equally interesting others,
such as employing wedge issues to get out the vote in otherwise low turnout judicial races; using
decoy, colorful candidates to gain public attention; developing intelligence on the personal lives of
incumbents; employing scare tactics and voting tariffs to deter certain voters; and involving federal
office holders with established political allies.
7.
The author assures the reader in his Author's Note that "[a]ny similarity to a real person is
coincidental." GRISHAM, supra note 5, at 357.
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I. GRISHAM, THE AUTHOR
"[O]utlandish"; "preposterous"; 9 "hallucinatory"; 1°' [s]pell-binding
hyperbole";" "healthy dose of exaggeration and falsehood";1 2 and "baloney of biased rhetoric."' 3 These are but a few of the words and phrases
that have been used to describe John Grisham's novels. The descriptions
may well be good fits for many of Grisham's plots and characters. The
Firm's story about Mitch McDeere-a 25-year old Harvard graduate,
who stumbles into employment with a law firm that works round-theclock for visible clients while laundering money in the back offices for
the Mafial 4-is a bit surreal. The same characterization applies to the
Sullivan law firm in A Time to Kill as a law firm that "every lawyer detested."' 5 Similarly, the depiction of Hemba and Hamilton-the "trusty
lawyers" in The Testament who use "lobbyists for legal bribery to land
fat government contracts and hide money in Swiss accounts" 16 and also
use prosecutors who forsake the obligations of their office in order to
align themselves for higher officel'-is at least inordinately jaded.
Moreover, Grisham's exaggerations do not end with the lawyers in his
books. He writes about judges who, while incarcerated, blackmail gay
men by threatening to expose their sexuality,1 8 as well as judges who
conspire with defense counsel to force plaintiffs to settle lawsuits. 19
8

Grisham's critics claim that his writings are agitprop,20 that he uniformly views the legal system with a "jaundiced eye ' 2' always favoring
the little guy 22 and that the system he portrays is always corrupt and
perverted, based on a "cynical premise. ''23 Still, others see Grisham as
8.
David Germain, Adaptation of Grisham Courtroom Thriller is "Outlandish Story,"
CANARSIE COURIER, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.canarsiecourier.comINews/2003/1030/
ArtsEntertainment/024.html.
Id.; Marilyn Stasio, Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991, at BR37.
9.
10.
Review of THE FIRM, http://www.amazon.co.uk/Firm-John-Grishamldp/0099830000
("Hallucinatory [E]ntertainment ... Terrifically [E]xciting... [Glrips and [Piropels.") (last visited
Oct. 31, 2008).
11.
Review of THE APPEAL, http://www.amazon.comgp/pdp/profile/A36LKTTFZJ3VI9 (last
visited Nov. 10, 2008).
Interview by SlushPile.net with John Grisham, Author (Mar. 1, 2006),
12.
http://www.slushpile.net/index.php/2006/03/01/interview-john-grisham-author/.
Janet Maslin, Book Review, If You Can't Win the Case, Buy the Election and Get Your
13.
Own Judge, NY TIMES, Jan. 28, 2008.
14.
See JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM (1991).
15.
See JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO KILL 27 (1989).
See JOHN GRISHAM, THE TESTAMENT 265 (1999).
16.
17.
See JOHN GRISHA , A TIME TO KILL 101 (1989); JOHN GRISHAM, THE CLIENT 120-21
(1993).
18. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE BRETHREN (2000).
See JOHN GRiSHAM, THE RAINMAKER 195-97 (2000).
19.
20. Timothy Rutten, Book Review, Deft Social Realism and Iffy Grammar, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2008 at El.
21.
John B. Owens, Grisham's Legal Tales: A Moral Compass for. the Young Lawyer, 48
UCLA L. REv. 1431, 1434 (2001).
22. Id. at 1435-38.
Stasio, supra note 9.
23.
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a mirror to our age,
"holding
and beingup
"deadly
accurate."
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painting a "sadly familiar picture, ' 25

II. BACKGROUND: THEAPPEAL

Drawing on a familiar formula, The Appeal includes bad rich guys
and good poor guys and gals, a Faustian challenge, and an ending that

brings a glimmer of hope. But is The Appeal just another "depressingly
fascinating" 26 Grisham tale? Or does it contain elements of reality,
an
27
expos6 of the effect of real world politics on state judicial systems?
The Appeal traces a fictitious toxic tort case, Baker v. Krane Chemical,28 from jury verdict until the case's conclusion in the Mississippi Su-

preme Court.29 A Mississippi jury finds that Krane contaminated the
groundwater in Bowmore causing the cancerous death of Jeanette
Baker's husband and son and awards Mrs. Baker $41 million dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages. 3° This verdict sets off a chain reaction, bankrupting Mrs. Baker's lawyers (the good guy and gal husbandand-wife law firm of Wes and Mary Grace Payton),3 1 making Krane's
CEO (bad guy Carl Trudeau) an even wealthier man,32 and landing an
unknown, undistinguished lawyer (foil family-value conservative Ron
Fisk) on the Mississippi Supreme Court3 3 in the place of an incumbent

24. Chuck Leddy, Grisham Provides a Shock to the System, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2008,
available
at
http://www.boston.conmae/books/articles/2008/01/26/grisham-provides-a-shockto_the-system/.
25. Id.
26. Peter Guttridge, Evil Comes in Many Guises, THE OBSERVER, Feb. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/feb/03/stephenking.fiction.
27. See Carol Memmott, Grisham's 'Appeal' Rules Harshly on Bought Elections, USA
TODAY, Jan. 30, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/books/reviews/2008-01-28grisham-appealN.htm.
28. THE APPEAL, supra note 5,Author's Note. Grisham describes the characters as "purely
fictional"; the town, county, company, products, and chemicals as nonexistent; the justices, organizations, churches, corporations, and think tanks as not real; the campaign as a "figment of [his]
imagination"; some of the laws as "butchered"; and the lawsuit as "borrowed from several actual
cases" but adds that "there is a lot of truth in this story."
29. THE APPEAL, supra note 5.
30. Id.at1-13.
31.
Id.at245-46. The members of the Payton firm hold hands and pray "as they had never
prayed before" when they learn that the jury has reached a verdict. Id.at5 ("Please, dear Lord ...
grant us a divine victory. And deliver us from humiliation, ruin, bankruptcy, and a host of other
evils that a bad verdict will bring."). By contrast, Krane's lawyer awaited the verdict "reading a
biography and watching the hours pass at $750 per" and "marched away without comment, without
prayer." Id.
32. Id.at352-55. In true Grisham style, a side story emerges in which Trudeau, while fighting the verdict with his government-relations consulting firm, manages to buy very low and sell very
high. After acquiring almost all of Krane stock when the prices were deflated, by virtue of the news
surrounding the verdict and other pending toxic tort lawsuits, Trudeau, through his lawyer mouthpieces, bolsters the stock price by rumors about settlement negotiations, and then instructs counsel to
withdraw from negotiations. Id.at 272-89.
33. Id.at 105-109, 300-01.
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justice (partial protagonist Sheila McCarthy, female, divorced, qualified,
experienced, but naive and unsuspecting).3 4
From the very beginning, Grisham makes it clear that Krane and
Trudeau are pure antagonists, bad to the core. Krane intentionally dumps
toxic waste, contaminating Bowmore's ground water; 35 Trudeau uses
bribes and well-placed connections to dupe the government. 36 For years,
residents of Bowmore complain about suspect water, both to the factory
and to the government, but are constantly reassured that it is safe.37
When unusually high rates of cancer strike Bowmore, the Paytons-the
story's absolute protagonists-are the only lawyers with the nerve to
fight Krane and the stomach to acquire the debt necessary to do so, 38 thus
making the large jury verdict even sweeter.
The verdict in favor of Baker enrages Trudeau, who vows to win on
appeal,39 and is aided in his effort by a friendly United States Senator
who calls Trudeau to suggest that with the help of Barry Rinehart-"[a
lawyer who is] extremely competent, smart, discreet, successful, and
expensive," but not in the phone book,40 and who is protagonist number
two-the verdict can be "fix[ed]. '41 Rinehart, a nefarious "consultant of
sorts," "specializes in elections" 42 and can assure Krane's victory on appeal if Trudeau will provide the cash to "restructure[] the Mississippi
Supreme Court. ' 4 3 "For eight million [dollars]," Trudeau "can buy
[him] self a supreme court justice." 44
Trudeau would not "buy" a sitting justice outright. Instead,
Rinehart would use his money to take a "not particularly friendly" incumbent justice "out of the picture. ' 45 Rinehart targets a moderate female justice, Sheila McCarthy, and selects as the unsuspecting prot6g6 an
inexperienced and unbaggaged 6 lawyer named Ron Fisk, 47 whose back-

34. Id. at 116-20, 188-190.
35.
Id. at 10-12, 17-18, 20-24.
36. Id. at 139-40.
37.
Id. at 20-24.
38.
Id. at 8. A side plot in Grisham's story involves the plaintiffs firm teetering on financial
disaster. In the end the antagonist controls the banks too, calling the loans, and forcing the firm into
almost certain bankruptcy.
39. Id. at 31. Within minutes of the verdict, Trudeau is assured by his lawyers that "'[i]t'll be
years before a dime changes hands, if, in fact, that ever happens,"' prompting Trudeau to swear "'it
will never happen. Not one dime of our hard-earned profits will ever get into the hands of those
trailer park peasants."' Id. at 18. Hours later, Trudeau boasted to "number 228 on the Forbes list of
the 400 richest Americans," "'[w]e'll never pay a dime."' Id. at 31.
40. Id. at 68.
41.
Id. at 68-69.
42. Id. at 68, 81-82.
43. Id. at 84.
44. Id. at 85.
45. Id. at 83.
46. Id. at 106. "The Fisks were squeaky-clean. There was nothing to dig up in the heat of a
nasty campaign."
47. Id. at 105.
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ground is conducive to the pro-business and socially conservative campaign that Rinehart calculates will win the election.48 After meetings
with politicians and special interest groups, Fisk, unknowingly at first,49
becomes the face of the operation "to convert Sheila McCarthy from the
sensible moderate she was into the raging liberal [the opposition] needed
her to be." 5°
As plaintiffs' lawyers descend on Bowmore to ride the coattails of
the Baker victory, and the Paytons struggle to avoid bankruptcy while
litigating the appeal, Rinehart's company takes full advantage of the
plodding appellate timeline and the emotional barometers of conservative
special interest groups. 5' Rinehart wrangles and masks massive contributions from business and special interests using shadow groups to funnel illegal campaign funds.52 Having coerced politicians and government
officials with a mixture of duplicity and bribery to gain a financial and
political advantage, Rinehart then employs wedge issues to both distract
and ignite voters. He enlists a diversion candidate to stoke the death
penalty debate, manufactures a gay marriage crisis in rural Mississippi,
and overwhelms the public with a barrage of advertisements that distort
53 What begins with Fisk's "soft ads ' 54
McCarthy's moderate record.
quickly evolves into a "blitzkrieg campaign, 55 accusing McCarthy of

Young white male, one marriage, three children, reasonably handsome, reasonably well
dressed, conservative, devout Baptist, Ole Miss law school, no ethical glitches in the law
career, not a hint of criminal trouble beyond a speeding ticket, no affiliation with any trial
lawyer group, no controversial cases, no experience whatsoever on the bench.
There was no reason anyone outside of Brookhaven would ever have heard the name of
Ron Fisk, and that was exactly what made him their ideal candidate. They picked Fisk
because he was just old enough to cross their low threshold of legal experience, but still
young enough to have ambitions.
48. Id. at 107. "Judicial Vision," Rinehart's organizational faqade has as its "sole purpose"
the election of "quality people to the appellate courts." Id. Quality people are:
•. . conservative, business oriented, temperate, highly moral, intelligent, and ambitious
young judges who can literally ... change the judicial landscape of this country .... [in-

cluding] protect[ing] the rights of the
consumed by . . . children, honor[ing]
out of [the] classrooms, fight[ing] off
and protect[ing] the true American way

unborn, restrict[ing] the cultural garbage that is
the sanctity of marriage, keep[ing] homosexuals
the gun-control advocates, seal[ing] our borders,
of fife.

Id.
49.
See id.
50. Id. at 190.
51.
See id. at 208-09. For good measure, the group plants two gay men in Jackson, Mississippi, who try to marry, and then file a lawsuit when they are denied a license. Their appeal meanders alongside of the Baker appeal in the Mississippi courts. Id.
52. Id. at 213.
53.
Id. at 222-24.
54. Id. at 190. The soft ads featured plays to patriotism and family heritage and featured
family values such as hard work and the pursuit of the truth. Id. They included "friendly stuff...
Rotary Club, Boy Scouts." Id. at I11.
55. Id. at 110. Rinehart's operative describes a blitzkrieg campaign as: "basically an ambush.
Right now Judge McCarthy has no idea she has an opponent ....She has six thousand bucks in her
campaign account ....[Wle'll wait until the last minute to announce your candidacy ....She will
be overwhelmed from the first day." Id. at 110-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on crime[, s]oft on gays[, s]oft on guns[, a]gainst the death
being "soft
56
penalty."
Taken largely by surprise, Justice McCarthy struggles to assemble
her own campaign with few resources. She garners the support of the
struggling plaintiffs' bar, which enables Rinehart to foster the stereotypical business versus trial lawyers debate over consumer protection and
frivolous lawsuits. In the end, McCarthy loses and Fisk is elected 57 just
in time to hear the Baker appeal and make good on his campaign platform of limiting liability and reversing punitive damages awards.58 The
dead and dying in Bowmore receive nothing, and Krane stock "roar[s] to
life," as Trudeau "sip[s] Cristal champagne, smoke[s] Cuban cigars," and
celebrates the realization of his vow that "[n]ot one dime ... would ever
be handed over to those ignorant people and their slimy lawyers. 59
Through constant inference and occasional explicit expression,
Grisham uses the setting, plot, and characters to push a frightening
theme: state appellate judges and ultimately the courts on which they
serve are manipulated and controlled by moneyed special interest
groups. 6° From start to finish, Grisham asserts what some might consider
fanciful facts to enhance the story: special interest groups and wealthy
businesses target sitting judges for removal; they select inexperienced,
pliable greenhorns to run for judicial office and spend millions of dollars
from unrevealed sources getting them elected; they run rank campaigns
demonizing incumbent judges and creating expectations of how the challenger will rule, to which the new judge succumbs once in office. Widespread voter apathy and poor citizen erudition simplify the take-over
while complicating the targeted judge's ability to respond and react.
The truly disturbing nature of Grisham's plot as well as the vile nature of the characters leaves one to contemplate to what extent the story
is simply artifice at work. Has Grisham spun another entertaining tale
which is pure fiction, or has he used the story as a medium to warn
against a frightening reality?

56.
57.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 301.

58.
Id. at 347. Grisham prolongs the inevitable, pausing for Fisk's son to suffer a catastrophic
injury caused by a "defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous" aluminum baseball bat and
exacerbated by a sloppy emergency room doctor. Id. at 328-29, 340-41. Fisk has to confront the
Ron Fisk he has become, a man who "can't sue" (despite his doctor's indictment that the emergency
room doctor committed "gross negligence") because to do so would "make a mockery" out of himself. Id. at 341. Despite his "true feelings," described as "changing," Fisk votes to reverse the Baker
verdict rather than "betray those who had elected him." Id. at 347.
Id. at 350-51.
59.
60.
In his Author's Notes, Grisham describes the theme more benignly: "[als long as private
money is allowed in judicial elections we will see competing interests fight for seats on the bench."
Id. at357, 358.
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III. REALITY OR PURE FICTION: TESTING SOME ASSERTIONS IN THE
APPEAL

A. Targeting Sitting Justicesfor Removal: Reality or Pure Fiction?
1. Targeting Sitting Justices
Rinehart to Trudeau: "We do campaigns.... When our clients need
help, we target a supreme court justice who is not particularly
friendly, and we take him, or her, out of the picture." 61
Senator to Fisk: "This gal, McCarthy . . . [has] never been on
plus, between us boys, she just ain't cut
board... She's too liberal,
62
outfor the black robe."
Rinehart's Agent to Fisk: "Sitting judges make tough decisions....
63
They leave trails, records that opponents can use againstthem."

Test the assertion that appellate judges are targeted for removal on
sitting Justice Carol Hunstein of Georgia, or former Justices Louis Butler
of Wisconsin, Warren McGraw of West Virginia, or Chuck McRae of
Mississippi. They likely will all agree that the assertion is not fictitious
but a common reality. Justice Hunstein was a veteran judge of twentytwo years, 64 with fourteen years on the Georgia Supreme Court when she
was targeted for removal by, among others, the American Justice Partnership. 65 She won the venomous contested race, 66 her first ever, in

61.
Id. at 82-83.
62.
Id. at 133.
63.
Id. at 109.
Judge Hunstein served as judge of the Dekalb County Superior Court from 1984 until she
64.
was appointed by Georgia Governor Zell Miller to the Georgia Supreme Court in 1992. She was
challenged in 2006 by Michael Wiggins, an attorney for the Department of Homeland Security who
"moved from Washington to Atlanta in May, just a month before qualifying." Bret Bell, Hunstein:
Can They Buy a Judgeship?, SAVANNAH Now, Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.savannahnow.comi/node/164280/print.
American Justice Partnership is a collaboration of organizations that join to accomplish
65.
state legal reform. See http://www.americanjusticepartnership.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2008):
In Georgia, millions were spent on TV ads in one of the most negative judicial campaigns
in American history. The Safety and Prosperity Coalition, an interest group that received
the majority of its funding from the American Justice Partnership, an arm of the National
Association of Manufacturers, reported raising over $1.8 million in an effort to defeat
Justice Carol Hunstein.
Voter Rejection of Political Tampering Doesn't Quell Special Interests in '06 Judicial Elections,
MONEY AND POLITICS, Nov. 8, 2006, available at http://www.joycefdn.org/Programs
/MoneyPolitics/NewsDetails.aspx?Newsld=l 25.
66.
Both candidates aired ads leveling personal attacks. An advertisement aired by the Safety
and Prosperity Coalition said: "Carol Hunstein ... voted to throw out evidence that convicted a
[she] even ignored extensive case law and overruled a jury to free a savage
cocaine trafficker ....
rapist." Hunstein's campaign ad attacking her opponent claimed that "Mike Wiggins was sued by
his own mother for taking her money. He sued his only sister. She said he threatened to kill her
while she was eight months pregnant." MONEY AND POLITICS, supra note 65. The ad won a "Pollie," the Oscar for political ads. Jim GALLOWAY, About those other Oscars: Hunstein ad gets a
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which she was challenged by a man whom she described as the opposition's thirty-fifth choice to run against her.67
Justice Louis B. Butler, Jr. was the first and only African-American
justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 68 Justice Butler had twelve
years of judicial experience, sitting as a city judge, circuit judge, and
supreme court justice,69 when he was targeted by special interests and
"phony issue ad groups ''70 as an activist, liberal judge who used loopholes to favor criminal defendants. 7 1 While those who financed the re-

moval of Justice Butler were likely motivated by concerns over tort
cases, 72 they used false accusations about rulings in criminal cases to
ignite and provoke the voters.73 One such television advertisement was
described by the independent, bipartisan Wisconsin Judicial Campaign
Integrity Committee 74 as "offensive" and "race-baiting" 75-reminiscent
of the Willie Horton ads used in the 1988 presidential campaign.76

Pollie, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 27, 2007, available at http://www.ajc.com
/metro/content/shared-blogs/ajc/poiticalinsiderentries/2007/02/27/about-those other-oscars-hunst.html.
67. Bell, supra note 64.
68. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has seven justices, all of whom are elected to ten-year
terms
in
state-wide
nonpartisan
elections.
See
Wisconsin
Court
System,
http://www.wicourts.gov/about/judges/supreme/index.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
69. Justice Butler's
biography, http://www.wicourts.gov/about/judges/supreme/retired
/butler.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
70. The phony ad groups were uncovered by Fact Check.org and the Wisconsin Democracy
Campaign.
See Judgment Day in Wisconsin, FACT CHECK, Mar. 7, 2008,
http://www.factcheck.org/judicial-campaigns/judgment-day-in-wisconsin.html;
Viveca Novak,
Wisconsin
Judgment
Day,
the
Sequel,
FAST
CHECK,
Mar.
21,
2008,
http://www.factcheck.org/elections-2008/wisconsin-judgment-day-the-sequel.html);
Hijacking
Justice 2008 Issue Ads in the 2008 Supreme Court Campaign, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://www.wisdc.org/hijackjustice08issueads.php; Nasty Supreme Court Race Cost Record $6
Million, July 22, 2008, http://www.wisdc.org/pr072208.php.
71.
Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,
2008; Dee Hall, Supreme Court Debate is Bitter, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/05/25/us/25exception.html.
The New York Times described the race as between a "small-town trial judge with thin
credentials" and "a graduate of the University of Wisconsin law school who served for 12 years as a
judge in Milwaukee courts." Id. at 72. The Wall Street Journal described the election as a "bar
brawl" and Justice Butler as "one of the court's most liberal members." Wisconsin Bar Brawl, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 24, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB 120631561392258183.html?mod=opinionmainreview_andoutlooks [hereinafter Brawl].
72. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, after Justice Butler's joinder, was described as having
"dismantled the state's tort reform law, eliminating caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice rulings," and accepting "collective liability for manufacturers in cases involving lead paint."
Brawl, supra note 71.
73.
Novak, supra note 70.
74. For a general discussion of judicial campaign oversight committees, see William Fortune
& Penny J. White, Judicial Campaign Oversight Committees' Complaint Handling in 2006 Elections: Survey and Recommendations, 91 JUDICATURE 232 (Mar./Apr. 2008). The Wisconsin Judicial Campaign Integrity Committee is a bipartisan seven-member task force created by the Wisconsin State Bar following the 2007 Supreme Court elections for the purpose of monitoring Supreme
Court races. The committee educated voters, sought pledges from candidates, monitored campaign
advertising and activities, and reviewed materials to ascertain compliance with the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
See
Judicial
Campaigns
and
Selections,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selectioin/campaigns-and-elections/campaign-oversight.cf
m?state= (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
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2. Targeting Judges Who are Easy to Label
Groups are strategic in choosing which judges to target, often
choosing judges who are easy to label, not based on their true judicial
philosophies, but based on commonly held stereotypes about race and
gender. Labeling a judge as an "activist, '' 77 a "liberal" or as "soft on
crime" is a favorite ploy utilized by those who wish to remove an incumbent. The branding manipulates the public to act out of fear or safety
concerns in a way that wealthy corporations, whining about insurance
rates or jury verdicts, do not. 78 For example, the campaign against Justice Butler in Wisconsin emphasized that he was a minority. Advertisements juxtaposed his picture against pictures of minority defendants.79
Detractors 80 nicknamed him "Loophole Louis" 81 and criticized him for
"putting criminals back on the street" 82 and jeopardizing cases based on
"technicalities," notwithstanding his moderate voting record.
Similarly, the forces that opposed Justice Carol Hunstein in Georgia
chose to target a female justice rather than any one of the three male incumbents who were also on the ballot, 83 even though her record "was
more conservative than her other colleagues. 84 Aware that some might
question the motivation for running against the sole woman on the ballot,
75. Novak, supra note 70; Brennan Center for Justice, Buying Time - 2008: Wisconsin Analysis, May, 12, 2008, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/buying-time_2008 wisconsin;
76. The
Willie
Horton
ad,
used
in
the
Bush-Dukakis
campaign.
http://www.youtube.comwatch?v=EC9j6Wfdq3o (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
77. The recurring use of the label "activist judge" may have been the brainchild of Karl
Rove's early judicial campaigns in Texas and Alabama. Whatever its origins, it has stuck and is the
kiss of death to a judicial candidate.
The term 'activist judges' motivates all sorts of people for very different reasons. If
you're a religious conservative . . . it means judges who established abortion rights or
who interpret Massachusetts's equal-protection clause as applying to gays. If you're a
business conservative, it means those who allow exorbitant jury awards. And in [the
south] especially, the term conjures up those who forced integration.
Joshua Green, Karl Rove in a Corner,THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2004).
78. The United States Chamber of Commerce targets judges by evaluating the rulings that the
judges have made on the high court and "grading them for positive or negative impact on the state's
economy. Then the chamber's Institute for Legal Reform, whose board members include chiefs of
major corporate donors to the judge-ousting campaign, recommend which judges to target." Robert
Lenzer & Matthew Miller, Buying Justice, FORBES 64 (July 21, 2003).
79.
Liptak, supra note 71.
80.
Some reports say that Justice Butler characterized the nickname as "affectionate."
81.
Debra Cassens Weiss, Wisconsin Justice Dubbed 'Loophole Louis' in TV Ads, ABA
JOURNAL
2008,
available
at
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/Wisconsin-justice dubbed loophole louis in tv-ads/; television ad referring to Justice Butler as "Loophole Louis", www.youtube.com/watch?v=mM9CEGPZX2A.
82.
A television advertisement claimed that "Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the
street. Like Reuben Mitchell, who raped an I l-year-old girl with learning disabilities. Butler found
a loophole. Mitchell went on to molest another child." Novak, supra note 70.
83.
See SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2006): How 2006 WAS
THE MOST THREATENING YEAR YET TO THE FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY OF OUR COURTS-AND

How
AMERICANS
ARE
FIGHTING
BACK,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files
/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf.
84.
Nina Totenberg, Report: Spending on Judicial Elections 2006, Oct. 4, 2008,
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=10253213.
In contentious criminal cases, Justice
Hunstein had agreed with the prosecution 39% more often than the court in its entirety. Id.
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a supporter suggested that the campaign needed a better answer than that
the Justice "was a one-legged Jewish female from DeKalb County with 85a
lot of money in the bank and Zell [Miller] as her campaign chair.,
During Justice Hunstein's campaign, United States Attorney General
John Ashcroft 86 recorded an automated telephone call endorsing Hunstein's opponent saying, "[h]e will protect us from terrorists and criminals," and disparaging her as a "liberal incumbent activist judge who will
stop at nothing to win." 87
It is not just the special interests groups who use branding to simplify-and often misstate-the records of judicial candidates. The candidates do so as well, even when they are fully cognizant of the misinformation. Often the candidates compete to drown out one another's law
and order mantra. In 2004, both candidates for the Illinois Supreme
Court were sitting judges, presumably aware of the complexities of judicial decision making. Yet both isolated frightening facts from selected
cases and used them to label their opponent as soft on crime. According
to Maag supporters, Judge Karmeier was "lenient" because he "gave
probation to kidnappers who tortured and nearly beat a ninety-two-yearold grandmother to death." Karmeier supporters countered that Judge
Maag overturned
the conviction of a "man who sexually assaulted a six88
year-old girl.
3. Targeting Judges With a Judicial Paper Trail
To succeed, it is also important to target a sitting judge who has
produced a body of work, a paper trail of judicial opinions that can be
misrepresented, oversimplified, and criticized. Explanations of nuanced
judicial opinions are no competition for simple "tough on crime" rhetoric
in a "world of 'thirty-second ads and snappy sound bites."' 89 While the
Hortonesque ad used against Justice Butler actually referred to a case he
had handled as a public defender, 90 not as a justice, his critics also used
85.
Bell, supra note 64.
86. In The Appeal, Senator Rudd, affectionately known as "the King," tells Fisk, "I don't get
involved in local races .... However, this race is too important .... I've made some powerful
friends in this business, and they will be happy to support your campaign. Just takes a phone call
from me .... My folks can put together a lot of money. Plus, I know the people in the trenches.
The governor, the legislators, the mayors." THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 131-32.
87.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83.
88.
DEBORAH GOLDBERG, ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2004): How
SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE ON OUR COURTS HAS REACHED A "TIPPING POINT" - AND HOW TO
KEEP OUR COURTS FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 10 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2005) available at

http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsReport2004.pdf.
89. THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 262.
90. The apparent source for the claim was the case of State v. Mitchell, a case that Butler
handled when assigned as a public defender. Butler's client, Reuben Mitchell, was not released,
although Butler won his appeal based on the introduction of evidence in violation of the rape-shield
statute. State v. Mitchell, No. 86-0879-CR, 1987 WL 267164 at *2-3 (Wis. Ct. App. April 23,
1987). The state successfully appealed the case to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, who found that the
error was harmless and reinstated the conviction. State v. Mitchell, 424 N.W.2d 698, 707 (Wis.
1998).
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cases from his judicial "trail" to complete the liberal brand. These ads
were also arguably inaccurate. 9'
Opponents also used a judicial trail to defeat Justice Warren
McGraw, a former Chief Justice and member of West Virginia's highest
court, the Supreme Court of Appeals. Brent Benjamin, whose campaign
was largely funded by a special interest organization's two and half million dollar donation, 92 tagged McGraw as an "activist judge who mollycoddles criminals and endangers the welfare of children. 93 The organization complained that McGraw had joined a per curiam opinion which
required a lower court to grant probation to a convicted sex offender in
order to enable him to participate in a proposed rehabilitation plan.94
4. Masking the Real Bull's Eye: Targeting Judges Who are "Not
Business Friendly"
As demonstrated by the political forces in Wisconsin, West Virginia, Washington, and Illinois (to name but a few), the visible platform
of choice of law and order is generally used to mask the opponent's real
agenda-tort reform. Occasionally, however, opponents will use both
messages as was the case with Mississippi's Justice C.P. (Chuck)
McRae. Justice McRae was targeted and removed from the Mississippi
Supreme Court after eleven years of service by pro-business forces. 95

91.
An ad sponsored by Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce claimed that Justice Butler
focused on "needless technicalities" and "nearly allowed a murderer to go free." Wisconsin Judgment Day, the Sequel, supra note 70. The case so described was State v. Jensen, in which Justice
Butler concurred in part and dissented in part. State v. Jensen 727 N.W.2d 518, 537 (Wis. 2007)
(Butler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The issue on which Justice Butler dissented was
an issue left uncertain by recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Ironically, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case raising the
issue a few months after the Jensen decision and decided the matter in June 2008. See Giles v.
California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
92. The organization, known as "And For the Sake of the Kids," donated $2.5 million dollars
to Justice Benjamin's campaign, which was provided by Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey Energy,
and "one of West Virginia's most powerful businessmen." Len Boselovic, Are Campaign Contributors Buying Justice?, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 21, 2008 at Al. Blankenship intermittently
claimed that his generosity was either fueled by the desire to do the right thing, Carol Morello,
PoliticalAds Aired in D.C.Target W.Va. Audience, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2004 at BO1, or by economics. Adam Liptak, Judicial Races in Several States Become Partisan Battlegrounds, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 4, 2004 at § 1.
93. Morello, supra note 92, at BO.
94. Id.; see also State v. Arbaugh, 595 S.E.2d 289, 294 (W. Va. 2004) (per curiam). The
defendant, Tony Arbaugh, described by the per curiam majority as having lived a "long and painful
life" and having "endured a long history of sexual assault at the hands of two of his adult male
family members," had been placed on probation. Id. at 290-91. After a circuit court found that he
had violated the probation by the use of drugs and alcohol, Arbaugh was sentenced to prison. The
Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the lower court to allow Arbaugh to participate in
an award-winning private rehabilitation program, Youth Services Systems, organized in conjunction
with the Catholic Church. Id. at 291- 93. "Considering Mr. Arbaugh's tender age and extreme
victimization, we cannot, we will not, surrender any opportunity to salvage his life and to turn him
into a productive member of society." Id. at 294.
95.
Justice Jess Dickinson, who defeated Justice McRae, received $1.2 million from doctors
and small business owners and another $1 million from Mississippians for Economic Progress, a
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Justice McRae was a former president of the Mississippi Trial Lawyers
Association, who prided himself as being the court's defender of the
"have-nots against the haves." 96 Although the forces against him were
primarily business groups interested in electing judges with a sympathetic ear to insurance, health care, and big business, they also utilized
ads that preyed upon the public's fear of crime. 97 Pro-business interests
likewise used dual messages in Wisconsin where Justice Butler and four
of his supreme court colleagues
were credited with making Wisconsin a
"mecca for the trial bar 98 and in West Virginia where Justice McGraw
was seen as hurting the state's business climate: "[w]ithout a change in
the Supreme Court, businesses w[ould] continue to avoid West Virginia. '

99

Similar tactics were used against Chief Justice Gerry Alexander in
Washington. In a six-day period, a single group spent $357,000 on an
advertisement featuring a mother whose young son was killed by a murderer released from prison as a result of a court ruling. 1°° The group
funding the advertisement was "Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse,"
based in Alexandria, Virginia, and organized to limit liability lawsuits.
During the campaign, the group's spokesperson confirmed that it targeted the Chief Justice hoping to achieve tort reform but ran the advertisement for its likely effect despite its complete irrelevance to the
group's agenda. 10 1
Efforts to hide the agenda by manipulating or mixing the message
have not always been the chosen course in judicial campaigns. When
Karl Rove staged the first all-out judicial battle in Texas,' 0 2 he created a
local group funded by the United States Chamber of Commerce. Justice McRae received $700,000,
mostly from trial lawyers. Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 64.
96.
Id.
97.
In the closing weeks of the campaign against Justice McRae, the Law Enforcement Alliance of American, an associate of the National Rifle Association, ran ads suggesting that Justice
McRae was lenient on child predators, having voted to reverse the conviction of a defendant convicted of molesting a three-year old. Justice McRae responded with equally acerbic ads, claiming
that his opponent had been sued for striking a customer with a liquor bottle and for not paying his
bills and that he wished to retain the Confederate flag. Id.
98.
Wisconsin Bar Brawl, supra note 71.
99.
Liptak, supra note 92, at § I (quote attributed to Don Blankenship, primary donor to the
organization that bankrolled Justice Benjamin's successful campaign against Justice McGraw).
100.
Richard Roesier, Supreme Cash Flows, SPOKESMAN REVIEW, Sept. 13, 2006 availableat
www.spokesmanreview.contools/story-breakingnews-pf.asp?ID=-7365.
101.
Id.
102.
Although the battle was ostensibly for the seats on the court, Rove's real interest was in
eliminating the power of Texas Democrats. As Sam Gwynne, Executive Editor of Texas Monthly,
would explain years later:
So it became this giant pitched battle, because it wasn't necessarily about the kind of verdicts and the ease with which someone might get a verdict for the plaintiff, but it was also
about the back end, which was the financing of the entire Democratic Party ....
It's a
battle for the soul of Texas politics because it's a battle for the money,the lifeline money
of Democrats, which is now drying up ....
Interview with Sam Gwynne, Executive Editor, Texas Monthly (Jan. 8, 2005), available at
http:llwww.pbs.orglwgbhlpages/frontlinelshows/architectlinterviews/gwynne.html
[hereinafter
Interview with Gwynne].
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"formula . . . for winning judicial races [that] involved demonizing Democrats as pawns of the plaintiffs' bar and stoking populist resentment
with tales of outrageous verdicts."'10 3 As one Texas lobbyist observed,
reflecting on Rove's winning formula years later: "[h]e knew intuitively,
...that you had to have, as Mark Twain says, 'a devil for the crusade.'..
. [Y]ou had to demonize somebody."' 1 4 In Texas, the demons were
members of the Texas Supreme Court whose stoking was done by the
plaintiff s bar.
Because the Texas Supreme Court does not hear criminal cases, the
platform challenging incumbent justices could not have as its centerpiece
the emotional issues of law and order. But the state was perceived as one
of the most plaintiff-friendly venues in the country, 0 5 with the court
largely controlled by trial lawyers.1 °6 Business leaders believed that this
reputation thwarted economic growth in the state. 10 7 The Texas Medical
Association also resented the court for its record in medical liability
cases, contending that it caused escalating malpractice rates. 0 8 Under
Rove's leadership, the business and medical communities and the state
Republican
Party refined and redefined a "neglected issue-tort re10 9
form."'

Judicial races were traditionally "low salience events, with low public interest, very low free media coverage, and, as a result, low voter
turnout."1 0 In addition, because judicial races are "down ballot" and
often of little interest to the public, significant voter falloff occurs."'
103.
Green, supra note 77.
104.
Interview with Kim Ross, Lobbyist, Texas Medical Association, in Tort Reform in Texas:
Rove's Genius at Work, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architecttexas/tort.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Ross]. Ross continued that "in this case it was
central casting. [The Supreme Court justices] were doing it to themselves .... And it just so happened, because that was that era when the trial lawyers were a very convenient device for us to use
to begin to educate voters in terms of a philosophical shift." Id.
105.
See Interview with Tom Phillips, Chief Justice (1988-2004), Texas Supreme Court, in
Tort
Reform
in
Texas:
Rove's
Genius
at
Work,
http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architect/texas/tort.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Phillips]. According to former Texas Chief Justice Tom Phillips, "Texas's
very lax venue laws ... allowed a disproportionate number of cases to be tried in areas of the state
that had no real connection with the dispute, but were areas where juries were known to be liable to
give a very large award if their sympathies could be properly invoked." Id.
106.
See Interview with Gwynne, supra note 102; see also Interview with Phillips, supra note
106 (stating that the "widespread feeling in Texas ...[was] that the trial lawyers were too powerful
within the legislature").
107.
See Interview with Gwynne, supra note 102.
108.
See John Jack, Corporatefinanced campaigns... Government by the rich, for the rich?,
(April 2000), available at www.afn.org/-iguana/archives/2000_04/20000402.html.
109.
See Interview with Phillips, supra note 105.
110.
George D. Brown, Political Judges and Popular Justice: A Conservative Victory or a
Conservative Dilemma?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1543, 1580 (Apr. 2008) (quoting Richard Briffault, Judicial Campaign Codes after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
181, 196 (2004).
Ill.
See Mathew Manweller, Examining Decreasing Rates of Voter Falloff in California and
Oregon, 36 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REvIEw 59 (Fall 2004), available at
http://www.cviog.uga.edu/slgr/2004/ld.pdf (explaining that voter falloff is the "difference between
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When Rove and company undertook the first comprehensive defeat of
incumbent supreme court justices in Texas, voter fall-off in some judicial
races ran as high as thirty percent. 1 2 Their task was to interest more of
the public in the judicial selection process. They did so by branding the
trial lawyers as dishonest co-conspirators, flagrantly "buying" justice in
the State of Texas.' 1 3 Framing the issue in this way connected the public
with the coalition, a connection that would have been unlikely had the
emphasis been on the financial complaints of wealthy doctors and business professionals.' 1 4 The merger worked. The campaign--Clean Slate
'88' 5-resulted in the election of five justices, viewed as more friendly
to the coalition's interests.
From those early state-court races until today, the American Tort
Reform Association (ATRA) has been a prime player in the state court
reshaping project. The organization lists its goal as "bringing greater
fairness, predictability, and efficiency to the civil justice system."1 16 It
monitors venues that it calls "judicial hell holes," based primarily on
court decisions in cases involving asbestos exposure, medical malpractice, and automobile liability, and then issues annual reports."t7 Based
upon its findings, it decides which judges to target for removal. As one
business leader explained, "We don't pick our opponents lightly when
we make selections of people to target for replacement on the bench.
how many people go to the polls and how many people actually vote on a specific candidate or
issue."). In other words, a number of voters go to the polls, but do not vote all the way down the
ballot, meaning that they do not vote on judges' races. Hon. Charles K. Wiggins, The Washington
State Supreme Court Elections of 2006: Factors at Work and Lessons Learned, 46 JUDGES'
JOURNAL

5

(Winter

2007),

available

at

hUp://www.abanet.org/jd/publications/jjoumal/2007winter/winterO7.pdf.
112.
See Larry Aspin, Trends in JudicialRetention Elections, 1964-1998, 83 JUDICATURE 79
(Sept./Oct. 1999). These figures apply to retention races, but uncontested elections would have
similar falloff.
113.
See Interview with Bill Miller, Texas political consultant, in Tort Reform in Texas:
Rove's Genius at Work, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architectltexas/tort.html
(last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (identifying the "breakthrough moment" as the airing of 60 Minutes'
"Justice for Sale" in 1987, which revealed that Texas Supreme Court justices took hundreds of
thousands of dollars in campaign donations from lawyers appearing before them).
Ironically, a decade later, in a follow-up program entitled "Payola Justice," 60 Minutes
concluded that justices continued to take large amounts of money from those with cases before the
court, but that the source of the donations had shifted to corporations and defense law firms, rather
than plaintiff attorneys, prompting the Austin American-Statesman to editorialize that "Ujustice is
still for sale, but with new buyers." Editorial, Justice is still for sale, but with new buyers, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN (Nov. 3, 1998), available at www.tpj.org/payola/editoriall .html.
114. See Interview with Ross, supra note 104.
115. See Jack, supra note 108. The political action committee for the Texas Medical Association, TEXPAC, used a video campaign to inform the public. TEXPAC distributed videos detailing
stories of huge verdicts against doctors, prompting members of the medical profession to contribute
to the campaign.
116. The website of the organization, which lists its mission, may be viewed at
http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
117. The "Judicial Hell Holes" reports may be viewed at www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/.
Some lament that jurisdictions that were previously labeled tort "hell holes" are now consumer hell
holes. See Exxon decision may re-emerge in court contest, HUNTSVILLE TIMES (June 29, 2008)
(quoting Alabama
state Democratic
party chair
Joe Tumham),
available at
http://www.al.com/news/huntsvilletimins/idex.ssfPlbase/news/l1214731002124261 .xml&coll=l.
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The primary way to make a selection is tracking all decisions the [court
has made] and determin[ing] how each of the judges ha[s] voted on the
merits of those cases. ' 18 Thus, not only does targeting exist, but its proponents regard it as rather scientific.
B. CampaignsFunded by Millions of Dollars Providedby Unknown and
CamouflagedSpecial Interest Groups: Reality or Pure Fiction?

1. Whose Money?
' 119

Trudeau to Rinehart: "Who are your clients?"

Rinehart: "I can't give you the names, but they're all on your side of
the street. Big companies in energy, insurance, pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, timber, all types of manufacturers,plus doctors, hospitals,
nursing homes, banks. We raise tons of money
and hire the people
20
on the ground to run aggressive campaigns.",,

If the real message is sometimes masked in judicial elections, the
real messenger is often completely hidden. Notwithstanding AMTRA's
leadership role in "reshaping" state courts, it is rarely out front in those
efforts. More usually, AMTRA and several other recognizable organizations filter their support through other groups, groups with warm, benevolent, and sometimes, intelligent-sounding or patriotic names 121 like
West Virginia's "For the Sake of the Kids"; Wisconsin's "Citizens to
Defend the Constitution" and the "Coalition for America's Families";
Georgia's Safety and Prosperity Coalition; Ohio's "Partnership for
Ohio's Future"; and Washington's "It's Time for a Change."
The four most expensive supreme court races in history-three in
Alabama and one in Illinois-and the recent $8 million race in Wisconsin, as well as many others, are notable not only for the amount spent but
also for the source of their funds and the manner in which the funds were
spent. While lawyers historically were the major contributors in judicial
races, donating about ten percent more than business as late as 2000, by
2006 business interests donated twice as much as lawyers. 122 In addition,
special interest groups spent millions more on information or issue advertising. These expenditures, which are not funneled through a candidate's campaign, are not reflected on the campaign disclosure state-

118.
See Jack, supra note 108 (quoting Ginger Sawyer, Louisiana Association of Business and
Industry).
119.

THE APPEAL, supranote 5, at 83.

120.
121.
122.

Id.
The front organization in THE APPEAL was "Lawsuit Victims for Truth." Id. at 222.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 18.

2008]

"THE APPEAL" TO THE MASSES

3
ment.
1
In 2005-06,
for example,
eighty-four
tures in
judicial
races came
from special
interestspercent
groups.of124total expendi-

These interest groups, not candidates or political parties, supplied
the funds for the greatest increase in expenditure among judicial candidates-television advertising. Most of the advertising reflects the organizational agenda on the issues of tort reform, crime control, and family
values. 25 In the 2006 judicial campaigns, business groups funded more
than ninety percent of all special interest television advertising.126 In the
state of Washington, business interests paid for all of the television ad27
vertising.1
Louisiana
has justCourt
become
the128"latest state to set a
record
for TV And,
spending
on a Supreme
race."'
While the infusion of money and the dominance of television advertising in judicial elections is disturbing, the stealth tactics of the donors is
alarming. The groups use innocuous names to camouflage their identities and mask their sources. They manipulate disclosure requirements by
securing larger contributions at the end of the election cycle, 129 thereby
avoiding reporting them until after the election. And they often escape
reporting requirements altogether by not using "magic words" like
"elect" or "defeat" in their advertisements. 3 °
In the Georgia contest between Justice Carol Hunstein and candidate Michael Wiggins, outside interest groups spent more than $4 million.' 3' The Safety and Prosperity Coalition in Georgia was the highest
123. See generally RACHEL WEISS, FRINGE TACTICS: SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS TARGET
JUDICIAL RACES 3 (2005), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200508251.pdf; PUBLIC
CITIZEN CONGRESS WATCH, THE NEW STEALTH PACs: TRACKING 501(C) NON-PROFIT GROUPS

ACTIVE IN ELECTIONS 11 (2004), http://www.stealthpacs.org/documents/StealthPACs.pdf.
124. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 18.
125. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: How 2000
WAS A WATERSHED YEAR FOR BIG MONEY, SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE, AND TV ADVERTISING IN
STATE
SUPREME
COURT
CAMPAIGNS
5,
13
(2000),

http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf In 2000, more than $10 million was spent
on more than 22,000 television airings. Id. at 5.
126. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 7.
127. Id. at 12. During the 2006 Washington Supreme Court race between Chief Justice Gerry
Alexander and challenger John Groen, a record 1,081 advertisements ran, all of which were paid for
by three special interests groups. The challenger's supporters spent four times as much on airtime as
did Chief Justice Alexander, who won the race. Id. at 13.
128. Press Release, Brennan Center For Justice, Buying Time - LA Smashes Records, AL Ad
Wars
Go
Negative
(Oct.
9,
2008),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/buying-time la smashes-records-al-ad-wars-go-n
egativel.
129. Most campaign reporting laws require that a final disclosure form be filed after the election, enabling groups to avoid being identified until after the election. In THE APPEAL, Rinehart
"knew the trial lawyers would scrutinize the contributors in the hope that out-of-state money was
pouring in from big business interests .... He was confident he would raise huge sums of money
from out of state, but these donations would pour in at the chosen moment, late in the campaign
when the state's benign reporting laws protected it from being an issue." THE APPEAL, supra note 5,
at 213.
130. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 125, at 18 (providing "[Miany interest groups have invested huge sums in judicial elections [but] avoided disclosing their finances.").
131. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 22.
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spending special interest group in judicial elections in the country in
2006, contributing $1.3 million to the Wiggins campaign. 13 The Coalition funneled its money through an out-of-state group, headquartered in
Michigan, and arranged for most of the money to arrive just weeks before the November election. 33 Justice Hunstein also raised an enormous
amount of money, becoming the 134
first judicial candidate in Georgia to
surpass $1 million in fund-raising.
In Wisconsin and Washington, groups headquartered in Virginia
weighed in, making major contributions to challengers who sought to
unseat incumbent justices. A Virginia-based business coalition known as
the "Coalition for America's Families" reportedly spent more than $1
million to unseat Wisconsin Justice Louis Butler. 135 Another Virginia
group, "Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse,' ' 36 combined with "Citizens
to Uphold the Constitution"'' 37 and "It's Time for a Change"'' 38 to spend
139
more than $2.5 million in 2006 Washington Supreme Court races.
Two other groups, "Constitutional Law PAC" and "FairPAC," forged
ahead independent
of the candidates in favor of or against targeted can0
didates.14
Perhaps the champion silent partner in the effort to restructure state
courts is the United States Chamber of Commerce. Targeting judges in
Texas, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Mississippi, Alabama, West Virginia,
Georgia, Wisconsin, Washington, and other states, some say that the
132.
Id. at 11.
133.
Id. at 22.
134.
Justice Hunstein is reported to have raised $1.38 million despite Georgia's $5000 individual contribution limitation. Id. at 17.
135.
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, Hijacking Justice 2008: Issue Ads in the 2008 Supreme Court Campaign, Feb. 22, 2008, http://wisdc.org/hijackjustice08issueads.php. The Coalition
for America's Families lists its address as Middleton, Wisconsin, and its goal as "continuing the
fight to lower the tax burden and increase the decision-making power of the American Family."
Coalition for America's Families, http://www.coalition4families.com/AboutUs.aspx (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008). The issues it seeks to address are taxes, right to life, right to bear arms, and school
choice. Coalition for America's Families, http://www.coalition4families.com/Home.aspx (last
visited Nov. 1, 2008) (follow "Issues" hyperlink).
136.
In 2006, the two largest donors to Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse were the American
Tort Reform Association and the American Justice Partnership. Together they gave almost
$890,000. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Americans Tired of Lawsuit Abuse: Top Contributors,
2006
Cycle,
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtedetail contribs.php?cycle=2006&ein=203371803
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2008).
137.
According to a Seattle newspaper, Citizens to Uphold the Constitution is supported by
labor, environmental groups, trial lawyers and other organizations. Andrew Garber, State Supreme
Court Contests Spark "Fundraising Arms Race," SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, available at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20060914&slug=supremel 4m.
138.
According to the blog from the Spokesman Review, "It's Time for a Change" is a PAC
backed by the Washington Building Industry.
Posting of Rich to Eye on Olympia,
http://www.spokesmanreview.comlblogs/olympialarchive.asp?postD=-4008 (Sept. 13, 2006).
139. SAMPLE ET AL., supranote 83, at 21.
140.
Ralph Thomas, Interest Groups Targeting State Supreme Court Races, SEATTLE TIMES,
May
23,
2006,
at
BI,
available
at
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20060523&slug=court23m.
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Chamber operates under the strategy that it's cheaper to buy a state supreme court than an entire state legislature. 14 1 The Chamber and its supporters respond that they are merely righting a system42that had become
obscenely one-sided after years of trial-lawyer control.
In less than three-quarters of a decade, 43 the Chamber of Commerce has infused hundreds of millions of dollars into state court
races. 144 Even assuming that "turn about is fair play," the Chamber's
furtiveness is problematic. The Chamber often masks contributions and
avoids disclosure by characterizing its efforts as "informational" rather
than as candidate support. 145 The Chamber also sabotages unsuspecting
candidates by pumping thousands of out-of-state dollars into cover organizations, who then enlarge the campaign's coffers in the final days of
the campaign, creating a blitzkrieg. 146 When, for example, the Chamber
decided to target Justice Chuck McRae of Mississippi, they channeled a
million dollars through various local groups; 147 in other cases, channeling
also occurred, using ally political action committees. Moreover, it is
commonplace for the Chamber to funnel donations through its taxexempt unit, the Institute for Legal Reform, 148 49thus giving most of the
contributing corporations a hefty tax deduction. 1
2. How Much Money?
150

Fisk: "What makes you think I can beat her?"'

Rinehart's Agent to Fisk: "Because we have the5 money ....
Unlimited. We partner with some powerful people."' '
141.
See Jesse M. Reiter, The Purchasing of our State Supreme Courts: How Goliath is Beating
David
in
Courtrooms
Across
America,
July
19,
2007,
http://www.buzzflash.com/articles/contributors/1 172.
142. Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 67.
143.
The genesis of the "war on the judges" is said to have been a meeting between Chamber
President Thomas Donohue and Home Depot founder Bernard Marcus in 2000. Id. at 70.
144.
Id. at 65. The article refers to the Chamber's involvement as a "secret war" with its
"prime objective: to vote out judges supported by trial lawyers, labor unions and the Democratic
Party and install new judges sympathetic to insurance companies, multinational corporations and the
Republican Party." Id. at 64-65.
145.
Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 67.
146.
1 borrow this term directly from Grisham, but he is not the only one to use it to describe
judicial campaigns. See THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 109; see also Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
79, 82 (Summer 1998).
147.
Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 64.
148.
The Institute for Legal Reform is forthright about its mission, stating, "The U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) is a national campaign, representing the nation's business community, with the critical mission of making America's legal system simpler, fairer and faster for everyone." About ILR, www.instituteforlegalreform.comlabout/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
The Institute further states that, "Founded by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1998 to address the
country's litigation explosion, ILR is the only national legal reform advocate to approach reform
comprehensively by not only working to change the legal culture, but also to change the legislators
and judges that create that culture." Id.
149.
Lenzer & Miller, supra note 78, at 70.
150.
THE APPEAL, supranote 5, at 108.

270

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

15 2
Fisk: "How much will this cost?"

Rinehart's Agent to Fisk: "Three million bucks."'

153

154

Fisk: "And you can raisethat much money?"'

Rinehart's Agent to Fisk: "[We] already
[have] the commitments.
' 55
more.
get
we'll
more,
need
we
if
And

Raising and spending money to get elected to the bench is nothing
new. But a study of the three election cycles before 2000 showed that
around one-third of the candidates for judicial office raised no funds at
all. 156 Even among those who did raise money, the amounts raised and
expended were relatively low in comparison to today's standards. What
was of interest to observers about the year 2000-a year pegged as the
"watershed year for big money, special interest pressure, and TV advertising in state supreme court campaigns"157-was the dramatic increase
in the amount of money spent in supreme court races. The more than
$45 million raised and expended by supreme court candidates represented a sixty-one percent increase over the amount raised in 1998 and a
one hundred percent increase over amounts raised in 1994.158 All combined, candidates for supreme court seats have raised over $157 million
since 1999, with $46.8 million raised
in the 2004-05 cycle and $34.4
159
million raised in the 2005-06 cycle.
If 2000 was a watershed year for the expenditure of money in state
supreme court elections, it was nonetheless the tip of the iceberg in comparison to the sums spent since then. Aggregate candidate fundraising
records were broken in forty percent of the states with supreme court
races in 2004.160 It was also the year of the single most expensive judicial race in United States history, the $9.3 million contest in Illinois between Illinois Court of Appeals Judge Gordon Maag and Circuit Judge
Lloyd Karmeier. 16 1 This figure almost doubled the previous record for a
state judicial election. 162 Moreover, the election was not even state-wide,

151.
Id. at 109.
152. Id. at 111.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 125, at 8 fig. 2.
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id. at4.
159. SAMPLE E7 AL., supra note 83, at 15 & n.10. The lesser amount in 2005-06 reflects the
number of contested elections in that year, 27 as compared to 33 contested elections in 2004-05. Id.
160. GOLDBERG ET AL, supra note 88, at 13.
161.
Torts and Courts, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2008, at 36.
162. Brennan Center for Justice, Avery v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., (Feb. 3, 2006),
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/avery_v state-farmautomobile-ins-co/.
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involving instead thirty-seven southern Illinois counties. 163 Special interest spending for the race pitted pro-business and Republican organizations against trial lawyers, labor groups, and Democratic organizations.' 64 In the end, Justice Karmeier
raised slightly more than Judge
1 66
Maag, 165 and won the election.

The campaign to become Alabama's Chief Justice in 2006 was the
second most expensive judicial race in U.S. history, with a total of $8.2
million raised between the primary and general campaigns.1 67 As in illinois, the judicial election battle was a war between business interests and
the chamber of commerce and trial lawyers, characterized as "not exactly
evenly matched opponents,"'' 68 with the business community being positioned to outspend the trial lawyers two to one. 169 In addition to attracting big business dollars, Alabama also attracts pure partisan dollars as
one of the few states with partisan appellate elections. 170 This may help
to explain Alabama's status as the1 71
home of three of the four most expensive judicial campaigns in history.
The spending levels set by candidates in Illinois and Alabama were
not surpassed, but they are within the sights of judicial candidates in
many other states, including Wisconsin, West Virginia, Georgia, Wash163.
Geri L. Dreiling, Supreme Fight, ILL. TIMES, May
http:llwww.illinoistimes.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A3205.

27, 2004,

available at

164.
JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS:
RECUSAL STANDARDS 21 fig. 5 (2008).

SETTING

165. The total reported contributions to Justice Karmeier's "Citizens for Karmeier" campaign
were $4,802,869, while the total reported contributions to Judge Maag's "Maag for Justice" campaign were $4,580,588. The Maag contributions are detailed at Illinois Campaign for Political
Reform,
Maag,
Gordon
(2003-2004
Cycle),
http://www.ilcampaign.orgsunshine/icpr/icpr-filer.aspx?cycle=2003-2004&id=8508
(last visited
Nov. 1, 2008). The Karmeier contributions are detailed at Illinois Campaign for Political Reform,
Karmeier,
Lloyd
(2003-2004
Cycle),
http://www.ilcampaign.org/sunshine/icpr/icprfiler.aspx?cycle=2003-2004&id=8502
(last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
166.
When Fisk asks "[wihat makes you think I can [win]?" the real response is "[b]ecause we
have the money." THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 108-09. While testing that assertion is beyond the
scope of this Essay, a few observations should be made. "[Tihe correlation between strong fundraising and electoral success persists. In 2003-2004, 35 out of 43 high court races were won by the top
fundraisers, a success rate of 81 percent. This figure represents an increase from 80 percent in 20012002, and 71 percent in 1999-2000." GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 16 & n.20. The percentage declined in 2006, with 17 of 25 top fund raisers winning the election. Some predict that this
may indicate a "voter backlash against big-money, heavy-handed court campaigns," though acknowledging that it is too soon to tell if it is a trend or a "blip." SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 24
&n.17.
167. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 5.
168. Scott Horton, The Best Justice Money Can Buy, HARPER'S, Dec. 13, 2007, available at
http://harpers.org/archive/2007/12/hbc-90001908.
169. SAMPLE ET AL., supranote 83, at 18 fig. 11.
170.
IN

1d. at 6; see also THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY REPORT ON JUDICIAL SELECTION
STATES:
APPELLATE
AND
GENERAL
JURISDICTION
COURTS
(2007),

www.ajs.org/selection/docs/Judicial%20Selection%2OCharts.pdf (reporting that eight states have
partisan elections for judges on the state's highest court: Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia).
171.
SAMPLE ET AL.,supra note 83, at 15.
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ington, Louisiana, and Ohio. In the 2008 campaign fueled by tort reform
interests, two candidates for the Wisconsin Supreme Court jointly raised
about $1 million, but spent $5 million,1 72 most of which was provided by
"outside special interest groups that secretly raised and spent most of that
money on negative ads about the candidates. '' 3 In West Virginia in
2004, the challenger, and now Justice, Brent Benjamin raised and spent
far in excess of Justice Warren McGraw. Justice Benjamin received $2.4
million from one donor and $745 thousand from another. 17 4 Georgia
Supreme Court Justice Carol Hunstein began with a $125 thousand war
chest, but managed to extend that amount to $1.38 million to defeat challenger Michael Wiggins, who received $1.75 million from one donor, the
Safety and Prosperity Coalition. 175 The Washington numbers were
lower: approximately $1 million in a 2004 supreme court race 176 and
more than $4 million in 2006.177
As 2008 draws to a close, Louisiana is on target to have its most expensive supreme court election in a decade. 178 Candidates and special
interest groups combined to spend more than $5.9 million through the
third quarter of the year; 179 a significant upsurge in spending was occurring as the campaign headed into the final weeks. 180 Twenty-eight seats
on fourteen supreme courts remain open, with elections in November
2008. Through November, candidates in those races had raised nearly
$30 million dollars. 81
All contested judicial elections require incumbent judges to spend
time raising money and campaigning during election years. In some
172. Liptak, supra note 71, at Al.
173. Wisconsin Democracy Campaign, Nasty Supreme Court Race Cost Record $6 Million:
Candidates Were Outspent $4 to $1 by Outside Special Interests (July 22, 2008),
http://www.wisdc.org/pr072208.php. Among the contributors were Club for Growth Wisconsin;
Coalition for America's Families, a Virginia-based coalition of businesses and non-profit groups; the
Greater Wisconsin Committee, a Milwaukee-based group; and the Wisconsin Manufacturers &
Commerce, the state's largest business organization. Id.
174.
GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 88, at 4 n.6. Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey Energy,
donated the larger amount through an organization known as "For the Sake of the Kids" which
filtered the money to the Benjamin campaign. The smaller amount was donated by an organization
called "Doctors for Justice." Id.
175.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 20.
176.
Thomas, supra note 140, at B 1.
177.
Kate Riley, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections, THE SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at B6,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.conhtml/opinion/2003422757_rileyl4.htmil.
178.
Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Louisiana, Alabama, Ohio Lead TV Spending Surge in State
Supreme
Court
Races,
www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/buying-time-la-al-oh-lead-spending-surge/ (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
179.
Brennan Center for Justice, Buying Time: Special Interests and Supreme Court Elections,
www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/buying-time special-interests-conspicuouslyabsent-fro
m-supreme-court elect/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
180. Spending increased from $178,600 to $316,000 from the second to third week in September 2008. Id.
181.
2008 Supreme Court Elections: More Money, More Nastiness, Nov. 5, 2008,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/contentViewer.asp?breadcrumb=5,55,1104
(last visited Nov. 11,
2008).
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states, judges must run in both primary and general elections increasing
the amount of time and money that the judge must expend. The need to
campaign and to raise large amounts of money interferes with the judge's
ability to perform the duties of office and affects a judge's and, consequently, a court's, productivity during election season. But campaign
demands may also result in a war-chest phenomenon. In order to ward
off potential contenders, judges may feel the need to raise funds continuously, thereby decreasing their productivity well beyond election year.
For example, in 2006, two incumbent justices in Michigan raised a com1 82
bined $1 million despite what was described as "token opposition.
An Illinois Supreme Court justice raised more than $1.7 million before
she realized she would not have opposition. 83
C. Campaigns Fundedfor the Purpose of "Restructuringthe Court" and
Justices Fulfilling Commitments Once Elected: Reality or Pure Fiction?
Fisk to Rinehart's' Agent: "I want to know why these people are
willing to pony 184
up three million bucks to support someone they've
never heard of."
Rinehart's Agent: "These are people who are demanding change,
and they are willing to pay for it." 185
' 186
"We will expect a commitment to limit liability in civil litigation."

"Justice Fisk wrestled with the case.... [H]e had great sympathy for
the child, but would not allow his emotions to become a factor. On
the other hand, he had been elected on a platform of limiting liability.
...
When a case involved a substantial verdict, the insurance com' 187
panies could now relax."
When a well-financed judge is elected on a well-defined platform,
what do the financial backers expect? The answer to that loaded question depends on who is asked and under what circumstances. When the
public is asked, nine out of ten respond that special interest groups are
mobilizing courts to promote their own agendas, and eight out of ten
judges agree.1 88 But special interest groups who spend thousands each
election cycle vow to be interested only in assuring a balanced and fair

182. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 83, at 20.
183. Michael Higgins, Burke to Return Most of War Chest to Donors Unopposed in Primary,
Justice Will Empty Coffers, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan.
21, 2008,
at
1, available at
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/jan/21/news/chi-burke_2ljan2l.
184.
THE APPEAL, supra note 5, at 152.
185.

Id.

186. Id. at 112.
187. Id.at 313.
188. Alexander Wohl, The Judge on the Stump, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 12, 2002, available at
http:llwww.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=judge-on the stump.
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state court system. For example, the Institute for Legal Reform, the political arm of the United States Chamber of Commerce, lists its mission
as "making America's legal system simpler, fairer and faster for everyone."'189 To this end, it routinely invests millions of dollars to replace
judges who are not (and who have not been objectively identified as)
obscure, unfair, or inefficient.
Like a teacher when students meet expectations, the groups cannot
conceal their exhilaration with (and approval of) the results. They loudly
applaud every decision that advances the group's agenda, even when
their pupils behave in ways that are inimical to model judicial behavior.19° The American Tort Reform Association, for example, boasts on
its webpage, "besides naming two new Judicial Hellholes this year, the
biggest headline may be the fact that Madison County, Illinois is no
longer a Hellhole [since] courts there have undertaken several positive
reforms which justify moving the county this year to the report's 'Watch
List."''" A fair translation of ATRA's message is this: we received a
high return on our investment; the judges we installed did just what we
expected them to do, notwithstanding the questionable conduct of their
initiates. 192 Thus, the short answer about the special interests' expectations is that they expect results. And if anecdotal evidence has any
value, they appear to realize their expectations.
When a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice whose campaign had
been bankrolled by Wisconsin's largest business organization authored
the opinion in a case which the organization financed, the financiers
praised the decision. 193 Though they characterized it as a "major victory

189.
Institute for Legal Reform, www.instituteforlegalreform.org/about/index.cfm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008).
190. The Wisconsin State Judicial Commission filed an ethics complaint against Justice Michael Gableman who defeated Justice Louis Butler in the spring. The complaint alleges that Gableman knowingly leveled false charges against Butler in an advertisement that claimed that Butler had
"worked to put criminals on the street." Patrick Marley & Steven Walters, Judicial Commission
Says Gableman Ad was Deceiving, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 8, 2008,

available at

http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/32440994.html. The ad concerned a case that Butler
handled as a public defender, not a judge. Butler initially won on appeal, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that any error in the case was harmless. The defendant served his entire sentence. FactCheck.org, Wisconsin Judgment Day, the Sequel, http://www.factcheck.org/elections2008/wisconsin-judgment day-thesequel.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
191.
American Tort Reform Foundation, Report Names New Judicial Hellholes,
http://www.atra.org/newsroomlreleases.php?id=8202 (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). The report adds
"The #1 Judicial Hellhole from 2002 to 2004 dropped to the #4 position in 2005, and then into
'purgatory' at #6 last year. Continued progress in restoring judicial fairness led by Chief Judge Ann
Callis and Judge Daniel Stack, combined with substantial drops in the filing of class action, asbestos
and large claims, has led ATRF to move Madison County onto the Watch List." AMERICAN TORT
REFORM

FOUNDATION,

JUDICIAL

HELLHOLES

(2007),

http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf.
192. See "Citizens for Karmeier" supra note 165.
193. Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, WMC Hails Supreme Court Ruling in Menasha
Corp. Tax Case (July 11, 2008), http://www.wmc.org/display.cfm?ID=1854.
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for all taxpayers," the 94taxpayer beneficiaries of the $350 million were
Wisconsin businesses. 1
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, the state's largest business
lobby, spent more than $2 million to help Justice Anne Ziegler win an
open seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. After winning, Justice
Ziegler was poised to hear a case which could result in $350 million in
tax refunds to Wisconsin businesses, a case that Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce had helped to finance. 95 Despite public outcry about
the case, Justice Ziegler not only refused to recuse herself, but also authored the majority
opinion in the 4-3 case which found in favor of the
196
businesses.
The refusal to recuse was but one in a long line of cases indicative
of Justice Ziegler's troubling interpretation of the role of a judge. As a
circuit judge, Ziegler ruled in two dozen cases involving a bank on which
her husband was a paid member of the board of directors.197 The state's
ethics rule clearly prohibited judges from hearing cases involving businesses if the judge's spouse was a director of that business. 98 But Justice Ziegler sat on twenty-four such cases and ruled for the bank twentyone times. 199
While no one but Justice Ziegler could say with certainty whether
her rulings were influenced by campaign contributions or family relations, her refusal to step aside in these cases, while quite satisfying to her
contributors, gives the public a jaundiced view of the bench, which further confuses the already muddled understanding of the role of the
courts. While the agenda-laden Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce
"hailed" the decision, Wisconsin newspapers called for Justice Ziegler's
resignation. 200 The calls for the Justice's resignation poignantly disclose

194.
Id. The case concerned the purchase of $5 million custom software, an unlikely purchase
for the average taxpayer. Wis. Dep't Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 745 N.W.2d 95, 103 (Wis. 2008).
195.
Patrick Marley, Ziegler Faces Conflict Questions, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Mar.
5, 2007, at B I availableat www.jsonline.comlstory/index.aspx?id=573250.
196.
Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. Menasha Corp., 754 N.W.2d 95, 126 (Wis. 2008). Justice Louis
Butler, who was defeated by another candidate promoted by Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, joined the dissent in the case. Id. at 147 (Butler, J., dissenting). The issue of Butler's recusal
was also raised because an attorney on his campaign finance committee represented Menasha Corporation and contributed to Butler's campaign. Editorial, Step aside in this case, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL
SENTINEL,
Nov.
28,
2007,
at
A12,
available
at
www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=691180.
197. Marley, supra note 195, at BI. Although Justice Ziegler's opponent raised this conflict of
interest during the Supreme Court campaign in 2007, Ziegler won the election. Soon afterwards,
however, the Judicial Commission investigated the complaint, the first-ever investigation of a sitting
justice, and recommended a public reprimand. Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Panel Recommends Ziegler Reprimand, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Sept. 7, 2007, at Al, available at
www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=658384.
198. Marley, supra note 195, at B 1.
199.
Id. See Editorial supra note 196.
200. Editorial, Ziegler Should Quit the Bench, THE CAPITAL TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2007, at A8.
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that the harm from her conduct extends far beyond the individual decision or the judge:
To try to pretend that Ziegler is not doing severe damage to the reputation of the state's highest court, and more broadly to the rule of
law, is at this point untenable to anyone who has sworn a solemn oath
to "support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the state of Wisconsin"
and to "faithfully and impartially discharge
20 1
the duties of office."
The explosion of special interest money in judicial campaigns has
amplified this disturbing trend of judges hearing cases that involve their
campaign contributors. Wisconsin's Justice Ziegler, unfortunately, is but
one example. It is likely more than coincidence that two other glaring
examples involve sitting justices whose multimillion dollar campaigns
were financed by special interests groups with clear judicial agendas.
The justices in the other two examples both refused to disqualify
themselves in cases involving their most generous donors; their conduct
led litigants to beseech the United States Supreme Court to intervene and
address whether participation in a principal financial supporter's case
violates due process of law.20 2
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Lloyd Karmeier prevailed in the
most expensive, and by some accounts the most bitter,0 3 supreme court
race in history in 2004. Included in his $4.8 million in contributions was
$1.35 million in donations from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, its lawyers, its affiliates, and its affiliates' lawyers. 2° In
1999, plaintiffs had secured a monumental $1.05 billion verdict against
State Farm. 20 5 State Farm appealed, but the judgment was affirmed by a
unanimous Illinois Court of Appeals in 2001. In late 2002, the Illinois
Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' permission to appeal. The court
held oral argument in May 2003, at a time when Justice Karmeier was
not a member of the court. The case remained pending during and after
the election. When it became apparent that newly-elected Justice Karmeier intended to participate in the decision, plaintiffs moved for his
Id.
201.
202.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., No. 08-22
(July 2, 2008), 2008 WL 2676568 [hereinafter Caperton Writ]. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i,
Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006) (No. 05-842), 2005 WL 3662258
[hereinafter Avery Writ].
203.
The election was described by the St. Louis Post Dispatch as an "ugly, dispiriting, destructive, misleading, money-drenched race." Editorial, Buying Justice, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Nov.
5, 2004, at B6.
204. Avery Writ, supra note 202, at 6.
205. The case against State Farm was a nation-wide class action involving two claims, one
alleging breach of contract and one alleging consumer fraud. The contract claims were tried by a
jury, while the judge tried the consumer fraud claims in a bifurcated seven-week trial. The jury
awarded in excess of $450 million dollars in contract damages. Once punitive damages and damages for disgorgement and consumer fraud were included the verdict exceeded $1 billion. Id. at 4.
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recusal noting that "perhaps through oversight" the justice
had failed to
20 7
disqualify himself.2 °6 State Farm opposed the motion.
Twenty-seven months after oral argument, in August 2005,2°8 the Ilinois Supreme Court reversed the verdict against State Farm, with Justice Karmeier agreeing and casting the deciding vote on the breach of
contract claim. 20 9 The extraordinary timeline of the case added to its
rankness. The fllinois Supreme Court issued its decision in the State
Farm case months beyond the acceptable, though voluntary,2 10 time period for opinion preparation as established by the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Appellate Courts. 211 Delay in any case adversely affects the litigants; it may also have a detrimental effect on the
public's perception of the courts. But when the delay is inordinatemore than two years from argument to decision-and when it appears to
be purposeful, its potential harm is multiplied. 212
Yet neither the delay nor its potential harm reduced the cheers of
the United States Chamber of Commerce. They celebrated the decision
as a significant victory in favor of the business community and against
class actions.213 Others were not so elated, warning that the judge's poor
judgment had dramatic widespread ramifications:
[T]he juxtaposition of gigantic campaign contributions and favorable
judgments for contributors creates a haze of suspicion over the highest court in Illinois.... Although Mr. Karmeier is an intelligent and
no doubt honest man, the manner of his election will case doubt over
every vote he casts in a business case. This shakes public respect214for
the courts and the law-which is a foundation of our democracy.
Plaintiffs in State Farm unsuccessfully urged the United States Supreme Court to determine whether Justice Karmeier's failure to recuse

206.
Id. at 6.
207. Id. at 9.
208.
SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 164, at 22 (discussing case timeline).
209.
Id.
210.
See National Center for State Courts, Case Processing Time Standards,
www.ncsconline.org/cpts/cptsState.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
211.
Standard 3.52 sets forth that 90% of all cases in a state court of last resort should be concluded within a year of oral argument. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, § 3.52,
(ABA Comm'n on Standards of Judicial Admin. 1994); STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
DELAY REDUCTION, §§ 3.52-.55, (ABA Judicial Admin. Div. 1988).
212.
Standard 2.4 of the Appellate Court Performance Standards and Measures requires that
appellate courts resolve cases expeditiously.

APPELLATE COURT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND

MEASURES, Standard 2.4, (Nat'l Ctr. for State Cts. & App. Ct. Performance Standards Comm'n.
1999),
available
at
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/appellate&CISOPTR=56.
213.
Business Wire, Chamber Hails Illinois Supreme Court Decision on State Farm, Aug. 18,
2005, http://findarticles.comlp/articles/mii-mOEIN/is_2005-August_18/ai-n14926963.
214.
Editorial, Illinois Judges: Buying Justice?, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 2005, at

B8.
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himself violated their due process right to a fair and impartial tribunal.21 5
Had the Court weighed in, states might have avoided a similar incident,
which is equally disturbing and has unfolded in West Virginia. Like
Justices Ziegler and Karmeier, Justice Brent Benjamin was involved in a
well-funded, rancorous campaign for the state supreme court. He successfully unseated an incumbent justice with the financial backing of
Don Blankenship, the CEO of Massey Energy and one of West Virginia's business elite. 216 All totaled, Benjamin received $3 million in
contributions from Blankenship and the PACs. This amount constituted
over sixty percent of Benjamin's total campaign finances. 217
Blankenship's company, Massey Energy, was embroiled in lengthy
litigation with Hugh Caperton, the owner of a coal production company
in West Virginia. 18 In 2002, a lower court in West Virginia ordered
Massey Energy to pay $50 million for tortuous interference with Caperton's business as well as for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment.2 19 In 2004, as the case lay dormant, Brent Benjamin was elected to
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
In October 2006, Massey Energy sought review in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Prior to Massey's filing, the plaintiff
requested Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. Justice Benjamin declined. The court granted review and then reversed the $50 million verdict against Massey Energy. 22° Two justices dissented and characterized
the majority decision as a "result-driven" effort.22 1
While the plaintiffs petition for rehearing was pending, photographs surfaced of Don Blankenship together with Chief Justice Elliot
Maynard, a member of the court's majority, at a vacation spot on the
222
French Rivera.
In the subsequent furor, the court agreed to rehear the
appeal. While the Chief Justice denied impropriety, he recused himself

215.
The issue presented in the petition for certiorari was whether a judge may "receive more
than $1 million in direct and indirect campaign contributions from a party and its supporters, while
the party's case is pending, [and] cast the deciding vote in that party's favor consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Avery Writ, supra

note 202, at i.
216.
Blankenship donated $1.7 million to Justice Benjamin's campaign through the organization "For the Sake of the Kids." Len Boselovic, Are Campaign Contributors Buying Justice?,

PITTSBURG POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 21, 2008, at Al.
217.
Liptak, supra note 92, at 11.
Caperton Writ, supra note 202, at 8.
218.
219.
Id. at5.
220.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 2008 W. Va. LEXIS 22, 135 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008).
The reversal was based on a forum selection clause in a contractual agreement to which neither
Massey Energy nor Caperton were parties and despite the fact that the verdict rendered against
Massey was on tort, not contract grounds. Id. at 42.
Id. at 137.
221.
222.
Ian Urbina, West Virginia's Top Judge Loses His Re-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,

available
at
2008,
at
A25,
www.nytimes.com2008/05/15/us/15judge.htm?-r=1-&scp=l &sq=west%20virginia's%20top%20jud
ge%201oses%20his%20re-election%20bid&st=cse&oref=slogin.
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from further proceedings in the case as did Justice Larry Starcher, one of
the two dissenting justices, who had been vocal in his opposition to
Blankenship' s financial entanglement with the court.22 3
Justice Starcher was candid about the effect of campaign contributions on the case's outcome. In a blunt opinion, he issued an invitation to
Justice Benjamin to join him in recusing.
I repeat-the pernicious effects of Mr. Blankenship's bestowal of his
personal wealth and friendship have created a cancer in the affairs of
this Court. And I have seen that cancer grow and grow .... At this
point, I believe that my stepping aside in the instant case might be a
step in treating that cancer-but only if others as well rise to the challenge. If they do not then I shudder to think of the cynicism and disgust that lawyers, judges and citizens of this wonderful State will
feel about our judicial system.
And I reiterate that unless another justice also steps aside in this
case, my replacement on the Court will be selected by the justice
whose campaign was supported by something close
to $4,000,000
224
from monies that came from one side of the case.
Justice Benjamin declined Justice Starcher's invitation as well as
the suggestions of state-wide media.225 Because he stood next in line to
serve as Chief Justice under West Virginia's rotational plan, Benjamin
also appointed the two replacement judges to sit in the place of the
recused justices.2 26 In April of 2008, four years after the original hearing, the court reheard the case and once again reversed by a 3-2 margin,
with Justice Benjamin joining the majority.
The United States Supreme Court was again invited to determine
whether due process requires the recusal of a judge who received large
campaign contributions from a party or an attorney:2 27 This time, the
Court has accepted the invitation, granting the Petition for Certiorari on
November 14, 2008.228 The Petition stresses the importance of the issue:
In light of the increasing prominent role of money in judicial elections and the public perception of impropriety that such campaign
223.
224.

Id.
Notice of Voluntary Disqualification of the Hon. Larry V. Starcher, Justice of the Su-

preme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. v. Caperton, No. 33350 (Feb.
15, 2008) (reprintedin SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 164, at 19).
225. Editorial, Bravo, CHARLESTON GAzETrE, Feb. 16, 2008, at 4A, available at
http://wvgazette.com/Opinion/Editorials/200802150735.
226. Boselovic, supra note 215, at Al.
227.
Caperton Writ, supra note 202, at 8. The issue presented for review in the Petition is
"whether Justice Benjamin's failure to recuse himself from participating in his principal financial
supporter's case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
228. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008),
cert. granted,77 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Nov. 14,2008) (No. 08-22).
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contributions tend to generate, this Court should clarify the circumstances in which due process requires the recusal of a judge who
benefited from the campaign expenditures of a party or an attor229
ney.

Perhaps, in addressing the issue, the Court will consider the weight
of empirical evidence indicating that judicial voting records track campaign contributions. Studies conducted in Ohio show that Ohio justices
vote with their contributors seventy-five percent of the time,23 ° while
similar studies in Louisiana show a contributor-decision ratio of sixtyfive percent.23' While it may be impossible to scientifically validate
cause and effect, when asked, judges candidly admit that a causal relationship exists. More than a quarter of state court judges believe that
campaign contributions have an influence on judges' decisions.232 Some
surprisingly state the simple truth: "everyone interested in contributing
has very specific interests.,, 233 "It's pretty hard in big-money races not to
take care of your friends.

234

The public overwhelmingly agrees. Although most Americans con-

tinue to express a belief that "[i]n spite of its problems, the American
justice system is still the 'best in the world,' '

235

only thirty percent ex-

pressed a high level of confidence in the overall justice system. 2 36 The
public's lack of confidence is generated by the influence of money in
judicial elections. Since the beginning of this decade, Americans have
229.
Caperton Writ, supra note 202, at 27.
230.
Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
1,
2006,
at
Al,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/us/Oljudges.html?pagewanted=print.
Justice
Terrence
O'Donnell's concurrence with his contributors was reported as 91% of the time.
231.
Adam Liptak, Looking Anew at Campaign Case and Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2008,
at
A14,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bar.html?sq=Liptak&st=nyt&scp=2&adxnnlx=12016190
26-XtMkjm/3pEJv8ra4bwZ6oA&pagewanted=print. Two of the Louisiana justices voted with their
contributors 80% of the time. A recent Texas study claims that six of the current Texas Supreme
Court justices took two-thirds of their campaign contributions from lawyers and litigants who appeared before them. Press Release, Texans for Public Justice, Uncovering Massive Campaign Conflicts, TPJ Calls for Halt to "Payola Justice" (Oct. 7, 2008), available at
http://www.tpj.org/reports/courtroomcontributions/pressrelease.pdf.
Others claim the study is the
product of trial lawyer rhetoric. See Press Release, Texans for Lawsuit Reform, Texans for Public
Funded by Trial Lawyers (Nov. 2, 2006), availableat http://www.tortreform.com/node/369/print.
232.
While 26% of state court judges say that campaign contributions have some influence on
decisions, 72% believe they have at least "some influence." Memorandum from Greenberg Quinlan
Rosner Research, Inc. & American Viewpoint to Justice at Stake Campaign I (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://gqrr.com/articles/1617/14 10_JAS-report.pdf.
233.
Liptak & Roberts, supra note 230, at Al (quoting Justice Paul Pfeifer as saying, "I never
felt so much like a hooker down by the bus station in any race I've ever been in as I did in a judicial
race."). Justice Pfeifer previously served in the Ohio Senate and House of Representatives, running
in five non-judicial elections. See www.sconet.state.oh.us/Justices/pfeifer/default.asp.
234.
Liptak & Roberts, supra note 230, at Al (quoting retired Chief Justice Richard Neeley,
who also said, "It's very hard not to dance with the one who brung you.").
235.
American Bar Association, Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System 58 (1998), available at
www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf.
236.
Id. at 50.
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expressed increasing concern about the effect of campaign contributions
on judicial decision-making.23 7 More than three-fourths of voters believe
that campaign contributions have an influence on judges' decisions. 38
To almost seventy percent of that number, that "influence" results in
contributors receiving favorable treatment in the courts.239
CONCLUSION: TESTING SOLUTIONS

Scientific validation of the effect that campaign contributions and
special interest agendas have on judicial decision making is unnecessary
to conclude that state courts systems face real danger. The emerging
setting is a court system seen as providing justice for some but rarely for
all; the plot is an effort to hijack the courts. As the justice system is increasingly perceived as unfair, favoring the wealthy, controlled by special interests, and being influenced by contributions, it will cease to be a
viable method of dispute resolution.
When the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of a candidate for judicial office to announce views on contested legal or political
issues in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,24° the Court maintained there was a difference between announcements, which are constitutionally protected, and promises, pledges, and commitments, which
arguably are not.24 1 But that difference-unlike Grisham's assertions
tested in this essay-is in reality pure fiction, much more the sophistry of
Supreme Court analysis than reflective of human cognition. When a
judicial campaign is focused on issues of limiting liability and tort reform, for example, the public does not separate the information into discrete categories of "announcements" and "commitments." Rather, the
public accepts and processes the information as defining the candidate's
platform and signifying the candidate's future judicial behavior.
In addition to perpetuating a misunderstood role of the courts, there
are other byproducts of the new setting for state judicial elections. Campaigning and fundraising, even on a small scale, take time away from
judicial duties, time when judges could be issuing opinions consistent
with reasonable appellate deadlines. Even judges who are not on the
ballot or who have little or no opposition feel mounting pressure to establish a war chest in order to deter potential challengers. Moreover, even
Memorandum from Greenberg Quinlan, supra note 230, at 1.
237.
238.
Id. The numbers are significantly higher in Texas with 83% of the public, 79% of lawyers,
and 50% of the justices believing that campaign contributions "significantly influence decisions."
John Jack, Corporatefinanced campaigns ... Government by the rich, for the rich? (April 2000),
available at www.afn.org/-iguanalarchives/2000_04/20000402.
Memorandum from Greenberg Quinlan, supra note 232, at 1. Surveys in individual states
239.
have yielded similar results. See generally Liptak & Roberts, supra note 230; Liptak, supra note
231; Memorandum from Coleen Danos, National Center for State Courts, Judicial Elections and
Judicial Independence Concerns: Stepping Up to the Plate (Nov. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/Publications/KISJudlnd_S98-1305_Pub.pdf.
240.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002).
241.
Id. at 770.
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judges who are not targeted will be tempted to check their opinions-or
to temper them-in order to not disagree with the current bandwagon
issues.
Once a new appellate judge is elected, the judge and the court must
undergo a transition. Even experienced lawyers likely will be illequipped to manage the unique demands of appellate judging-not
merely researching and writing, but collaboratingon appellate opinions.
Courts with frequent turnover are less productive not only because of the
steep learning curve for a new judge,242 but also because of the inevitable
shift in group dynamics. 243 In addition, because appellate judging is a
collaborative function, the absence of even one judge, who is meeting
with fundraisers or on the stump, affects the overall productivity of the
court.
Judges who have faced hard-fought election battles may become
cynical and resentful; they may be forced to serve with judges who campaigned against them, reducing collegiality and creating artificial divides. 244 Finally, upheaval in a court's composition may result in instability in the law, which in turn affects the willingness to rely on precedent and overall confidence in government.
Because John Grisham writes for profit, his chosen setting for The
Appeal did not publicly finance judicial elections; nor did it impose limitations or rigorous reporting requirements on campaign contributors.
Justice Fisk was neither governed by a mandatory recusal provision nor
subject to transparent and public disciplinary proceedings for sitting on a
case in which he had made a campaign commitment. All of those possi242.
A case in point is Alabama, the state with a frequent turn-over on its supreme court.
Between 1998 and 2008, twenty different justices have served on Alabama's nine-member supreme
court. The issue of productivity surfaced in a 2006 race for the position of chiefjustice. Incumbent
Chief Justice Drayton Nabers accused Justice Tom Parker, who was vying for the position, of being
unqualified to hold the position. In support of his claim, Nabers revealed that Parker had authored
only one opinion in his first year on the bench. During the same time period, Chief Justice Parker
had authored twenty-four opinions. Two other justices who had joined the court with Parker in 2004
had authored thirty-eight and twenty-eight opinions respectively during the same time period. Justice Parker blamed his lack of productivity on the fact that he had not served as a judge before,
which classically begs the question. Dana Beyerle, New Justice Parker Slower than Colleagues,
TUSCALOOSA
NEWS,
Apr.
24,
2006,
available
at
http://www.tuscaloosanews.comarticle/20060424/NEWS/604240329.
243.
Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Chief of the Wisconsin Supreme Court since 1996 says that
"[e]very time you get a new justice; it's a new court in terms of how you work together." Bill Lueders,
Under
Fire,
MILWAUKEE
MAGAZINE,
Dec.
1,
2005,
available at
www.milwaukeemagazine.com/currentlssue/full feature_story.asp?NewMessagelD= 13177.
Even
with consistent leadership, interpersonal squabbles can interfere with a court's productivity. The
members of the Wisconsin Supreme Court were described in the late 1980s as "claw[ing] at each
other ....
They are more preoccupied with one another than the law." In 1999, four justices accused Chief Justice Abrahamson of abusing her authority and publicly supported a contender for her
position. Id.
244.
In Wisconsin, Chief Justice Abrahamson threatened to sue four other justices, referred to
by the Wisconsin media as the "Gang of Four" when the four took steps to diminish the Chief Justice's constitutional powers. Id.
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ble reforms, untested in Grisham's fiction, might make a difference in
reality. Public finance, campaign finance, and disclosure reform would
alter the financier's lethal weapon-money. Mandatory recusal provisions, stringent disciplinary standards, and transparent disciplinary proceedings would cower even the most blatant violator.
All or some of those reform efforts might make a difference, but the
only certain solution is an appeal to the masses. Through public pressure
and backlash, the public can send a message to judges who accept large
contributions, campaign on issue-oriented platforms, use and endorse
misleading and injudicious advertisements, and refuse recusal in obvious
conflict of interest situations that such conduct by a judge will not be
tolerated. In many ways, Grisham's books-much more real that fiction-could begin the much-needed process of appealing to the public to
save the courts.

LOPEz TORRES: A LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR JUDICIAL
REFORM
INTRODUCTION

In 1921, as a reaction to a system viewed as corrupt and ineffective,
the New York Legislature moved from a primary system for selecting
trial court judge nominees to a convention system.1 This convention
system, unique among the fifty states, has come under heavy attack during the past decade. 2 Ironically, many of the same faults critics identified
in the primary system a century ago are now relevant to the convention
system.3 In New York State Board of Elections v. L6pez Torres,4 the
Supreme Court held that the New York system is constitutional. The
Court declined to extend First Amendment protection to judicial candidates who faced substantial burdens because of the inherent flaws in the
New York convention system. By doing so, the Court passed by an opportunity to ensure that New York judges are not beholden to specialinterest groups or backroom politicians.
As this Comment portrays, the Court's narrow characterization of
New York's judicial convention system belies the reality of a system
where political parties have become the de facto appointers of judges. 5
The convention system makes it virtually impossible for individuals not
backed by their party's leaders to gain their party's nomination.6 While
an individual can appear on the ballot as an independent candidate after
satisfying certain requirements, the reality of New York's one-party rule
makes such an effort pointless.7 "[T]he general election is little more
than ceremony" for those individuals whose names appear next to the
dominant political party on the ballot.8 For these reasons, the convention

1. L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 172 (2d. Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 791 (2008).
2.
See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of JudicialSelection in
New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 791-97 (2004) (stating that New York has
been the epicenter for a movement calling for reforms to judicial selection processes).
3.
See Ldpez Torres, 462 F.3d at 171-72.
4.
128 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2008).
5.
The Judicial Selection Task Force, Recommendations on the Selection of Judges and the
Improvement of the JudicialSelection System in New York State, 62 THE RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 89, 98-99 (2007) [hereinafter Task Force].
6. See, e.g., Norman L. Greene, What Makes a Good Appointive System for the Selection of
State Court Judges: The Vision of the Symposium, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35, 43-46 (2007) (detailing the significant obstacles faced by individuals not backed by their parties).
7.
L6pez Torres, 462 F.3d at 193-94.
8.
Id. at 178.
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system places an undue burden on these individuals and, in light of past
Supreme Court decisions, is inconsistent with the First Amendment. 9
Part I of this Comment details the basis for a constitutional challenge against a candidate-selection process and explains how New
York's convention system operates. Part II summarizes the Court's
opinion in L6pez Torres, including the facts, procedural history, and opinions. Part 111 explores two topics: (1) the flaws of the Court's narrow
portrayal of the New York convention system; and (2) alternatives to the
convention system including the encouraging effects such alternatives
would have. This Comment concludes that the Court's holding in L6pez
Torres was flawed due to the Court's unwillingness to examine the practical effects of the New York convention system.
I. BACKGROUND

A. ConstitutionalChallenges to State Imposed Candidate-Selection
Processes
Under the First Amendment, a political party is free to choose any
candidate-selection process that will, in its view, produce the best nominee. 10 However, these rights are limited when the State gives the party a
role in the election process.' One such role the State gives a party is the
privilege of having their candidates' names appear on the general election ballot with a party endorsement.' 2 By extending this right, "the
State acquires a legitimate governmental interest in assuring the fairness
of the party's nominating process., 13 This interest gives the State the
prescriptive power to set the candidate-selection process for all such parties.' 4 However, the selection1 5process that the State dictates is subject to
First Amendment limitations.
In California Democratic Party v. Jones,16 the Supreme Court invalidated California's blanket primary system, which allowed citizens to
vote in any party primary, regardless of their current party affiliation.
The Court reasoned that the blanket primary violated the First Amend17
ment by allowing non-party members to determine a party's nominee.
9. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres: Is the Right to Vote a
Constitutional Constraint on Partisan Nominating Conventions?, 6 ELECrION L.J. 399, 403-11
(2007) (discussing the burdens created by New York's convention scheme and the possible models
to evaluate the severity of those burdens).
10. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2008).
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 797-98.
13.
In addition, a party's conduct may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 798.
14.
See id.
15.
Id.

16.

530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).

17.
Id. (stating that the blanket primary system placed a severe and unnecessary burden on the
rights of political association).
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The Supreme Court has also invalidated state imposed selection processes for being unduly burdensome or exclusionary on candidates.1 8 In
particular, the Court has determined that candidates must have a reasonable opportunity to appear on the general election ballot. 9
B. New York's Judicial Candidate-SelectionProcess
In New York, the State's trial court of general jurisdiction is the Supreme Court of New York. 20 Each of the State's twelve judicial districts
elects Supreme Court Justices to fourteen-year terms. 2' The current method for selecting Supreme Court Justices follows a convention system
first set forth in 1921.22
New York's convention system consists of a three-part process for
electing Supreme Court Justices. 23 First, the State holds a primary election during which registered party voters select judicial delegates.24
Next, these delegates attend a convention where they select their party's
nominees.25 The chosen nominees automatically appear on the general
26
election ballot with their party affiliation next to their names. Finally,
the State holds a general election during which the voting public in each
judicial district chooses its justices.
Only political parties that received 50,000 or more votes in the most
28
Judicial
recent election for governor can make judicial nominations.
candidates who fail to gain their party's nomination, or whose party does
not meet the 50,000-vote threshold, can gain access to the general election ballot by submitting required nominating petitions. 29 However,
these independent candidates' names appear on the ballot with no party
affiliation.3 °

18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 804-06 (1983) (holding that an Ohio
statute requiring an unreasonably early filing deadline was unconstitutional).
19. See id. at 801.
20. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
21.
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (a)-(c) (stating that N.Y. is divided into eleven judicial districts,
with the ability to add more, and that the terms of the justices shall be fourteen years); N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 140 (McKinney 2005) (stating that there are twelve judicial districts).
22. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791,796 (2008).
23. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-106, -124, -158, 8-100(1)(c) (McKinney 2007).
24. Id. §§ 6-106, -124.
25. Id. §§ 6-106, -124, -158.
26.
Id. § 7-104(5)(a).
27.
Id. § 8-100(1)(c).
28.
Id. § 1-104(3).
29.
Id. §§ 6-138, -142(2).
30. See id. § 7-116(2).
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H. NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS V. L6PEZ TORRES
A. Facts

Petitioner Margarita L6pez Torres won the Brooklyn Civil Court
Judge election in 1992. 3' Subsequently, members of the Kings County
Democratic Committee, who backed L6pez Torres' nomination, directed
32
L6pez Torres to hire a person of their choosing for her court attorney.
After L6pez Torres refused, Clarence Norman, the committee chair, informed L6pez Torres that she would never become a Supreme Court
Justice.33 In 1995, another committee official, Vito Lopez, informed
L6pez Torres that if she hired his daughter as her court attorney, Lopez
would ensure L6pez Torres' nomination for an upcoming Supreme Court
vacancy.34 L6pez Torres refused to fire her current court attorney and
turned Lopez down.35 From that point forward, L6pez Torres received
no support from the committee for a Supreme Court nomination.36
The lack of support from her party's leaders made it virtually impossible for L6pez Torres to succeed in her pursuit of a Supreme Court
nomination.37 In 1997, L6pez Torres attempted to secure her party's
nomination for the Supreme Court in her judicial district.38 Naively,
L6pez Torres thought she could petition for a nomination at her party's
convention. 39 However, L6pez Torres found that without the support of
her party's leaders, such as Norman and Lopez, not a single delegate
would propose her for nomination. 40 L6pez Torres tried several times
over the next seven years to gain her party's nomination. 4' Each time,
because of her past conflicts with Norman and L6pez, her attempt to gain
her party's nomination failed.42
B. ProceduralHistory

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the
New York convention system for judicial nominations was unconstitu31.
L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 178 (2d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 791 (2008).
32. L6pez Torres contacted a former employer of the applicant and received a less then favorable assessment. Id. at 179.
33. Norman told L6pez Torres that she "did not understand the way it works." He went on to
state that someday L6pez Torres would want to become a Supreme Court Justice and the party
leaders would "not forget this." Quite bluntly, Norman stated that without the committee's support,
L6pez Torres' Supreme Court nomination "will not happen." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 179-81.
37. See id.
38. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lpez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2008).
39.
L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 179 (2d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 791 (2008).
40. Id.
41.
See id. at 180.
42.
See id. at 180-81.
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tional.43 The Second Circuit found that the system effectively transformed the process of electing justices into a scheme of de facto appointment by party leaders. 44 In making its determination, the court rejected the state's argument that First Amendment protections only apply
to direct primaries as opposed to the indirect primaries New York employs.4 5 The court went on to state that the First Amendment not only
grants candidates access to a nominating process, but also affords a realistic opportunity to participate in the process. 46 Participation must be
free from severe and unnecessary burdens.47 The court also noted that
exclusion from a nominating process does not necessarily have to be
categorical in nature, but can result from the aggregation of otherwise
valid election regulations.48
In holding the New York system unconstitutional, the Second Circuit found the system imposed severe burdens on candidates and was
exclusionary in nature.49 The court also held that an alternate means of
access to the general election, namely access as an independent candidate, does not automatically render the system constitutional. °
C. Majority Opinion
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
New York convention system violates the First Amendment rights of
prospective party candidates.51 In a unanimous opinion written by Jus52
tice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision.
The Court held that New York is free to use a convention system for
selecting candidates and the First Amendment does not compel New
York to use a different system.53 The Court made three findings in determining that New York's judicial candidate-selection process is constitutional.54
First, the Court found the requirements the convention system imposed upon candidates reasonable.5 5 Specifically, the requirement that a
candidate collect five hundred valid party signatures from his or her dis43. See id. at 208.
44.
Id. at 200.
45. Id. at 186 ("[C]onstitutional protection attaches to all integral phases of the nominating
process, regardless of whether the nomination is conferred directly by public ballot or indirectly by
the votes of elected party officials.").
Id. at 187.
46.
47. Id.
48. Id. ("Further, while categorical race and sex-based exclusions undoubtedly violate the
associational rights of voters and candidates, exclusions that result from a complex of otherwise
facially valid regulations also may offend the First Amendment.") (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 195-201, 208.
50.
Id. at 194-95.
51.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 795 (2008).
52.
Id. at 794, 801.
53. See id. at 801.
54.
See id. at 798-801.
Id. at 798.
55.

290
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trict within a thirty-seven day timeframe was well within the scope of
requirements the Court had previously upheld.56 While prior Supreme
Court decisions analyzing the reasonableness of primary election requirements involved the right to vote,57 the
Court noted that the same
58
principles are applicable to the right to run.
Second, the Court found the Constitution does not require that candidates receive a "fair shot" at securing their party's nomination. 59 Although the Court recognized that the party leadership effectively determined the nominees, it refused to look beyond the bare requirements to
"the manner in which political actors function under those requirements. ' 6° Relying on an institutional-competency argument, the Court
noted that determining what constitutes a fair shot is better left to the
legislature and is an inappropriate constitutional question for judges.61
Third, the Court rejected the argument that the convention system
was unconstitutional based upon the pervasiveness of New York judicial
districts with one-party rule. 62 The Court focused only on the requirements to gain access to the general election ballot as an independent candidate, and found these requirements reasonable.6 3 Any measures to
make the general election more competitive, beyond reasonable access to
the general ballot, were not constitutionally required. 64 The Court noted
that one-party entrenchment had never been a basis for interfering with a
candidate-selection process.65
D. Concurring Opinions
Justice Stevens's short concurring opinion, in which Justice Souter
joined, stressed that the Court's opinion is not an endorsement of New
York's candidate-selection process. 66 Quoting Thurgood Marshall, Jus-

tice Stevens noted that "[t]he Constitution does not prohibit legislatures
from enacting stupid laws.

67

56.
Id. at 798-99 (stating that the requirement for a five hundred signature petition in a thirtyseven day period is "entirely reasonable").
57.
See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 52, 61 (1973) (holding an Illinois election law that
prevented some individuals from voting in their party's primary was unconstitutional); Rosario v.
Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756, 762 (1973) (holding a New York election law placing temporal
enrollment requirements on individuals to vote in a party's primary was constitutional).
58. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 798 (2008).
59.
Id. at 799.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62. Id. at 800.
63. See id. at 798, 800.
64.
Id. at 800.
65. Id. at 800-01 (stating that the First Amendment "does not call on the federal courts to
manage the market by preventing too many buyers from settling upon a single product").
66.
Id. at 801 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer
joined in part, is notable in that it comments on New York's use of elections to select judges.68 Justice Kennedy noted that judicial elections
require candidates to conduct campaigns and raise funds, which leaves
the candidates open to influence by special-interest groups and political
parties. 69 Justice Kennedy questioned whether this process was consistent with the desire for judicial independence and excellence. 70 He concluded, however, that as flawed as the New York system might be, the
present suit did not permit the Court to intervene on constitutional
grounds.7'

III. ANALYSIS
In its opinion for L6pez Torres, the Court focused only on the bare
requirements set forth by New York election law, thereby narrowly portraying the effects of the convention system on judicial candidates and
the voting public. Specifically, the system places an undue burden on
candidates seeking a nomination, effectively excluding them from both
the nomination process and general election. As such, the Court incorrectly determined that the New York convention system was constitutional under the First Amendment. In doing so, the Court passed by an
opportunity to compel New York to adopt an alternative candidateselection process that protects First Amendment rights. This alternative
could have far-reaching, positive effects on New York's judicial system.
A. The Flaws in the Court'sNarrow Portrayalof the New York System
By focusing only on the bare requirements set forth in New York
election law, the Court did not consider the practical effects these requirements have on judicial candidates and the voting public. However,
past Supreme Court decisions have taken the practical effects of election
requirements into consideration, and based upon those effects, held state
election laws unconstitutional.72
By narrowly portraying the New York convention system, the Court
failed to address several significant, unconstitutional effects of the system. Specifically, the Court erred in three ways: (1) it failed to address
properly the aggregate effect of the requirements and the burden these
requirements place upon candidates; (2) it ignored the exclusionary effect of New York's convention system on judicial candidates; and (3) it
68. Id. at 801, 803 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 803.
70. Id. (stating that a selection process that is open to manipulation, criticism, and serious
abuse is unfair to the concept ofjudicial independence).
71.

See id.

72. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (holding that a Texas filing fee was
unconstitutional because of the fee's effect on candidates); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 24 (1968) (holding that an Ohio election law was unconstitutional because of the law's effect on
new political parties).
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did not give sufficient weight to the convention system's effect on the
independence and quality of New York Supreme Court Justices.
1. Significant Burden Placed on Individuals Seeking a Nomination
During the primary election phase of the New York convention system, candidates not backed by their party face obstacles so burdensome
that success is virtually impossible.73 Judicial candidates themselves do
not take part in the primary elections. 74 Instead, "rank-and-file party
members elect judicial delegates" who attend the party's convention and
select the party's nominees.7 5 Consequently, a judicial candidate must
assemble a slate of delegates to run on his or her behalf, trusting these
delegates will nominate him or her at the convention.76
Each judicial district within New York is comprised of between
nine and twenty-four assembly districts.77 Small subgroups of potential
delegates run against each other in each assembly district.78 In effect, the
primary election consists of a series of contests between groups of delegates within each assembly district.79
To appear on the primary ballot, each delegate is required to gather
five hundred valid signatures from party members residing in his or her
particular assembly district within a thirty-seven day period. 80 Because
signatures are often challenged, delegates "must realistically gather be''
tween 1000 and 1500 signatures to gain a primary ballot position. 81
Therefore, depending on the number of assembly districts in his or her
judicial district, a judicial candidate is responsible for between 9,000 and
24,000 signatures to ensure his or her slate of delegates appears on the
primary ballot. 82 Additionally, the primary ballot does not indicate the

judicial candidate with whom each delegate is associated.8 3 This has the
effect of requiring judicial candidates to mount a separate voter education campaign for each assembly district. 84
The aggregate effect of these requirements places a significant burden on candidates lacking support from their political party, even for

73. See L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 172-75 (2d. Cir. 2006),
rev'd, 128 S.Ct. 791 (2008).
74. Id. at 172.
75. Id.
76.
Id.
77.

Id.

78. Id. (citing N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-124 (McKinney 2007)).
79. Id.
80. N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 6-134(4), 136(2)(i) (McKinney 2007).
81.
Lrpez Torres, 462 F.3d at 173 (stating that because each party member can sign only one
petition, signatures are routinely and successfully challenged under the one-petition signature rule).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. (stating that the candidate must inform the primary electorate in each assembly
district of which delegates are pledged to him or her).
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those who possess significant public support.85 However, candidates
who are backed by their local party leadership "easily navigate the pri-86
mary system with the benefit of the party's pre-existing apparatus.
Because of the burden placed upon candidates not backed by their party,
the vast majority of primary elections are uncontested. 87 Thus, the majority of party-backed delegates run unopposed, are simply deemed
elected, and do not even appear on the primary ballot.88
In past decisions, the Supreme Court has looked at the aggregate effect of election requirements in determining constitutionality. For example, in Williams v. Rhodes, the Court looked at the totality of the effect of
Ohio's election laws in determining whether the requirements were unconstitutionally burdensome on political parties seeking to appear on the
state ballot. 89 To appear on the state ballot, Ohio election law required
new political parties to collect a large number of signatures, file earlier
than existing parties, and conduct a primary election that conformed to
detailed and rigorous standards. 90 The Court noted that the laws made it
virtually impossible for some political parties, regardless of how much
popular support they had, to appear successfully on the state ballot. 9' In
holding that the Ohio election laws were unconstitutional, the Court considered the aggregate effect of the requirements, rather than considering
each bare requirement on its own.92
The New York system places a similar unconstitutional burden on
candidates not backed by their party. L6pez Torres enjoyed popular support from the public, but lacked her party's support. As evidenced by her
lack of success, and the lack of success of many other candidates not
backed by their party,93 the burden on these individuals is impossibly
high.94 The New York system has the practical effect of requiring candidates to collect up to 24,000 signatures in thirty-seven days and hold a
separate voter education campaign in up to twenty-four assembly districts.95 Taken together, the effects of these requirements make seeking a
nomination impractical without the institutional support of a candidate's
party. Thus, the New York system places an unconstitutional burden on
candidates not backed by their parties.

85. See id. at 174-75.
86. Id. at 175.
87. See id. (stating that between 1999 and 2002, four counties did not field a single contested
delegate race).
88.
Id. ("This kind of invisible, automatic 'election' is the norm rather than the exception.").
89. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
90. See id. at27.
at24.
91. Id.
92. See id. at38.
93. See Lrpez Torres, 462 F.3d at174.
94. See id.
95. Id. at197.
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2. Exclusionary Effect of the Requirements on Judicial Candidates
In L6pez Torres, the Court determined that the requirements for a
delegate to get on the primary ballot were not exclusionary. 96 By not
considering the practical effects of the New York system, the Court ignored its exclusionary nature. Just as it has when considering the burden
election requirements place on candidates, the Supreme Court has also
taken the practical effects of election requirements into consideration
when analyzing whether the requirements are exclusionary.
In Bullock v. Carter, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a
Texas filing fee for primary elections.97 Instead of simply examining the
specific dollar amount required by Texas law, the Court looked at the
effect the fee had on particular candidates. 98 The Court noted that candidates lacking both personal wealth and affluent background are in every
practical sense precluded from seeking their party's nomination.99 As
such, the Court held that the fee was exclusionary.' ° Additionally, the
fee had the effect of substantially limiting the voters' choices during the
primary election.' 0 '
In practice, the New York election scheme has a similar exclusionary effect. As detailed above,10 2 the lack of support of their party's leaders essentially excludes candidates from their party's nomination process. Just as the filing fee in Bullock had the practical effect of excluding
candidates lacking particular resources, the New York scheme has the
practical effect of excluding candidates who refuse to play the game with
their political party.
The exclusionary nature of the New York system goes beyond just
the primary election. Once the party delegates are determined, the nominating convention takes place. No debate or competition takes place at
the nominating convention. 0 3 The vast majority of nominations are by
unanimous voice vote.10 4 Because the vast majority of nominations are
uncontested, many delegates choose not to attend the nominating convention. 105 Consequently, delegate absentee rates have been as high as

96.
See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 798 (2008).
97.
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 135 (1972).
98.
See id. at 143.
99.
Id.
100. See id. at 143-44 (stating that the Texas scheme had a real and appreciable impact on
particular candidates) (emphasis added).
101.
See id. at 149.
102.
See supra notes 73-88, 93-95 and accompanying text.
103.
L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d 161, 178 (2d Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128
S. Ct. 791 (2008).
104.
Id. (stating that between 1990 and 2002, over ninety-six percent of nominations went
uncontested).
105.
Id. ("Not only were the conventions devoid of debate and competition, they were fleeting.
Over a 12-year span, conventions statewide averaged a mere 55 minutes in length. In 1996, the
Second Judicial District's convention lasted II minutes but yielded eight nominations.").
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sixty-nine percent. 106 Candidates whose slate of delegates was unsuccessful at the primary election have 107
no chance of securing the nomination independently at the convention.
Candidates nominated at the convention appear on the general election ballot with their party designation.' °8 For those candidates associated with the majority political party, the general election is "little more
than ceremony" due to one-party rule in most judicial districts. 10 9 During
a twelve-year period ending in 2002, in eight of the state's twelve judicial districts, almost half of the Supreme Court Justice elections were
uncontested. 110 In the Sixth Judicial District during this period, the uncontested rate was ninety-one percent.'11
When the Court examined whether the general election was exclusionary, it looked only at the requirement to gain access to the general
election ballot as an independent candidate, not at the practical effect of
trying to do so.'1 2 The Court stated that a candidate's interests are protected as long as the candidate has "an adequate opportunity to appear on
the general-election ballot."' 13 The Court did not address the domino
effect the New York system has on candidates not backed by their parties. In reality, candidates not backed by their party are not able to secure a nomination and thus cannot appear on the general election ballot
with their party designation. 14 Without a party designation, candidates
cannot win the general election.' 15 In effect, the system excludes certain
types of candidates during the general election, just as it does during the
primary and convention phases, by making success impossible.
The Court has also expressed concern over the exclusionary effects
of requirements when they "limit the field of candidates from which voters can choose."' 1 6 In examining these effects, the Court has stated, "it is
essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters."' 1 7 While the New York system may not directly limit
the field of candidates in the general election, it does effectively limit the
field of candidates during the nominating convention. 1 8 Thus, the sys-

106. Id.
107. See id. at 176-77.
108.
See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 802 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
109. Ldpez Torres, 462 F.3d at 178.
110.
Id.
111.
Id.
112. See Lepez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 800.
113. Id.
114.
See supra notes 73-88, 93-95, 108 and accompanying text.
115.
See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
116.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 143 (1972) stating that restrictions that limit voters' choices are of a primary concern).
117. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
118.
See supra notes 82-88, 94-95 and accompanying text.
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tern has an appreciable impact on voters by limiting the general ballot to
candidates that each party has sanctified.
3. The Effect on the Independence and Quality of New York
Supreme Court Justices
The New York system also has a negative effect on the independence and quality of New York Supreme Court Justices. 1 9 While these
negative effects alone may be insufficient to deem the New York system
unconstitutional, they warrant consideration with regard to the overall
effect of the system on the public. 12 Because the Court did not consider
the practical effects of the New York system, it failed to give any weight
to these judicial independence and quality concerns.
As detailed above, 12 the New York convention system results in
party leaders effectively determining who will become a Supreme Court
Justice. As noted by the Commission to Promote Public Confidence in
Judicial Elections, 22 the system "vests almost total control in the hands
of local political leaders ....
The Task Force on Judicial Diversity' 24
further noted that because ' of
one-party rule, "most often this nomination
25
is tantamount to election." 1
Knowing success is impossible without their party leaders, candidates feel the need to be responsive to their party in order to obtain and
retain their positions. 26 This increased level of political pressure affects
a judge's decisions and thus judicial independence. 127 After all, judicial
independence can only exist if there is immunity from outside political
pressures in the resolution of individual cases. 128 L6pez Torres was denied a nomination because she refused to hire a particular law clerk.
Likely, political parties will make further demands once individuals get
on the bench.

119. See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 803-29.
120. See Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1046 (2007) (stating
that if elections "introduce random volatility and noise into the selection or retention of judges, they
are certainly a bad thing.").
121.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
122.
New York State's Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye created the Commission to Promote Public
Confidence in Judicial Elections in 2003. The New York State Commission to Promote Public
Confidence in Judicial Elections, http:/law.fordham.edulcommissionljudicialelections/main.ihtml
(last visited October 30, 2008). The Commission was charged with determining how to better improve voter participation in the judicial election process. The Commission included judges, academics, public servants, and private practitioners. L6pez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 462 F.3d
161, 172-76 (2d. Cir. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
123.
Ldpez Torres, 462 F.3d at 181.
124.
Created by Governor Mario Cuomo in 1991 to study minority representation in the New
York judiciary. Id.
125.
Id.
126. See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 826-27.
127.
Id. at 825.
128.
Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, The Ideologies of Judicial Selection: Empiricism and
the Transformation of the JudicialSelection Debate, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 551, 559-60 (2008).
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Additionally, otherwise qualified candidates may choose not to pursue a judgeship because they are not politically savvy or are unwilling to
play the political game. 129 This affects the overall quality of Supreme
savvy] campaigner
Court Justices since the "qualities of a [politically
130
may be very different from those of a good judge."'
B. Alternative Judicial Candidate-SelectionProcesses
Although the Court did not force New York to change its convention system, change nevertheless seems likely.13' There are a number of
alternative candidate-selection processes available should New York
abandon the current system. While none of the alternatives address all of
the concerns with judicial selection, two alternatives are a marked improvement over New York's current system. If New York opts to maintain judicial elections, the current convention system could be reformed.
If judicial elections are deserted, a commission-based appointive system
may be the best alternative.
1. Reformed Convention System
Although the New York convention system is flawed, it does not
need to be completely abandoned. If New York is determined to continue electing Supreme Court Justices, reforms could be made to the current convention system to address the concerns outlined above. These
reforms, however, should be limited. For example, there would be several problems with moving from the current system to a primary-only
election model. A primary election would force candidates to raise large
sums of money and conduct campaigns, just as the convention system
does. 132 In fact, the costs and burdens of running a district-wide primary
campaign33 would likely be "more daunting" than under the convention
system.
Keeping these concerns in mind, the Judicial Selection Task
35
Force 134 has proposed reforms to the current convention system.
While the Task Force prefers a commission-based appointment system, it
recognizes that reforms may be needed before the New York State Constitution can be amended. 136 The Task Force's proposal consists of several changes to the current system.

129.
Zeidman, supra note 2, at 826.
130. Id.
131.
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 6, at 41-47 (explaining the political climate in New York
after the district court and Second Circuit decisions); see also Zeidman, supra note 2, at 829-31.
132.
Task Force, supra note 5, at 108.
133.
Id.
134.
The Judicial Selection Task Force was created by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York in March of 2006. The Task Force's mission was to make recommendations on improving the judicial selection system in New York State. Id. at 91.
135.
Id. at 107-16.
136.
Id. at 107.
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First, each judicial district would be divided up into judicial convention districts, for the purpose of nominating justices. 137 These convention
districts would be grouped into eight geographic regions. 38 Within each
region, 9a judicial qualification commission (JQC) would be estab13
lished.

JQCs would consist of twenty-one members.140 These members
would include executive, legislative and judicial government representatives, as well as a mix of community members from inside and outside
the legal profession.141 JQC members would be limited to serving on the
42
committee for no more than three consecutive years.1
Potential judicial candidates would be required to submit their qualifications to the JQC.1 43 The JQC would then determine the three most
qualified candidates for the first vacancy.144 The next two most qualified
45
candidates would then be recommended for each additional vacancy.
However, if an incumbent were to seek reelection, and the JQC determined that the incumbent was highly qualified,
he or she would be the
146
JQC's only recommendation for the vacancy.
Delegates to each party's convention would still be selected by a
primary election. 147 However, the signature requirement to appear on the
primary ballot would be decreased. 48 More importantly, delegates
would be allowed to identify the candidate they have pledged to nominate, thereby removing the need for candidates to run multiple voter edu149
cation campaigns.

Prior to both the primary and general election, the JQC would publish a judicial voters' guide, complete with biographical information on
each candidate who submitted his or her qualifications.150 The guide
would also include the JQC's recommendations for each judicial vacancy. 151 The Task Force notes that these reforms retain several flaws of
137. Id. at 112 (stating that each judicial convention district would consist of two or three
assembly districts).
138.

Id.

139.

JQCs would not be limited to reviewing the qualifications of only Supreme Court Justices.
They would also review candidates for District and City Courts, the Civil Court of the City of New
York, the Surrogate and County Courts, and the Family Court outside of the City of New York. Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id. (stating that each JQC should broadly represent the community within its region,
including race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and sexual orientation as diversity factors).
142.
Id.at 113.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.at113-14.
148.
Id. at 114 (stating that delegates would need two hundred signatures at most).
149.
Id.
150.

Id. at 114-15.

151.
Id. (stating that the guide would indicate in each candidate's biographical entry whether
the candidate was rated most qualified, highly qualified, or unqualified).

2008]

A LOST OPPORTUNITY

the current system. 52 However, the Task Force recognizes that a commission-based appointive system, which would require an amendment to
the New York State Constitution, could take time to implement.153 As
such, reforms to the current system could alleviate some of the concerns
in a more timely fashion.
2. Moving Away from Judicial Elections
a. The Concern with Judicial Elections
As pointed out by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion, "the
Framers did not provide for election of federal judges, [but] most states
have made the opposite choice, at least to some extent."1 54 While states
have the authority to hold elections for state judges, there are many concerns in relation to judicial elections. 15 The most common concerns
involve the reality of what candidates must do to win judicial elections.156 This includes the costs and combative nature of elections, as
well as the concern that judges will decide cases based upon what is
popular, and not based upon the law and facts.157
In addition, there is an expectation among the public that judges
should be as independent and impartial as possible.158 However, the
"need to raise campaign funds, among other things, threatens the appearance (or fact) of impartiality. ' t 59 Independence also suffers when political leaders control elections, which is an occurrence New York's convention system facilitates. These elective systems elevate party favorites
and value party loyalty over the quality of the candidate.1 60 The need for

152. Id. at 109-11 (stating that even under the reformed system candidates would still face
burdens and costs).
153. Id.at 111.
154. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 803 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
155.
See David E. Pozen, The Irony of JudicialElections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 269 (2008)
(stating that competitive judicial elections undermine the capacity of state courts to safeguard nonjudicial elections and public values); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2168, 2204-05 (2006) (describing several concerns including the possibility that elected judges are
more likely to be biased against out-of-state residents). But see Carolyn Dineen King, Current
Challenges to the Federal Judiciary, 66 LA. L. REV. 661, 667 (2006) (arguing that the appointive
system for federal appellate judges conveys to the public "the notion that the Judiciary is yet another
political branch of government, a kind of stepchild of the other two branches . . . and when the
Judiciary is perceived as a stepchild of the political branches of government, the separation of the
three branches of government is impaired.").
156.
See Pozen, supra note 155, at 267-68, 278.
157.
See id. at 277 (stating that elected judges will tend to be more sensitive to popular opinion); Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1081
(2007) ("Judicial elections have become nastier, nosier, and costlier.").
158.
See L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. at 803 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
159.
Greene, supra note 6, at 38. See also Marilyn S. Kite, Wyoming's Judicial Selection
Process: Is it Getting the Job Done?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 203 (2007) ("Public perception of
political influence on the judiciary, whether through money or political affiliation, undermines the
citizenry's confidence in the integrity of the system.").
160.
Greene, supra note 6, at 38.
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Such a concern has long
an independent judiciary cannot be overstated.
1 61
been a part of politics in the United States.
Many of these concerns have been validated. A report prepared by
Professor Steven Zeidman,1 62 which compared the relative quality of
appointed and elected judges in New York, found that elected judges "far
' 63
surpass their appointed colleagues in incidents of judicial discipline.'
In addition, Professor Zeidman found that elections result in a less diverse judiciary. 164
b. Commission-Based Appointments
In reaction to these concerns, several groups have advocated that
New York move away from judicial elections to commission-based appointments.1 65 The groups suggest that commission-based appointments
would remove political considerations from judicial selection as much as
possible and increase the quality of state judges. 66 The groups advocate
the formation of commissions, consisting of government and community
members, which
would make merit-based recommendations for judicial
67
appointments. 1
For example, the Judicial Selection Task Force suggests that New
York create JQCs, similar to the ones discussed above, which would
to the Governor for state judicial appointmake 16
recommendations
8
ments.

During a symposium held at Fordham Law School in 2006, partici169
pants made several suggestions for commission-based appointments.
Participants stressed that the commissions should be as diverse as possi161. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961)
(stating that the independent spirit of judges is essential to the faithful performance of their duties).
162.
Steven Zeidman is an Associate Professor at CUNY School of Law. Zeidman, supra note
2, at 836 n.al.
163.
Id. at 809. But see Michael E. DeBow, State Judicial Selection: Once More Unto the
at
http://www.fed(2008),
available
9
ENGAGE
128,
128
Breach,
soc.org/publicationstpubID.696/pub-detail.asp (follow "State Judicial Selection: Once More Unto
the Breach" hyperlink) ("There is a large body of social science research on state supreme courts and
it shows that there is no real, observable difference between the judges chosen in merit selection
states, and those chosen in other states.").
164.
Zeidman, supra note 2, at 817 (stating that when examined on a statewide basis, elections
produce a disproportionally white judiciary).
165.
See, e.g., Greene, supra note 6, at 41 (stating that the best permanent solution would be to
move away from judicial elections to a merit-based appointment system); Task Force, supra note 5,
at 93 ("[T]he Task Force firmly reiterates the Association's long-standing position in favor of a
commission-based appointive system.").
166. See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 834; Mark S. Cady & Jess R. Phelps, Preservingthe Delicate Balance Between JudicialAccountability and Independence: Merit Selection in the Post-White
World, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 343, 345 (2008).

167.
See Zeidman, supra note 2, at 831-32.
168.
Task Force, supra note 5, at 103-08.
169.
The symposium's purpose was to guide the reform of judicial selection processes. Participants included political scientists, lawyers, law professors, and judges from various states. See
Greene, supra note 6, at 36-37.
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ble with respect to race, political affiliation, and legal specialty. 170 They
also suggested that the commission proceedings be open to the public to
avoid secrecy and public distrust of the process. 17 1 However, one participant7 2cautioned that excessive openness might drive away some candidates. 1
Professor Zeidman has also outlined a commission-based appointment system. Like several other groups, he suggests that the nominating
commission be as diverse as possible. 173 He notes that the more diverse
the commission, "the more likely it is to produce a representative and
high quality judiciary."'174 The commission would identify, recruit, inter75
view, evaluate, and recommend candidates to the appointing authority. 1
The appointing authority, likely a designated executive, would choose
from the recommended candidates within a specified time frame. 176 Professor Zeidman also advocates that states move away from retention
elections and instead charge the nominating commission
with recom77
mending whether an existing judge be retained.
CONCLUSION
By ignoring the significant practical effects of the New York convention system, the Court incorrectly held that the system was constitutional. Although the Court stated that it had not focused on "the manner
in which political actors function under... [election] requirements," past
decisions are inconsistent with that assertion. 78 In reality, the New York
system places significant burdens on candidates, excludes candidates not
backed by their party, and endangers the independence and quality of the
judiciary.
The Court declined an opportunity to push New York towards a judicial selection process that would benefit both judicial candidates and
the public. Such alternatives would increase the quality and diversity of
the judiciary while raising the public's confidence in the judicial system.
The importance of such judicial reforms cannot be underestimated. As
Justice Kennedy stated, "[t]he rule of law, which is the foundation of
freedom, presupposes a functioning judiciary respected for its independ-

170. See id. at 49.
171.
Id. at 56-58.
172.
Id. at 60 (stating that discussions within the commission should remain private, while
names of finalists should be publicized).
173.
Zeidman, supra note 2, at 831-32.
174.
Id. at 832.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 833 (stating that the commission would recommend whether to reappoint the judge
based upon judicial performance evaluations and reviews).
178.
N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 799 (2008).
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ence, its179 professional attainments, and the absolute probity of its

judges."'

Justin Schneider*

Id. at 803 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179.
* I would like to thank Professor Alan Chen for his valuable input. I would also like to
thank the Denver University Law Review editors and staff for their help, especially Zach Courson.
Finally, thank you to my family and friends for their support and encouragement.

STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS V. SCIENTIFICATLANTA: RETHINKING THE FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET
PRESUMPTION AND THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
PERMEATING THE COURT'S DECISION
INTRODUCTION

Recent corporate scandals have led many Americans to demand accountability for fraud in the securities markets.! After losing billions in
the wake of the Enron and Worldcom scandals, investors started questioning the integrity of the securities in which they invested.2 This, however, was not the first time American investors and policy makers entertained concerns over, the safety of the securities markets.3 Outraged by
corporate deception and unfair trade practices in the early 1930s, Congress enacted § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to ensure
effective punishment of fraudulent practices in the securities markets.4
For over fifty years, the Supreme Court's decisions reflected that, under
§ 10(b), fraud would not be tolerated.5 Recently, however, the Court has
made it increasingly difficult for injured investors to maintain § 10(b)
claims against persons defrauding the market.6
Part I of this Comment explains pertinent case law, economic theory, and legislation prior to Stoneridge. Part II summarizes the holding
in Stoneridge. Part III analyzes Stoneridge, criticizes the Court's holding, and provides suggestions for a more appropriate rule. This Comment concludes that the recent holding in Stoneridge unnecessarily raises
the hurdle for primary actor liability by further limiting the fraud-on-themarket presumption of reliance in contravention of the economic principles supporting that presumption. In the end, the Court's decision is a
reflection of pro-business policy considerations that degrade the integrity
of U.S. securities markets.

1.
See Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central Bank of Denver After
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 Mo. L. REv. 367, 384 (2006).
2.
See id. at 375, 384.
3.
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 779-80

(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4.

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version at 15

U.S.C.A. § 780) (West 2008)); see also Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164, 195 (1994).
5.
See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 192-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6.
See id.; see also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768.
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Section 10(b) of the SecuritiesAct of 1934 and Rule 1Ob-5
In response to public outcry following manipulative trading practices leading up to the Great Depression, Congress enacted § 10(b) making it:
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange...
[T]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.7
With the express authority of Congress as embodied in § 10(b), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) propounded Rule 10b-5 to
combat fraudulent activities in the markets by making it unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 8
Not surprisingly, the intent of Congress in enacting § 10(b) was to
promote honest securities markets and rebuild investor confidence after
the stock market crash of 1929. 9 Congress designed the broad scope of §
10(b)'s language as a "catchall" provision to prevent fraudulent activities
in securities markets. 1 ° Moreover, the purpose of the 1934 Act was to
ensure fairness in the impersonal securities markets where, traditionally,
common-law remedies had failed defrauded investors. 1 In sum, Congress enacted § 10(b)
to preserve fairness and integrity in America's se2
curities markets.'

7.

15 U.S.C.A. § 78(j) (West 2008).

8.

17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2008). Rule lOb-5 is the SEC's implementation of § 10(b). See

United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). Accordingly, for purposes of this Comment,
use of the term "a § 10(b) claim" refers to both the statutory provision and the SEC Rule lOb-5.
9.

10.

See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.

See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

11.

Id. at 248.

12.

Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975

U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 322.
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1. The Elements of a § 10(b) Claim
During eighty years of jurisprudence, the Court has established that
to maintain a claim under § 10(b), a plaintiff must generally prove: (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; 13 (3) a connection
with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss;
and (6) loss causation.' 4 The Court, however,
noted that deceptive con6
duct 5 could also satisfy the first element.'
B. Superintendent of Insurance
of the State of New York v. Bankers Life
17
Company
Casualty
and
In Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers
Life and Casualty Company, the Supreme Court recognized that § 10(b)
carried an implied right of action for private plaintiffs. 8 In Bankers Life,
respondent Bankers Life agreed to sell all of the stock of Manhattan
Casualty Company to a third party for $5,000,000.19 However, the buyer
conspired to pay for the stock using Manhattan's own assets. 20 Manhattan investors were deceived into believing that the assets were being used
to fund the purchase of government bonds. 2' Importantly, the statutory
text of § 10(b) does not explicitly confer the fight for private parties to
maintain suits. 22 Yet, the Court interpreted § 10(b)'s broad remedial
language to implicitly confer a private right of action.23 Thereafter, defrauded investors had a powerful remedy under § 10(b) to disgorge persons engaging in securities fraud of their ill-gotten gains.
24
C. Chiaralla v. United States

In Chiarallav. United States, the Court expanded upon the rule that
a misrepresentation stemming from nondisclosure of material information under Rule 1Ob-5 is not actionable unless the actor had a duty to
13.
Scienter, to put it succinctly, is a wrongful state of mind. See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 197 (1976).
14. Dura Pharms, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
15.
"Deceptive act" is an ever-changing term. Prior to Stoneridge, the prevailing definition
included only a misrepresentation or an omission by one with a duty to disclose. See infra notes 8183. In Stoneridge, however, the Court recognized that a "deceptive act" included not just misrepresentations and omissions, but other unspecified "deceptive conduct." See Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,769-70 (2008).
16. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (holding that it was erroneous for the circuit court to
conclude that only misstatements or omissions by one with a duty to disclose are deceptive under §
10(b). The Court noted that a deceptive act does not require a specific written or oral statement for
liability to attach).
17.
404 U.S. 6 (1971).
18.
Id. at 13 n.9.
19.
Id. at7.
20. Id.
21.
Id. at 8-9.
22. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 780) (West 2008) (conferring power only to the SEC to promulgate
appropriate regulation).
23.
Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12-13, 13 n.9.
24.
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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In Chiaralla, the defendant
disclose the information to investors.
worked for a financial printer that frequently handled corporate takeover
bids.26 The defendant would decipher insider information regarding
takeovers and subsequently buy stock in those companies.27 When the
information was released to the public, the defendant sold his shares and
made a significant profit.28 The crux of the case concerned whether a
defendant's silence could be considered a manipulative or deceptive device under § 10(b). 29 Using corporate insider trading and fiduciary relationships as its guide, the Court concluded that § 10(b) liability does not
attach to a defendant's silence in the absence30 of a duty to disclose the
information stemming from a position of trust.
D. The "Efficient Market" Theory
The efficient market theory is an economic hypothesis relied upon
31
as well as lower federal courts,32 and is the backbone of
by the Court, 31
the fraud-on-the-market presumption.33 In short, the theory proposes that
well-developed markets are "informationally efficient., 34 In particular,
the theory holds that within well-developed impersonal trading markets
any public information regarding a particular security is quickly seized
upon by investors and therefore reflected in the market price.35 For example, misinformation about a company's increased earnings that
reaches the efficient market will very quickly be acted upon by investors.
In light of the earnings information, some investors will buy or sell the
stock of that company. The buying and selling, based in part upon the
misinformation about earnings, will lead to an increase in trading activity
and therefore an increase or decrease in the stock's price. In sum, the
efficient market theory holds that in well-developed markets, all public
information, good or bad, is reflected in a security's market price.36

25.
Id. at 228.
26.
Id. at 224.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.at 226.
30.
Id. at 235.
31.
See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1987) (applying the efficient
market theory).
32.
See, e.g., In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig. v. PolyMedica Corp., 432 F.3d 1, 14-17 (1st
Cir. 2005) (applying the efficient market theory).
33.
See William 0. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of
Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 847-49 (2005).

34.
See In re PolyMedica, 432 F.3d at 14-17.
35. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums?Market Price, Fair Value,
and CorporateLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1240-41 (1990).
36.
See Roger J. Dennis, Materialityand the Efficient CapitalMarket Model: A Recipefor the
Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374-81 (1984); see also Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also In re LTV Sec.
Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142-47 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (providing detailed descriptions of the history of the
efficient market hypothesis and its application to the fraud-on-the-market presumption).

2008]

RETHINKING STONERIDGE

There are actually three distinct forms of the efficient market theory: the weak form, the semi-strong form, and the strong form. 3 7 The
weak form simply states that past information has no bearing on a security's future market price.38 The weak form is largely ignored by the
courts.39 In contrast, the strong form dictates that both public and private

information is already reflected in a security's market price. 40 Similar to
the weak form, the strong theory has also been uniformly rejected by the
courts. 4 However, the semi-strong form states that a security's market
price reflects all public information.42 It is the semi-strong form that has
been generally accepted by the courts and forms the basis for the fraudon-the-market presumption of reliance.43
Eventually, the efficient market theory was used to support the
"random walk" investing theory which states that markets are so efficient
it is impossible for any investor to "beat" the market using information
that is available to the rest of the investing public. 44 The basis of the
random walk theory is that any public information an investor obtained
would already be reflected in the market price thereby offsetting that
investor's ability to use the information to his tactical advantage.45
To be sure, the efficient market theory has come under fire for some
of its limitations. 46 In general, however, the concept that all public information has the ability to influence a security's market price is fairly
well accepted.47
48
E. Basic Incorporated v. Levinson

In Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, the Court established the standard that a plaintiff (or class of plaintiffs) can satisfy the reliance re37. See Nathaniel Carden, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 883-41 (explaining
three forms of the efficient market theory).
38. Id. at 883.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. See id. at 883-84. As the courts have generally adopted the semi-strong form of the efficient market theory, use of the term "the efficient market theory" within this Comment refers to the
semi-strong form.
44. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 100 (W.W. Norton &
Company Inc. 2007) (1973) (providing brief overview of the random walk theory and the efficiency
of capital markets).
45. See id.
46. See Frederick C. Dunbar and Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL J. CORP. L. 455, 531 (2006) (concluding that the efficient market is not efficient
during market bubbles); see also Note, Securities law-Fraud-on-the-Market-FirstCircuit Defines
An Efficient Marketfor Fraud-On-The-MarketPurposes.-In re Polymedica Corp. Securities Litigation, 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), 119 HARV. L. REV. 2284, 2289-90 (2006) (stating that an efficient
market may respond to all information, but it does not respond to all information with an equal effect
on market price).
47. See Carden, supra note 37, at 883-84.
48. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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49
quirement of § 10(b) by virtue of a defendant's "fraud on the market."
In that case, petitioner Basic, Inc., entertained offers to merge but concurrently issued three public announcements stating that it was not considering a merger. 50 Plaintiffs as a class alleged that they sold their stock
after Basic, Inc., made its first denial and that Basic, Inc.'s misrepresentations regarding the merger artificially depressed the value of the company's stock. 5 1 Because plaintiffs were a class, determining each individual's reliance on Basic, Inc.'s statements would overwhelm the common elements of the case. -52

To remedy this problem, the Court fashioned the fraud-on-themarket rebuttable presumption of reliance, which is based in large part
on the economic principles and scholarship surrounding the efficient
market theory.53 In creating the presumption, the Court reasoned that in
modem impersonal securities markets, the market itself performs a
valuation function by transmitting information regarding the market price
of a security. 54 The Court adopted the views of the Third Circuit's opinion in Peil v. Speiser,55 by reciting that:
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock
is determined by the available material information regarding the
company and its business .... Misleading statements will therefore
defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely
on the misstatements .... The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no
than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentaless significant
56
tions.
In Basic, the Court established that purchasers of stock rely on the
integrity of the price of a stock as a reflection of its value.5 7 In reaching
this position, the Court noted that a significant body of empirical data
suggested that market prices are affected by all available public information.58 Accordingly, public misstatements are necessarily reflected in a
security's market price. 59 Since no person would "knowingly roll the dice

49.
Id. at 247.
50. Id. at 227.
Id. at 228.
51.
52. Id. at 242.
53. Id. at 241-49.
54. Id. at 244.
55. 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986).
56. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161).
57. Id. at 242.
58. Id. at 246 (stating that empirical evidence supports that the market price of shares traded
within well-developed markets is a reflection of "all publicly available information, and, hence, any
material misrepresentations.").
59. Id.
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in a crooked crap game," the Court held that all purchasers of securities
rely on the integrity of the market.6 °
To invoke the presumption, the Court adopted the same test applied
by the circuit court in that case: (1) the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) the misrepresentations were material; (3) the securities
were traded in an efficient market; (4) the misrepresentations would lead
a reasonable investor to misinterpret the value of the securities; and (5)
the securities were traded in the time period between when the defendant
made the misrepresentations and when the truth was revealed to the public. 6 1 The Court also noted that the second and fourth elements could
collapse into a single element.62
However, the Court expressly stated that the presumption of § 10(b)
reliance under the fraud-on-the-market theory was rebuttable.63 In an
abundance of caution, the Court warned that "any showing that severs
the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a64fair market
price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance."
65
F. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver

In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the
Court overruled more than thirty years of precedent by holding that an
actor's aiding and abetting another's fraudulent conduct was not actionable under § 10(b).6 6 In 1986, a public building authority issued bonds to
fund a planned residential area.67 The bonds were secured by land owner
assessment liens, which required that the value of the land be at least 160
percent of the bonds. 68 The value of the land was to be assessed annually.69 In 1988, the developer of the land provided an assessment to the
Central Bank of Denver that remained largely unchanged from 1986 despite a significant downturn in the real estate market.70 In response, the
Central Bank of Denver demanded a reassessment of the land, but
worked with the developer to delay the reassessment until after a bond
issue.7 1 Prior to the reassessment but after the bond issue, the public
building authority defaulted on the bonds.72 Purchasers of the bonds
60.

Id. at 247 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y.

1982)).

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 248 n.27.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id.

65.

511 U.S. 164 (1994).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

191.
167.

167.
167-68.
168.
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brought an action under § 10(b) alleging that the Central Bank of Denver
aided and abetted the Authority's fraudulent conduct by tacitly agreeing
to stay the reassessment until after the bond issue.73
In eliminating aider and abettor liability, the Court once again paid
close attention to the statutory text of § 10(b).74 Importantly, the text of
the statute only prohibits the use or employment of a manipulative or
deceptive act.75 The Court focused on this language and reasoned that an
actor must actually "make" a manipulative or deceptive act in order to be
within the purview of § 10(b). 76 In sum, the Court held that an actor does
not "use or employ" a manipulative or deceptive act as proscribed by §
10(b) unless that actor "makes" a manipulative or deceptive act such as a
77
material misrepresentation or omission.
Central to its holding, the Court noted that aiders and abettors do
not make statements at all, but rather, facilitate the statements of others.7 8
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that aiding and abetting was not conduct prohibited by the text of § 10(b) since aiders and abettors do not use
or employ (make) a manipulative or deceptive act.79 The Court was concerned that, were the rule otherwise, aiding and abetting could extend to
include actors that did not engage in the conduct Congress intended to
proscribe in § 10(b). 80 Another rationale to support the Court's holding
was that allowing liability against aiders and abettors circumvented the
reliance requirement of a § 10(b) claim. 81 That is, how can82a plaintiff
rely on a misstatement that is never "made" by the defendant?
However, the Court was not without reservation and at the end of its
opinion noted that:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from
liability under the securities acts. Any person or entity, in including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under
lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under
Rule lOb-5 are met.83

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 175.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A § 78(j) (West 2008).
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 191.
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In reserving this caveat, the Court made no mention of the language
permeating its opinion beforehand, namely, that an actor must use or
employ a manipulative or deceptive act.84 Instead, the Court held that a
"deceptive act" as mentioned in § 10(b) only includes making a material
misstatement or omission.8 5 This small textual difference was later
found to be erroneous in Stoneridge,86 but nevertheless greatly reduced
the perceived scope of conduct encompassed by the term "deceptive
act.' 87 Indeed, a normal reading of the above caveat seems to suggest
that the only conduct prohibited by § 10(b) are manipulative acts or material misstatements or omissions. 88 The text of § 10(b), however,
broadly proscribes deceptive acts, which, as plainly evident, encompasses conduct more expansive than merely misstatements and omissions. 89 It was not until Stoneridge that the Court acknowledged that a
deceptive act could include deceptive conduct, not just misstatements
and omissions. 90
1. Chaos After the Storm: § 10(b) Litigation Following Central
Bank
The Court's opinion in Central Bank caused an upheaval in the securities world. 9' Shortly after the Court issued the opinion, Congress
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199592 (PSLRA).
PSLRA changed the pleading requirements of § 10(b) actions and
granted the SEC additional authority in prosecuting aiding and abetting
in the securities markets.9 3 Originally, the proponents of PSLRA sought
a Congressional declaration that aiders and abettors are liable under §

84.
Id.
85.
See id. The Court relied on Santa Fe Industriesv. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) to
conclude that the term "deceptive act" as it is used in § 10(b) only prohibits the making of a material
misstatement or an omission by one with a duty to disclose. This finding, however, was held as
erroneous in Stoneridge. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct.
761, 769 (2008).
86.
Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. at 769 (stating that it was error for the circuit court to conclude that
only misstatements, omissions by one with a duty to disclose, and manipulative trading are "deceptive acts" as proscribed in § 10(b)).
87.
Following Central Bank, many lower courts interpreted that the only deceptive acts for
which § 10(b) liability could attach were material misstatements and omissions by persons with a
duty to disclose. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482
F.3d 372, 384 (5th Cir. 2007).
88. See id.
89.
15 U.S.C.A. § 786) (West 2008); see also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 775 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
90.
See Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. at 769.
91.
See Andrew S. Gold, Reassessing the Scope of Conduct Prohibitedby Section 10(b) and
the Elements of Rule lOb-5: Reflections on Securities Fraud and Secondary Actors, 53 CATH.U. L.
REV.667, 667 (2004).
92.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
93.
Id.
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10(b). However, in a legislative compromise,94 Congress only extended
a right of action to the SEC.95
In the aftermath, lower courts struggled over the implications of
Central Bank's holding.96 Specifically, while CentralBank required that
an actor "make" a statement in order for liability to attach, it did not define what
actions would suffice for a statement to be considered
"made., 97 As a result, three standards developed in the lower courts. 98
a. The "Bright Line" Test
Jurisdictions subscribing to the bright line test recognize a primary
§ 10(b) violation only if an actor actually makes a material misstatement
attributable to the actor at the time of public dissemination.9 9 In order for
a misstatement to be attributable to an actor, it must be communicated by
that actor directly to the investing public or the actor must have known or
should have known that the misstatement would reach the public. 1' ° According to the bright line rule, an absence of attribution of the deceptive
act to the defendant at the time a plaintiffs investment decision was
made would circumvent the reliance requirements of § 10(b) and the
Court's decision in CentralBank.'0 ' In sum, the bright line test equated
"making" a misstatement with attribution of the misstatement to the
speaker. 10 2 The justification for the bright line test is aptly described in
In re MTC Electronic Technologies ShareholdersLitigation:
[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable
under Section 10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter how substantial that
aid may be, it is
03
not enough to trigger liability under Section 10(b).1
Not all courts, however, interpreted Central Bank as requiring attribution of a misstatement to a speaker in order for that speaker to have
used or employed the misstatement.

94.
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95.
Id.; see also id. at 771.
96.
See Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Expanding the Scope of Securities Fraud? The Shifting Sands of
CentralBank, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 25, 33 (2004).
97.
See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
98.
See Kuhne, supra note 96, at 33 (describing the "bright-line" test and the "participation"
test); see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 723 (S.D.
Tex. 2006) (describing the "scheme" test).
99.
See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc. (USA), 482 F.3d
372, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Gold, supra note 91, at 676-78.
100.
See Kuhne, supra note 96, at 34.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 33.
103.
In re MTC Elec. Techs. S'holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); see also
Kuhne, supra note 96, at 33.
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b. The "Participation" Test
Under the participation test it is not necessary that an actor actually
make a statement (let alone one attributable to him) to be primarily liable
under § 10(b). 1 4 Rather, an actor must only substantially participate in
the creation of fraud.105 In effect, the participation test equates creating a
misrepresentation with making a misrepresentation. 10 6 Under the participation test, conduct such as involvement in the creation of false documents, or overstating revenues without public attribution have been held
to be primary § 10(b) violations. 1° 7
c. Hybrid "Scheme" Liability
Litigation stemming from the Enron scandal created a new standard
of liability combining pertinent portions of both the bright line and participation tests.108 Under "scheme" liability, an actor can be liable for a
misrepresentation if it was created with the purpose and effect of furthering a scheme to defraud. 1° 9 In essence, misrepresentations in furtherance
of a scheme are considered deceptive acts directly prohibited by the text
of § 10(b).11 ° That is, misrepresentations in furtherance of a scheme to
11
defraud are primary violations of § 10(b), not aiding and
112 abetting. ' The
Stoneridge.
in
liability
scheme
rejected
Supreme Court
II. STONERIDGE INVESTMENT PARTNERS V. SCIENTIFIC-ATL4NTA

1 13

A. Facts
In late 2000, executives from the cable service provider Charter
Communications (Charter) realized Charter's revenue would fall short of
Wall Street's projections to the tune of fifteen to twenty million dollars. '1 4 To cover up the deficit, Charter engaged in a series of deceptive
acts with the suppliers of its cable boxes, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola
(Respondents). 15 Particularly, Charter entered into sham deals whereby
Charter would overpay a sum of twenty dollars for each cable box and in
return, the box providers would use the overpayment to purchase adver104.
See Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006).
105.
See id. at 1048-50.
106.
Id. at 1048; see also Kuhne, supra note 96, at 37-42.
107.
See Kuhne, supra note 96, at 38-39.
108.
See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 723 (S.D.
Tex. 2006).
109.
See id. at 723-24.
110.
See id.
111.
See id. at 724.
112.
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770-72
(2008) (finding that deceptive acts of Respondents engaged in with the purpose and effect of defrauding investors could not satisfy the reliance and causation elements of a § 10(b) claim absent a
public disclosure).
113.
128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
114.
Id. at 766.
115.

Id.
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tising from Charter.' 16 Charter would then record the advertising as
revenue.11 7 All parties were aware that the agreements had no economic
18
substance, yet respondents still agreed to the arrangement.'
In order to deceive Charter's auditor, respondent Scientific-Atlanta
authored and submitted a false letter to Charter stating that it had increased production costs by twenty dollars per cable box. 1 9 Similarly,
respondent Motorola entered into a contract serving no useful business
purpose whereby Charter agreed to purchase a specific number of cable
boxes and would pay liquidated damages to respondent Motorola in the
amount of twenty dollars per cable box that it did not purchase, with the
expectation that Charter would not buy all of the cable boxes and would
have to pay the damages. 12 The monies paid in liquidated damages
would then be used by respondent Motorola to purchase advertising from
Charter. 12 1 The letters and contracts were backdated to appear as separate transactions from the purchase of advertising in order to not raise
any suspicions with Charter's auditor. 22 In total, Charter overpaid Respondents seventeen million dollars that was subsequently used to purchase advertising. 23 As known to all involved, Charter reported the seventeen million as revenue on its financial statements filed with the SEC
and disseminated to the investing public. 124
B. ProceduralHistory
When the scheme was uncovered, injured investors brought a class
action lawsuit against Charter and certain of its executives, Charter's
auditor, and Respondents. The class alleged that by engaging in the
fraudulent transactions and affirmatively drafting false backdated docu125
ments, both Respondents were liable under § 10(b) as primary actors.
Petitioners Stoneridge Investment Partners, L.L.C. (Petitioners) acted as
the lead plaintiff. 126 To prove their claim, Petitioners sought to invoke
"scheme" liability, alleging that Respondents engaged in deceptive conduct with the purpose and1 effect
of furthering a scheme to make a mis27
representation to investors.
The district court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. 28 The Eighth Cir116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.

119.

Id. at 767.

120.
121.

Id.
Id.

122.

Id.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 770.

128.

Id. at 767.
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cuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, reasoning that Respondents
did not make misstatements that were relied upon by the class, and therefore, primary § 10(b) liability could not attach. 29 In short, the district
and circuit courts ruled that Respondents' conduct did not fit squarely
into the caveat reserved by the Court's holding in Central Bank; that is,
Respondents did not make a misstatement that independently satisfied all
of the elements of § 10(b). Therefore, Respondents were merely aiding
and abetting Charter's deceptive conduct30and could not be liable under
the precepts established in CentralBank.
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that
Respondents only aided and abetted Charter and therefore could not be
found liable under § 10(b).' 3 1 The Court reasoned that unless Respondents' conduct satisfied all of the elements of a § 10(b) action, Respondents could not be considered primary actors and would be excluded
from liability under the rule set forth in Central Bank.132 In determining
whether Respondents met each element, the Court acknowledged that the
conduct of Respondents would be considered a "deceptive act" as that
term is used in § 10(b). 133 In doing so, the Court resolved the ambiguity
not
permeating its earlier decisions and held that a deceptive act included
34
conduct.'
deceptive
also
but
omissions,
and
only misstatements
Nevertheless, the Court held that the class could not prove the necessary element of reliance. 135 In rejecting Petitioner's fraud-on-themarket argument, the Court reasoned that Respondents did not make a
public statement to the investing public and Charter's filing with the SEC
did not mention Respondents.' 36 In other words, Respondents' deceptive
conduct was not publicly attributable to Respondents. 137 The Court reasoned that Respondents' conduct did not make it "necessary or inevitable" that Charter file the transactions as fraudulent revenue with the
SEC. 13 Ultimately, the majority concluded that the investing public had
and therefore no way of relying on, Respondents'
no way of knowing,
139
deceptive acts.

The majority rejected Petitioners' contention that Respondents
should be liable under the hybrid "scheme" liability theory that evolved
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 768.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 769.
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during the Enron cases after Central Bank.140 Specifically, Petitioners
asserted, "in an efficient market investors rely not only upon the public
statements relating to a security but also upon the transactions those
statements reflect., 41 Therefore, Petitioners argued that since Respondents engaged in deceptive conduct with the purpose and effect of defrauding Charter's investors, Respondents were liable as primary violators of § 10(b) under the "scheme" liability framework.142 The majority,
however, noted that the elements of reliance and causation under the
"scheme" theory were too remote for liability to attach. 143 On this point,
the Court felt that it would be too tenuous to find that Petitioners relied
upon Respondents' deceptive acts when those acts were not directly
communicated to the market by Respondents and Petitioners had no way
of attributing the acts to Respondents." 4
The Court reasoned that Petitioners' theory would extend liability
beyond the realm of the securities markets (and therefore § 10(b)) and
into the realm of day-to-day business. 45 Costs associated with being a
publicly traded company would increase and foreign companies would
be deterred from entering America's securities markets. 46 Expanding
the scope of liability, according to the majority, was
not within the statu147
tory language of § 10(b) or the power of the Court.
To buttress its holding, the majority relied on Congress' enactment
of the PSLRA after Central Bank.1 48 Importantly, when enacting the
PSLRA, Congress entertained the notion of extending aiding and abetting liability to private citizens under § 10(b) but it ultimately chose not
to do So. 149 The majority stated:
And in accord with the nature of the cause of action at issue here, we
give weight to Congress' amendment to the Act restoring aiding and
abetting liability in certain cases but not others. The amendment,
in
50
our view, supports the conclusion that there is no liability.1

140.

Id. at 770.

141.

Id.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 771.
Id.
Id. In fact, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt suggested extending a private right of action in

his testimony and report to Congress. See Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the FederalSecurities Laws: Hearings on the Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in Central Bank Before the
Subcomm. on Securities Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the S., 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994), available at 1994 WL 233142; see also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768-69 (citing S.
Hearing No. 103-759, at 13-14) (1994)).
150.
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772.
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D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented
based on their view that Respondents' fraud was itself a deceptive act
satisfying all of the elements for § 10(b) liability. 5 That is, Respondents conduct was a primary violation of the statute and therefore
amounted to more than aiding and abetting. 52 The dissent argued that
Stoneridge was distinguishable from Central Bank because the Respondents in that case did not actually commit a deceptive act.1 53 The dissent
believed the majority's view encompassed an overly broad interpretation
of CentralBank and imposed an inappropriate "super causation" view of
reliance unsupported by authority. 54 Specifically, the dissent stated that
reliance is not meant to be a difficult hurdle to cross, but traditionally has
only required transaction causation. 55 To prove transaction causation, a
plaintiff need only show that "but for" the deceptive act, he or she would
not have purchased or sold securities. 156 Further, the dissent asserted that
the rebuttable presumption of reliance under the fraud-on-the-market
theory was created precisely for this type of situation, where investors
but
cannot prove that they relied on the defendant's misrepresentations,
57
instead relied on the market and were thereafter defrauded.1
The dissent noted that Petitioners' theory of liability would not extend to the entire market but only to those persons and entities engaging
in fraudulent conduct. 58 In closing, the dissent commented that the 1934
created to prevent fraud and that every wrong deserves a remAct was
59
edy.
1I. ANALYSIS
A. Rethinking the Scope of the Fraud-on-the-MarketPresumption of
Reliance: The Court Should have Expanded the Applicability of the
Presumptionwhen it Held that a "Deceptive Act" Included More than
Just Statements and Omissions
In Stoneridge, the Court held that Petitioners could not use the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance because Respondents did
not make a public misrepresentation as required by Basic.t 6° Unable to
prove reliance, Petitioners could not satisfy all of the elements of a §
151.
152.

Id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.

153.

Id.

154.

Id. at 774-75.

155.

Id. at 775.

156.

Id. at 776 (citing Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005);

Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065-66, (9th Cir. 1999)).
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 779.
Id. at 779-82.

160.
Id. at 769-70 (finding that Respondents' deceptive acts were not communicated to the
public and therefore the public did not have any knowledge of those acts).
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10(b) claim and could therefore only be considered aiders and abettors
based on the rule set forth in Central Bank. 16 1 The Court, however, applied the elements of the fraud-on-the-market presumption without considering that, at the time Basic was decided, and indeed, from the Santa
Fe decision in 1977 until Stoneridge in 2008, the prevailing rule of law
was that a deceptive act only included misrepresentations or omissions
by one with a duty to disclose. 62 When the Stoneridge Court overturned
this precedent by acknowledging that a deceptive act could include conduct other than a misrepresentation or omission, 16 3 it should have also
considered how this expansion would affect the fraud-on-the-market
presumption.
1. Reliance Under the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Should Not be
Limited Solely to a Defendant that Makes a "Public Misrepresentation," but Should Apply to Any Defendant Engaging in a
Deceptive Act the Substance of which Becomes Public
The economic principles permeating the fraud-on-the-market theory
are equally applicable to information contained in a public misrepresentation as to information contained in a nonpublic deceptive act that is
later disseminated to the public. 164 Accordingly, although Basic requires
that the defendant make a public misrepresentation,1 65 the precepts of the
efficient market theory underlying Basic's holding dictate that any material information that becomes public will influence a security's market
price in the same manner as a direct public misrepresentation. 166 In the
wake of Stoneridge, it has become clear that the Court needs to reconsider whether the fraud-on-the-market presumption applies to deceptive
acts other than misstatements. This Comment proposes that, even though
Basic requires that a defendant speak a misrepresentation to the market,
that rule was created when a deceptive act only included misstatements

161.
See id.
162.
See id. In Santa Fe, the Court inferred that an act is not "deceptive," as that term is used
in § 10(b), absent a misstatement or an omission by one with a duty to disclose. See Santa Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977). The Court affirmed this rule in Central Bank. See Cent.
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). Generally, in the
thirty-one years between Santa Fe and Stoneridge, the prevailing rule among lower courts reflected
that a deceptive act only included misstatements and omissions. See Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220,
235 (6th Cir. 2004); accordZiemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1204-06 (11 th Cir. 2001);
Wright v. Ernst & Young L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod.
Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225-27 (10th Cir. 1996); In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d
615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Dynegy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 339 F. Supp. 2d 804, 914-16 (S.D. Tex.
2004); In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1040-41 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
Indeed, even the Eighth Circuit applied that test in the lower proceedings of Stoneridge. In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006).
163.
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
164.
See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244-48 (1987) (stating that empirical studies
have shown that a security's market price is a composite of all available public information, and
therefore, all public misrepresentations); see also supra Part I.D.
165.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
166.
See supra Part I.D.
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or omissions by persons with a duty to disclose. 167 As an omission inherently cannot be spoken, the Basic rule was designed to apply solely to
misrepresentations. 168
In Stoneridge, when the Court expanded the scope of conduct
amounting to a deceptive act proscribed by § 10(b) it should have reconsidered the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to deceptive acts other than just misrepresentations instead of determining that the presumption was inapplicable. Notably, the same result is achieved upon a security's market price whether a defendant
makes a public misrepresentation or whether that defendant, like in Stoneridge, commits a deceptive act in secrecy and the substance of that act
later reaches the public through other means. 169 Misinformation that
becomes public is not less fraudulent, and does not abstain from influencing a security's market price, simply
70 because the defendant does not
communicate it directly to the market. 1
As the Court noted in Basic, the fraud-on-the-market theory is
premised on the notion that investors rely on the market price when purchasing or selling a security and that price is affected by all available
public information.' 7' Importantly, the efficient market theory notes that
172
after information becomes public, it is reflected in the market price.
At that point, if the information is false, investors have been defrauded
because the market price they are relying upon is not genuine. 73 Surely,
if fraudulent information becomes public and is reflected in the market
price, then under the efficient market theory it is of little consequence
how that information came to the public eye.
Thus, on one hand, the Court in Basic noted that all public information is reflected in a security's price, 174 but on the other hand, the Court
only allowed the presumption to apply if the defendant made a public
misrepresentation. 75 One possible explanation for this inconsistency is
that when Basic was decided a misrepresentation was the only type of
"deceptive act" proscribed by § 10(b) that could be communicated to the

167.
See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168.
See supra Part I.E.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243-47; see also supra Part I.D. If the efficient market theory and
169.
the Court's reasoning in Basic hold that a security's market price is affected by all public information, then that market price has the potential to be affected by any form of information that reaches
the public. In this sense, the market price does not distinguish between a public misrepresentation,
or a misrepresentation or other deceptive act that is not directly communicated to the public but
becomes public at a later date through any means.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47; see also supra Part I.D.
170.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47.
171.
Id.; supra Part I.D.
172.
173.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47; see also supra Part I.D.
174.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 244-48.
175.
Id. at 248.
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public.1 76 Thus, the Basic court had no occasion to consider whether the
fraud-on-the-market presumption could apply to other forms of conduct
or communication. 77 As a result, when the Stoneridge court acknowledged at the outset of its decision that a "deceptive act" encompassed
more than just misrepresentations and omissions, it should not have
summarily dismissed the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance because Respondents had not made a "public misrepresentation. ' 78 Had the Court considered how expanding the scope
of prohibited deceptive acts would affect the fraud-on-the-market presumption, it would have also had to address that the rationale supporting
the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not distinguish between information that is directly communicated to the public or arrives there via
some other means. 179 To an efficient
market, information is informa0
tion-regardless of its source.18
In determining that the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not
apply, the Court found it fatal that "no member of the investing public
had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of Respondents' deceptive
acts."' 18 1 The Court relied on Basic for this assertion. 182 However, affirmative knowledge of the defendant's acts appears nowhere in Basic
and runs contrary to the rationale permeating that decision.' 83 Rather, the
efficient market theory and the Court's rationale for the fraud-on-themarket presumption in Basic speak about how information influences the
price of a security when it infiltrates the market. 184 It is the mere presence of that information, not the identity of the person supplying that
information, that affects a security's market price. 85 Moreover, it is the
plaintiffs reliance on the integrity of that price, as opposed to the identity and nature of defendant's actions, that forms the basis for the fraudon-the-market presumption.1 86 If anything, Basic holds that a plaintiff
using the fraud-on-the-market presumption does not need to have knowledge of the defendant's deceptive acts so long as those acts
somehow
87
become public and influence the market price of a security.

176.
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 776 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
177.
Compare Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-77 (1977) (establishing that the
term "deceptive conduct" only includes misstatements and omissions by one with a duty to disclose),
with Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 (holding that the fraud-on-the-market theory only applies to public
misrepresentations). See also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178.
See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
179.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47; see also supraPart I.D.
180.
See supra Part I.D.
181.
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
182.

See id.

183.
See Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
184.
See id. at 241-47; see also supraPart I.D.
185.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47; see also supra Part I.D.
186.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 (holding that traders of securities in well-developed markets
rely on the integrity a security's market price).
187.
See id. at 244-49; see also Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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However, the Court reasoned in Stoneridge that knowledge of the
Respondents' deceptive acts, by means of attribution of the acts to the
88
Respondents in a public statement, served a vital causation function.1
Without a clear public statement, the Court felt that it was impossible for
the Petitioners to rely on the "Respondents' own deceptive conduct. ' 89
This reasoning, however, eschews the principles underlying the fraud-onthe-market presumption, which dictate that the fraud-on-the-market
plaintiff relies on the integrity of the market's price instead of having to
rely on the defendant's own deceptive conduct. 190 The Court circumvented this reasoning by preemptively stating that the fraud-on-themarket presumption was inapplicable.1 91 However, as mentioned, this
should not have been the case. The dissent stated that the majority applied the wrong standard for causation and used that standard to assert
that the fraud-on-the-market presumption did not apply. 92 Instead, the
dissent argued that the majority should have looked at causation first,
using the correct standard, and it would have found that the fraud-on-themarket presumption sufficed for the Petitioners to at least plead reliance. 193
This Comment agrees with the dissent's causation and reliance
views but also asserts that a causation analysis for a plaintiff using the
fraud-on-the-market theory should reflect the market's role, and the
Court should have considered this. Notably, the theory of causation applicable to a plaintiff who must prove actual reliance is not perfectly interchangeable with a plaintiff using the fraud-on-the-market theory to
establish reliance.1 94 The difference lies in the nature of each plaintiffs
injury and how each defendant's deceptive acts influenced those injunes. 95

Take, for example, a plaintiff bringing a traditional § 10(b) claim
against a defendant who made a misrepresentation during face-to-face
See Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. at 769 (stating that a plaintiff's reliance upon a defendant's
188.
deceptive act is essential because it ensures a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
the plaintiffs injury).
189.
Id. at 770.
190.
See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.
See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
191.
192.
See id. at 776-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193.
See id. (noting that traditionally, reliance only requires transactional causation, meaning
that but for the deceptive act, the plaintiff would not have entered into the securities transaction). In
the alternative, the dissent argued that Petitioner had successfully alleged that Respondents' acts
proximately caused Charter's misstatement of income and knew that their acts would enter those
statements and thereafter the market. Id.
194.
Compare Basic, 485 U.S. at 244-47 (holding that a plaintiff using the fraud-on-the-market
presumption relies on the market's integrity and is injured when the defendant's public misrepresentation affects that integrity), with Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. at 769 (holding that a plaintiff not pleading a
presumption must prove that he or she directly relied on the defendant's deceptive act). Essentially,
a central theme of this Comment is that the Court required Petitioner to show direct reliance on
Respondents' deceptive acts and that those acts directly caused Petitioner's injury, when itshould
have adopted the fraud-on-the-market presumption and allowed Petitioner to rely upon the market.
195. See Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. at 769.
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negotiations. In this example, the plaintiff must prove actual reliance on
the defendant's misrepresentation and that his or her reliance on that
misrepresentation caused economic loSS. 196 Here, the plaintiff's injury
shares a direct link with the defendant's conduct. There is no middleman. In this hypothetical, if the plaintiff relied on the defendant's misrepresentations and that reliance caused the plaintiff's injury, then the
plaintiff has successfully pleaded the reliance and causation elements of
his § 10(b) claim. Because of the direct link between the injury and the
defendant's conduct, attribution of the deceptive conduct to the defendant is necessary to prevent circumventing the reliance and causation
elements. In sum, a plaintiff who must prove actual reliance is unable to
do so absent knowledge of the defendant's identity and deceptive act.
Actual reliance is a test with two parties where one person made a statement and the other directly relied on it.
On the other hand, a plaintiff using the fraud-on-the-market presumption is pleading an injury that came to fruition by a different
means. 197 Particularly, such a plaintiff is alleging that he or she specifically did not rely directly on the defendant's misrepresentation.' 9 8 Instead, he or she relied on the integrity of the market and its reflection of
the value of a security as represented by that security's price.' 99 The
market, in this case, performs a valuation function that is not present in a
face-to-face negotiation. 200 Here it is possible for the plaintiff to rely on
the price of a security and suffer an injury when that price is affected by
misinformation as a result of the defendant's deceptive acts without actually discovering the identity of that defendant or his or her deceptive
acts. 20 1 Accordingly, the plaintiff can suffer an economic loss that is
caused by the defendant's deceptive act by virtue of that act infiltrating
the market and affecting the market price and, in turn, the plaintiff s reliance upon that price. 2 Causation, in this instance, should reflect that
the plaintiff relies on the market instead of the deceptive actor. The introduction of the market changes the nature of plaintiff's reliance as well
as how the defendant's conduct causes the plaintiff's injury.20 3 Specifically, if reliance is designed to ensure a sufficient causal connection between the plaintiffs injury and the defendant's deceptive act, changing
the nature of that plaintiff s reliance should necessarily change the nature
196.
See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 (inferring that if a presumption of reliance is inapplicable, a plaintiff must prove actual reliance upon the defendant's deceptive act and that the defendant's
deceptive act caused plaintiff's injury).
197.
Basic, 485 U.S. at 242-49 (noting that a plaintiff proving reliance under the fraud-on-themarket presumption is injured by virtue of the defendant's deceptive act infiltrating the market with
misinformation that degrades the integrity of the market price upon which the plaintiff is relying).
198.
Id. at 241-42.
199.
Id. at 245-46.
200.
Id. at 244-45.
201.

See supra Part I.D.

202.
203.

See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.
Id. at 243-45.
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of causation. 204 Therefore, in Stoneridge, the Court should have found
that Petitioners relied on the market's integrity, and that Respondents
influenced that market.
The Court declined to follow this reasoning by applying, as aptly
put in the dissent, a "super-causation ,'' 2 5 theory that requires attribution
of the deceptive act to the defendant within a public communication.2 6
The Court noted that, allowing anything less than public attribution
would result in causation that is too remote. 207 However, this really is
not the case. Rather, the causation element has one extra proxy because
of the market's role.208 A causation analysis under the fraud-on-themarket presumption should reflect that it has an additional actor, the
market, and that the plaintiff relies on the market. 20 9 Thus, causation
under the fraud-on-the-market presumption should be a test involving
three parties: the defendant, the market, and the plaintiff. Specifically, if
a defendant's deceptive acts influenced the market, and the plaintiff relied on the integrity of that market, a sufficient causal connection should
exist.210
There is no question that Respondents used or employed (made) a
deceptive act as defined in Central Bank.2 t1 In fact, the Court concedes
that Respondents' conduct would be considered a deceptive act under the
language of § 10(b).212 Yet, the Court rests its opinion on the fact that it
was Charter, not Respondents, who reported the false revenue to investors.21 3 It is inherently contradictory for the Court to state that on the one
hand, Respondents committed a deceptive act; while on the other hand,
investors could not have relied on that act under the fraud-on-the-market
presumption when the substance of it became public and affected the
market price. The Court failed to see that Respondents' deceptive act
was not just the making of sham contracts; rather, the Respondents were
making sham contracts for the sole purpose of inflating Charter's revenue in a statement they knew would be distributed to the public. When
that revenue was disseminated to the market 21 4 and when its falsities surfaced and affected the price of Charter's stock, it is difficult to see how
204.
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
205.
Id. at 774.
206.
Id. at 769-70; see also id. at 774-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207.
Id. at 769.
208.
Basic,485 U.S. at 243-47.
209.
Id.
210.
See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a correct view of
causation coupled with the fraud-on-the-market theory should have allowed Petitioners to plead
reliance).
211.
See id. at 769.
212.
Id.
213.
Id. at 770.
214.
Charter, as a publicly-traded company, was required to disclose its revenue to the SEC for
publication. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.301(c)2 (2008). Presumably, Respondents were not ignorant
of this fact.
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the requisite causal connection was not met under the rationale supporting the fraud-on-the-market theory.
The Court rested its holding on the notion that the securities industry needs a clear and predictable standard with which to conform. 21 5
Stoneridge provides that standard, but for the wrong reasons.
B. Policy ConsiderationsUnderlying Stoneridge
The explanation for the Court's holding in Stoneridge likely comes
from policy considerations. Interested parties filed nearly thirty Amicus
briefs in the case.21 6 Many of those briefs urged the Court to take the
215.
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770-72.
216.
Amici Curiae Brief of Charles W. Adams and William Von Glahn in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43),
2007 WL 1701932; Brief for Amici Curiae States of Arkansas et al. in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL
1701934; Brief for Attorneys' Liab. Assurance Soc'y, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43),
2007 WL 2363261; Brief for Bus. Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL
2363259; Brief for Change to Win and the CtW Inv. Group as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007
WL 1701933; Brief for Former SEC Comm'rs and Officials and Law and Fin. Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329638; Brief for Professors James D. Cox et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701606; Brief for Richard . Beattie et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363253; Brief for the Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363263; Brief for the Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc.
and NYSE Euronext as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2958946; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329639; Brief of AARP et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701939; Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Ins. Ass'n and Prop.
Cas. Insurers Ass'n of Am. in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 3068882; Brief of Cal. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701937; Brief of Council of Institutional Investors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701610; Brief of Merrill Lynch &
Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. ScientificAtlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363254; Brief of Ohio et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1957413; Brief of Org.
for Int'l Inv. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363262; Brief of the Am.
Ass'n for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701936; Brief of the Am.
Bankers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329637; Brief of the Chamber
of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners,
L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363260; Brief of the
Def. Research Inst. in Support of Respondents Amicus Curiae for Respondents, Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2329636;
Brief of the Los Angeles County Employees Ret. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-

2008]

RETHINKING STONERIDGE

Respondents' position and affirm the circuit court's decision. The Court
picked up on several general concerns permeating the arguments of Respondents' Amici and those arguments are reflected in the Court's holding.
1. Snowballing Litigation and Keeping Up with the Joneses:
Policy Considerations Important to the Court
Sixteen Amici filed briefs in support of Respondents' position, and,
while each had its own advice for the Court, several themes emerged.
First, Respondents' Amici argued that Petitioners' theory would lead to
an explosion of expensive class-action litigation that would in turn make
U.S. financial markets less competitive with foreign markets that either
do not allow, or significantly limit, class action lawsuits. 2 7 A second
theme alleged that adopting Petitioners' theory would not provide a rule
that was "clear and predictable" enough to be administered in the economy at large.21 8 Third, Respondents' Amici contended that there are
adequate safeguards and deterrents in place to protect against fraud and
compensate its victims without the need of a private right of action
against aiders and abettors. 219
a. Class-Action Lawsuits Make U.S. Markets Uncompetitive
As succinctly put by one of Respondents' Amici:
There is a widely acknowledged perception, backed by empirical
evidence, that a hostile U.S. litigation environment materially in43), 2007 WL 1701940; Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43),
2007 WL 2363258; Brief of the N.Y. State Teachers' Ret. Sys. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 0643), 2007 WL 1701935; Brief of the N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No.
06-43), 2007 WL 1701938; Brief of the Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Court-Appointed Lead Plaintiff
in the Enron Sec. Litig., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C.
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 1701942; Brief of the Sec.
Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass'n and Futures Indus. Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007
WL 2363256; Brief of the Wash. Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL
2363255.
217.
See, e.g., Brief for Attorneys' Liab. Assurance Soc'y, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 216, at *9; Brief for Former SEC Comm'rs and Officials and Law and Fin.
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 216, at *14-15; Brief for the Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at
*21-22; Brief of Org. for Int'l Inv. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 216,
at *11.

218.
See, e.g., Brief for Bus. Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 216, at *17-18; Brief for Richard I. Beattie et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 216, at *28; Brief of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at 16-19.
219.
Brief of the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass'n and Futures Indus. Ass'n as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at *21-23; Brief of the Wash. Legal Found. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at *12-16.
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creased the costs and risks associated with raising capital in the U.S.
markets. Several recent studies demonstrated that this environment is
behind the precipitous decline in the U.S. capital mara driving force
2°
activity.
ket
This argument asserted that class-action lawsuits greatly increase
the cost of doing business in U.S. markets and this cost is not present in
foreign markets.22 ' The main fuel for this argument came from three
reports concluding that foreign companies feared entering U.S. markets
because of the possibility of class-action lawsuits against them, and that
such fears played an important role in the recent decline in U.S. market
share.222 Therefore, allowing § 10(b) liability without public attribution
of a misrepresentation to a defendant would lead to a huge increase in the
amount of class-action lawsuits resulting in further erosion of U.S. market share.223 In short, the chilling effect would get colder, encouraging
"[f]light to [f]oreign [e]quity [m]arkets, [w]hich [o]ffer [i]ncreasingly
,,224
[c]ompetitive [a]ltematives.
b. Petitioner's Theory is Not "Clear and Predictable"
Another theme surfaced among Respondents' Amici alleging that if
§ 10(b) liability was extended to persons who engaged in conduct with
the purpose and effect of creating fraud, business transactions would
effectively be created on an "ad hoc" basis without the guidance of a
clear and predictable rule. 225 This would come as a disadvantage to an
area that demands predictability.226 Importantly, Amici argued that the
purpose and effect (the liability theory advanced by Petitioner) of a business transaction is completely subjective, so that persons engaged in le227
gitimate transactions have no clear way of guarding against liability.
That is, discerning the purpose and effect of a particular transaction involves a subjective analysis that is of little predictive value. Indeed,
Amici feared that conduct that was legitimate during the transaction
220.
Brief of Org. for Int'l Inv. etal. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note
216, at *11.
221.
See, e.g., id.
222.
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL
MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30 (2007), available at

http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/O703capmarketscomm.htm;

MICHAEL

R.

BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 78 (2007), available at http://www.schumer.senate.gov

/SchumerWebsite/pressroonmspecial..reports/2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf;

COMM.

ON

CAPITAL MKTS., INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 34

(2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30 CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf.
223.
See Brief of Org. for Int'l Inv. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 216, at *14-15.
224.
Brief for the Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc. & NYSE Euronext as Arnici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 216, at * 12-15.
225.
See, e.g., Brief of the Am. Bankers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at *15.
226.
See id.
See id.
227.
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could later be artfully pleaded to appear as being entered into with the
purpose and effect of creating fraud. As stated: "[T]his Court should not
create an amorphous and subjective theory of potentially catastrophic
liability that would impede the important functions of banks and other
financial institutions in providing the financial fuel that drives our Nation's economy. 228 In sum, the parties to business transactions need to
know what they can and cannot do in order to avoid § 10(b) liability.
c. Adequate Remedies Already Exist, and Those Remedies
Deter Fraud
A third theme advanced by Respondents' Amici argued that adequate remedies are already in place to guard against aiding and abetting
without the need for creating a private right of action.229 Indeed, Amici
asserted that aiders and abettors already face significant deterrents under
the current rule of law. 230 For example, the SEC can bring actions
against aiders and abettors and return ill-gotten profits to injured investors.23' In fact, Amici reminded the Court that the SEC returned many
billions of dollars to investors between 2002 and 2006.232 Moreover, the
Department of Justice is able to bring criminal charges against aiders and
23 One Amici alleged that criminal prosecution for aiding and
abettors. 23
abetting had the possibility to not only stigmatize a violator's business
prospects, but effectively bankrupt the company.234 The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association argued that criminal penalties
have the potential to end a career or shut down a company. 235 Lastly,
Amici alleged that state law remedies are also in place to guard against
fraud.236
2. The Court Adopts the Views of Respondents' Amici
Even a cursory review of Stoneridge reveals that the views of Respondents' Amici struck a note with the Court. Indeed, the concerns of
Respondents' Amici are peppered throughout the Court's opinion, with
an entire section devoted to those concerns.237 The Court touched upon
how, if the Petitioner's theory was accepted, "the implied cause of action
would reach the whole marketplace in which the issuing company does
business. 23 8 Moreover, the Court noted that Petitioners sought to apply
228. Id. at *14.
229. See, e.g., Brief of Former SEC Comm'rs & Officials & Law & Fin. Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 216, at * 18-19.
230. Id. at *18.
231.
Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Brief of the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n & Futures Ind. Ass'n as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents, supra note 216, at *22-24.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *28.
237. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,772-74 (2008).
238. Id. at 764.
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§ 10(b) "beyond the securities markets into [the realm of financing business-to-purchase and supply contracts] the realm of ordinary business
operations ... [The latter realm is governed], for the most part, by state
'
law."239
Additionally, the Court noted that "[s]econdary actors are subject to criminal penalties and civil enforcement by the SEC," and that
"both parties agree that criminal penalties are a strong deterrent. 2 40 Petitioners' Amici refuted some of Respondents' Amici's arguments; however, none of those arguments appear in the Court's opinion.
3. A Response: Policy Considerations the Court Should Have
Noticed
The Court's Stoneridge opinion makes it clear that only deceptive
acts either (1) communicated to the public by the actor, or (2) identified
to the public at the time a security is bought or sold will face liability
under § 10(b).24 1 Unfortunately, the rule is equally clear to persons seeking to defraud the market: make sure your name stays out of public releases and let someone else do the talking. Fraud in the market is not
likely to stop and defrauders are consistently coming up with new ways
to cheat investors. 242 To such persons, Stoneridge poses no obstacle.
In support for its "clear and predicable" rule, the Court reasons that
uncertainty and the increased cost of business under any other rule would
not only hinder existing businesses, but deter foreign corporations from
entering the American market. 243 Yet, the sanctity of our securities markets does not balance upon either premise. Instead, a single factor binds
the market: investor confidence. 244 Simply put, if investors do not believe that the markets are secure, they will invest their money elsewhere.
This confidence is derived from investor perception of market integrity.24 5 Surely, investors both local and foreign are attracted to the U.S.
securities markets because they are the largest and safest in the world. 246
These accolades are not mutually exclusive. 247
To be sure, the U.S. markets are the largest because they are the safest.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
388.
245.
246.

Id.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 769.
See Taylor, supra note 1, at 389.
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772.
See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244-47 (1988); see also Taylor, supra note 1, at
See Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 24447 (1988); see also Taylor, supra note 1, at 388.
See Cheryl Nichols, H.R. 2179, The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution

Act of 2004: A Testament to Selective Federal Preemption, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 533,

537-38 (2008) (explaining that U.S. securities markets are the largest in the world due in part to
investor confidence secondary to regulatory framework); see also W. Carson McLean, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Detriment to Market Globalization & International Securities Regulation, 33

SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 319, 324-25 (2005) (noting that U.S. securities markets are the largest in the world).
247.
See Nichols, supra note 246, at 53940.
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Concededly, foreign investors and institutions may be somewhat deterred by an increase in the cost of business or capital. However, the
financial uncompetitiveness of U.S. markets as envisioned by Respondents' Amici is not solely a result of an increased cost of business secondary to an increase in the amount of class-action litigation.248 In fact, at
least one commentator has opined that fear of class actions is but a small
facet in the decline of U.S. competiveness in the financial services industry.249 For example, the initial fee for being listed on the NASDAQ
(which, ironically, filed an Amicus brief arguing that class-action litigation is to blame for the decrease in U.S. competitiveness) is approximately $100,000 with a subsequent yearly fee of between $25,000 and
$75,000 to maintain the listing. 5 0 Comparatively, the cost for listing on
competitor foreign markets was approximately $7,500 for an initial fee
and the same amount yearly to maintain the listing.25 The fact that listing fees on the NASDAQ are approximately ten times as dear surely
undermines the competitiveness of U.S. financial services, along with a
myriad of other social and economic factors.252
Instead, entering a market is likely a balancing of several pros and
cons for any foreign entity. This Comment proposes that such entities do
not enter a market solely because it is has the lowest cost of business. If
this were true, the U.S. markets would likely be a lot less populated.
Rather, entities both local and foreign enter the U.S. markets because of
the enormous amount of investors trading and the amount of capital such
investors make available for funding new opportunities. 53 However, this
market rests on a foundation based upon its integrity, and each chip the
Court takes out of that foundation brings the house closer to tumbling
down. Congress recognized this when it enacted the 1934 Act. The
Court recognized this when it created the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Unfortunately, Stoneridge marches to the beat of a different drummer.
Primarily, the Court's unwavering reliance on Central Bank was
misplaced. The conduct of the defendants in Central Bank was considerably more benign than that of Respondents in Stoneridge 4 In Central
See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Tyranny of the Multitude is a Multiplied Tyranny: Is the
248.
United States FinancialRegulatory Structure Undermining U.S. Competitiveness?, 2 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 369, 376 (2008) (suggesting that, in addition to an increase in class action
litigation, expanding the number of regulatory agencies decreases competiveness).
See id. at 390.
249.
250.
Id. at 400.
251.
Id.
252.
See id. at 376.
See McLean, supra note 246, at 324-25 (suggesting that U.S. securities markets have the
253.
largest amounts of investors and capital available for investment and these attributes make it attractive to foreign companies).
Compare Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 167-68
254.
(1994) (noting that respondent's conduct was delaying a land reassessment until after a bond issue),
with Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 761, 766-67 (2008) (ex-
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Bank, the defendants merely postponed a land reassessment until a bond
issue was complete. 5 In fact, the Central Bank Court concluded that
such actions did not amount to a deceptive act within the meaning of §
10(b).256 However, in Stoneridge, Respondents not only agreed to engage in a fraudulent scheme, they actively participated by drafting, backdating, and then signing contracts with the sole purpose of defrauding the
market.257 The Court concluded that such actions amounted to "making"
a deceptive act as defined in CentralBank.258 In light of this significant
factual difference, the Court should have used caution in relying so heavily on Central Bank's precepts.
The dissent implied that since Respondents "made" a deceptive act
they should have been considered primary actors under the strictures of
Central Bank.25 9 Applying this reasoning, the Court was not even presented with the issue of aiding and abetting, and, accordingly, its reliance
upon the precedent and policy considerations applicable to aiding and
abetting are inapposite to the factual scenario presented by the Stoneridge Respondents' conduct. As a result of this interpretation, plaintiffs
will seize upon the dissent's reasoning and lower courts will likely continue to develop confusing law as to what conduct amounts to primary
liability and what is merely aiding and abetting.
Likewise, the Court's rationale that adequate remedies and deterrents are in place falls short of the mark. Specifically, the Court states
that the SEC's enforcement is not "toothless," having collected more
than $10 billion in disgorgement since 2002.260 Recently, however, the
SEC has pleaded for additional help in the form of a private right of action.26' While the SEC's efforts may not be entirely toothless, the SEC is
an agency of limited resources. 262 In the words of several former SEC
commissioners who submitted an Amicus brief in support of Petitioners:
The SEC's disgorgement and civil money penalty powers, although
enhanced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are limited, and will generally
cover only a fraction of the damage done to investors by serious securities fraud. "Moreover, the SEC with limited resources cannot

plaining that Respondents drafted false contracts and correspondence and backdated those documents to engage in a circular transaction to artificially boost Charter's revenue).
255.
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 167-68.
256.
See id. at 177-78.
257.
Stoneridge, 128 S.Ct. at 767.
258.
Id. at 769.
259.
Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260.
Id. at 773.
261.
See, e.g., Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006).
262.
See Taylor, supranote 1, at 385.
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possibly undertake to bring actions in every one or even most of the
263
financial fraud cases that have proliferated of the past few years."
The same Amicus proffered that, while the SEC has disgorgement
authority, its efforts are not as effective as a private right of action in
compensating the victims of fraud.264 For example, the SEC was only
able to disgorge and return approximately $440 million of the nearly $40
billion of claimed losses as a result of Enron.265 So, while the SEC's
authority may not be "toothless," it certainly does not have the bite the
Court suggested. At the end of the day, the Court may not be required to
defer to the SEC's judgment, however, that does not mean it should ignore it completely.
Perhaps most misguided of all are the Court's continuing efforts to
guarantee a "clear and predictable" rule for the business world. In creating such a rule, the Court in Stoneridge gives businesses engaging in
shady transactions a shield, when the legislative intent behind § 10(b)
mandates that it should be giving plaintiffs injured by those transactions
a sword.
Respondents (and their Amici) asserted that they did not break any
laws and that the contracts they entered into with Charter were completely legitimate. 266 However, when Charter approached Respondents
with the revenue-inflating deal, Respondents had to make a decision of
whether to participate. On the one hand, Respondents and their numerous counsel presumably knew the current state of the law regarding §
10(b) liability. Indeed, the law was clear and predictable. As the law
then existed, Respondents knew that if they did not speak to the public or
have a duty to speak they could not be found liable in a private suit for
engaging in the sham transactions.267
On the other hand, however, Respondents also certainly knew that
their dealings with Charter had no economic value and did not serve any
decent economic purpose. While those transactions may have been "legitimate" according to the law as it then existed, they definitely did not
serve a legitimate purpose.

263.

Motion for Leave to File Brief Out of Time & Brief Amici Curiae of Former SEC

Comm'rs in Support of Petitioner, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2065260, at *8.

264.
265.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.

266.
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 767 (2008)
(stating that Respondents booked the sham "transactions as a wash, under generally accepted ac-

counting principles"); see, e.g., Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 216, at *15 (noting that under the rule applied by the Eighth Circuit an

entity can only be held liable for violating § 10(b) it makes an affirmative misrepresentation or omits
facts it had a duty to disclose).
267.
See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 180 (refusing to consider reliance to be met when

one does not make a misstatement or omission when there is a duty to disclose).
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The question then becomes, what sort of predictable rule most accurately reflects Congress's intent as reflected in §10(b)? As one Senate
report noted, § 10(b) is designed to prohibit "those manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful funcCourt has departed from the legislative intent it purports to
tion. ,,268 The Cuthst
follow by creating a clear and predictable rule that fosters and protects
shady business transactions negatively affecting the securities markets.
Instead, the Court should seek to create a rule of law that attempts to
mend the gap between what is ethical and what is "legitimate."
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Stoneridge is a win for persons engaging in fraud in the securities markets. The Court incorrectly
determined that fraud-on-the-market theory did not apply and foreclosed
Petitioners from asserting that they relied on the integrity of the market
instead of on Respondents ' deceptive acts. The Court should have considered how expanding the scope of conduct encompassed by the term
"deceptive act" would affect the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance. This, along with a correct view of causation,
would have allowed Petitioners to at least plead that Respondents' deceptive acts caused their injuries.
The Court should have noticed that, as in this case, a misrepresentation communicated directly to the public by the defendant has the same
result in the market as a deceptive act committed in secrecy and later
disseminated to the public. In both instances the market price is affected.
Since all investors are presumed to rely on the price of a security269 when
making a trading decision, it should not matter whether that price was
influenced by a direct public misrepresentation or a deception that became public at a later date. As the results are the same, the fraud-on-themarket presumption of reliance should be available under either scenario,
not just for direct public misrepresentations.
Further, the chain of causation for a plaintiff applying the fraud-onthe-market presumption should no longer be compared to a standard of
actual reliance. The Court should recognize that the market is an additional actor in the chain of causation for plaintiffs using the fraud-on-themarket presumption. As in this case, if the defendant committed a deceptive act, and the substance of that act reached the market, and the
plaintiff was relying on the integrity of that market, a sufficient causal
nexus should exist.
Instead, it appears that the Court's decision was based largely upon
pro-business policy considerations proffered by Respondents and their
268.

(1934).
269.

FLETCHER, FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 6

See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
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Amici. These considerations, however, are lack-luster. The competitive
edge of U.S. securities markets is influenced by a myriad of social and
economic factors other than just its cost of doing business. In fact, the
most significant competitive advantage of our securities markets is that
their size enables an enormous amount of capital to fund the businesses
that need it. However, the size of our markets is secondary to their
safety. Simply put, more money is available in U.S. securities markets
because investors feel comfortable leaving it there. The Court's decision
in Stoneridge should cause those investors to question the depth of that
safety.
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